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Introduction 
The district court erred when it declared that the State owned title to the 
bed of the Weber River through the section of river at issue here. The Utah 
Stream Access Coalition (USAC) lacked standing to bring a title claim on behalf 
of the State, and the district court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to declare title in 
the State. The district court also plainly erred in failing to apply the statutory test 
for navigability set out in HB 141. The state navigability test for recreational access 
is based on present-day commercial use, whereas the federal navigability test for 
title looks to the date of statehood. Finally, even if the statute had adopted the 
federal test for navigability, the court erred when it ruled that the floating of logs 
during temporary times of high water is enough to satisfy the federal test. 
Argument 
1. The district court erred in declaring that fixed title to the streambed in 
the State because USAC did not have standing to seek such a 
determination and the trial court there£ ore lacked jurisdiction to grant it 
The district court, in its ruling of April 10, 2015, declared that (i) the public 
is "entitled to use the riverbed of the Weber River at [the location of Landowner 
Properties] for lawful recreational purposes," and (ii) "the State of Utah holds 
sovereign land title to the bed ... at the location of the Landowner Properties." 
(R. 892.) In its opening brief, Orange Street argued that the district court erred in 
making the title-declaration because the State had made no claim for a title 
determination and USAC lacked standing to seek one. Orange St. Opening Br. at 
1 
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29-33. In its response brief, the State agreed that the district court's title 
declaration should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction. State Resp. Br. at 22-29. As 
the State noted, " [a] quiet title case would require a different plaintiff, a different 
cause of action, and a different form of relief." Id. at 24. 
USAC is ambivalent in its response to Orange Street's argument. Although 
it originally asked the district court to determine title in its complaint, (R. 8-9.), it 
later told the district court that it was not seeking a title determination. (R. 337.) 
In its brief to this court, it repeatedly states that it is not seeking to have title 
quieted in the State. USAC Resp. Br. at 18 n.4, 20, 26, 30. Yet USAC spends 
considerable time briefing why it should have standing to raise the question of 
title. Id. at 18-31. The reason seems to be USAC fears that if this court accepts 
Orange Street's separate argument that HB 141 did not adopt the federal 
navigability for title test, USAC, for some reason, will be denied standing to 
claim an alternative right of recreational access under the Utah Constitution. Id. 
at 18-19. Orange Street has made no such argument. 
Orange Street's position is that members of the public who claim denial of 
access to public waters to which they are entitled under HB 141 have standing to 
bring an action to assert that right of access, if they meet the usual standing tests. 
But no claim of a right of access should give standing to assert, on behalf of the 
State of Utah, a claim to have title quieted in the State on grounds of navigability 
for title. The concern that seems to prompt USAC to hedge its repeated 
2 
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disavowals of a right to seek a title determination is not grounded in any position 
taken by Orange Street.1 The relief of a title declaration that property belongs to 
the State can only be given at the request of the State. A private party without 
any associated interest does not have standing to make such a claim. 
The district court's entry of a declaration of title in the State presents a 
troubling precedent to private landholders. It permits parties without tangible 
interests in property to obtain a title declaration that may remove certain of the 
landowners' property rights with potentially far-ranging consequences. The 
issue is similarly troublesome for the State, which is justifiably concerned about 
the orderly administration of public property and land titles. This case is not 
about title, but about access to public waters. Because USAC, who has no claim 
to title, does not have standing to litigate the rights of the State to the bed of the 
Weber River under HB 141, this court should vacate the district court's title 
determ.ina tion for a lack of jurisdiction. 
1 The reason for USAC' s hedging on the question of standing appears to be that it 
separately contends its members have a constitutional right founded in article 
XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution to access waters that qualify as navigable 
under the federal title test, regardless of the Utah Legislature's enactment of HB 
141. USAC Resp. Br. at 26, 30-31. But that issue was not addressed by the district 
court and is not before this court in this case. This case only involves access 
under HB 141. The article XX, section 1 issue is one of several before this court in 
the separate case of Utah Stream Access Coalition v. VR Acquisitions, LLC, No. 
20151048-SC. 
3 
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2. The language of the navigation definition in HB 141 does not track the 
federal test; this court should clarify the statutory test for access 
Orange Street argued in its opening brief that the language of the 
navigability test in HB 141 does not track the federal navigability for title test. 
Orange St. Opening Br. at 33-38. HB 141' s navigability test reads in the present 
tense. Utah Code§ 73-29-102(4). It requires a determination of the present 
susceptibility of a water's use for commerce and as a public highway of 
transportation. In contrast, the federal navigability test for title asks after the 
susceptibility of a water's use for trade and travel at statehood. United States v. 
Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931) ("In accordance with the constitutional principle of 
the equality of states, the title to the beds of rivers within Utah passed to that 
state when it was admitted to the Union, if the rivers were then navigable .... "); 
Orange St. Opening Br. at 35-37.2 The State and USAC acknowledge this critical 
time difference in the text of HB 141, but argue that the intention of the drafters 
as determined from the legislative history suggests that they intended to use the 
federal navigability test for title. State Resp. Br. at 9-10; USAC Resp. Br. at 33. 
This court has held that the text is primary when interpreting a statute. 
Our evaluation of the statute's purpose must start with its text, not 
the legislative history. Where the statute's language marks its reach 
in clear and unambiguous terms, it is our role to enforce a legislative 
purpose that matches those terms, not to supplant it with a narrower 
2 Orange Street did not raise this issue below. But the plain error doctrine permits 
this court to address it. Orange Street Opening Br. at 34-37. The variance between 
the text and the test applied by the district court warrants this court's attention. 
The consequences for owners of property along bodies of water require 
clarification of the relevant test, either by this court or the legislature. 
4 
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or broader one that we might infer from the legislative history. That 
history might identify a social problem that first sparked the 
legislature's attention. But we cannot presume that the legislature 
meant only to deal with that particular problem, as legislative bodies 
often start with one problem in mind but then reach more broadly in 
their ultimate enactment. And when they do, we cannot limit the 
reach of their enactment to the ill that initially sparked their interest. 
Hooban v. Unicity Intern., Inc., 2012 UT 40, ,r 17,285 P.3d 766 (citations omitted); 
see also Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361,374 
(1986) ("Invocation of the 'plain purpose' of legislation at the expense of the 
terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise and, in 
the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent."); Brogan v. United 
States, 522 U.S. 398,403 (1998) ("[T]he reach of a statute often exceeds the precise 
evil to be eliminated."). That a state legislature might adopt a state test of 
navigability at odds with the federal navigability test for title is not unlikely. 
Many have done precisely that for various reasons.3 
If the court adopts the literal definition of "navigability" in HB 141, that 
definition requires a showing of current susceptibility for use for commerce and 
as a public highway of transportation. Orange St. Opening Br. 34-36. While there 
...i) was some slight reference to the susceptibility of these waters to modern boat 
travel, there was no evidence of commerce. Id. at 36. This requires a reversal of 
the district court's determination that USAC is entitled to access under HB 141. 
3 Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust 
Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public 
Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 53 (2010) (includes an extensive appendix detailing 
navigability laws in the western states) attached as Addendum A. Craig's article 
includes an extensive appendix detailing navigability laws in the western states. 
5 
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3. Neither log drives alone nor use during temporary high water satisfy the 
federal navigability for title test 
Assuming the federal navigability for title test is the test incorporated in 
HB 141, this court has been presented with two straightforward questions about 
how that test is satisfied. First, is evidence of occasional log drives only, without 
evidence of use of watercraft for transportation, enough to show susceptibility to 
use for commerce and transportation?4 Second, is evidence of a water's 
susceptibility to use for commerce during times of temporary high water enough 
to satisfy the federal test? 
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue, 
though the inferences to be fairly drawn from its navigability for title cases 
support Orange Street in answering both questions in the negative. Orange Street 
Operung Br. at 39-43, 51-52. On the whole, the various lower court cases support 
Orange Street's position, and those few seemingly against it are analytically 
suspect. Id. at 44-54. The State has not addressed the issue on appeal, but 
concluded in its trial brief that "the Weber River's relatively low flows, steep 
4 Susceptibility of use does not require actual proof of use. "The evidence of the 
actual use of streams, and especially of extensive and continued use for 
commercial purposes may be most persuasive, but, where conditions of 
exploration and settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use, 
the susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be satisfactorily 
proved." United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931). Present day use, while 
helpful, "must be confined to that which shows the river could sustain the kinds 
of commercial use that, as a realistic matter, might have occurred at statehood." 
PPL Montana v. Montana, 132 S.Ct. 1215, 1233 (2012). 
6 
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gradient, and short, inconsistent window of annual utility, raise questions 
regarding whether it was navigable-in-fact in 1896." (R. 647) 
Orange Street will not revisit arguments already made in the opening 
briefs on the merits of the question. Instead, it will briefly address two points not 
raised earlier, one legal and one practical. First, in PPL Montana v. Montana, the 
U.S. Supreme Court said nothing about log floating as a basis for navigability, 
even though the issue was briefed. 132 S.Ct. 1215 (2012). Instead, the Court 
focused on the absence of boat travel in declaring the Missouri River non-
navigable through the Great Falls reach. Id. at 1232. 
In PPL Montana, Montana argued that logs floating on the Madison River 
were enough to establish susceptibility for commerce and to satisfy the federal 
navigability test. Br. of Resp' t, State of Montana, p. 21, attached as Addendum B; 
see also Br. of Amicus Curiae, Nat'l Wildlife Fed. et al., p. 25, attached as 
Addendum C. In deciding that the Missouri River through the Great Falls reach 
was not navigable at statehood, and in discussing the facts relevant to 
determining the susceptibility of a waterway being used for trade and travel, the 
Court never addressed the issue of the floating of logs.5 PPL Montana, 132 S.Ct. 
at 1232-33. Rather, it held that the fact that portages were required around the 
5 In fact, no evidence of log floats on the Missouri River was presented to the 
court. But this argument is not about whether log floats actually occurred on the 
river, but whether the river was susceptible to log floats at statehood and was 
that enough to satisfy navigability requirements. 
7 
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Great Falls reach defeated title for navigability purposes. Id. at 1232. Relying only 
on the passage of watercraft, the court stated: 
[T]he Court sees no evidence in the record that could demonstrate 
that the Great Falls reach was navigable. Montana does not dispute 
that overland passage was necessary to traverse the reach. Indeed, 
the State admits the falls themselves were not passable by boat at 
statehood. And the trial court noted the falls had never been 
navigated. 
Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, because 
boats had to portage around the falls, the river was not navigable. 
If susceptibility to floating logs was all that was required for navigability 
for title, the outcome would have been different; logs can float over waterfalls 
and rapids where boats cannot go. Nor was there an issue about low water. Boats 
were able to be navigated above and below the Great Falls reach. The only 
reason the Court concluded that the segment was non-navigable was because 
"the falls themselves were not passable by boat at statehood." Id. Orange Street 
urges this court to follow the Supreme Court's lead and hold that the use of boats 
is necessary to establish navigability for title purposes. 
Second, and practically, Orange Street notes that if susceptibility to the 
floating of logs alone is enough to establish navigability for title purposes, 
stretches of Utah's rivers previously determined non-navigable may be opened 
up to a new navigability for title analysis. In other words, the stability of 
landowners' previously decided entitlement or lack of entitlement to ownership 
of beds may be brought into question. For example, in United States v. Utah, the 
8 
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Supreme Court decided navigability for title issues regarding the Green River, 
Colorado River, and the Grand River (currently the Colorado River above its 
confluence with the Green River). 283 U.S. 64 (1931). A section of the Colorado 
River through Cataract Canyon was deemed non-navigable because of its rapid 
descent and dangerous rapids. Id. at 80. The United States, as the owner of the 
adjacent land in Cataract Canyon, therefore has title to the bed underlying that 
non-navigable section. Id. at 74. Again, like the Missouri River in PPL Montana, 
the decision was not based on insufficient water to carry watercraft. Sections 
above and below Cataract Canyon were deemed navigable because boats had 
been on those sections or they were susceptible to such use. Id. at 89-90. If a log 
floating down the river is enough to make the water way susceptible to 
commerce, then the United States' title in Cataract Canyon may very well be void 
and Utah may own those beds.6 
For these reasons, and the reasons stated in its opening brief, Orange Street 
asks the court to reverse the district court's ruling and conclude that the one mile 
._;, stretch of the Weber River at issue in this case is not navigable. 
6 Similarly, the San Juan River was determined to be non-navigable from Chinle 
Creek (5 miles below the town of Bluff) to its confluence with the Colorado River, 
a total of 133 miles. Utah, 283 U.S. at 74. Portions of this river are likely able to 
float logs and thus be considered navigable under USAC's test. Adjacent 
landowners include the United States, the Navajo Nation, and private interests in 
the town of Mexican Hat. Instability of title would open up the possibility of 
quiet title actions for all of these land owners. 
9 
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Conclusion 
The district court erred in entering a ruling concluding that the State holds 
title to the bed of the Weber River where it crosses Orange Street's property 
because USAC lacks standing to challenge Orange Street's title. The district court 
also plainly erred in not applying the statutory test for navigability set out in HB 
141. Finally, even if the federal navigability for title test is the HB 141 test, the 
district court failed to apply the proper test. 
This court should vacate the title determination and reverse the finding of 
navigability and of a right in USAC' s members to access Orange Street's 
property for recreational purposes. 
DATED this 17th day of June, 2016. 
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER 
10 
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A Comparative Guide to the 
Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: 
Public Values, Private Rights, and the 
Evolution Toward an Ecological Public Trust 
Robin Kundis Craig* 
This companion Article to the fall 2007 A Comparative Guide to the 
Eastern Public Trust Doctrines explores the state public trust doctrines-
emphasis on the plural-in the nineteen western states. In so doing, this Article 
seeks to make the larger point that, while the broad contours of the public trust 
doctrine have a federal law basis, especially regarding state ownership of the 
beds and banks of navigable waters, the details of how public trust principles 
actually apply va,y considerably from state to state. Public trust law, in other 
words, is very much a species of state common law. Moreover, as with other 
forms of common law, states have evolved their public trust doctrines in light of 
the particular histories and the perceived needs and problems of each state. 
This Article observes that, in the West, four factors have been most 
important in the evolution of state public trust doctrines: (1) the severing of 
water rights from real property ownership and the riparian rights doctrine,· (2) 
subsequent state declarations of public ownership of fresh water; (3) clear and 
explicit perceptions of the scarcity of water and the importance of submerged 
lands and environmental amenities; and (4) a willingness to consider water 
and other environmental issues to be of constitutional importance and/or to 
incorporate broad public trust mandates into statutes. From these factors, two 
important trends in western states' public trust doctrines have emerged: (1) the 
extension of public rights based on states' ownership of the water itself; and (2) 
an increasing, and still cutting-edge, expansion of public trust concepts into 
ecological public trust doctrines that are increasingly protecting species, 
ecosystems, and the public values that they provide. 
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The Article includes an extensive appendix that summarizes each of the 
nineteen states' public trust doctrines. These summaries include relevant 
constitutional provisions, statutory provisions, and cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the arid West, balancing private needs for fresh water to consume 
against the public values-recreational, aesthetic, and ecological-served by 
leaving fresh water in situ has tended to favor the private use side. Evidence of 
this result is both massive and minor, ranging from California's multi-billion-
dollar water transportation system, 1 to the routine de-watering of the Colorado 
River so that little to no water reaches the Sea of Cortez, 2 to water-related 
Endangered Species Act lawsuits in dozens of watersheds. 3 
One of the legal tools that can re-balance private and public rights in water 
in any particular state is that state's public trust doctrine. In 1970, Professor 
Joseph Sax published his seminal article arguing for revitalization of the public 
trust doctrine,4 and, ever since, academics, politicians, voters, and judges have 
been exploring the potential value of the public trust doctrine for protecting 
public values in water, including recreational and ecological values. 5 
This Article is the second of two that explore what states are actually 
doing with their public trust doctrines-emphasis on the plural. As I argued in 
the first article,6 which covered the thirty-one eastern states' public trust 
doctrines, the states have progressed and diverged in interesting ways beyond 
I. By September 30, 2006, the total construction costs of the CVP had reached approximately 
$3.4 billion. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION: REIMBURSEMENT OF 
CALIFORNIA 's CENTRAL VALLEY PROJECT CAPITAL CONSTRUCDON COSTS BY SAN LUIS UNIT 
IRRIGATION WATER DISTRICTS 2 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08307r.pdf 
2. ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORING COLORADO RlvER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF 
IMMENSITY 34 (2007); Robin Kundis Craig, Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water 
Triage, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 825, 826-27, 897-98 (2008). 
3. Craig, supra note 2, at 875-78. 
4. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Ejfectil'e Judicial 
Inten•ention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
5. See, e.g., Marc R Poirer, Modified Pr;vate Property: New Jersey's Public Trust Doctrine, 
Pr;,,ate Development and Exclusion, and Shared Public Uses of Natural Resources, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 
71 (2006); J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Ecosystem Sen•ices and the Public Trust Doctrine: Working 
Change.from Within, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 223 (2006); Jeffrey W. Henquinet & Tracy Dobson, The Public 
Trust Doctrine and Sustainable Ecosystems: A Great Lakes Fisheries Case Study, 14 N.Y.U. ENvTL. 
L.J. 322 (2006); Zachary C. Kleinsasser, Public and Prfrate Property Rights: Regulatory and Physical 
Takings and the Public Trust Doctrine, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 421 (2005). 
6. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines: 
Classification of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. I, 113 
(2007). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1405822 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunt r Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2-CRAIG 3/8/2010 4:30:53 PM 
56 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 37:53 
the precepts of the U.S. Supreme Court's seminal discussion of the public trust 
doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. lllinois.7 
In some ways, what was true for the eastern states is also true for the 
western states. A state's public trust doctrine outlines public and private rights 
in water and submerged lands by delineating five components of those rights: 
(1) the beds and banks of waters that are subject to state/public ownership; (2) 
the line or lines dividing private from public title in those submerged lands; (3) 
the waters subject to public use rights; ( 4) the line or lines in those waters that 
mark the limit of public use rights; and (5) the public uses that the doctrine will 
protect in the waters where the public has use rights. 8 
In addition, prior discussions of western public trust doctrines are subject 
to the same two general limitations I discussed for the eastern public trust 
doctrines: "The first is a tendency to generalize all public trust law into a single 
doctrine. The second and opposite tendency is to view each state's public trust 
doctrine as unique."9 
Nevertheless, public trust doctrine law in the western states can be 
differentiated from that in the eastern states in several respects. First, in the 
eastern states, coastal access, coastal development, and coastal rights have 
generally been of more pressing concern than public trust rights in fresh waters. 
Because of the timing of their statehood, many eastern states' public trust 
doctrines have been influenced in significant ways by the English "ebb-and-
flow" tidal test of navigability for purposes of state title. 10 In addition, many 
eastern states recognize different public/private title lines along the sea coasts 
and Great Lakes than they do in fresh water streams, rivers, and lakes and/or 
protect more extensive sets of public rights in the ocean and Great Lakes. 11 In 
contrast, most western states became states after the U.S. Supreme Court had 
outlined most of its core principles regarding navigable waters, and far fewer of 
them are coastal states----only Alaska, California, Hawai'i, Oregon, Texas, and 
Washington. Partially as a result of this timing and geographical reality, 
western states, in general, have paid far greater attention than eastern states to 
public rights in fresh waters. 
In addition, western states are more arid than eastern states, resulting in a 
consciousness of the importance of fresh water that pervades many of these 
states' public trust doctrines. The Hundredth Meridian, which runs through 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas, is 
generally considered the "water divide" of the United States--east of that line, 
there is generally enough rainfall to support farming without irrigation; west of 
7. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
8. Craig. supra note 6. at 4. 
9. Id. at 2-3. 
10. Id. at 11-14. 
11. Id. at 16-17. 
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the line, there generally is not. 12 Survival in the west depends on access to 
water, and water is generally viewed as being in short supply. As will be 
discussed, this perception of shortage or potential shortage of fresh water has 
influenced the public trust doctrine in many western states. 
Further, the western states use a different system of water law than the 
eastern states. Eastern states' water laws are founded on common-law 
riparianism, 13 although many states have transitioned to regulated riparian 
systems. 14 Riparianism incorporates notions of adjustable, correlative rights to 
water among riparian property owners, with a general expectation--couched 
originally in terms of a "natural flow" doctrine and more recently in terms of 
"reasonable use"-that there is enough water to both serve human needs and 
leave water in the natural system. In contrast, western states (with the notable 
exception of Hawai'i) base their water law on prior appropriation, including 
states like California that retain limited riparian rights. 15 Prior appropriation is 
based on the principle of "frrst in time, first in right" and acknowledges through 
its priority system that water supplies from a given source will sometimes-
maybe often-be insufficient to meet all needs. Thus, prior appropriation as a 
legal system acknowledges that fresh water is in short supply. In practice, 
however, prior appropriation systems have allowed appropriators to drain 
streams and rivers dry, making obvious the loss of public values such as 
navigation, fishing and other recreation, aesthetics, species, biodiversity, water 
quality, ecological health, an~ more recently, ecosystem services. 
Finally, in almost all prior appropriation states, state water law includes a 
declaration, constitutional or statutory, that the state or the public owns the 
fresh water itself. Legally, these declarations dissociate control over the water 
from land ownership, including submerged land ownership. For public trust 
purposes, therefore, such declarations leave western states free to impress 
waters with public trust protections entirely independently of state ownership of 
the beds and banks of navigable waters, extending many state public trust 
doctrines to non-navigable waters. 
All of these features of prior appropriation water law have become 
relevant to states' public trust doctrines in the West. Indee~ western public 
trust common law reflects conscious struggles, often lacking in the eastern 
states, regarding the legal relationship between private appropriative water 
rights, on the one han~ and public rights and values in water, on the other. 
12. HERBERT C. YOUNG, UNDERSTANDING WATER RIGHTS AND CONFLICTS 42 (2d ed. 2003). 
13. George A. Gould, Water Rights Systems, in WATER RlGIITS OF THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 
8-9 (Kenneth R Wright, ed., 1998). 
14. Richard F. Ricci et al., Ball/es over Eastern Water, 21 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT. 38, 38 
(2006); Jeremy Nathan Jungreis, "Permit" Me Another Drink: A Proposal for Safeguarding the Water 
Rights of Federal Lands in the Regulated Riparian East, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. R.Ev. 369, 370-71 (2005). 
15. Gould, supra note 13, at 7. 
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This Article explores these and other features of western states' public 
trust doctrines, identifying broad categories of how these nineteen states have 
developed their common law regarding public rights in water. The Article is 
both classificatory and comparative, first identifying categories of trends 
among the western states and then comparing those approaches to demonstrate 
the different ways that their public trust doctrines have developed. 
At the same time, this Article seeks to make the larger point that, while the 
broad contours of the public trust doctrine have a federal law basis, especially 
regarding state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, the details 
of how public trust principles apply vary considerably from state to state. 
Public trust law, in other words, is very much a species of state common law. 
Moreover, as with other forms of common law, states have evolved their public 
trust doctrines in light of the particular histories and perceived needs and 
problems of each state. As Professors Robert Abrams and Noah Hall have 
observed more generally for all of water law, any given state's public trust 
doctrine "evolves instrumentally in ways that support a society's most pressing 
needs. The periods of greatest change in water law tend to be the ones where 
serious and protracted shortage or unsatisfied demand is felt in one or more key 
economic sectors." 16 Therefore, is it perhaps unsurprising that more robust 
public trust doctrines have evolved in states such as Hawai'i, California, and 
Montana where water- and environment-based tourism and recreation are 
important contributors to the states' economies. 
Part I of this Article provides a brief history of the public trust doctrine, 
including its development before the formation of the United States and 
emphasizing its public rights nature. Part II outlines the federal contours of 
state public trust doctrines, including the federal law of state title to navigable 
waters, the U.S. Supreme Court's pronouncements regarding the public trust 
doctrine in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 17 and the Supreme Court's 
further elaborations regarding states' authority to define rights to and in water. 
Part III identifies and compares many of the trends in western states' public 
trust doctrines, emphasizing moments when particular states' courts and, less 
often, legislatures, acknowledge the evolving nature of public trust principles 
and the need to protect public values recognized to be in short and decreasing 
supply. The Article concludes with a short examination of the implications of 
state public trust doctrines as a form of common law, arguing against the utility 
of continuing to describe a single public trust "doctrine," particularly as 
western states face unprecedented water supply pressures from climate change. 
16. Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy in a Carbon Affected and Carbon 
Constrained Environment, 49 NAT. REsOURCES l (2009). 
17. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
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L HISTORICAL VIEWS OF PUBLIC INTERESTS IN WATER 
As many writers have explained in varying degrees of detail, the public 
trust doctrine has an extensive history dating back to Roman law. 18 A short 
review of this history is useful to underscore the concern for the public interests 
in water that the public trust doctrine has always addressed. 
As the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized, "navigable waters uniquely 
implicate sovereign interests." 19 It has traced the protections for public rights in 
water to the fustitutes of Justinian,20 which stated that '"[r]ivers and ports are 
public; hence the right of fishing in a port, or in rivers are in common .... "'21 
Such principles also have a long history in English common law:22 "[t]he 
Magna Carta provided that the Crown would remove 'all fish-weirs ... from 
the Thames and the Medway and throughout all England, except on the sea 
coast."'23 
The recognition of public interests and rights in waters has led to the 
division of title in navigable waters between thejus privatum andjus publicum. 
The jus privatum is the naked legal title to submerged lands, which may in fact 
end up in private ownership. 24 However, private title to such lands generally 
excludes the difficult-to-alienate jus publicurn, which protects public access to 
and rights to use navigable waters.25 The jus publicum may be protected legally 
I 8. For more ex1ensive discussions of the public trust doctrine's history, see Barton H. Thompson, 
The Public Trust Doctrine: A Consen•ative Reconstruction and Defense, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 47, 50-54 
(2006); Eric Nelson, 11,e Public Trust Doctrine and the Great Lakes, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OITTL0OK J. 
131, 13µ0 (2006); George D. Smith II & Michael W. Sweeney, n,e Public Trust Doctrine and 
Natural Law: Emanations within a Penumbra, 33 BOSTON C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 307, 310-14 (2006); 
Henquinet & Dobson, supra note 5, at 24-30; Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae. 
and the Attorney General as the Guardian of the State's Natural Resources, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & 
POL 'y F. 57, 61-86 (2005); Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in 
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 7l IOWA L. REV. 631, 633-36 (1986); 
Joseph L. Sax, supra note 4, at 475-78. 
19. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,284 (1997). 
20. Id. 
21. Id. ( quoting INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Lib. II, Tit. I, § 2 (T. Cooper transl. 2d ed. 1841 )). 
22. "The special treatment of navigable waters in English law was recognized in Bracton's time. 
He stated that '[a]II rivers and ports are public, so that the right to fish therein is common to all persons. 
The use of river banks, as of the river itself, is also public."' Id. (quoting 2 H. BRACTON, DE LEGmus ET 
CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE 40 (S. Thome transl. 1968)). 
23. Id. (quoting M. EVANS & R JAC~ SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL AND CONSTilVrI0NAL 
HlsT0RY 53 (1984), and citing Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 410-13 (1842) ("tracing 
tidelands trusteeship back to Magna Carta")). 
24. Mary Turnipseed et al., The Silver Anniversary of the United States' Exclusive Economic 
Zone: Twenty-Fil•e Years of Ocean Use and Abuse, and the Possibility of a Blue Water Public Trust 
Doctrine, 36 Ec0LOGY L.Q. I, 25, 42 (2009); Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sovereign Trust of 
Government to Safeguard the Environment for Present and Future Generations (Part II): /nstilhng a 
Fiduciary Obligation in Governance, 39 ENVTL. L. 91, 122-23 (2009); Charles G. Stevenson, Title of 
Land under Water in New York, 23 YALE L.J. 397,399, 402-03 (I 914). 
25. See Idaho ,,. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 284, 286 (quoting Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 
1, 13 (1894)); New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1934); Ill. Cent. RR Co. v. Illinois, 146 
U.S. 387,458,466 (1892). 
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in a number of ways. For example, in 1838, the U.S Supreme Court concluded 
that because 
the Potomac river is a navigable stream, a part of the jus publicum, any 
obstruction to its navigation would, upon the most established principles, 
be what is declared by law to be a public nuisance. A public nuisance being 
the subject to criminal jurisdiction, the ordinary and regular proceeding at 
law is by indictment or information, by which the nuisance may be abated; 
and the person who caused it may be punished. If any particular individual 
shall have sustained special damage from the erection of it, he may 
maintain a private action for such special damage; because to that extent he 
has suffered beyond his portion of injury, in common with the community 
at large.26 
Thus, according to the Court, the quintessential protection of the jus publicum 
is a public nuisance lawsuit, preferably brought by the states themselves. 
Private individuals may protect the jus publicum, but only to the extent that 
they have suffered unusual private damages. 
Building on this history, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1892 adopted the New 
York courts' view that: 
"The title to lands under tide waters, within the realm of England, were by 
the common law deemed to be vested in the king as a public trust, to 
subserve and protect the public right to use them as common highways for 
commerce, trade, and intercourse. The king, by virtue of his proprietary 
interest, could grant the soil so that it should become private property, but 
his grant was subject to the paramount right of public use of navigable 
waters, which he could neither destroy nor abridge .... 
"The principle of the common law to which we have adverted is 
founded upon the most obvious principles of public policy. The sea and 
navigable rivers are natural highways, and any obstruction to the common 
right, or exclusive appropriation of their use, is injurious to commerce, and, 
if permitted at the will of the sovereign, would be very likely to end in 
materially crippling, if not destroying, it. The laws of most nations have 
sedulously guarded the public use of navigable waters within their limits 
against infringement, subjecting it only to such regulation by the state, in 
the interest of the public, as is deemed consistent with the preservation of 
the public right."27 
26. Mayor of City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co .• 37 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1838). 
27. lll. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 458 (quoting People v. New York & S.I. Ferry Co., 68 N.Y. 71, 
1877 WL I 1834, at •3 (1877)); see also Shively, 152 U.S. at 11 ("By the common law, both the title and 
the dominion of the sea. and of rivers and arms of the sea, where the tide ebbs and flows, and of all the 
lands below high-water mark, within the jurisdiction of the crown of England. are in the king. Such 
waters, and the lands which they cover, either at all times, or at least when the tide is in, are incapable of 
ordinary and private occupation, cultivation, and improvement; and their natural and primary uses are 
public in their nature, for highways of navigation and commerce, domestic and foreign, and for the 
purpose of fishing by all the king's subjects. Therefore the title, jus privaturn, in such lands, as of waste 
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Thus, as a matter of both public policy and international consensus, the 
Supreme Court early on connected the overall protection of public rights in 
navigable waters to the protection and promotion of commerce and economic 
growth. 
Moreover, the federal government's early conveyances of title to riparian 
properties in federal patents also reflect these public values. Grants of land 
bordering navigable streams generally conveyed title that extended only to the 
stream, which remained a "public highway."28 Grants of land bordering rivers 
above tide-water conveyed exclusive right and title to the center of the stream, 
unless otherwise specified, but the public retained an easement or right of 
passage along navigable streams-waters navigable for "boats and rafts."29 In 
other words, in the tidally influenced navigable waters, private landowners 
claiming title through federal patents had no property rights sufficient to 
interfere with public rights of commerce and navigation. Moreover, the U.S. 
Supreme Court extended this rule to federal patents of land bordering 
navigable-in-fact waters.30 
Thus, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that protecting public 
rights in water, and limiting interfering private rights, promotes the overall 
well-being of the nation by promoting navigation, trade, and commerce. These 
and other public policy considerations remain relevant to the western states' 
implementation of their public trust doctrines. 
II. FEDERAL LAW COMPONENTS OF STA lE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES 
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
the submerged lands beneath navigable waters are subject to special 
considerations because of their connections to sovereignty. However, the 
sovereignty to which the Court usually refers, at least in the public trust 
context, is state sovereignty. In 1842, the Court declared that "when the 
(American] revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves 
sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable 
and unoccupied lands, belongs to the king. as the sovereign; and the dominion thereof, jus publicum, is 
vested in him, as the representative of the nation and for the public benefit."). 
28. Saint Paul & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Schurmeier, 74 U.S. 272,287 (1868). 
29. Id. 
30. See, e.g., Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 336 (1876) (stating as a general rule that 
private title to lands under navigable-in-fact waters extends only to the high-water mark); Shively, 152 
U.S. at 11, 49-50 (adopting the English common law rule that federal conveyances go to the high-water 
mark). In the most generalized sense, waters are .. navigable in fact" when they can actually be used for 
navigation, regardless of their immediate connection to the sea. Thus, in the United States, the adoption 
of a "navigable in fact" test reflected a need to move away from the English tidal test, where waters are 
deemed .. navigable" only if they are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. That said, however, defining 
"navigable in fact" has become a bit of an art in American water law, and several definitions potentially 
apply, depending on the regulatory context. For a taste of these complications, see infra notes 46-58 and 
the accompanying text. 
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waters, and the soils under them, for their own common use, subject only to the 
rights since surrendered by the constitution to the general government."31 
The Supreme Court's most explicit articulation of the public trust doctrine 
is found in the 1892 case of Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Jllinois. 32 The 
decision had the effect of reifying the doctrine's existence in American law 
while simultaneously adapting it to the particular conditions of the United 
States. Moreover, Illinois Central Railroad provided an apparent federal law 
basis for many later state pronouncements of their own public trust doctrines. 
The legal basis-federal common law, federal constitutional law, or state 
law-for some aspects of the Court's pronouncements regarding the public 
trust doctrine, such as the alienability of public trust lands, is questionable. 33 
Such haziness of source, however, did not prevent many western states-
particularly Arizona-from adopting the Supreme Court's statements as 
binding federal law. As Richard Lazarus has observed, "[s]tate courts have 
repeatedly turned to [ federal pronouncements] in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries to justify rejecting or at least carefully scrutinizing 
shortsighted or even corrupt legislative attempts to convey into private hands 
critical coastal or inland waterway resources."34 
The states' implementations of their own public trust doctrines began with 
the assertion of state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters. In 
the context of title disputes between the federal and state governments (as 
opposed to title disputes between state governments and private landowners), 
the question of title to these beds and banks is clearly a matter of federal law. 35 
Western states such as Oregon and Utah played pivotal roles in developing the 
jurisprudence of "state title navigability," which uses one definition of 
"navigable waters" to determine whether a state has title to the beds and banks 
of-and hence control over-a given waterway,36 further evidencing the 
western states' interests in controlling their fresh waters. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has made it clear that, once federal law has 
conferred title to the beds and banks of navigable waters on a particular state, 
that state has broad authority to redefine the property rights between itself and 
31. Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367, 4 IO (1842). 
32. Ill. Cent. R.R, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
33. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 639-40 ("It is far from clear what source of law 
the Court was drawing upon to reach its result."); Appleby v. City of New York. 271 U.S. 364, 395 
(1926) (stating that the alienability ruling in Illinois Central was based on state law). 
34. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 640. 
35. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); 
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931). 
36. Definitions of"navigable waters" vary among legal contexts. For example, "navigable waters" 
are defined differently for: (1) state title purposes; (2) the federal Commerce Clause power; (3) federal 
jurisdiction under the federal Clean Water Act; (4) federal jurisdiction under the Rivers and Harbors 
Act; (5) federal jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act; and (6) admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 
JOSEPHJ. KALo ET AL., COASTAL AND OCEAN LAW 30 (3d ed. 2006). 
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its citizens.37 Similarly, the states have broad authority to define the public and 
private rights in navigable waters themselves. 38 
A. State Ownership and Control of Submerged Lands 
1. The Basic Rules 
The original thirteen states acquired title to beds and banks underlying 
tidal and, as would later be confirmed, navigable-in-fact nontidal waters as a 
result of their conquest of England.39 All other states-including all of the 
western states-acquired ownership of the beds and banks of these waters upon 
their statehood as a result of the Equal Footing Doctrine, under which all 
subsequent states were admitted with the same rights as the original thirteen.40 
A given state's title to tidal and navigable waters is fixed as of the date of its 
admission to the United States. 41 
Under federal law, the default rule and strong presumption is that a state 
owns the beds of the navigable waters within its borders.42 Sovereign 
ownership of tidal waters-waters affected by the ebb and flow of the tide-
arises as a direct adoption of English common law.43 Moreover, the U.S. 
Supreme Court clarified in 1988 that states own the beds of all tidal waters, 
whether or not those waters are navigable-in-fact.44 State title, however, is 
"subject always to the paramount right of [C]ongress to control ... navigation 
so far as may be necessary for the regulation of commerce with foreign nations 
and among the states. "45 
37. Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371,380 (1891); Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661,669 (1891); Shively 
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 40 (1894); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 
U.S. 363, 370-72 (l977)(overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973)). 
38. Arkansas v. Tennessee, 246 U.S. 158, 176 (1918). 
39. Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 317-18, ol'erruled on other grounds by Con•allis Sand & 
Gral'e/ Co., 429 U.S. at 370-72; Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at IO; Den ex dem. Russell v. Ass'n of 
Jersey Co., 56 U.S. 426, 432 (1853); Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223 (1845); Martin v. 
Waddell's Lessee,41 U.S. 367,410(1842). 
40. See Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262,272 (2001); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe 
of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 283-84 (1997); United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); Montana v. 
United States, 450 U.S. 544,551 (1981); Bonelli Cattle Co., 414 U.S. at 317-18; United States v. Holt 
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926); Shively, 152 U.S. at 48-50; Weber v. Bd. of Harbor Comm'ners, 85 
U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65-66 (1873); Mumford v. Wardell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423,436 (1867). 
41. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. at 370-71 (citing Wilcox v. Jackson, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 
498 ( 1839)). 
42. See Idaho,,. United States, 533 U.S. at 272-73; Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 
282; United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. at 34; Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 
197-98 (1987); Montana,,. United States, 450 U.S. at 552; Shi,•ely, 152 U.S. at 26-50 (1894). 
43. Ill. Cent RR Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,435 (1892); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 
324, 336-38 (1876). 
44. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476-81 (1988). 
45. See lll. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 435; see also Pollard's Leesee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212, 223 
(1845). 
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In contrast, state ownership of non-tidal "navigable-in-fact" waters was a 
federal adaptation of English law to American realities. Thus, for example, the 
Great Lakes "possess all the general characteristics of open seas, except in the 
freshness of their waters, and in the absence of the ebb and flow of the tide," 
and hence "there is no reason or principle for the assertion of dominion and 
sovereignty over and ownership by the state of lands covered by tide waters 
that is not equally applicable to its ownership of and dominion and sovereignty 
over lands covered by the fresh waters of these lakes."46 Even earlier decisions 
of the U.S. Supreme Court had announced a "navigable-in-fact" test for inland 
rivers and streams.47 However, waters must be navigable-in-fact as of the date 
of the state's admission into the union.48 
2. The Federal Test of Navigability for Navigable-in-Fact Waters 
As noted, state title to the beds and banks of navigable-in-fact waters is a 
question of federal law, determined in accordance with the federal test of 
navigability for state title.49 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not been 
uniformly consistent in how it defines "navigable" waters for these purposes. 
Under the classic test of navigability from The Daniel Ball, waters 
are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, 
in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade 
and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and 
travel on water. And they constitute navigable waters of the United States 
within the meaning of the acts of Congress, in contradistinction from the 
navigable waters of the States, when they form in their ordinary condition 
by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway over 
which commerce is or may be carried on with other States or foreign 
countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is conducted by 
water.50 
The Daniel Ball test thus closely aligns navigability with usefulness in 
interstate commerce, suggesting that waterways must be navigable by fairly 
large boats and ships. 
46. fl/. Cent. RR, 146 U.S. at 435-37. 
47. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (holding that the English 
common law tidal test has no applicability in the United States)~ Barney, 94 U.S. at 336 (stating that, 
"[i]n this country, as a general thing, all waters are deemed navigable which are really so"). 
48. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971) (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28 
(1894)~ Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. 367,410, 316-17 (1842)); United States v. Oregon, 295 
U.S. 1, 14 (1935). 
49. Utah v. Uni1ed Slates, 403 U.S. at 10 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (IO Wall.) at 563). 
50. See The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563~ see also Utah,,. United States, 403 U.S. at 10-
11 (citing The Daniel Ball as the first important test of navigability for state title purposes and stating 
that that test applies to all waters, not just rivers). 
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However, the Supreme Court has also stated that a waterway is navigable 
when it is useful for trade, agriculture, or commerce by any kind of vessel. For 
example, in The Montello, the Court concluded: 
It would be a narrow rule to hold that in this country, unless a river was 
capable of being navigated by steam or sail vessels, it could not be treated 
as a public highway. The capability of use by the public for purposes of 
transportation and commerce affords the true criterion of the navigability of 
a river, rather than the extent and manner of that use. If it be capable in its 
natural state of being used for purposes of commerce, no matter in what 
mode the commerce may be conducted, it is navigable in fact, and becomes 
in law a public river or highway. Vessels of any kind that can float upon the 
water, whether propelled by animal power, by the wind, or by the agency of 
steam, are, or may become, the mode by which a vast commerce can be 
conducted, and it would be a mischievous rule that would exclude either in 
determining the navigability of a river. It is not, however, as Chief Justice 
Shaw said, "every small creek in which a fishing skiff or gunning canoe 
can be made to float at high water which is deemed navigable, but, in order 
to give it the character of a navigable stream, it must be generally and 
commonly useful to some purpose of trade or agriculture."51 
Moreover, in the course of adjudicating the navigability of waterbodies in 
western states, the Court has emphasized that the water need not be "part of a 
navigable or interstate or international commercial highway" in order for the 
state to take title to its bed. 52 
Thus, depending on where a state court wants to focus its attention, the 
U.S. Supreme Court's statements regarding navigability for state title purposes 
allow for both liberal and stringent approaches to claiming title and, as a 
consequence, asserting and protecting public rights. The Court itself, however, 
attempted to reconcile its various definitions of navigability in two cases from 
the 1930s involving allegedly navigable waters in Utah and Oregon. The 1931 
Utah case resolved Utah's claims of title to the submerged lands beneath the 
Green, Grand, and Colorado Rivers in Utah's favor. 53 The Court first reiterated 
that states received title to the submerged lands of navigable waters, while the 
federal government retained title to those beneath non-navigable waters, with 
the question of title navigability to be resolved by federal law.54 It then 
established a definition of navigability that attempts to unify prior definitions 
51. The Montello, 87 U.S. (11 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874). 
52. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 10 (citing United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931); 
United States l'. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 14). 
53. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 89. 
54. Id. at 74. Given the last point, the Utah legislature's declaration that the three rivers were 
navigable was ofno binding effect. Id. at 75 n.6. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2-CRAJG 3/8/2010 4:30:53 PM 
66 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 37:53 
from The Daniel Ball, The Montello, and Holt State Bank. 55 After reviewing 
previous holdings on navigability, the Utah Court explained that: 
The extent of existing commerce is not the test. The evidence of actual use 
of streams, and especially of extensive and continued use for commercial 
purposes may be most persuasive, but, where conditions of exploration and 
settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use, the 
susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be satisfactorily 
proved.56 
As a result, the presence of sandbars that occasionally impeded navigation did 
not make the three rivers non-navigable because the rivers were still generally 
susceptible to use as channels of commerce. 57 
Four years later, applying the same test, the Supreme Court determined 
that Lake Malheur, Mud Lake, Hamey Lake, the Narrows, and Sand Reef in 
Oregon were not navigable. According to the Court's findings: 
Neither trade nor travel did then [at statehood] or at any time since has or 
could or can move over said Divisions, or any of them, in their natural and 
or ordinary conditions according to the customary modes of trade and 
travel over water; nor was any of them on February 14, 1859 (Oregon's 
date of statehood] nor has any of them since been used or susceptible of 
being used in the natural or ordinary condition of any of them as permanent 
or other highways or channels for useful or other commerce. 58 
In contrast, under the same consolidated federal test, the Great Salt Lake was 
navigable, and its beds owned by Utah, because of its use as a channel of 
commerce, despite its not being part of an interstate or international network. 59 
55. United States v. Holt State Banlc, 270 U.S. 49 (1926). In Holt State Bank, the U.S. Supreme 
Court detennined the navigability of Mud Lake in Minnesota. After emphasizing that the lower courts 
erred in using a local state standard of navigability instead of a federal standard, id. at 55, the Court 
applied the federal navigability test from The Montello. Specifically, the Court stated that: 
The rule long since approved by this court in applying the Constitution and laws of the 
United States is that streams or lakes which are navigable in fact must be regarded as 
navigable in law~ that they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of 
being used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which 
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on 
water, and further that navigability does not depend on the particular mode in which such use 
is or may be had-whether by steamboats, sailing vessels or flatboats-nor on an absence of 
occasional difficulties in navigation, but on the fact, if it be a fact, that the stream in its 
natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful commerce. 
Id. at 56 (citing The Montello, 87 U.S. at 439). 
56. Unites States v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 82. 
57. Id. at 86. 
58. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. at 15 (citing Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 56; United States 
v. Utah, 283 U.S. at 76; Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922); 
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922); Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 
122-23 (1921); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899); The 
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)). 
59. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10-11 (1971). 
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3. Exceptions to State Title in the Western States 
Although the presumption is that western states received title to the beds 
and banks of the navigable rivers within their borders, most western states 
existed as federal territories for some time before achieving statehood. As a 
result, state title in the West, far more than in the East, is subject to prior 
federal conveyances and reservations of title to navigable waters. 
For example, when the federal government reserved navigable waters to 
some federal purpose before the date of statehood ( or unappropriated waters 
even after statehood), those navigable waters remain in federal ownership. 
Many such reservations in the West benefit Indian tribes. For example, the 
Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Nations own the bed under portions of the 
Arkansas River in Oklahoma, 60 and the Osage Tribe owns the lands beneath 
the Arkansas River flowing along the Osage Indian Reservation.61 Similarly, 
the United States holds title to Coeur d'Alene Lake and the St. Joe River in 
Idaho in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 62 
Other reservations, however, serve other federal purposes. Thus, the State 
of Alaska did not receive title to any of the submerged lands within the 
boundary of the National Petroleum Reserve or the Arctic National Wildlife 
Refuge.63 
In addition, the federal government retains title to lands under some 
waters, especially coastal waters, as an aspect of its fundamental sovereignty. 
For example, Alaska does not have title to the submerged lands in the lower 
inlet of Cook Inlet because the state could not show a sufficient exercise of 
sovereignty historically to make these waters a "historic bay," leaving title to 
the inlet in the federal government. 64 
Finally, federal patents granted to private individuals before the date of 
statehood can affect both a state's title to submerged lands and the application 
of the state's public trust doctrine. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
made clear that California cannot enforce any public trust easement over 
tidelands that the federal government conveyed to private individuals pursuant 
to the Act of 1851 if the federal patent makes no mention of a public 
easement.65 
60. Chocktaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-32 ( 1970)~ United States v. Cherokee 
Nation ofOklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 70 I (I 987). 
61. Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co., 260 U.S. at 86-87. 
62. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262,272 (200 I). 
63. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 36-46 (1997). 
64. United States v. Alaska,422 U.S. 184, 200-04 (1975). 
65. Summa Corp. v. Cal. ex rel. State Lands Comm'n. 466 U.S. 198, 20~9 (1984). 
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4. Superiority of the Federal Interest in Navigation 
Despite state ownership of the beds and banks of navigable waters, the 
federal government retains a paramount interest in maintaining navigation in 
the navigable waters. This interest is one of the most basic manifestations of the 
federal government's Commerce Clause powers, but it can also serve to 
reinforce the public values in navigable waters protected by the public trust 
doctrine. 
One aspect of this paramoW1t federal navigation interest is the federal 
navigation servitude. The main import of the federal navigation servitude is that 
government actions to maintain navigation do not require the government to 
compensate private persons and entities for injuries to private property rights.66 
For example, as early as 1829 the U.S. Supreme Court noted that 
[l]aws in relation to roads, bridges, rivers and other public highways, which 
do not take away private rights to property, may be passed at the discretion 
of the legislature, however much they may effect common rights; even 
private rights, if they are not those of property, may be taken away, if it be 
deemed necessary consequence of their construction, without making 
compensation.67 
Thus, with respect to navigation, public values can intrude upon private. 
Another aspect of the navigation interest is the federal government's 
continuing right to regulate interstate commerce. This right, while 
distinguishable from regulating navigation per se, nevertheless has substantial 
overlaps with navigation concerns.68 Moreover, W1der the Supremacy Clause,69 
Congress's regulation of interstate commerce in navigable waters will trump 
any conflicting state regulation. 70 
Finally, in the context of water law, the federal government's paramount 
interest in navigation may, in extreme cases, limit the rights of western 
appropriators to destroy public values in any waters that become navigable, 
even if they are not so at the point of diversion. In an 1899 case, the U.S. 
Supreme Court addressed the propriety of the complete diversion of the Rio 
Grande River in New Mexico, where it is not navigable. The Court concluded 
66. Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269, 271-76 (1897)~ Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 
156-58, 163-65 (1900). 
67. Wilson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. 245, 252 n. l ( 1829). 
68. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 11-20, 64-69, 71-79 (1824). 
69. The Supremacy Clause states: 
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance 
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United 
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound 
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 
U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
70. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. at 71-79, 89-96. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2-CRAIG 3/8/2010 4:30:53 PM 
2010] WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES 69 
that such upstream diversions could not interfere with the federal government's 
downstream interest in maintaining navigability, for two reasons: 
First, . . . in the absence of specific authority from [C]ongress, a state 
cannot, by its legislation, destroy the right of the United States, as the 
owner of lands bordering on a stream, to the continued flow of its waters, 
so far, at least, as may be necessary for the beneficial uses of the 
government property; second, ... it is limited by the superior power of the 
general government to secure the uninterrupted navigability of all 
navigable streams within the limits of the United States. In other words, the 
jurisdiction of the general government over interstate commerce and its 
natural highways vests in that government the right to take all needed 
measures to preserve the navigability of the navigable water courses of the 
country, even against any state action.71 
The Court has reaffirmed these potential limitations on the destruction of 
downstream navigability in subsequent cases. 72 
B. The Supreme Court's Delineation of an American Public Trust Doctrine 
and the Limitations the Doctrine Imposes on States73 
The U.S. Supreme Court most clearly announced the existence of a public 
trust doctrine in American law in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Jllinois.74 
According to that decisio~ a state holds title to submerged lands, 
[b ]ut it is a title different in character from that which the state holds in 
lands intended for sale .... It is a title held in trust for the people of the 
state, that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce 
over them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or 
interference of private parties. 75 
Thus, the three public uses of waters that a public trust doctrine generally 
protects are navigation, commerce, and fishing.76 
In addition, according to the Illinois Central Railroad Court, the doctrine 
acts as a restraint on the state's ability to alienate the beds and banks of 
71. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 703 (1899). 
72. See, e.g., Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 159-60 (1935). 
73. As discussed supra, the extent to which the U.S. Supreme Court based some of these 
limitations-especially the restraint on alienation-on federal law that could preempt state law is highly 
debatable. As a result, states vary in how "binding,., they consider the Court's articulations of public trust 
doctrine restraints. although most have followed lllinois Central Railroad's restrictions. 
74. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). For discussions of the history of this case and its relationship to state 
public trust doctrines, see generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill. The Origins of the 
American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 
(2004); Douglas L. Grant, Underpinnings of the Public Trust Doctrine: Lessons from lllinois Central 
Railroad, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 849 (2001); Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine in 
State Law, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 713 ( 1996). 
75. lll. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 453. 
76. Id.; see also Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 13 (1894) (emphasizing the public rights of 
fishing and navigation). 
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navigable waters or to abdicate regulatory control over those waters. The Court 
described the trust as essentially prohibiting a state from abdicating its general 
control over lands under navigable waters, such as by granting very large 
parcels to development interests: "The control of the state for the purposes of 
the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting 
the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of without any substantial 
impairment of the public interest in the lands and waters remaining."77 This 
restraint on alienation-and its perception as a federal law requirement-has 
been important in several western states, notably Arizona.78 
C. A Note on Federal Law, Prior Appropriation, 
and Non-Navigable Waters in the West 
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress have recognized that western 
states adopted prior appropriation as their dominant water law. In the Act of 
July 26, 1866, Congress began to formally recognize prior appropriation's 
ascendancy over riparian rights in the West.79 In the Desert Land Act of 
1877,80 as interpreted by the Supreme Court, it both subjected non-navigable 
waters to prior appropriation and gave western states control over those waters. 
The Desert Land Act applies to lands in California, Oregon, Nevada, 
Colorado, Washington, Idaho, Montana, Utah, Wyoming, Arizona, New 
Mexico, North Dakota, and South Dakota that were public at the time of 
enactment. 81 In other words, it applies to all states discussed in this Article 
except Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, Texas, Hawai'i, and Alaska. In the Act, 
Congress recognized that reclamation, large-scale development, and movement 
of fresh water would be necessary in order to settle the arid western lands. 82 As 
a result, according to the Supreme Court, Congress both severed non-navigable 
waters from the public lands, ending common-law riparian rights,83 and gave 
control over water rights in those waters to the states. 84 
Thus, through the Desert Land Act and statutes like it, Congress allowed 
western states to assert ownership and control over non-navigable waters as 
well as navigable, even though the states did not own the beds and banks 
77. III. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 452-53. 
78. See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 726--28 (Ariz. App. 2001) (relying on 
Illinois Central Railroad to conclude that the restraint on alienation of submerged lands is a common-
law rule grounded in the Constitution that invalidates the Arizona legislature's attempts to disclaim or 
restrict state ownership of those lands). 
79. ActofJuly26, 1866,c.262,§9, 14Stat.251,251. 
80. 43 u.s.c. § 321 (2008). 
81. Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 165 (1935). 
82. Id. at 157-58. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 163-64; see also Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 139 n.5 (1976); Nebraska v. 
Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589,612 (1945); Ickes v. Fox., 300 U.S. 82, 95-96 (1937) (all confirming the import 
of the Desert Land Act). 
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beneath those waters. As will be discussed in more detail, this ability to declare 
state ownership of all water has been an important component of many western 
states' public trust doctrines. 
III. WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES: 
TRENDS AND APPROACHES TO PUBLIC RIGHTS IN WATER 
In the western states, the Illinois Central Railroad Court's pronouncements 
regarding the public trust doctrine have generally been interpreted as defining 
the doctrine's minimal applicability in terms of waters covered, uses protected, 
and restraints on state authority to eliminate the public trust. The courts in 
several western states--especially Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, and 
Nebraska-have largely adhered to this "minimalist" public trust doctrine, 
while Nevada courts simply lack sufficient public trust statutes to have effected 
any state-law expansions of the doctrine. 
The other thirteen western states, however, have added important state-law 
dimensions to the scope of the public trust doctrine as it operates within their 
respective borders. These states have used a variety of legal techniques to 
protect and expand public rights in the waters of each state: redefining 
"navigable" waters for state law purposes; expanding the list of protected 
public uses beyond navigation, fishing, and commerce; and extending public 
rights and public trust principles to all state waters, regardless of who owns the 
beds and banks. 
More recently, several states have extended the concept of a public trust in 
waters to environmental protection-what this Article refers to as the 
"ecological public trust." California and Hawai'i have most extensively 
developed their ecological public trust doctrines, but nascent ecological public 
trusts are detectable in several other western states as well. 
In addition, as a result of the variety of elements on which state law might 
operate-the definition of "navigable," the uses protected, extensions to all 
water, and/or inclusion of ecological considerations-the western states' public 
trust doctrines have become highly individualistic. Thus, the import of public 
trust principles is now largely a matter of state common law, sometimes 
supplemented by state statutes, rather than any kind of straightforward 
application of the U.S. Supreme Court's statements from Illinois Central 
Railroad. 
A. Adaptations of the Public Trust Doctrines to Particular State 
Circumstances and Public Policies 
Courts and, to a lesser extent, legislatures in western states often clearly 
connect the state's public trust doctrine to larger issues of state public policy. In 
states where these larger public policies include recognition of actual or 
potential loss of the public values of fresh water, more robust public trust 
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doctrines are often the result. In contrast, in states where public policies favor 
private rights, more restricted public trust doctrines have been the norm. 
Arizona, for example, is an example of the latter kind of state-so much so 
that legislative attempts to restrict the state's public trust doctrine have 
prompted repeated interventions by the Arizona courts. 85 By statute, Arizona 
limits "navigable waters"-and its public trust doctrine-to those waters 
subject to the federal equal footing doctrine.86 In contrast, Hawai'i courts are 
acutely aware of the scarcity of fresh water in the state and have subordinated 
private water rights to the public interest in preserving the state's "natural 
bounty."87 
States that seek to preserve the public interest in waters have used a 
variety of legal techniques for doing so. For example,· the North Dakota 
Supreme Court adapted the state's law regarding shifting rivers to protect the 
public rights in those rivers: 
The Territorial Legislative Assembly recognized that our state would 
receive title to the beds of navigable waters at statehood. Accordingly, by 
1877, it had enacted a code that would secure title of the state to such lands 
and modify common law so that the state's title would follow the 
movement of the bed of the river. This accords with underlying public 
policy, since the purpose of a state holding title to a navigable riverbed is to 
foster the public's right of navigation, traditionally the most important 
feature of the public trust doctrine. Moreover, it seems to use that other 
important aspects of the state's public interest, such as bathing, swimming, 
recreation, and fishing, as well as irrigation, industrial and other water 
supplies, are most closely associated with where the water is in the new 
riverbed, not the old. 88 
To address a different threat to public rights in waters, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court has distinguished navigability for title purposes from 
navigability for public use purposes. Using a pleasure boat test of navigability, 
it protects its smaller rivers and the recreational and aesthetic amenities that 
85. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727 (Ariz. App. 2001); San Carlos Apache Tribe 
v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 (Ariz. 1999); Calmat of Ariz. v. State 
ex rel. Miller, 836 P.2d 1010, 1020-21 (Ariz. App. 1992); Ariz. Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. 
Hassell, 837P.2d 158, 162-73 (Ariz. App. 1991). 
86. As such, a "navigable watercourse" for purposes of both state title and the application of the 
public trust doctrine is 
a watercourse that was in existence on February 14, 1912, and at that time was used or was 
susceptible to being used, in its ordinary and natural condition, as a highway for commerce, 
over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted in the customary modes of 
trade and travel on water. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 37-1130(5) (LexisNexis 2009). "Public trust lands" are limited to the beds of these 
navigable watercourses. Id. § 37-1130(8). 
87. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 311-12 (Haw. 1982). 
88. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 140 (N.D. 
1988). 
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they provide. It found, for instance, "that the Kiamichi River is one of the 
beautiful streams of southeastern Oklahoma that has for many years been 
known as one of the best fishing streams in the State and used by the public for 
fishing, recreation, and pleasure" and extended legal protections to those public 
uses and values. 89 
More extensively, courts in California have explicitly and repeatedly 
emphasized that lands beneath nontidal navigable waters "constitute a resource 
which is fast disappearing in California; they are of great importance for the 
ecology, and for the recreational needs of the residents of the state."90 
Moreover, the California Supreme Court considers the public trust doctrine to 
be adaptable and evolving, noting that "[t]he objective of the public trust has 
evolved in tandem with the changing public perception of the values and uses 
of waterways. "91 It recognizes that the trust traditionally protects navigation, 
commerce, and fishing, but also has expansively announced that public trust 
rights "have been held to include the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for 
boating, and general recreation purposes the navigable waters of the state, and 
to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other 
purposes. "92 
The Texas courts, similarly, have noted that "[t]he purpose of the State 
maintaining title to the beds and waters of all navigable bodies is to protect the 
public's interest in those scarce natural resources."93 As such, "the State, as 
trustee, is entitled to regulate those waters and submerged lands to protect its 
citizens' health and safety and to conserve natural resources. "94 
Oregon has used a variety of legal mechanisms to acknowledge and 
protect the public interests in tidal and navigable-in-fact waters. Like in 
California, the Oregon courts view the state's waters as a limited and precious 
resource: 
The severe restriction on the power of the state as trustee to modify water 
resources is predicated not only upon the importance of the public use of 
such waters and lands, but upon the exhaustible and irreplaceable nature of 
89. Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935 (Okla. 1969). 
90. State v. Superior Court (Lyons). 625 P.2d 239,242 (Cal. 1981). 
91. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (citing Marks v. 
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971)); see also Pers. Watercraft Coal. v. Marin County Bd. of 
Supervisors, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 437 (CaJ. Ct. App. 2002) (repeating that the doctrine is "sufficiently 
flexible to encompass changing public needs" (citations omitted)). 
92. Marks, 491 P.2d at 379-80 (Cal. 1971); see also City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 
362, 365 (Cal. 1980); Graf v. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1228-29 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
93. Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 17, 175 S.W.2d 34, 49 
(Tex. App. 2005). 
94. Id. (citing Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)); see 
also Carruthers v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. 1983) 
("The waters of public navigable streams are held by the State in trust for the public, primarily for 
navigation pwposes." (citing Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458 (Tex. 1926))). 
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the resources and its fundamental importance to our society and our 
environment. These resources, after all, can only be spent once. Therefore, 
the law has historically and consistently recognized that rivers and estuaries 
once destroyed or diminished may never be restored to the public and, 
accordingly, has required the highest degree of protection from the public 
trustee.95 
Thus, in applying the public trust doctrine, the Oregon courts have noted that 
"lands underlying navigable waters have been recognized as unique and limited 
resources and have been accorded special protection to insure their preservation 
for public water-related uses such as navigation, fishery and recreation."96 As a 
result, "[u]nder the common law public trust doctrine, the public use of such 
waters could not be substantially modified except for water-related 
purposes. "97 
Moreover, like Oklahoma, 98 Oregon has refined its definition of 
navigability to reflect the physical realities and public policy priorities of the 
state. Thus, Oregon early on adopted a log floatation test for navigability 
because that rule 
best accords with common sense and public convenience, for these rapid 
streams, penetrating deep into the mountains, are the only means by which 
timber can be brought from these rugged sections, without great labor and 
expense; and by their use large tracks of timber, otherwise too remote or 
difficult of access, can be rendered of great value, as the country shall grow 
and timber become scarce. 99 
Finally, unusually (but not uniquely)100 among states, Oregon has employed 
the doctrine of custom to ensure public access to dry sand beaches not 
protected by the public trust doctrine. 101 As a result, the Oregon Supreme Court 
concluded that no taking of private property had occurred when the state denied 
landowners permits to build sea walls.102 
Other states have also used some of these mechanisms to adapt the public 
trust doctrine to the particular public interests and policies of that state. For 
example, by statute, and for purposes of establishing public rights in waters, 
Alaska defmes a "navigable water" to be: 
95. Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands. 581 P.2d 520. 524 (Or. Ct. App. 1978). affd, 590 P.2d 709 
(Or. 1979). 
96. Id. at 523. 
97. Id. 
98. See supra note 89 and accompanying te>..1. 
99. Felger v. Robinson, 3 Or. 455,458 (1869). 
100. Because the public has long used the beaches of Hawai'i. that use "has ripened into a 
customary right. Public policy, as interpreted by this court. favors extending to public use and ownership 
as much of Hawaii's shoreline as is reasonably possible." Hawaii County v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 61-
62 (Haw. I 973) (citing Oregon ex rel. Thorton v. Hay. 462 P.2d 671 (Or. 1969)). 
101. Oregon ex rel. Thornton. 462 P.2d at 673-78. 
102. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach. 854 P.2d 449,451 (Or. 1993). 
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any water of the state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek, 
bay, sound, estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other 
body of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or 
subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful public 
purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for commercial 
navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public 
boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other 
public recreational purposes .... 103 
75 
The public also has rights in "public waters," which by statute include not only 
navigable waters, but also "all other water, whether inland or coastal, fresh or 
salt, that is reasonably suitable for public use and utility, habitat for fish and 
wildlife in which there is a public interest, or migration and spawning of fish in 
which there is a public interest .... " 104 These definitions and public rights 
protections reflect Alaska's unique environmental and cultural circumstances. 
Alaska, for example, is the only western state that explicitly identifies use of 
waters by seaplanes as an important public use to be protected by law. In 
addition, Alaska is a prime fishing state, and its statutory declarations of what 
constitute public waters give special consideration to the use of waters not just 
for fishing but also for spawning and migration, reflecting most obviously the 
peculiarities of salmon life cycles; sahnon in Alaska are important to 
commercial fishennen, recreational fishers and the recreation industry, and 
Native Alaskans. 105 The public trust doctrines of Oregon106 and Washington107 
similarly reflect the importance of salmon and shellfish, respectively, to those 
states' citizens. 
103. ALASKA STAT. ANN.§ 38.05.965(13) (2004). 
I 04. Id. § 38.05.965(18). 
I 05. Timothy J. Mullins, The Clean Water Initiar;l'es and the Proper Balance Between the Right to 
Ballot /nUiatives and the Prohibition on Appropriations, 26 ALASKA L. REV. 135, 141, 168 (2009); Katy 
Hansen, Rebecca Vernon, & Hana Bae, Supreme Court Preview, 56 FED. LAWYER 62, 62-63 (2009). 
I 06. For example, Oregon's public trust responsibilities have been applied to fishing regulation. As 
a result, statutes purporting to convey exclusive rights to fish in navigable ·waters violated the Privileges 
and Immunities Clause in the Oregon Constitution. Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065, 
1072-73 (Or. 1907); see also Johnson v. Hoy, 47 P.2d 252,252 (Or. 1935) (holding that the Legislature 
cannot grant an exclusive right to fish for salmon). Nevertheless, because the state has jurisdiction over 
navigable waters, it can regulate fishing. Oregon v. Nielsen, 95 P. 720, 722 (Or. 1908); Antony v. 
Veatch, 220 P.2d 493, 498-99 (Or. 1950). Specifically, fishing methods can be enjoined if they interfere 
with the public's common right of fishing. Radich v. Frederckson, 10 P.2d 352, 355 (Or. 1932); 
Johnson, 47 P.2d at 252. 
107. "[I]n Washington, the public trust doctrine does not encompass the right to gather clams on 
private property" because shellfish rights follow title to the submerged lands. Washington v. Longshore, 
982 P.2d 1191, 1195-96 (Wash. App. 1999), aff'd, 5 P.3d 1256, 1259-03 (Wash. 2000) (en bane); see 
also Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass'n v. Wash. State Dept of Natural Res., 101 P.3d 891, 895 
(Wash. App. 2004) (noting that shellfish are not typical wildlife in Washington because they are 
considered part of the land). However, state regulation of geoducks does not violate the public trust 
doctrine.Id 
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B. Public Ownership of Submerged Lands, 
Public Ownership of Water, and Public Rights in Water 
[Vol. 37:53 
As discussed above, the U.S. Supreme Court has most explicitly 
connected public trust rights to navigable waters-that is, the waters in which 
the state owns the beds and banks. Thus, in what might be called the state-
property-based view of public trust doctrines, public rights follow state title to 
submerged lands. 
However, in the West, as noted, federal and state law both allow for-and 
most states have declared108-state or public ownership of the fresh waters 
themselves, independent of ownership of submerged lands. This public aquatic 
property right provides these states with another property law basis upon which 
to recognize and expand public rights in water beyond those recognized in 
traditional concepts of the public trust doctrine, as articulated in Illinois Central 
Railroad. Thus, as was true for the eastern states, 109 most western states have 
divorced public rights in waters from state or public ownership of the relevant 
submerged lands, although the western states generally rely on different legal 
mechanisms-such as state ownership of water-to do so. 
Among the western states, Colorado and Idaho have most clearly adhered 
to the strict and limited traditional view of public rights in their public trust 
doctrines. Relying on the federal test of navigability, the Colorado Supreme 
Court has declared almost all streams in Colorado to be non-navigable: "the 
natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable within its territorial 
limits, and practically all of them have their sources within its own boundaries, 
and ... no stream of any importance whose source is without those boundaries, 
flows into or through this state."1 JO It then explicitly refused to follow the 
"modem trend" and allow public rights in non-navigable rivers based on state 
ownership of the water itself, concluding that the Colorado Constitution does 
not preserve public recreation rights in such waters. 111 Instead, "[ w ]ithout 
permission, the public cannot use such waters for recreation."112 
108. ALASKA CONST., art. VIII,§ 13; ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.030 (2009); ARlz. REV. STAT.§ 45-
14l(A) (LexisNexis 2009); CAL. WATER CODE§ 1201 (2009); COLO. CONST., art. XVI, § 5; HAW. 
CONST., art. XI, §§ J, 7; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (2009); MONT. CONST., art. IX, § 3(3); NEB. 
CONST., art. XV,§ 5; NEV. REV. STAT.§ 533.025 (2008); N.M. CONST., art. XVI,§ 2; N.M. STAT.§ 72-
1-J (2009); N.D. CONST., art. XI,§ 3; N.D. CENT. CODE§ 61-01-01 (2009); OR. REV. STAT.§§ 537.010, 
537.525 (2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 46-1-3 (2009); TEX. WATER CODE ANN.§ 11.02l(a) (Vernon 
2009); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 73-1-1 (2009); WASH. REV. CODE§ 90.03.010 (2009); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 
41-3-115(a) (2009). 
109. Craig, supra note 6, at 14-16. 
110. Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220,222 (Colo. 1912), ol'erruled on other grounds, Denver Ass'n 
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975); see also United States v. 
Dist. Court, 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969) (holding that even though the Eagle River is a tributary of 
the Colorado River, it is non-navigable). 
111. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Colo. 1979). 
112. Id. at 1029; see also Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686-87 (Colo. 1905) (holding that public 
ownership of the water itself, as stated in the Colorado Constitution, does not create a public fishery in 
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In contrast, the Idaho courts until 1996 were following the western 
"modem trend," indicating that water and "proprietary rights to use water . . . 
are held subject to the public trust."113 In 1996, however, Idaho's legislature 
invalidated this line of cases, instead defining (and confining) the state's public 
trust doctrine by statute. 114 These provisions declare that 
[t]he public trust doctrine as it is applied in the state of Idaho is solely a 
limitation on the power of the state to alienate or encumber the title to the 
beds of navigable waters as defined in this chapter .... The public trust 
doctrine shall not be applied to any purpose other than as provided in this 
chapter, [especially not to' (t]he appropriation or use of water, or the 
granting, transfer, administration, or adjudication of water or water rights .. 
. or any other procedure or law applicable to water rights in the state of 
Idaho [or to] [t]he protection or exercise of private property rights within 
the state ofldaho.115 
Most other western states, however, have followed the "modem trend" 
that the Colorado Supreme Court rejected. For example, according to the 
Montana Supreme Court, "[t]he public trust doctrine in Montana's Constitution 
grants public ownership in water not in beds and banks of streams," and "[a]ll 
waters are owned by the State for the use of its people."116 As a result, "the 
public has the right to use the water for recreational purposes and minimal use 
of underlying and adjoining real estate essential to enjoyment of its ownership 
in water," even if the bed and banks are privately owned.117 Nevertheless, 
non-navigable streams; instead, the private landov.ner owns the right of fishery, and only appropriative 
rights can trump this common-law rule). Kansas takes the same approach: 
Owners of the bed of a nonnavigable stream have the exclusive right of control of everything 
above the stream bed, subject only to constitutional and statutory limitations, restrictions, and 
regulations. Where the legislature refuses to create a public trust for recreational purposes in 
non-navigable streams, courts should not alter the legislature's statement of public policy by 
judicial legislation. 
State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1350, 136.µ:,5 (Kan. 1990). As a result, "[tJhe public has no right 
to the use of nonnavigable water overlying private lands for recreational purposes without the consent of 
the landowner." Id. at 1365. 
l 13. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995); Kootenai Envtl. 
Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983) (holding that "the public 
trust doctrine takes precedence even over vested water rights."). 
114. IDAHO CODE §§ 58-120 I to 58• 1203 (1996). 
115. Id. §§ 58-1203(1), (2)(b), (c). These statutes define "navigable waters" as "those waters that 
were susceptible to being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce on the date of 
statehood, under the federal test of navigability" and identify the line of "natural or ordinary high water 
mark" as the boundary of the beds of navigable waters, in complete agreement with federal law. Id. § 
58-1202(1). 
116. Galt v. Montana, 731 P.2d 912,915 (Mont 1987) (emphasis added). 
117. Id.; Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1092 (Mont. 1984) 
(noting that underlying ownership of the bed does not matter for the public's recreational use right); 
Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984) (holding that "under the 
public trust doctrine and the 1972 Montana Constirution, any surface waters that are capable of 
recreational use may be so used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for 
nonrecreational purposes."). 
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Montana statutes make it clear that appropriated water rights trump any other 
public interest in the waters, including environmental protections and public 
use rights. 118 
New Mexico and North Dakota, similarly, have found constitutional and 
statutory declarations that waters are publicly owned relevant to their public 
trust doctrines. Thus, in 194 7, the New Mexico Supreme Court declared that all 
waters are public waters until beneficially appropriated and that the public can 
thus use all waters for outside recreation, sports, and fishing. 119 In 1976, North 
Dakota declared that the public trust doctrine extends broadly to management 
of the state's water resources, requiring the State Engineer to determine "the 
potential effect of [ a proposed] allocation of water on the present water supply 
and future needs of this State," necessitating water resources planning. 120 
More recently, the South Dakota Supreme Court decided to follow 
"modern trend" decisions in Idaho (now overruled by statute), Montana, New 
Mexico, Wyoming, Minnesota, North Dakota, and Iowa to open all waters in 
the state to public use. 121 As a result, the South Dakota Water Resources Act, 
which governs allocation of appropriative water rights in the state, must now 
work in tandem with the public trust doctrine: 
[W]hile we regard the public trust doctrine and Water Resources Act as 
having shared principles, the Act does not supplant the scope of the public 
trust doctrine. The Water Resources Act evinces a legislative intent both to 
allocate and regulate water resources. In part, this Act codifies public trust 
principles. The first three sections of the Act embody the core principles of 
the public trust doctrine-"the people of the state have a paramount interest 
in the use of all the water of the state," SDCL 46-1-1; "the state shall 
determine in what way the water of the state, both surface and 
underground, should be developed for the greatest public benefit," SDCL 
46-1-2; and "all water within the state is the property of the people of the 
state." SDCL 46-1-3. 122 
Moreover, when increased precipitation creates new lakes on private property, 
"the State of South Dakota retains the right to use, control, and develop the 
water in these lakes as a separate asset in trust for the public," and the public 
trust doctrine applies independently of bed ownership. 123 In summary, "all 
waters within South Dakota, not just those waters considered navigable under 
the federal test, are held in trust by the State for the public."124 
118. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 75-5-705, 75-7-104, 85-1-11 l (2009). 
119. State ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 429-32 (N.M. 
1947). 
120. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 461, 
463 (N.D. 1976). 
121. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 833-36 (S.D. 2004). 
122. Id. at 838. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. at 838-39. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2-CRAIG 3/8/2010 4:30:53 PM 
2010] WESTERN STATES' PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES 79 
Under Utah's statutes, waters are owned by the public, 125 and the Utah 
Supreme Court has tied the need for public rights to water scarcity: water is "a 
scarce and essential resource in this area of the country" that "is indispensable 
to the welfare of all people; and the State must therefore assume the 
responsibility of allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the 
people of the State as a whole."126 Thus: 
Under this "doctrine of public ownership," the public owns state waters and 
has "an easement over the water regardless of who owns the water bed 
beneath." In granting this public this easement, "state policy recognizes an 
interest of the public in the use of state waters for recreational purposes." 
This court has enumerated the specific recreational rights that are within 
the easement's scope. They include "the right to float leisure craft, hunt, 
fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water." 127 
Hence, bed ownership is irrelevant for the public's rights to use waters in the 
state. 128 Moreover, "the scope of the public's easement in state waters provides 
the public the right to engage in all recreational activities that utilize the water 
and does not limit the public to activities that can be perfonned upon the 
water." 129 As a result, "the public has the right to touch privately owned beds 
of state waters in ways incidental to all recreational rights provided for in the 
easement." 130 
Finally, Wyoming, too, has extended public use rights to all waters based 
on its ownership of the water itsel£ According to the Wyoming Supreme Court, 
"the actual usability of the waters is alone the limit of the public's right to 
employ them.")3] Except in federally navigable waters, "the exclusive control 
of waters is vested in the state," and hence "[i]t follows that the state may lay 
down and follow such criteria for cataloguing waters as navigable or 
nonnavigable, as it sees fit, and the state may also decide the ownership of 
submerged lands, irrespective of the navigable or nonnavigable character of the 
waters above them." 132 As a result, state ownership of the waters themselves 
impresses those waters with a public trust. 133 The public can float craft down 
any waters so usable, regardless of bed ownership, and can scrape bottom, 
disembark, and pull the craft over shoals. 134 Moreover, members of the public 
125. UTAH CODE ANN.§ 73-1-J (2009). 
126. JJNP Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982). 
127. Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting JJNP Co., 655 P.2d at 
1137). 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 901. 
130. Id. at 901--02 (limiting criminal trespass liability for water users). 
131. Dayv.Annstrong,362P.2d 137, 143(Wyo. 1961). 
132. Id. at 143. 
133. Id. at 145. 
134. Id. at 14~6. 
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can hunt or fish while floating. 135 However, public use rights do not give the 
public the right to wade or walk on privately owned streambeds. 136 
C. The Emergence of Ecological Public Trust Doctrines in the West 
As in eastern states, 137 most western states have expanded the protected 
public rights in waters beyond the three acknowledged in Illinois Central 
Railroad-navigation, fishing, and commerce-to recreation and other public 
uses, including, in some states, aesthetics.1 38 Only Arizona (by statute)139 and 
Colorado (by case law 140) have intentionally limited public rights in waters, 
135. Id. at 147. 
136. Id. at 146. 
137. Craig, supra note 6, at 17-19. 
138. See. e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN.§ 38.05.965(13) (2004) (defining "navigable waters" to include 
waters that are usable for "floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public boating, trapping, 
hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes"); Marks v. 
Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) (noting that public trust rights "have been held to include the 
right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating, and general recreation purposes the navigable waters 
of the state, and to use the bottom of the navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes"); 
In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,448 (Haw. 2000) (recognizing broad public rights in 
its waters, noting that "the trust has traditionally preserved public rights of navigation, commerce, and 
fishing" but also mentioning "a wide range of recreational uses, including bathing, swimming, boating, 
and scenic viewing, as protected trust purposes"); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht 
Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Idaho 1983) (acknowledging recreation as a public trust right); Kansas 
v. Akers, 140 P. 637, 640 (Kan. 1914) (protecting "the purposes for which [submerged land] has been 
used from time immemorial, viz; the common right of passage, of fishing, of the use of the waters for 
domestic, agricultural, and commercial purposes"); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to 23-2-322, 85-1-
111, 85-1-112, 85-16-102, 87-2-305 (2009) (codifying public rights of recreation, fishing, and 
navigation); New Mexico ex rel. State Game Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 429-32 
(N.M. 1947) (recognizing public rights of recreation, sports, and fishing); J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. 
Sun Exploration & Prod. Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 140 (N.D. 1988) (recognizing bathing, swimming, 
fishing, and irrigation as protected public interests); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935-36 (Okla. 1969) 
(acknowledging that the public can have rights of boating, recreation, and fishing in waters that are not 
navigable under the federal title test); Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520, 523 (Or. App. 
1978), aff'd, 590 P.2d 709 (Or. 1979) (noting that public trust rights extend to recreation); Hillebrand v. 
Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (1937) (listing sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking 
water, and cutting ice as public uses)~ Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441,444 (Texas 1935) 
(noting that public rights include hunting, fishing, navigation, "and other lawful purposes"); JJNP Co. v. 
Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982) (noting that public rights include "the right to float leisure craft, 
hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water"); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 
P.2d 232,239 & n.7 (Wash. 1969) (holding that in navigable waters, the public has rights of navigation, 
"fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related recreational" rights, which probably include 
boating, bathing, fishing, fowling, skating, cutting ice, water skiing, and skin diving); Day v. Armstrong, 
362 P.2d 137, 145-47 (Wyo. 1961) (holding that the public can float craft down any waters so usable, 
regardless of bed ownership, and can scrape bottom, disembark, and pull the craft over shoals and can 
hunt or fish while floating). 
139. ARIZ. REV. STAT.§ 37-1130(9) (LexisNexis 2009). 
140. The Colorado Supreme Court has declared most streams in Colorado non-navigable. 
Stockman v. Leddy, 129 P. 220, 222 (Colo. 1912), ove"uled on other grounds, Denver Ass'n for 
Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975). In a non-navigable river, title 
to the bed and banks belongs to the private landowner, giving the landowner exclusive control over the 
vi.,ater and the right to exclude recreational users who would like to use the water for floating or fishing. 
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although neither Nebraska nor Nevada has yet fully developed its public trust 
law in this respect. 
Such expanded public rights, however, still remain focused on public uses 
of waters-not on the ecological and ecosystem services values of aquatic and 
other ecosystems. Indeed, with the emergence of pervasive statutory 
environmental and natural resources law in the 1970s and 1980s, both federal 
and state, the need for broader public trust principles to protect ecological 
values seemed highly questionable. Thus, Richard Lazarus concluded in 1986 
that the day of "final reckoning" for the doctrine is here, or soon will be, 
and reliance upon it is no longer in order .... [T]he law of standing, tort 
law, property law, administrative law, and the police power have all 
evolved in response to increased societal concern for and awareness of 
environmental and natural resources problems and are weaving a new and 
unified fabric for natural resources law. Whether these developments are 
viewed as totally independent of the doctrine or, alternatively, as somehow 
having subsumed the doctrine's principles does not matter. The conclusion 
is the same from either perspective: much of what the public trust doctrine 
offered in the past is now, at best, superfluous and, at worst, distracting and 
theoretically inconsistent with new notions of property and sovereignty 
developing in the current reworking of natural resources law. 141 
Nevertheless, scholars continue to assert the need for expanded public 
trust doctrines. For example, in 1991, Alison Rieser summarized the drive to 
broaden public trust concepts as follows: 
Due largely to recent decisions of the California courts, the notion that the 
public has a right to expect certain lands and natural areas to retain their 
natural characteristics is finding its way into American law. Through 
interpretation and expansion of the common law public trust doctrine, state 
courts are identifying governmental duties to redefine existing private 
property rights where such rights may threaten the ecological value of 
natural areas. Courts have subjected to this special duty primarily 
properties associated with navigable waters. Litigants and state agencies, 
however, appear poised and willing to invoke the public trust doctrine with 
respect to a number of other resources unrelated to navigation. Several 
public trust commentators-including Professor Joseph Sax, the modem 
doctrine's earliest and most prominent proponent-either urge or foresee a 
continuing expansion in the doctrine's scope. Some predict that courts will 
eventually apply public trust protections to all waterbodies, as well as to 
such diverse resources as old growth forests, mountains, and wildlife. 142 
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Colo. 1979) (upholding a criminal trespass conviction for 
floating down a non-navigable river). 
141. Lazarus, supra note 18, at 658. 
142. Alison Rieser, Ecological Preservation as a Public Property Right: An Emerging Doctrine in 
Search ofa Theory, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. R.Ev. 393, 393-94 (1991). See generally Susan Morath Homer, 
Embryo, Not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust in Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23 
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More recently, Mary Christina Wood has argued for comprehensively 
expanded public trust concepts in American environmental and natural 
resources law to address emerging environmental crises and the impacts of 
climate change.143 
Academic scholars' continuing revisitations of the public trust doctrine 
suggest that the doctrine can provide remedies to perceived shortcomings in 
environmental law and policy. Indeed, two drivers for these returns are 
discernible in the literature. First, scholars often turn to the public trust doctrine 
when they conclude that statutory law has not, in fact, been sufficient to protect 
the full gamut of public interests in the environment. 144 For example, in light of 
the acknowledged weaknesses in U.S. ocean and coastal law, 145 scholars with 
interests in these areas have repeatedly suggested the public ·trust doctrine as a 
means of better protecting coastal and marine resources. 146 Similarly, the 
public trust doctrine has been of interest to scholars promoting the relatively 
new-and hence statutorily slighted-conception of ecosystem services, 
(2000); Gary D. Meyers, Variations on a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include 
Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723, 728-35 (1989). 
143. Mary Christina Wood, Advancing the Sol'ereign Trust of Government to Safeguard the 
Enl'ironment for Present and Future Generations (Part I): Ecological Realism and the Need for a 
Pardign1 Shift, 39 ENVTL. L. 43, 43-45, 65-84 (2009). 
144. "Under the system of environmental statutory laws enacted in the United States over the past 
three decades, agencies at every jurisdictional level have gained nearly unlimited authority to manage 
natural resources and allow their destruction by private interests through permit systems." Id. at 44; see 
also id at 54--61 ( discussing the failed paradigm of environmental law). 
145. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2004); PEW OCEANS COMMISSION, AMERICA'S LIVING OCEANS: CHARTING A COURSE FOR 
SEA CHANGE (May 2003). 
146. See, e.g., Madeleine Reed, Seawalls and the Public Trust: Nal'igating the Tension between 
Private Property and Public Beach Use in the Face of Shoreline Erosion, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 
305 (2009); Turnipseed et al., supra note 24, at 1; F. Patrick Hubbard, The Impact of Lucas on Coastal 
Development: Background Principles, The Public Trust Doctrine, and Global Warming, 16 SE. ENVTL. 
L.J. 65 (2007); Hope M. Babcock, Grotius, Ocean Fish Ranching, and the Public Trust Doctrine: Ride 
'Em Charlie Tuna, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2007); Kevin J. Lynch, Note, Application of the Public 
Trust Doctrine to Modern Fishery Management Regimes, 15 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 285 (2007); Ewa M. 
Davison, Note, Enjoys Long Walks on the Beach: Washington's Public Trust Doctrine and the Right of 
Pedestrian Passage Over Private Tidelands, 81 WASH. L. REV. 813 (2006); Kim Diana Connolly, 
Bridging the Dil'ide: Examining the Role of the Public Trust in Protecting Coastal and Wetland 
Resources, 15 SE. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2006); J.C. Sylvan, How to Protect a Coral Reef The Public Trust 
Doctrine and the Law of the Sea, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 32 (2006); Kristen M. Fletcher, 
Regional Ocean Governance: The Role of the Public Trust Doctrine, 16 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 
·187 (2006); Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding Property Rights 
and the Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317 (2006); Monserrat Gorina-Yserri, World Ocean 
Public Trust: High Seas Fisheries After Grotius-Towards a New Ocean Ethos?, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. 
L. REV. 645 (2004); Donna R. Christie, Marine Resen•es, the Public Trust Doctrine and 
Intergenerational Equity, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 427 (2004); Robin Kundis Craig, Mobil Oil 
Exploration, Enl'ironmental Protection, and Contract Repudiation: It's Time to Recogni=e the Public 
Trust in the Outer Continental Shelf. 30 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 11,104 (2000). 
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acknowledging that ecosystems provide economically valuable services to 
human beings. 147 
Second, and more importantly, the articulation of a "public trust" 
encapsulates a more general values system for the environment and its 
ecosystems-an environmental ethos, if you will-that is longer-term in focus, 
more comprehensive in its considerations, and more willing to preserve purely 
public values than regulatocy law. Wood, for example, has recently argued that 
there is a need for a fundamental paradigm shift in environmental and natural 
resources law and has focused on the public trust doctrine as her model because 
it is "the most compelling beacon for a fundamental and rapid paradigm shift 
towards sustainability." 148 Moreover, the public trust doctrine provides one 
well-grounded legal mechanism for re-balancing private and public rights in the 
environment, and scholars increasingly perceive such a rebalancing to be 
necessary. 149 Thus, the legal recognition of a "public trust" provides both a 
rhetorically resonant articulation of the larger public interests in intact and 
functional ecosystems and a means of imposing broad duties on governments to 
act for the long-term preservation of ecosystems and other environmental 
values-what I have termed the ecological public trust. 150 
In many ways, however, the western states have anticipated these 
scholarly calls for the expansion of public trust concepts to the environment 
generally. While California is widely acknowledged to have evolved its public 
trust doctrine into an ecological public trust (at least when navigable waters are 
affected), it is not alone. Hawai'i has, if anything, an even broader ecological 
public trust doctrine than California, and other western states are more 
cautiously using public trust principles to expand the legally cognizable public 
values in the environment. 
The emergence of these ecological public trust doctrines represents the 
leading edge of public trust common law. However, the ecological public trust 
doctrines are also highly individualistic, underscoring the need for scholars to 
147. See, e.g., Patrick J. Connolly, Note, Saving Fish to Save the Bay: Public Trust Doctrine 
Protection/or Menhaden's Foundational Ecosystem Sen•ices in the Chesapeake Bay, 36 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 135 (2009); J.B. Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 5, at 223. 
148. Wood, supra note 143, at 45. 
149. See, e.g., Wood, supra note 24, at 117 (arguing that "thirty years of statutory law has produced 
an imbalanced picture in which public property rights are simply not in the equation," but that "public 
trust law springs from the property realm and forces an adjustment of private property rights and 
expectation to protect the people's property rights in common, vital assets"); see also Christine A. Klein, 
The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 
1158-67 (2007) (in the context of a nuisance law article, tracing the "supersizing.., of private property 
rights and the demonization of public rights, interests, and values in the environment in law, policy, and 
rhetoric to argue that public and private rights have become unbalanced in American culture and law). 
150. Professor Wood has called this "Nature's Trust." Wood, supra note 143, at 65-84. In the 
second of her two articles on this subject, she has discussed in detail the governmental obligations to 
protect natural resources that she would impose through this expanded public trust. See Wood, supra 
note 24, at 93-116. 
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acknowledge public trust doctrines in the plural and to actively discern and 
compare the common law evolutions of those doctrines in and among particular 
states. 
1. California 
It is no accident that Rieser tied the conception of an ecological public 
trust to California. In the 1971 case of Marks v. Whitney, the California 
Supreme Court announced: 
There is growing public recognition that one of the most important public 
uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands trust-is the 
preseivation of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as 
ecological units for scientific study, as open space, and as environments 
which provide food and habitat for birds and marine life, and which 
favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area. 151 
In connection with Lake Tahoe litigation, the court soon extended its 
recognition of ecological values to nontidal submerged lands as well, 
underscoring the human-created scarcity and fragility of these resources. It 
noted that "the [fresh water] shorezone has been reduced to a fraction of its 
original size in this state by the pressures of development. Such lands now 
cover less than one half of I percent of the state .... " 152 Moreover, 
The shorezone is a fragile and complex resource. It provides the 
environment necessary for the suivival of numerous types of fish (including 
salmon, steelhead, and striped bass), birds (such as the endangered species: 
the bald eagle and the peregrine falcon), and many other species of wildlife 
and plants. These areas are ideally suited for scientific study, since they 
provide a gene pool for the preseivation of biological diversity. In addition, 
the shorezone in its natural condition is essential to the maintenance of 
good water quality, and the vegetation acts as a buffer against floods and 
erosion. 153 
Thus, the California public trust doctrine extends to "environmental . 
purposes." 154 
California courts have extended public trust concepts not just to aquatic 
wildlife habitat, but also to the wildlife itself, 155 creating "two distinct public 
trust doctrines" in the state. 156 Wildlife "are natural resources of inestimable 
151. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,380 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted). 
152. California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256, 258-59 (Cal. 1981 ). 
153. Id. 
154. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Properties, 644 P.2d 792, 794 (Cal. 1982). 
155. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 596-98 (Cal. a. 
App. 2008) (citing Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Therrnalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989)). 
156. According to the California Supreme Court: 
First is the common law doctrine, which involves the government's "affirmative duty to take 
the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources . . . . " The 
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value to the community as a whole. Their protection and preservation is a 
public interest that is now recognized in numerous state and federal statutory 
provisions,"157 and those statutes generally define the contours of the public 
trust obligation regarding wildlife. 158 Members of the general public can sue to 
enforce the wildlife public trust as well as the navigable water public trust, 
because the public trust doctrine "places a duty upon the government to protect 
those resources."159 
Within the navigable waters trust, moreover, public trust interests can 
extend California's authority and duties beyond the navigable waters. For 
example, "[t]he state's right to protect fish is not limited to navigable or 
otherwise public waters but extends to any waters where fish are habitated or 
accustomed to resort and through which the have the freedom of passage to and 
from the public fishing grounds of the state."160 Similarly, in National 
Audubon Society v. Superior Court (the "Mono Lake case"), 161 the California 
Supreme Court determined that the public trust doctrine could restrict or 
require modifications in established water rights even in non-navigable 
tributaries of navigable waters. Withdrawals of water from Mono Lake's 
tributaries were imperiling "both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of 
Mono Lake . . . ."162 As a result, the public trust doctrine required 
second is a public trust duty derived from statute, specifically Fish and Gatne Code section 
711.7, pertaining to fish and wildlife: "The fish and wildlife resources are held in trust for the 
people of the state by and through the department." There is doubtless an overlap between 
the two public trust doctrines - the protection of water resources is intertwined with the 
protection of wildlife .... Nonetheless, the duty of government agencies to protect wildlife is 
primarily statutory. 
Envtl. Prot. & Infonnation Ctr. v. Cal. Dept of Forestry & Fire Prot., 187 P.3d 888, 926 (Cal. 2008) 
(quoting and citing Nafl Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983))~ see also Cal. 
Trout, Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (establishing 
that Fish and Grune Code § 5946 establishes a public trust rule but noting "that it does not follow from 
the application of the tenn 'public trust' to the state's interest in fisheries of non-navigable streams that 
all of the consequences of the public trust doctrine as applicable to navigable waters also apply to non-
navigable streams. For example, the beds of non-navigable streams are not owned by the state based 
upon a public trust fishery interest."). 
157. Ctr.for Biological Diversity, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 598. 
158. Id. at 599-600. 
159. Id. at 600-01. 
160. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n, 257 Cal. Rptr. at 840; see also People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 
48 P. 374, 399-401 (Cal. 1897) (noting that "the right and power to protect and preserve [fish] for the 
common use and benefit is one of the recognized prerogatives of the sovereign, coming to us from the 
common law" and asserting that the state's authority to protect fish for the public is not limited to fish in 
navigable waters~ "[t]o the extent that waters are the common passageway for fish, although flowing 
over lands entirely subject to private ownership, they are deemed for such purposes public waters, and 
subject to all laws of the state regulating the right of fishery"); Cal. Trout, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 212 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1989) (concluding "that a public trust interest pertains to non-navigable streams which sustain a 
fishery"). 
161. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983). 
162. Id. at 711. 
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modifications in the prior appropriation system. 163 Specifically, "the public 
trust doctrine ... protects navigable waters from harm caused by diversion of 
non-navigable tributaries," 164 and "when the public trust doctrine clashes with 
the rule of priority, the rule of priority must yield."165 
Nevertheless, despite its reputation as the vanguard of the ecological 
public trust doctrine movement, California does limit the breadth of its 
doctrine. In particular, the National Audubon rule does not apply to water 
withdrawals from purely non-navigable waters in the absence of an effect on 
navigable waters.1 66 Similarly, the California courts have declined to extend 
the National Audubon doctrine to groundwater. 167 Thus, despite having 
recognized a second, largely statutory, wildlife public trust doctrine, California 
maintains a connection between its ecological public trust doctrine and the 
traditional American source of public trust rights: state ownership of the beds 
and banks of navigable waters. 
2. Hawai'i 
Like California, Hawai'i recognizes two different public trust doctrines-
in Hawaii's case, the navigable water public trust doctrine and a unique public 
trust growing out of Hawaii's complex history and Native Hawaiian rights, 
known as the water resources public trust. Both have contributed to a broad 
ecological public trust perspective in the state that favors public rights over 
private. 
The Hawai'i water resources public trust doctrine has largely superseded 
the navigable waters public trust in the context of water rights and fresh waters. 
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has noted that in the Kingdom of Hawai'i, the 
right to water was reserved to the people for their common good in all land 
grants, and ownership of the water remained at all times in the people. 168 This 
sovereign reservation imposed a public trust on the water itself, similar to but 
different from the navigable waters public trust doctrine. 169 
163. Id. at 712, 727-28. 
164. Id. at 721. 
165. El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468,490 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
166. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836,839 (1989). 
167. Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868,884 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2003); Cal. Water Network v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, Civil Nos. B177978, B181463, 2006 WL 
726882, at * 11 (Cal. App. Dep 't Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that the public trust doctrine does not apply 
to groundwater or non-navigable waterways, absent some impact on navigable waters). 
168. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); see also Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310-11 (Haw. 1982). 
169. In re Water Use Pennit Applications, 9 P.3d at 441; Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310 (noting that 
this sovereign interest was more than just a police power interest; "[t]he nature of this ownership is thus 
akin to the title held by all states in navigable waterways"). 
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Given the limited availability of fresh water resources in Hawai'i, 
reassertion of this traditional water resources trust has been deemed critical, 
both as against assertions of riparian rights and in light of the Hawai'i Water 
Code and water use permits. With respect to riparian rights: 
The reassertion of donnant public interests in the diversion and application 
of Hawaii's waters has become essential with the increasing scarcity of the 
resource and recognition of the public's interests in the utilization and flow 
of these waters. . . . [W]hile there indeed exist relative usufructory rights 
among landowners, these rights can no longer be treated as though they are 
absolute and exclusive interests in the waters of our state. 170 
Instead, "underlying every private diversion and application there is, as there 
always has been, a superior public interest in this natural bounty." 171 Thus, the 
Hawai'i Supreme Court has clearly re-balanced public and private interests in 
these scarce resources in favor of the public. 
With respect to the Hawai'i Water Code, "[t]he public trust in the water 
resources of this state, like the navigable waters trust, has its genesis in the 
common law .... The [State Water] Code does not evince any legislative intent 
to abolish the common law public trust doctrine. To the contrary, . . . the 
legislature appears to have engrafted the doctrine wholesale in the Code."172 As 
a result, the Hawai'i Water Code "does not supplant the protections of the 
public trust doctrine," and "the public trust doctrine applies to all water 
resources without exception or distinction," including ground waters. 173 
As in California, Hawai' i may "revisit prior diversions and allocations, 
even those made with due consideration of their effect on the public trust," in 
implementing its water law. 174 Moreover, 
the constitutional requirements of "protection" and "conservation," the 
historical and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public 
rights, and the common reality of the "zero-sum" game between competing 
water uses demand that any balancing between public and private purposes 
begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment ... 
175 
As a result, the state water agency's decisions in favor of private uses of water 
are subject to "higher scrutiny."176 Finally, the state agency must consider the 
170. Robinson, 658 P.2d at 311. 
171. Id. at 312. 
172. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 443 (citations omitted). 
173. Id. at 445. 
174. Id. at 409,452 (citations omitted). 
175. Id at 454. 
176. Id.~ see also In re Water Use Permit Applications, 93 P.3d 643,650,657 (Haw. 2004) (noting 
that "because water is a public trust resource and the public trust is a state constitutional doctrine, this 
court recognizes certain qualifications to the standard of review regarding the Water Commission's 
decisions" and in effect imposes a burden on proposed users to justify their uses of water). 
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cwnulative impacts of diversions and "implement reasonable measures to 
mitigate this impact, including the use of alternative sources."177 
Importantly, according to the Hawai'i Supreme Court, "the maintenance 
of waters in their natural state constitutes a distinct 'use' under the water 
resources trust."178 Thus, this public trust doctrine encompasses ecological 
protection and preservation. To underscore that point, in expounding the water 
resources trust, the Hawai'i Supreme Court explicitly has followed the 
California Supreme Court's decision in National Audubon Society.179 
Unlike in California, however, both of Hawaii's two water-based public 
trusts are incorporated into the state's much broader constitutional public trust 
doctrine.180 The Hawai' i Constitution provides that: 
For the benefit of present and future generations, the State and its political 
subdivisions shall conserve and protect Hawaii's natural beauty and all 
natural resources, including land, water, air, minerals and energy sources, 
and shall promote the development and utilization of these resources in a 
manner consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-
sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust by the 
State for the benefit of the people. 181 
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has indicated that these more general 
constitutional public trust concepts extend to environmental and biodiversity 
protection, such as regulation of the Palila, an endangered bird. 182 In 2006, 
moreover, it explicitly connected the constitutionally incorporated navigable 
waters public trust doctrine to environmental protection when it held that the 
doctrine applies to the Hawai'i Department of Health's implementation of the 
federal Clean Water Act. Thus, when environmental groups asserted that the 
Department violated the public trust doctrine by failing to prevent a developer 
from violating state water quality standards for coastal waters, the court 
concluded that state issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System permits pursuant to the Clean Water Act are subject to the public trust 
doctrine and that the Department must ensure that water quality measures are 
actually being implemented. l 83 
3. Other States 
Other states besides California and Hawai'i have incorporated public trust 
principles into resource management and ecological conservation, although not 
177. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 409, 455 (citations omitted). 
178. Id. at 448. 
179. Id. at 452 (adopting the reasoning ofNat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 
(Cal. 1983)). 
180. Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1009, 1002 (Haw. 2006). 
181. HAW. CONST., art. XI,§ 1. 
182. Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 113 P.3d 172, 184 (Haw. 2005). 
183. Kelly, 140 P.3d at 1009, 101 I. 
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so extensively. For example, according to the Alaska Supreme Court, "(t]he 
public trust doctrine provides that the State holds certain resources (such as 
wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in trust for public use and that government 
owes a fiduciary duty to maintain such resources for the common good of the 
public as beneficiary."184 Moreover, while that court has made it clear that the 
navigable waters public trust doctrine per se does not extend to wildlife 
management, the state does have a duty under the Alaska Constitution to 
manage fish, wildlife, and water resources for the people's benefit, "to 
guarantee the common citizen participation in wildlife harvest, and to divest the 
[government] of exclusive entitlement to those resources."185 Thus, according 
to the Alaska Supreme Court: 
We have frequently compared the state's duties as set forth in Article VIII 
to a trust-like relationship in which the state holds natural resources such as 
fish, wildlife, and water in "trust" for the benefit of all Alaskans. Instead of 
recognizing the creation of a public trust in these clauses per se, we have 
noted that "the common use clause was intended to engraft in our 
constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish, wildlife, 
and water resources of the state." 186 
Nevertheless, in general, the State of Alaska cannot be liable in damages under 
the public trust doctrine for allowing the destruction of natural resources, such 
as when beetles destroy trees. 187 
There are also indications from the Texas courts that fish and other aquatic 
life are subject to public trust principles. As far back as 1942, the Texas Civil 
Court of Appeals declared: 
The waters of all natural streams of this State and all fish and other aquatic 
life contained in fresh water rivers, creeks, stream, and lakes or sloughs 
subject to overflow from rivers or other streams within the borders of this 
State, are declared to be the property of the State; and the Game, Fish and 
Oyster Commission has jurisdiction over and control over such rivers and 
aquatic life. The ownership is in trust for the people ... , and pollution of 
streams and water courses is condemned .... The Constitution of Texas, 
Art. 16, § 59(a) ... designates rivers and streams as natural resources, 
184. Baxley v. Alaska, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska 1998). Nevertheless, mining is not an activity 
protected by the public trust. Commercial uses protected under the Illinois Central Railroad decision are 
commerce in the sense of trade, traffic or transportation of goods over navigable waters, a 
meaning which does not include mining. Most importantly, a mining claim is not a "public 
use," but rather an exclusive, depleting use of a non-renewable resource for public profit. We 
believe that even the most expansive interpretation of the scope of public trust easements 
would not include private mining enterprises. 
Hayes v. A.J. Assocs., Inc., 846 P.2d 131, 133 (Alaska 1993). 
185. McDowell v. Alaska, 785 P.2d 1, 16 (Alaska 1989). 
186. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alaska 1999) (citation omitted). But see Pullen v. 
Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60 (Alaska 1996) (noting that the state has a trust responsibility to manage fish, 
wildlife, and water resources, including salmon). 
187. Brady v. Alaska, 965 P.2d I, 17 (Alaska 1998). 
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declares that such belong to the State, and expressly invests the Legislature 
with the preservation and conservation of such resources. 188 
In 2005, moreover, the court indicated that the public trust doctrine allows the 
state to "conserve natural resources."189 
Washington has also flirted with applying some version of a public trust 
doctrine to wildlife, especially shellfish. For example, the Washington Court of 
Appeals has stated that the public trust doctrine applies to the Washington 
Department of Natural Resources' regulation of shellfish, such as geoducks. 190 
Nevertheless, the Department's regulation of the commercial geoduck harvest 
did not violate the public trust doctrine despite the public right to fish, because: 
(1) the state must "balance the protection of the public's right to use resources 
on public land with the protection of the resources that enable these activities"; 
(2) the Department had not given up its control over the state's geoduck 
resources; and (3) the regulation facilitated sustainable geoduck harvesting and 
natural regeneration of the resource, serving the public interest.191 These 
conclusions thus fairly clearly suggest that Washington is beginning to connect 
public trust principles to sustainable development. 
Similarly to Washington, North Dakota has considered the role of the 
public trust doctrine with regard to more general ecological considerations but 
has nevertheless continued to confine the doctrine's application to water 
resources. The North Dakota Supreme Court acknowledged as early as 1976 
that "[i]t is evident that the Public Trust Doctrine is assuming an expanding 
role in environmental law."192 The public trust doctrine does not prohibit all 
development, and hence the State Engineer can grant permits to drain wetlands, 
especially when he studied the consequences, imposed permit conditions, and 
was subject to a public interest requirement. 193 Nevertheless, the public trust 
doctrine does limit the state's discretionary authority "to allocate vital state 
resources," as enunciated in Illinois Central Railroad. 194 Nor is the doctrine 
restricted to conveyances of submerged lands; "[t]he State holds the navigable 
waters, as well as the lands beneath them, in trust for the public," as provided in 
188. Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534,535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942). 
189. Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 17. 175 S.W.2d 34, 49 
(Tex. App. 2005). 
190. Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass•n v. Wash. State Dept. of Natural Res .• 101 P.3d 891,895 
(Wash. App. 2004). But see Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. Washington. 103 P.3d 203,205 
(Wash. App. 2004) ("No Washington case has applied the public trust doctrine to terrestrial wildlife or 
resources. But we need not decide whether the public trust doctrine applies [to prohibitions on terrestrial 
hunting and trapping] because, even if it does, Citizens' challenge fails." (emphasis added)). 
191. Wash. State Geoduck Han,est Ass 'n, 101 P.3d at 895, 896-97. 
192. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457, 463 
(N.D. 1976). 
193. In the Matter of the Application for Permits to Drain Related to Stone Creek Channel 
Improvements and White Spur Drain, 424 N.W.2d 894, 901 (N.D. 1988) (citing United Plainsmen 
Ass 'n, 247 N.W.2d at 463 (quoting Payne v. Kassab. 312 A.2d 86, 94 (Pa. Cmwlth 1973))). 
194. United Plainsmen Ass'n, 247 N.W.2d at 460. 
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the North Dakota Constitution and refined by statute. 195 As a result, "protecting 
the integrity of the waters of the State is a valid exercise of the [North Dakota 
Water Commission's] duties," allowing it, for example, to control the drainage 
of a lake. 196 
More general-but also more embryonic-discussions of an ecological 
public trust have also surfaced in South Dakota and Utah. The South Dakota 
Supreme Court has determined that the state's Environmental Protection Act 
embodies a broader public trust doctrine than the navigable waters public trust 
alone would allow. 197 This Act "authoriz[es] legal action to protect 'the air, 
water and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, 
impairment or destruction."' 198 Utah also appears to be extending its public 
trust doctrine to ecological protection, because, according to the Utah Supreme 
Court, "[t]he 'public trust' doctrine ... protects the ecological integrity of 
public lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at 
large." 199 
CONCLUSION 
In contrast to the many discussions over the years seeking to accurately 
describe "the" public trust doctrine, this Article argues that the contemporary 
power of public trust concepts lies not in tracing their historical bases but rather 
in embracing their status as varying and evolving state common law. Like any 
other category of state common law, such as early landlord/tenant law, tort law, 
or contract law, state public trust doctrines both reflect historic concerns and 
public policies-specifically, the particular public concerns regarding water in 
particular locations of the United States-and provide the states with an 
"ability to adapt to emerging societal needs. "200 State courts on both sides of 
the Hundredth Meridian have celebrated the flexible and evolutionary nature of 
their public trust doctrines,201 but scholars have been reluctant to embrace the 
rich mixture of approaches to balancing public and private rights in water and 
other natural resources that has emerged. 202 
195. Id. at 461 (also noting that "[w]e believe that§ 61-01-01, NDCC, expresses the Public Trust 
Doctrine."). 
196. N.D. State Water Comrn'n v. Bd. of Managers, 332 N.W.2d 254,258 (N.D. 1983). 
197. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 838 (S.D. 2004). 
198. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34A-10-1 (1973)). 
199. Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909,919 (Utah 1993). 
200. Wood, supra note 143, at 78. 
201. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971)~ Matthews v. Bay Head 
Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355,365 (N.J. 1984). 
202. See, e.g., David Takacs, The Public Trust Doctrine, Em•ironmental Hwnan Rights, and the 
Future of Private Property, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 711, 713-20 (2008) (laying out a singular public 
trust doctrine). See generally James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient Truths-A History of the 
Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y F. 1 (2007) (discussing at length the "mythical" 
history ofa singular American public trust doctrine). 
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The western states, ranging from Hawai' i and California on one end of a 
complex spectrum to Arizona and Colorado on the other, provide a particularly 
instructive diversity of approaches to the recognition (or not) of public rights 
in, and the public values of, water and other aspects of the environment. In 
comparing the public trust doctrines of the western states, moreover, four 
factors emerge as most important in the evolution of state public trust doctrines. 
First, the severing of water rights from real property ownership and the riparian 
rights doctrine freed these states from one set of potentially confining private 
property rights. Second, subsequent state declarations of public ownership of 
fresh water allow western states' public trust doctrines to operate independently 
of state title to submerged lands and federal pronouncements regarding "the" 
public trust doctrine. Third, perceptions of shortages of fresh water, submerged 
lands, and environmental amenities have prompted increased interest, 
compared to the East, in preserving the public values in these resources. 
Finally, the willingness of most western states to raise water and other 
environmental issues to constitutional status and/or to incorporate broad public 
trust mandates into statutes has encouraged their courts to evolve water-based 
public trust principles into expanding ecological public trust doctrines. 
As the most recent cases demonstrate, and despite occasional limiting 
interventions by states legislatures (as in Idaho), the evolution of western state 
public trust doctrines is not slowing. Instead, in true common law fashion, state 
courts are using state public trust doctrines to respond to particular and 
emerging state needs-the loss of native species and critical need to protect 
coastal waters in Hawai'i; profound conflicts between appropriators, species, 
and ecological values in California; and the perhaps climate-change driven 
appearance of new publicly usable water resources in South Dakota. While 
such evolutions and expansions complicate the identity-indeed, the very 
existence-of any unitary, national, perhaps Constitution-based public trust 
doctrine, they also provide place-based balancings of public and private needs 
and values in that most basic of natural resources-fresh water-that may 
better serve the long-term interests of the nation as a whole. 
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APPENDIX: SUMMARIES OF INDNIDUAL STATE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINES 
ALASKA 
Date of Statehood: 1959 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation 
Alaska Constitution: Alaska has constitutionalized some of the access and 
use rights guaranteed by the public trust doctrine. Article VIII of the Alaska 
Constitution governs natural resources, including waters and submerged lands. 
Relevant provisions of this Article include: 
• § I: "It is the policy of the State to encourage the settlement of its 
land and the development of its resources by making them available 
for maximum use consistent with the public interest." 
• § 2: "The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development, 
and conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State, 
including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people." 
• § 3: "Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and 
waters are reserved to the people for common use." 
• § 5: "The legislature may provide for facilities, improvements, and 
services to assure greater utilization, development, reclamation, and 
settlement of lands, and to assure fuller utilization and development 
of fisheries, wildlife, and waters." 
• § 6: "Lands and interests therein, including submerged and tidal 
lands, possessed or acquired by the State, and not used or intended 
exclusively for governmental purposes, constitute the state public 
domain. The legislature shall provide for the selection of lands 
granted to the State by the United States, and for the administration 
of the state public domain." 
• § 8: "The legislature may provide for the leasing of, and the 
issuance of permits for exploration of, any part of the public domain 
or interest therein, subject to reasonable concurrent uses. Leases and 
permits shall provide, among other conditions, for payment by the 
party at fault for damage or injury arising from noncompliance with 
terms governing concurrent use, and for forfeiture in the event of 
breach of conditions." 
• § 9: "Subject to the provisions of this section, the legislature may 
provide for the sale or grant of state lands, or interests therein, and 
establish sales procedures. All sales or grants shall contain such 
reservations to the State of all resources as may be required by 
Congress or the State and shall provide for access to these resources. 
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Reservation of access shall not unnecessarily impair the owners' 
use, prevent the control of trespass, or preclude compensation for 
damages." 
• § 13: "All surface and subsurface waters reserved to the people for 
common use, except mineral and medicinal waters, are subject to 
appropriation. Priority of appropriation shall give prior right. Except 
for public water supply, an appropriation of water shall be limited to 
stated purposes and subject to preferences among beneficial uses, 
concurrent or otherwise, as prescribed by law, and to the general 
reservation of fish and wildlife." 
• 
• 
§ 14: "Free access to the navigable or public waters of the State, as 
defined by the legislature, shall not be denied any citizen of the 
United States or resident of the State, except that the legislature may 
by general law regulate and limit such access for other beneficial 
uses or public purposes." 
§ 15: "No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be 
created or authorized in the natural waters of the State. This section 
does not restrict the power of the State to limit entry into any fishery 
for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic distress 
among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood 
and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the 
State." 
Alaska Statutes: 
• ALASKA STAT. § 38.04.062: In general, "the state owns all 
submerged land underlying navigable water to which title passed to 
the state at the time the state achieved statehood under the equal 
footing doctrine" or under the federal Submerged Lands Act of 
1953.203 The Commissioner must make a list of all waters deemed 
navigable or nonnavigable by state or federal agencies or courts, but 
"[w]ater not included on the lists ... is not considered either 
navigable or nonnavigable until the commissioner has made a 
determination as to its navigability at the time the state achieved 
statehood."204 However, submerged lands that the state conveyed 
pursuant to state statute are not governed by this section.205 
"Navigable water," for purposes of this statute, is "water that, at the 
time the state achieved statehood, was used, or was susceptible of 
being used, in its ordinary condition as a highway for commerce 
over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted in 
the customary modes of trade and travel on water; the use or 
203. ALASKA STAT.§ 38.04.062(a) (2009) (referencing 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1953)). 
204. Id § 38.04.062(b), (c), (d). 
205. Id. § 38.04.062(f). 
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potential use does not need to have been without difficulty, 
extensive, or long and continuous .... "206 
• ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.126: This statute recognizes the public trust 
doctrine in Alaska, declaring that: (a) "[t]he people of the state have 
a constitutional right to free access to and use of the navigable or 
public water of the state"; (b) "that state holds and controls all 
navigable or public water in trust for the use of the people of the 
state"; (c) "(o]wnership of land bordering navigable or public water 
does not grant an exclusive right to the use of the water and a right 
of title to the land below the ordinary high water mark is subject to 
the rights of the people of the state to use and have access to the 
water for recreational purposes or other public purposes for which 
the water is used or capable of being used consistent with the public 
trust"; and (d) nothing in this statute "a:ffect[s] or abridge[s] valid 
existing rights or create a right or privilege of the public to cross or 
enter private land." 
• ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.127: Before the state can sell, lease, grant, or 
otherwise dispose of lands adjacent to water, the Commissioner 
must determine whether the water is a navigable water, a public 
water, or neither. If the water is navigable or public, the state must 
"provide for the specific easements or rights-of-way necessary to 
ensure free access to and along the body of water, unless the 
commissioner finds that regulation or limiting access is necessary 
for other beneficial uses or public purposes." 
• ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.128: No person may obstruct a navigable 
water or interfere with others' use of that water unless authorized by 
state or federal law. "An unauthorized obstruction or interference is 
a public nuisance and is subject to abatement." Moreover, "[f]ree 
passage or use of any navigable water includes the right to use land 
below the ordinary high water mark to the extent reasonably 
necessary to use the navigable water consistent with the public 
trust," and "[f]ree passage or use of any navigable water includes 
the right to enter adjacent land above the ordinary high water mark 
as necessary to portage around obstacles or obstructions to travel on 
the water .... " 
• ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.825: "Unless the commissioner finds that the 
public interest in retaining state ownership of the land clearly 
outweighs the municipality's interest in obtaining the land, the 
commissioner shall convey to a municipality tide or submerged land 
requested by the municipality that is occupied or suitable for 
occupation and development," so long as the land is within or 
contiguous to the municipality and "use of the land would not 
unreasonably interfere with navigation or public access." 
206. Id.§ 38.04.062(g). 
95 
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ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.965: This statute defines "navigable water" 
for purposes other than state title and also distinguishes "navigable 
water'' and "public water." "Navigable water" is "any water of the 
state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek, bay, sound, 
estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other body 
of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or 
subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful 
public purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for 
commercial navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of 
aircraft, and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic 
animals, fishing, or other public recreational purposes .... "207 
"Public water" is "navigable water and all other water, whether 
inland or coastal, fresh or salt, that is reasonably suitable for public 
use and utility, habitat for fish and wildlife in which there is a public 
interest, or migration and spawning of fish in which there is a public 
interest . . . ."208 The statue also includes other definitions of 
relevance to the state public trust: "shoreland" is "land belonging to 
the state which is covered by nontidal water that is navigable under 
the laws of the United States up to ordinary high water mark"; 
"submerged land" is "land covered by tidal water between the line 
of mean low water and seaward to a distance of three geographical 
miles or further as may hereafter be properly claimed by the state"; 
and "tideland" is "land that is periodically covered by tidal water 
between the elevation of mean high water and mean low water ... 
,,209 
ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.010-46.15.270: Alaska Water Use Act. 
"Wherever occurring in a natural state, the water is reserved to the 
people for common use and is subject to appropriation and 
beneficial use and to reservation of instream flows and levels of 
water, as provided in this chapter."210 Reservations are allowed for 
fish.211 Appropriations are subject to a public interest review, which 
includes "the effect on fish and game resources and on public 
recreational opportunities" and "the effect upon access to navigable 
or public water."212 Moreover, the Act allows reservations of water 
or instream flows to "protect ... fish and wildlife habitat, migration, 
and propagation," for "recreation and park purposes," for 
"navigation and transportation purposes," and for "sanitary and 
water quality purposes."213 
207. Id. § 38.05.965(13). 
208. Id § 38.05.965(18). 
209. Id. § 38.05.965(20), (22), (23). 
210. Id§ 46.15.030. 
211. Id § 46.15.035(c). 
212. Id.§ 46.15.080(b)(3), (8). 
213. Id. § 46.15.145(a). 
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Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
By statute, Alaska has adopted the federal title definition of "navigable 
water" to identify the waters for which the state owns the bed and banks. Thus, 
"navigable water" for state title purposes is 
water that, at the time the state achieved statehood, was used, or was 
susceptible of being used, in its ordinary condition as a highway for 
commerce over which trade and travel were or could have been conducted 
in the customary modes of trade and travel on water; the use or potential 
use does not need to have been without difficulty, extensive, or long and 
continuous .... 214 
For other purposes, including public rights in waters, a "navigable water" is 
any water of the state forming a river, stream, lake, pond, slough, creek, 
bay, sound, estuary, inlet, strait, passage, canal, sea or ocean, or any other 
body of water or waterway within the territorial limits of the state or 
subject to its jurisdiction, that is navigable in fact for any useful public 
purpose, including but not limited to water suitable for commercial 
navigation, floating of logs, landing and takeoff of aircraft, and public 
boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, fishing, or other 
public recreational purposes .... 215 
In addition, the public has rights in "public waters," which by statute include 
not only navigable waters but also "all other water, whether inland or coastal, 
fresh or salt, that is reasonably suitable for public use and utility, habitat for 
fish and wildlife in which there is a public interest, or migration and spawning 
of fish in which there is a public interest .... "216 
Because of federal reservations, however, Alaska did not acquire title to 
the submerged lands within the boundary of the National Petroleum Reserve or 
the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge.217 Nor does Alaska hold title to the lower 
inlet of Cook Inlet.218 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
In general, the state owns the beds of the navigable waters "up to the 
ordinary high-water mark."219 However, the public has rights of access and use 
214. Id.§ 38.04.062(g). 
215. Id. § 38.05.965(13). 
216. Id§ 38.05.965(18). 
217. United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. l, 36-46 (1996). 
218. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184, 200-04 (1975). 
219. Alaska Dep't of Natural Res. v. Panlcratz, 538 P.2d 984, 988 (AJaska 1975); see also Panlcratz 
v. Alaska Dep't of Highways, 652 P.2d 68, 73 (Alaska 1982) (noting that "it is clear that a state has title 
to land underlying navigable waters up to the mean high water mark"). 
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to both state-defined navigable and public waters, even if the landowner owns 
below the high-water mark.220 
In its case law regarding public uses, Alaska remains closely aligned with 
the principles set forth in Illinois Central Railroad. For example, tidelands "are 
subject to the public's right to use tidelands for navigation, commerce, and 
fishing."221 However, by statute, Alaska deems state "navigable waters" to 
include waters that are usable for "floating of logs, landing and takeoff of 
aircraft, and public boating, trapping, hunting waterfowl and aquatic animals, 
fishing, or other public recreational purposes,"222 suggesting that these uses are 
also protected under the state public trust doctrine. No person may obstruct a 
navigable water or interfere with others' use of that water unless authorized by 
state or federal law,223 and "[a]n unauthorized obstruction or interference is a 
public nuisance and is subject to abatement."224 Moreover, "[f]ree passage or 
use of any navigable water includes the right to use land below the ordinary 
high water mark to the extent reasonably necessary to use the navigable water 
consistent with the public trust," and "[f]ree passage or use of any navigable 
water includes the right to enter adjacent land above the ordinary high water 
mark as necessary to portage around obstacles or obstructions to travel on the 
water .... "225 
Also in line with Illinois Central Railroad, conveyances of tidelands to 
private owners generally convey only "naked title," and the tidelands remain 
subject to the public trust unless the conveyance meets the Illinois Central 
Railroad criteria-"first, whether the conveyance was made in furtherance of 
some specific public trust purpose and, second, whether the conveyance can be 
made without substantial impairment of the public's interest in state 
tidelands."226 No such intent is present in § 38.05.820 of the Alaska statutes, 
especially in light of Article VIII, § 3 of the Alaska Constitution, so those 
conveyed tidelands remain subject to the public trust.227 Moreover, even 
conveyances of tidelands to municipalities pursuant to § 38.05.825 remain 
subject to the public trust; "[t]he conveyance transfer to the municipality the 
state's right to use and manage the tidelands, but does not confer the right to 
sell of dispose of the lands or exempt them from the public trust doctrine."228 
In terms of resource protection, "[t]he public trust doctrine provides that 
the State holds certain resources (such as wildlife, minerals, and water rights) in 
trust for public use and that government owes a fiduciary duty to maintain such 
220. ALASKA STAT.§ 38.05.126. 
221. City of St. Paul v. Alaska Dep't of Natural Res., 137 P.3d 261,263 n.8 (Alaska 2006). 
222. ALASKA STAT.§ 38.05.965(13). 
223. Id.§ 38.05.128. 
224. Id. 
225. Id. 
226. CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1118-19 (Alaska 1988). 
227. City of St. Paul v. Alaska Dep't of Natural Res., 137 P.3d 261 (Alaska 2006). 
228. Id. 
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resources for the common good of the public as bene:ficiary."229 Nevertheless, 
mining is not an activity protected by the public trust. Commercial uses 
protected under the Illinois Central Railroad decision are 
commerce in the sense of trade, traffic or transportation of goods over 
navigable waters, a meaning which does not include mining. Most 
importantly, a mining claim is not a 'public use,' but rather an exclusive, 
depleting use of a non-renewable resource for public profit. We believe that 
even the most expansive interpretation of the scope of public trust 
easements would not include private mining enterprises.230 
The public trust doctrine per se does not extend to wildlife management, 
although the state does have a duty under Article VIII, § 3 of the Alaska 
Constitution to manage fish, wildlife, and water resources for the people's 
benefit, "to guarantee the common citizen participation in wildlife harvest, and 
to divest the [government] of exclusive entitlement to those resources."231 
According to the Alaska Supreme Court: 
We have frequently compared the state's duties as set forth in Article VIII 
to a trust-like relationship in which the state holds natural resources such as 
fish, wildlife, and water in "trust" for the benefit of all Alaskans. Instead of 
recognizing the creation of a public trust in these clauses per se, we have 
noted that "the common use clause was intended to engraft in our 
constitution certain trust principles guaranteeing access to the fish, wildlife, 
and water resources of the state."232 
Access rights are equal for both personal and professional fishing.233 However, 
in general, the state cannot be liable in damages under the public trust doctrine 
for allowing the destruction of natural resources, such as when beetles 
destroyed trees.234 
ARIZONA 
Date of Statehood: 1912 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation 
Arizona Constitution: Article XVII of the Arizona Constitution governs water 
rights. Relevant provisions include: 
229. Baxley v. Alaska, 958 P.2d 422, 434 (Alaska 1998). 
230. Hayes v. A.J. Assocs., Inc., 846 P.2d 131, 133 (Alaska 1993). 
231. McDowell v. State, 785 P.2d 1, 16 (Alaska 1989). 
232. Brooks v. Wright, 971 P.2d 1025, 1031 (Alaska 1999) (citation omitted). But see Pullen v. 
Ulmer, 923 P.2d 54, 60 (Alaska 1996) (noting that the state has a trust responsibility to manage fish, 
wildlife, and water resources, including salmon). 
233. Owsichek v. Alaska Guide Licensing & Control Bd., 763 P.2d 488, 497 (Alaska 1988). 
234. Brady v. State, 965 P.2d 1, 17 (Alaska 1998). 
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• § 1: "The common law doctrine of riparian water rights shall not 
obtain or be of any force or effect in the State.'' 
• § 2: "All existing rights to the use of any of the waters in the State 
for all useful or beneficial purposes are hereby recognized and 
confirmed." 
Arizona Statutes: 
• ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 37-1130 to 37-1156: State Claims to 
Streambeds. These provisions establish the Arizona Navigable 
Stream Adjudication Commission, which acts as an advocate for the 
public trust.235 The Commission issues a determination of 
navigability after a public hearing and issues a report on the public 
trust values of any navigable stream or watercourse.236 Its 
determinations are subject to judicial review.237 A determination of 
non-navigability relinquishes the state's claims to the bed and 
banks. 238 The state can appropriate water "to maintain and protect 
public trust values," but only by complying with the normal 
requirements for an appropriation.239 The statute also provides for 
refunds of taxes and purchase prices, and compensation for 
improvements to landowners who "lose" title to the beds of waters 
determined to be navigable.24° Finally, the statutes provide a 
petition process to release public trust status.241 In these provisions, 
"navigable watercourse" "means a watercourse that was in existence 
on February 14, 1912, and at that time was used or was susceptible 
to being used, in its ordinary and natural condition, as a highway for 
commerce, over which trade and travel were or could have been 
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water."242 
The state generally owns the beds and banks of navigable 
watercourses to the ordinary high watermark.243 "Public trust land" 
is "the portion of the bed of a watercourse that is located in this state 
and that is determined to have been a navigable watercourse as of 
February 14, 1912. Public trust land does not include land held by 
this state pursuant to any other trust."244 "Public trust purposes" and 
"public trust values" are "commerce, navigation, and fishing."245 
235. Aruz. REV. STAT.§ 37-1121 (LexisNexis 2009). 
236. Id. § 37-1128. 
237. Id. § 37-1129. 
238. Id.§ 37-1130. 
239. Id. 
240. Id.§ 37-1132. 
241. Id. § 37-1151. 
242. Id. § 37-1101(5). 
243. Id.§ 37-1101(6). 
244. Id.§ 37-1101(8). 
245. Id § 37-1101 (9). 
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"Watercourse" does not include man-made water conveyance 
systems. 246 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 45-101 to 45-343: Department of Water 
Resources and Appropriation. "The waters of all sources, flowing in 
streams, canyons, ravines, or other natural channels, or in definite 
underground channels, whether perennial or intermittent, flood, 
waste or surplus water, and of lakes, ponds and springs on the 
surface, belong to the public and are subject to appropriation and 
beneficial use as provided in this chapter."247 Arizona's water law 
creates a hierarchy of the relative value of uses of water: (1) 
domestic and municipal; (2) irrigation and stock watering; (3) power 
and mining; ( 4) recreation and wildlife, including fish; and (5) 
nonrecoverable water storage.248 In the 1995 laws discussing these 
provisions, "the legislature declares that it does not intend to create 
an implication that the public trust doctrine applies to water rights in 
this state. "249 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
101 
By statute, Arizona limits "navigable waters"-and its public trust 
doctrine-to those waters subject to the federal equal footing doctrine. As such, 
a navigable watercourse for purposes of both state title and the application of 
the public trust doctrine is 
a watercourse that was in existence on February 14, 1912, and at that time 
was used or was susceptible to being used, in its ordinary and natural 
condition, as a highway for commerce, over which trade and travel were or 
could have been conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on 
water.250 
"Public trust lands" are limited to the beds of these navigable watercourses.251 
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the 
Colorado River in Arizona is navigable, and that Arizona owns the beds and 
banks of that river.252 
246. Id.§ 37-1101(11). 
241. Id.§ 45-14l(A). 
248. Id. § 45-157(B). 
249. 1995 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 9, § 25(B). 
250. AR!Z. REV. STAT.§ 37-1101(5). 
251. Id. § 37-1101(8). 
252. Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313,319 (1973) (noting that Arizona holds title to the 
bed of the Colorado River), overruled on other grounds, Or. ex rel. State Lands Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & 
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370-72 (1977); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423, 452-54 (1931) (holding 
that the Colorado River below Black Canyon is navigable). 
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Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
The state's title to the beds and banks of navigable waters, like the 
Colorado River, extends up to the ordinary high water mark.253 This line is 
defined by soil and vegetation, 254 but is not "the line reached by the water in 
unusual floods. "255 
By statute, Arizona limits "public trust purposes" and "public trust values" 
to the three uses recognized in Illinois Central Railroad: commerce, navigation, 
and fishing.256 Moreover, while the state can appropriate water to promote 
these uses, it must follow the normal appropriation requirements and does not 
receive any preference in priority.257 However, the Arizona Court of Appeals 
recently emphasized in connection with the Central Arizona Water 
Conservation District that landowners take their properties subject to existing 
and initiated water rights,258 suggesting that the public trust doctrine can 
insulate the state from regulatory takings claims. 
Like many western states, Arizona manages groundwater under a different 
regulatory regime-the Groundwater Management Act of 1980-than it 
manages surface water rights. The Arizona courts have determined that the 
state public trust doctrine does not apply to the Groundwater Management 
Act.259 As a result, the public trust doctrine cannot influence the establishment 
of rights to pump groundwater in Arizona. 
Since 1987, Arizona's legislature has engaged in numerous efforts to 
restrict the public trust doctrine's application in the state, only to be thwarted 
repeatedly by the Arizona courts. The controversy began in 1985, when 
Arizona officials began asserting state ownership rights in the beds of the 
state's navigable waters based on the federal equal footing doctrine; until that 
time, the Colorado River had been the state's only equal footing/public trust 
claim.260 In 1987, the legislature responded with H.B. 2017, which attempted 
to relinquish most of Arizona's title claims through an "uncompensated 
quitclaim of the state's equal footing interest in all watercourses other than the 
Colorado, Gila, Salt, and Verde Rivers and in all lands formerly within those 
253. State v. Bonelli Cattle Co., 495 P.2d 1312, 1313 (Ariz. 1972). 
254. Id. at 1314. 
255. Id. at l3l 5. 
256. AruZ. REV. STAT.§ 37-1101(9). 
257. Id.§ 37-1130. 
258. S. W. Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Cent. Arizona Water Conservation Dist., 212 P.3d 1, 4 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2008); W. Maricopa Combine, Inc. v. Arizona Dep't of Water Res., 26 P.3d 1171, 1180 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2001). 
259. Seven Springs Randt, Inc. v. State ex rel. Arizona Dep't of Water Res., 753 P.2d 161, 165-66 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1987). 
260. For additional information about the controversy, see Tracey Dickman Zobenica, The Public 
Trust Doctrine in Arizona's Streambeds, 38 AruZ. L. R.Ev. 1053, 1059-78 (1996). 
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rivers but outside their current beds."261 The Arizona Court of Appeals held 
many of the relevant provisions unconstitutional.262 It declared that every 
future land patent includes the equal footing interest, that the standard of 
navigability is federal, and that navigability is established as of the date of 
statehood.263 Relying on Illinois Central Railroad, moreover, the Court of 
Appeals declared that "the state's responsibility to administer its watercourse 
lands for the public benefit is an inabrogable attribute of statehood itself," and 
"the state must administer its interest in lands subject to the public trust 
consistently with trust purposes. "264 
In 1995, the legislature amended Arizona's water law to include a 
provision stating: 
The public trust is not an element of a water right in an adjudication 
proceeding held pursuant to this article. In adjudicating attributes of water 
rights pursuant to this article, the court shall not make a determination as to 
whether public trust values are associated with any or all of the river 
system or resource.265 
The Arizona Supreme Court found these provisions unconstitutional.266 
Finally, in 1998, after fact-finding by the Arizona Navigable Stream 
Adjudication Commission pursuant to 1994 amendments to Arizona's water 
law, the Arizona legislature enacted S.B. 1126. This statute "disclaim[ed] the 
state's 'right, title, or interest based on navigability and the equal footing 
doctrine' to the bed lands of the Agua Fria, New, Hassayampa, and Lower Salt 
Rivers, as well as Skunk Creek" and Verde River, based on an overly 
constricted definition of "navigable."267 The Arizona Court of Appeals found 
that S.B. 1126 violated both the gift clause in Arizona's Constitution and the 
public trust doctrine.268 Moreover, with respect to the public trust, the court 
held that the legislature had to apply the navigability test from The Daniel 
Ba//,269 to determine what qualified as a "navigable water," and that the 
legislature had constructed a much more constrained test for navigability than 
the Daniel Ball standard.270 Because federal law under the equal footing 
doctrine presumes that the state has title to beds and banks of navigable waters, 
federal law preempted S.B. 1126.271 
261. Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Public Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1991). 
262. Id. at 173. 
263. Id. at 163-65. 
264. Id at 168. 
265. ARiz. REV. STAT.§ 45-263(B) (LexisNexis 2009). 
266. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 
(Ariz. 1999). 
267. Defenders of Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P.3d 722, 727 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001). 
268. Id. at 729. 
269. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (IO Wall.) 557 (1870). 
270. Id. at 730-37. 
271. Id. at 737. 
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This litigation made clear that the Arizona courts view the public trust 
doctrine as a federal constitutional issue because the equal footing doctrine is 
grounded in the U.S. Constitution272 : 
The public trust doctrine is a constitutional limitation on legislative power 
to give away resources held by the state in trust for its people. The 
Legislature cannot order the courts to make the doctrine inapplicable to 
these or any other proceedings .... It is for the courts to decide whether the 
public trust doctrine is applicable to the facts. The Legislature cannot by 
legislation destroy the constitutional limits on its authority .273 
As such, the state has a duty to assert its ownership interest in navigable or 
potentially navigable waters, and the courts will remand cases where the state 
has not done so.274 For example, estoppel may not be asserted to defeat the 
public interest in navigable waters.275 
CALIFORNIA 
Date of Statehood: 1850 
Water Law System: California Doctrine-mostly prior appropriation, but 
with recognition of some riparian rights 
California Constitution: Several provisions of the California Constitution 
embody or are otherwise relevant to the state's public trust doctrine. Article X, 
for example, governs water, Article XA governs water resources development, 
and Article XB contains the Marine Resources Protection Act of 1990. 
Especially relevant provisions of these and other articles include: 
• Art. I, § 25: "The people shall have the right to fish upon and from 
the public lands of the State and in the waters thereof, excepting 
upon lands set aside for fish hatcheries, and no land owned by the 
State shall ever be sold or transferred without reserving in the 
people the absolute right to fish thereupon; and no law shall ever be 
passed making it a crime for the people to enter upon the public 
lands within this State for the purpose of fishing in any water 
containing fish that have been planted therein by the State; 
provided, that the Legislature may by statute, provide for the season 
when and the conditions under which the different species of fish 
may be taken." 
• Art. X, § 1: "The right of eminent domain is hereby declared to exist 
in the State to all frontages on the navigable waters of this State." 
272. See Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Public Interest, 837 P.2d 158, 161-62 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991). 
273. San Carlos Apache Tribe v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 972 P.2d 179, 199 
(Ariz. 1999) (citing Arizona Ctr.for Law in the Public Interest, 837 P.2d at 166-68). 
274. Calmat of Ariz. v. State ex rel. Miller, 836 P.2d 1010, 1020-21 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992). 
275. Id. at 1021. 
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Art. X, § 2: "It is hereby declared that because of the conditions 
prevailing in this State the general welfare requires that the water 
resources of the State be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of 
which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable use or 
unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the 
conservation of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the 
reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people 
and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of 
water in or from any natural stream or water course in this State is 
and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for 
the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not 
e>..1end to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of 
use or unreasonable method of diversion of water. Riparian rights in 
a stream or water course attach to, but to no more than so much of 
the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently with this 
section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may be made 
adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, 
however, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as 
depriving any riparian owner of the reasonable use of water of the 
stream to which the owner's land is riparian under reasonable 
methods of diversion and use, or as depriving any appropriator of 
water to which the appropriator is lawfully entitled." 
• Art. X, § 3: "All tidelands within two miles of any incorporated city, 
city and county, or town in this State, and fronting on the water of 
any harbor, estuary, bay, or inlet used for the purposes of 
navigation, shall be withheld from grant or sale to private persons, 
partnerships, or corporations; provided, however, that any such 
tidelands, reserved to the State solely for street purposes, which the 
Legislature finds and declares are not used for navigation purposes 
and are not necessary for such purposes may be sold to any town, 
city, county, city and county, municipal corporations, private 
persons, partnerships or corporations subject to such conditions as 
the Legislature determines are necessary to be imposed in 
connection with any such sales in order to protect the public 
• 
interest." 
Art. X, § 4: "No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or 
possessing the frontage or tide lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, 
or other navigable water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude 
the right of way to such water whenever it is required for any public 
purpose, nor to destroy or obstruct the free navigation of such water; 
and the Legislature shall enact such laws as will give the most 
liberal construction of this provisions, so that access to the 
navigable waters of this State shall always be attainable for the 
people thereof." 
105 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2-CRAIG 
106 
• 
• 
• 
• 
3/8/2010 4:30:53PM 
ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 37:53 
Art. X., § 5: "The use of all water now appropriated, or that may 
hereafter be appropriated, for sale, rental, or distribution, is hereby 
declared to be a public use, and subject to the regulation and control 
of the State, in the manner to be prescribed by law." 
Art. XA, § 3: "No water shall be available for appropriation by 
storage in, or by direct diversion from, any of the components of the 
California Wild and Scenic River System, as such system exists on 
January 1, 1981, where such appropriation is for export of water 
into another major hydrologic basin of the state, _ . . unless such 
export is expressly authorized prior to such appropriation be: (a) an 
initiative statute approved by the electors, or (b) the Legislature, by 
statute passed in each house by roll call vote entered in the journal, 
two-thirds of the membership concurring." 
Art. XB, § 14: "Prior to January 1, 1994, the Fish and Game 
Commission shall establish four new ecological reserves in ocean 
waters along the mainland coast. Each ecological reserve shall have 
a surface area of at least two square miles. The commission shall 
restrict the use of these ecological reserves to scientific research 
relating to the management and enhancement of marine reserves." 
Art. XB, § 15: "This article does not preempt or supersede any other 
closures to protect any other wildlife, including sea otters, whales, 
and shorebirds." 
California Statutes: 
• 
• 
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6301 to 6369.3: Administration and 
Control of Swamp, Overflowed, Tide, or Submerged Lands, and 
Structures Thereon. These provisions give "exclusive jurisdiction 
over all ungranted tidelands and submerged lands owned by the 
State" to the State Lands Commission.276 Any exchanges of lands 
that are subject to the public trust doctrine must ensure that the lands 
acquired "will provide a significant benefit to the public trust" and 
that "the exchange does not substantially interfere with public rights 
of navigation and fishing. "277 
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200 to 1248: Appropriation. "All water 
flowing in any natural channel, excepting so far as it has been or is 
being applied to useful and beneficial purposes upon, or in so far as 
it is or may be reasonably needed for useful and beneficial purposes 
upon lands riparian thereto, or otherwise appropriated, is hereby 
declared to be public water of the State and subject to appropriation 
in accordance with the provisions of this code."278 These provisions 
276. CAL. Pus. R.Es. CODE§ 6301 (2009). 
277. Id § 6307. 
278. CAL. WATER CODE§ 1201 (2009). 
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allow for protections of flows to "protected areas,"279 and establish 
that "[t]he use of water for recreation and preservation and 
enhancement of fish and wildlife resources is a beneficial use of 
water."280 
CAL. Gov'r CODE§ 39933: "All navigable waters situated within or 
adjacent to a city shall remain open to the free and unobstructed 
navigation of the public. Such waters and the water front of such 
waters shall remain open to free and unobstructed access by the 
people from the public streets and highways within the city." 
CAL. Gov'r CODE § 56740: "No tidelands or submerged lands ... 
which are owned by the State or by its grantees in trust shall be 
incorporated into, or annexed to, a city, except lands which may be 
approved by the State Lands Commission." For purposes of this 
provision, "'submerged lands' ... includes, but is not limited to, 
lands underlying navigable waters which are in sovereign ownership 
of the State whether or not those waters are subject to tidal 
influence." 
• CAL. Gov'r CODE§§ 66478.1 to 66478.14: Public Access to Public 
Resources. These public access provisions apply to navigable 
waters.281 "The Legislature further finds and declares that it is 
essential to the health and well-being of all citizens of this state that 
public access to public natural resources be increased. It is the intent 
of the Legislature to increase public access to public natural 
resources. "282 
• 
• 
CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE § 36: '"Navigable waters' means waters 
which come under this jurisdiction of the United States Anny Corps 
of Engineers and any other waters with the state with the exception 
of those privately owned." 
CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE §§ 90 to 153: Navigable Waters . 
"Navigable waters and all streams of sufficient capacity to transport 
the products of this country are public ways for purposes of 
navigation and such transportation. "283 However, navigable waters 
do not include floodwaters.284 These provisions also expressly list 
several watercourses as navigable waters and public ways,285 and 
they define California's coastline.286 
279. Id.§§ 1215-1216. 
280. Id. § 1243. 
281. CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 66478.1 (2009). 
282. Id.§ 66478.3. 
283. CAL. ll.a.RB. & NAV. CODE§ 100 (2009). 
284. Id. 
285. Id. §§ 101-106. 
286. Id. § 107. 
107 
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• CAL. HEALTII & SAFETY CODE § 117510: '"Navigable waters' 
means all public waters of the state in any river, stream, lake, 
reservoir, or other body of water, including all salt water bays, 
inlets, and estuaries within the jurisdiction of the state." 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
The California courts recognize the differences between various 
definitions of"navigable waters." For example, in 1976 the California Court of 
Appeals acknowledged that there were two relevant federal definitions of 
navigability: the Commerce Clause definition and the state title definition. 
Further, the state title test from Utah v. United States detennines the waters for 
which California holds title to the bed and banks as a result of its admission to 
the Union.287 However, the court also recognized that for non-federal matters, 
the states are free to use different definitions of "navigable waters" to 
determine rights.288 
Under these rules, "[w]aters which are subject to tidal influence are 
subject to the public trust regardless of whether they are navigable."289 
Although the boundary between public and private ownership in littoral waters 
is the low-water mark,290 in tidal waters, the "lands between the mean high tide 
and mean low tide are owned by the public. "291 "Tidelands" can cover both 
true tidelands and submerged lands more generally.292 
In addition, California has explicitly rejected arguments based on 
traditional English common law that state ownership of submerged lands is 
limited to tidal waters.293 Instead, the California Supreme Court has 
emphasized that lands beneath nontidal navigable waters "constitute a resource 
which is fast disappearing in California; they are of great importance for the 
ecology, and for the recreational needs of the residents of the state."294 
Upon its admission to the Union, California received title to the beds and 
banks of federally defined navigable waters "to the high-water mark. "295 
Nevertheless, an 1872 statute conveyed title to properties bordering these lands 
to the low-water mark.296 Even so, the public trust doctrine applies to the lands 
287. Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 127 Cal. Rptr. 830, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1976). 
288. Id. at 835. 
289. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass'n v. Thennalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 841 n.3 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989). 
290. County of Lake v. Smith, 278 Cal. Rptr. 809, 819-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). 
291. California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239,241 (Cal. 1981). 
292. City ofBerkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363 n. l (Cal. 1980). 
293. California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d at 242-45. 
294. Id. at 242. 
295. Id. at 246. 
296. Id. at 245, 248~ Bess v. County of Humboldt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 401-02 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1992). 
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between the low- and high-water marks, although the landowner "may utilize 
them in any manner not incompatible with the public's interest in the 
property. ,,297 
For purposes of state-Jaw public trust rights, a stream that can only float 
logs is not navigable.298 Landowners can obstruct non-navigable waters at 
will.299 
Nevertheless, "all waters are deemed navigable which are really so."300 
"A waterway usable only for pleasure boating is nevertheless a navigable 
waterway and protected by the public trust."301 Moreover, "[t]here is no 
authority, or at least none cited to use, for the proposition a river must be 
designated 'non-navigable' because it may be navigated only seasonally."302 
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Sacramento River in 
California is navigable and that private landowners along that river received 
title only to the high water mark. 303 In addition, and supported by the fact that 
California legislatively deemed the Klamath River in California non-navigable, 
the Supreme Court held that title to the Klamath River's beds in California 
remained with the United States and became part of the Hoopa Valley 
Reservation. 304 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
Article X of the California Constitution constitutionalizes the public trust 
doctrine in California. 305 California acquired title to the navigable waterways 
and tidelands by virtue of her sovereignty when admitted to the Union in 
1850.306 The traditional uses that the trust protects are navigation, commerce, 
297. California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d at 252; Golden Feather Community Ass'n v. 
Thennalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal Rptr. 836, 839 (Cal. Ct App. 1989). 
298. People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 97 Cal. Rptr. 488,450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) (citing American 
River Water Co. v. Amsden, 6 Cal. 443, 443-46 (1856)). 
299. Id. 
300. Churchj)) Co. v. Kingsbury, 174 P. 329, 330-31 (Cal. 1918). 
301. Nat') Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 720 n. 17 (Cal. 1983) (citing People ex 
rel. Younger v. County of El Dorado, 157 Cal. Rptr. 815 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Baker, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 
448); see also Golden Feather, 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 n.2; People v. Weaver, 197 Cal. Rptr. 521, 524 
n.2 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1983); Hitchings v. Del Rio Woods Recreation & Park Dist., 127 Cal. 
Rptr. 830, 834 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976); Baker, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 450 (all asserting the same 
pleasure/recreational boating test). 
302. Bess v. County of Humboldt, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399, 402 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); accord 
Hitchings, 127 Cal Rptr. at 837. 
303. Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 666-68, 672-73 (1891). 
304. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, 260-64 (1913). 
305. See, e.g., Younger, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 835 (holding that public access to the South Fork of the 
American River for whitewater rafting is protected by the California Constitution). 
306. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 379 n.5 (Cal. 1971) (citing Borax Consolidated Ltd. v. Los 
Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 15-16 (1935)). 
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and fishing. 307 More expansively, public trust rights "have been held to include 
the right to fish, hunt, bathe, swim, to use for boating, and general recreation 
purposes the navigable waters of the state, and to use the bottom of the 
navigable waters for anchoring, standing, or other purposes."308 hnportantly, 
the California Supreme Court considers the public trust doctrine to be adaptable 
and evolving, noting that "[t]he objective of the public trust has evolved in 
tandem with the changing public perception of the values and uses of 
waterways. "309 
"The power of the state to control, regulate and utilize its navigable 
waterways and the lands lying beneath them, when acting within the terms of 
the trust, is absolute, except as limited by the paramount supervisory power of 
the federal government over navigable waters."310 Specifically, "[p]reservation 
of the public trust in the shorezone will allow the state flexibility in 
determining the appropriate use of such land so that, for example, areas which 
are endangered by overuse can be closed to certain activities," because "[t]he 
exercise of the police power has proved insufficient to protect the 
shorezone."311 No estoppel is available against the government with respect to 
public trust interests,312 and exercise of the public trust doctrine is not an 
unconstitutional taking of private property.313 However, "the public trust 
doctrine as codified in the California Constitution does not prevent the state 
from preferring one trust use over another" in particular situations. 314 
Moreover, the state can delegate its regulatory authority over particular public 
trust lands to state agencies and municipalities.315 
In early parts of California's history, the state extensively conveyed public 
trust lands to private individuals for a variety of purposes. For example, about 
one-quarter of the original San Francisco Bay was conveyed into private 
ownership and filled for development. As a result, California recognizes 
different public trust rights in different public trust lands. Nevertheless, the 
public generally retains its public trust rights even when the state has conveyed 
tidelands and lands under navigable waters to private owners, unless the state 
307. Id. 
308. Id. at 380 (citations omitted); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (Cal. 
1980); Grafv. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 7 Cal. App. 4th 1224, 1228-29 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992). 
309. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (Cal. 1983) (citing Marks, 491 
P.2d at 374); see also Personal Watercraft Coal. v. Bd. of Supervisors. 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d 425, 437 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2002) (repeating that the doctrine is "sufficiently flexible to encompass changing public needs" 
(citations omitted)). 
310. Marks, 491 P.2d at 380 {citations omitted); Graf, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1228-29, 1231-32. 
311. California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256,260 (Cal. 1981). 
312. Id. at 258-59. 
313. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 658 P.2d at 723. 
314. Carstens v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 227 Cal. Rptr. 346,360 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
315. Graf, 7 Cal. App. 4th at 1231-32. 
G 
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conveyed the lands in furtherance of navigation or commerce.316 Thus, the 
public trust applies to the "lands between high and low water in nontidal 
navigable lakes,'' even if that land in is private ownership.317 Especially since 
the public trust amendments to the California Constitution in 1879, public trust 
lands "may be conveyed to private persons only to promote trust uses,"318 and 
statutes purporting to abandon the public trust are to be strictly construed; 
the intent to abandon must be clearly expressed or necessarily implied; and 
if any interpretation of the statute is reasonably possible which would retain 
the public's interest in the tidelands, the court must give the statute such an 
interpretation. 319 
When trust lands have been conveyed to private individuals, "the interests 
of the public are paramount in property that is still physically adaptable for 
trust uses, whereas the interests of the grantees and their successors should 
prevail insofar as the tidelands have been rendered substantially valueless for 
those purposes."320 However, 
there is no legal obligation on the part of a landowner subject to the public 
trust doctrine to inspect or warn of natural hazards in navigable waters 
subject to recreational use abutting the property, or to make such water safe 
for recreational uses by trespassers or those on the water by means other 
than access over abutting land.321 
As a result, landowners along navigable waters who do not alter those waters 
are entitled to the tort liability protections in the California Civil Code. 322 
Under the public trust doctrine, owners of property along public trust 
waters are entitled to natural accretions, because "[t]he state has no control over 
nature; allowing private parties to gain by natural accretion does not harm to 
the public trust doctrine."323 In contrast, "to allow accretion caused by artificial 
means to deprive the state of trust lands would effectively alienate what may 
not be alienated."324 
Unlike most states, California has extended its public trust doctrine, 
beginning in 1971, to the preservation of the natural environment and 
316. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 363-67 (Cal. 1980); San Diego County 
Archeological Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 146 Cal. Rptr. 786, 787-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978); People v. 
Sweetser, 140 Cal. Rptr. 82, 85 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 378-79 (Cal. 
1971). 
317. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Props., 644 P.2d 792, 793-94 (Cal. 1982) (citing 
California v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1981); California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 
625 P.2d at 256). 
318. City of Los Angeles, 644 P.2d at 793-94. 
319. City of Berkeley, 606 P.2d at 369. 
320. Id. at 373. 
321. Charpentier v. Von Geldem, 236 Cal. Rptr. 223,239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
322. Id. (discussing CAL. CML CODE§ 846 (1980)). 
323. State ex rel. State Lands Comm'n v. Superior Court, 900 P.2d 648, 661-62 (Cal. 1995). 
324. Id. 
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ecosystems as well as to public uses of the navigable waters and tidelands. In 
the 1971 case of Marks v. Whitney, the California Supreme Court announced: 
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to 
encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is not 
burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of utilization 
over another. There is growing public recognition that one of the most 
important public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the 
tidelands trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so 
that they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space, 
and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and marine 
life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area. It is not 
necessary here to define precisely all the public uses which encumber 
tidelands. 325 
The recognition of the ecological value of submerged lands extends to non tidal 
submerged lands as well. As the California Supreme Court stated in connection 
with Lake Tahoe litigation: 
[T]he shorezone has been reduced to a fraction of its original size in this 
state by the pressures of development. Such lands now cover less than one 
half of 1 percent of the state; a further reduction by 15 percent was 
projected for 1980. Some authorities have warned that at the present rate of 
destruction nearly all riparian vegetation on the Sacramento River could be 
eliminated in the next 20 years. 
The shorezone is a fragile and complex resource. It provides the 
environment necessary for the survival of numerous types of fish (including 
salmon, steelhead, and striped bass), birds (such as the endangered species: 
the bald eagle and the peregrine falcon), and many other species of wildlife 
and plants. These areas are ideally suited for scientific study, since they 
provide a gene pool for the preservation of biological diversity. In addition, 
the shorezone in its natural condition is essential to the maintenance of 
good water quality, and the vegetation acts as a buffer against floods and 
erosion.326 
Thus, the California public trust doctrine extends to "environmental . 
purposes,"327 and encompasses "the right to preserve the tidelands in the 
natural state as ecological units for scientific study."328 
California courts have also extended the public trust doctrine not just to 
aquatic wildlife habitat, but also to the wildlife itself. 329 "These are natural 
325. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374,380 (Cal. 1971) (citations omitted). 
326. California v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256, 258-59 (Cal. 1981). 
327. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Props., 644 P.2d 792, 794 (Cal. 1982). 
328. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362,363 (Cal. 1980) (citing Marks, 491 P.2d at 
374). 
329. Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc. v. FPL Group, Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 588, 596-98 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2008) (citing Golden Feather Comty. Ass'n v. Thermalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989)). 
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resources of inestimable value to the community as a whole. Their protection 
and preservation is a public interest that is now recognized in numerous state 
and federal statutory provisions ... _,mo Those statutes generally define the 
contours of the public trust obligation regarding wildlife. 331 Members of the 
general public can sue to enforce the wildlife public trust as well as the 
navigable water public trust, because the public trust doctrine "places a duty 
upon the government to protect those resources. "332 
The California Supreme Court clarified in 2008 that California has "two 
distinct public trust doctrines": 
First is the common law doctrine, which involves the government's 
"affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and 
allocation of water resources .... " The second is a public trust duty 
derived from statute, specifically Fish and Game Code section 711.7, 
pertaining to fish and wildlife: "The fish and wildlife resources are held in 
trust for the people of the state by and through the department." There is 
doubtless an overlap between the two public trust doctrines-the protection 
of water resources is intertwined with the protection of wildlife .... 
Nonetheless, the duty of government agencies to protect wildlife is 
primarily statutory.333 
Given this statutory focus, an incidental take permit did not violate the 
common-law public trust doctrine.334 
Public trust interests can extend the state's authority and duties beyond the 
navigable waters. For example, "(t]he state's right to protect fish is not limited 
to navigable or otherwise public waters but extends to any waters where fish 
are habitated or accustomed to resort and through which the have the freedom 
of passage to and from the public fishing grounds of the state. "335 
330. Id. at 598. 
33 l. Id. at 599-600. 
332. Id. at 600. 
333. Envtl. Prot. & Info. Ctr. v. Cal. Dep't ofForestry & Fire Prot., 80 Cal. Rptr. 3d 28, 73 (2008) 
(quoting Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728-29 (1983)); see also Cal. Trout, 
Inc. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 138,212 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (establishing that Fish 
and Game Code § 5946 establishes a public trust rule but noting "that it does not follow from the 
application of the tenn 'public trust' to the state's interest in fisheries of non-navigable streams that all 
of the consequences of the public trust doctrine as applicable to navigable waters also apply to non-
navigable streams. For example, the beds of non-navigable streams are not owned by the state based 
upon a public trust fishery interest."). 
334. Enwl. Prot. & Info Ctr., 80 Cal. Rptr. at 74. 
335. Golden Feather Cmty. Ass 'n v. Thennalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 840 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1989); see also People v. Truckee Lumber Co., 48 P. 374, 399-400, 400--01 (Cal. 1897) (noting 
that "the right and power to protect and preserve [fish] for the common use and benefit is one of the 
recognized prerogatives of the sovereign, coming to us from the common law" and asserting that the 
state's authority to protect fish for the public is not limited to fish in navigable waters; "[t]o the e>..1ent 
that waters are the common passageway for fish, although flowing over lands entirely subject to private 
ownership, they are deemed for such purposes public waters, and subject to all laws of the state 
regulating the right of fishery"); Cal. Trout, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 212 (concluding "that a public trust 
interest pertains to non-navigable streams which sustain a fishery"). 
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Similarly, in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 336 the 
California Supreme Court determined that the public trust doctrine could 
restrict or modify established water rights even in non-navigable tributaries of 
navigable waters. Withdrawals of water from Mono Lake's tributaries were 
imperiling "both the scenic beauty and the ecological values of Mono Lake ... 
. "
337 As a result, the public trust doctrine could require modifications in the 
prior appropriation system: 
In our opinions, the core of the public trust doctrine is the state's authority 
as sovereign to exercise a continuous supervision and control over the 
navigable waters of the state and the lands underlying those waters. This 
authority applies to the waters tributary to Mono Lake and bars DWP or 
any other party from claiming a vested right to divert waters once it 
becomes clear that such diversions harm the interests protected by the 
public trust. ... Approval of such diversions with considering public trust 
values ... may result in needless destruction of those values. Accordingly, 
we believe that before state courts and agencies approve water diversions, 
they should consider the effect of such diversion upon interests protected 
by the public trust, and attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or minimize any 
harm to these interests. 338 
As such, "the public trust doctrine . . . protects navigable waters from harm 
caused by diversion of non-navigable tributaries."339 The state retains the 
authority to review and reconsider water rights when harm becomes evident, 
particularly if it did not consider public trust values in the original granting of a 
water right.340 Moreover, "in determining whether it is 'feasible' to protect 
public trust values like fish and wildlife in a particular instance, the [State 
Water Resources Control] Board must determine whether protection of those 
values, or what level of protection, is 'consistent with the public interest. "'341 
"[W]hen the public trust doctrine clashes with the rule of priority, the rule of 
priority must yield. [Nevertheless,] every effort must be made to preserve water 
right priorities to the extent those priorities do not lead to violation of the public 
trust doctrine," and "the subversion of water right priority is justified only if 
336. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (the "Mono Lake case"). For discussions of the Mono Lake dispute, 
see generally Timothy J. Conway, Note, National Audubon Society v. Superior Court: 77ze Expanding 
Public Trust Doctrine, 14 ENVTL. L. 617 (1984); Kevin M. Raymond, Protecting the People's Waters: 
The California Supreme Court Recognizes Two Remedies to Safeguard Public Trust Interests in Water, 
59 WASH. L. REV. 357 (1984); Martha Guy, Comment, 11,e Public Trust Doctrine and California Water 
Law: National Audubon Society v. Department of Water and Power, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 653 (1982). For a 
more recent discussion of subsequent developments, see generally Craig Anthony Arnold, Litigation's 
Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of the Mono Lake Case, 14 
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 1177 (2008). 
337. Nat'/ Audubon Soc y, 658 P.2d at 711. 
338. Id. at 712; see also id. at 727-28. 
339. Id. at 721. 
340. Id. at 728. 
341. State Water Res. Control Bd. Cases, 39 Cal. Rptr. 3d 189, 272 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (involving 
water rights and salmon protection in the Bay Delta). 
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enforcing that priority will in fact lead to the unreasonable use of water or 
result in harm to values protected by the public trust."342 
However, the National Audubon rule does not apply to water withdrawals 
from purely non-navigable waters in the absence of an effect on navigable 
waters.343 "The public trust doctrine is based upon public access and usage of 
navigable waters and pursuant to that doctrine the public has an easement and 
servitude upon such waters. But the public has never had common access and 
usage of nonnavigable streams .... "344 Similarly, the California courts have 
declined to extend the National Audubon doctrine to groundwater.345 
\Vhile the California public trust doctrine protects a variety of natural 
resources as well as public uses of water, it does not extend to everything. For 
example, as a result of California's complicated history, California did not 
acquire title to--and the public trust doctrine does not apply to--"lands which 
were the subject of a prior Mexican land grant and later patented by the United 
States government in accordance with its obligations under the treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo."346 Less uniquely, "(t]he public trust doctrine applicable to 
beaches owned by the sovereign does not apply to hotels located on land which 
is privately owned. Although hotel owners have certain common law 
obligations to travelers, hotels are by no means owned in public trust like 
public beaches."347 Instead, "[t]he doctrine has been restricted to tidelands, 
navigable waters, and situations where the government or public in general own 
the property"-situations where "the state holds or held title because it was 
important the land be available to all. It does not involve private property 
except where the state has conveyed the land into private hands. It does not 
cover artifacts located on private property."348 The public trust doctrine does 
not apply to public employment contracts, 349 or to formal trusts. 350 
342. El Dorado Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 468, 489-90 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
343. Golden Feather Comty. Ass'n v. Thennalito Irrigation Dist., 257 Cal. Rptr. 836, 839 (Cal Ct. 
App. 1989). 
344. Id. at 840; accord Hi-Desert County Water Dist. v. Blue Skies Country Club. Inc., 28 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 909, 916 n.10 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994). 
345. Santa Teresa Citizen Action Group v. City of San Jose, 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 868,884 (Cal. a. App. 
2003); Cal. Water Network v. Castaic Lake Water Agency, Civil Nos. B177978, B181463, 2006 WL 
726882, at • 11 (Cal. App. Dep 't Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that the public trust doctrine does not apply 
to groundwater or non-navigable waterways, absent some impact on navigable waters). 
346. City of Los Angeles v. Venice Peninsula Props., 253 Cal. Rptr. 331, 335 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988); 
Summa Corp. v. California ex rel. State Lands Com.m'n, 466 U.S. 198, 205-09 (1984). 
347. Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 140 Cal. Rptr. 599,603 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977). 
348. San Diego County Archeological Soc'y, Inc. v. Compadres, 145 Cal. Rptr. 786, 787-89 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1978); see also Pitt River Tribe v. Donaldson, No. C05 l 902, 2007 WL 1874323, at •7 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2007) (holding that a transfer of tribal remains to private parties, when ''there is no allegation that 
the remains in question were located on navigable waters in tidelands," did not constitute a claim under 
the public trust doctrine). 
349. Lucasv. Santa Maria Pub. Airport Dist., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 177, 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). 
350. Hardman v. Feinstein, 240 Cal. Rptr. 483,486 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987). 
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COLORADO 
Date of Statehood: 1876 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation 
Colorado Constitution: Several provisions of Colorado's constitution relate to 
water, but the state does not have a constitutionalized public trust doctrine, 
despite state ballot initiatives in the mid- l 990s that repeatedly sought to amend 
Article XVI, § 5 of the Colorado Constitution to require the state to "adopt and 
defend a strong public trust doctrine," even for nonnavigable waters.351 
Important water-related and other relevant provisions include: 
• Art. IX, § 10: Selection and Management of Public Trust Lands. 
This section identifies state school lands as public trust lands, to be 
managed in accordance with Colorado Revised Statutes § 36-1-
101.5. 
• Art. XVI, § 5: "The water of every natural stream, not heretofore 
appropriated, within the State of Colorado, is hereby declared to be 
the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of 
the people of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter 
provided." 
• 
• 
Art. XVI, § 6: "The right to divert the unappropriated waters of any 
natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied. Priority of 
appropriation shall give the better right as between those using the 
water for the same purpose; but when waters of any natural stream 
are not sufficient for the service of all those desiring the use of the 
same, those using the water for domestic purposes shall have the 
preference over those claiming for any other purpose, and those 
using the water for agricultural purposes shall have preference over 
those using the same for manufacturing purposes." 
Art. XXVII: Great Outdoors Colorado Program. In § 1 of this 
Article, the Colorado Constitution dedicates lottery money "to the 
preservation, protection, enhancement and management of the 
state's wildlife, park, river, trail and space heritage .... " Section 2 
establishes a trust fund. However,§ 7 declares that "[n]othing in this 
article shall affect in any way whatsoever any of the provisions 
under Article XVI of the State Constitution of Colorado, including 
351. See, e.g .• Matter of Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and Summary Adopted April 6, 
1994, by Title Board Pertaining to a Proposed Initiative on Water Rights, 877 P.2d 321, 326--29 (Colo. 
1994) (en bane) (upholding the initiative); In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, 
and Summary Adopted April 5, 1995 by the Board Pertaining to a Proposed Initiative "Public Rights in 
Water II," 898 P.2d 1076, 1078-80 (Colo. 1995) (en bane) (holding the initiative invalid because it 
contained more than one subject); In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title, Submission Clause, and 
Summary Adopted March 20, 1996, by the Title Board Pertaining to Proposed Initiative "1996-6," 917 
P.2d 1277, 1279-82 (Colo. I 996) (en bane) (upholding the initiative). 
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those provisions related to water, nor any of the statutory provisions 
related to the appropriation of water in Colorado." 
Colorado Statutes: 
• COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 37-80-101 to 37-80-120: State Engineer. 
• COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 37-81-101 to 37-81-104: Diversion of Waters. 
• COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-82-101 to 37-82-106: Appropriation and 
Use of Water. 
• COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 37-83-101 to 37-83-106: Exchange of Water . 
• COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-84-101 to 37-84-125: Responsibility of 
User or Owner. 
• COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-85-101 to 37-85-1 I I: Charge for Delivery 
of Water. 
• COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-86-101 to 37-86-113: Rights of Way and 
Ditches. 
• COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-87-101 to 37-87-125: Reservoirs. Section 
37-87-102(1) defines "natural stream" and "ordinary high 
watennark." 
• COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-88-101 to 37-88-110: State Canals and 
Reservoirs. 
• COLO. REV. STAT.§§ 37-89-101 to 37-89-104: Offenses. 
• COLO.REV. STAT.§§ 37-90-101 to 37-90-143: Underground Water. 
• COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to 37-92-602: Water Right 
Detennination and Administration. Colorado relies on a judicial 
system rather than a pennitting system for its water rights. 
• COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-6-201 to 38-6-216: Condemnation of 
Water Rights. 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
117 
Colorado retains a "commercial use" definition of "navigable waters."352 
However, the Colorado Supreme Court has declared most streams in Colorado 
non-navigable: "the natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable 
within its territorial limits, and practically all of them have their sources within 
its own boundaries, and . . . no stream of any importance whose source is 
352. People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Colo. 1979). 
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without those boundaries, flows into or through this state."353 As a result, there 
is almost no case law further explicating the definition of "navigable water." 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
Article XVI, § 5, of the Colorado Constitution establishes the state's 
property right to the water in natural streams.354 Nevertheless, in a non-
navigable river, title to the bed and banks is in the private landowner, giving the 
landowner exclusive control over the water and the right to exclude recreational 
users who would like to use the water for floating or fishing. 355 
The Colorado Supreme Court refused to follow the "modem trend"-as 
represented by Wyoming's interpretation of similar provisions in its 
constitution-and al1ow public rights in non-navigable rivers, concluding that 
Art. XVI, § 5 of the Colorado Constitution does not preserve public recreation 
rights.356 Instead, "[w]ithout permission, the public cannot use such waters for 
recreation. "357 
One early case notes that in navigable waters, the riparian landowner owns 
to the thread, or center, of the stream. 358 
HAWAl'I 
Date of Statehood: 1959 
Water Law System: Combination of Native Hawaiian rights with elements 
of both riparianism and prior appropriation 
Hawai'i Constitution: "[T]he people of this state have elevated the public 
trust doctrine to the level of constitutional mandate .... We therefore hold that 
article XI, section 1, and article XI, section 7 adopt the public trust doctrine as a 
353. Stock.man v. Leddy, 129 P. 220,222 (Colo. 1912), overruled on other grounds, Denver Ass'n 
for Retarded Children, Inc. v. School Dist. No. 1, 535 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1975); see also United States v. 
Dist. Court. 458 P.2d 760, 762 (Colo. 1969) (holding that even though the Eagle River is a tributary of 
the Colorado River, it is non-navigable). 
354. Stockman, 129 P. at 222. 
355. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027 (upholding a criminal trespass conviction for floating down a non-
navigable river); see also Heimbecher v. City & County of Denver, 9 P.2d 280,281 (Colo. 1932) (noting 
that the general presumption at common law is that title to land riparian to a non-navigable stream 
ex1ends to the center of the river); More v. Johnson, 568 P.2d 437, 439 (Colo. 1977) (same). 
356. Emmert, 597 P.2d at 1027-28. 
357. Id. at 1029; see also Hartman v. Tresise, 84 P. 685, 686-87 (Colo. 1905) (holding that public 
ownership of the water itself, as stated in the Colorado Constitution, does not create a public fishery in 
non-navigable streams; instead, the private landowner owns the right of fishery, and only appropriative 
rights can trump this common-law rule). 
358. Hanlon v. Hobson, 51 P. 433,435 (Colo. 1897). 
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fundamental principle of constitutional law in Hawai'i."359 The Hawai'i 
Constitution constitutionalizes many public trust rights, including the 
traditional public trust doctrine and a water rights public trust. Relevant 
provisions include: 
• Art. IX, § 8: "The State shall have the power to promote and 
maintain a healthful environment, including the prevention of any 
excessive demands upon the environment and the State's resources." 
• Art. XI, § I : "For the benefit of present and future generations, the 
State and its political subdivisions shall conserve and protect 
Hawaii's natural beauty and all natural resources, including land, 
water, air, minerals and energy sources, and shall promote the 
development and utilization of these resources in a manner 
consistent with their conservation and in furtherance of the self-
sufficiency of the State. All public natural resources are held in trust 
by the State for the benefit of the people." 
• Art. XI, § 2: "The legislature shall vest in one or more executive 
boards or commissions powers for the management of natural 
resources owned or controlled by the State, and such powers of 
disposition thereof as may be provided by law; but land set aside for 
public use, other than for a reserve for conservation purposes, need 
not be placed under the jurisdiction of such a board or commission." 
• Art. XI, § 6: "The State shall have the power to manage and control 
the marine, seabed and other resources located within the 
boundaries of the State, including the archipelagic waters of the 
State, and reserves to itself all such rights outside state boundaries 
not specifically limited by federal or international law. All fisheries 
in the sea waters of the State not included in any fish pond, artificial 
enclosure or state-licensed mariculture operation shall be free to the 
public, subject to vested rights and the right of the State to regulate 
the same; provided that mariculture operations shall be established 
under guidelines enacted by the legislature, which shall protect the 
public's use and enjoyment of the reefs. The State may condemn 
such vested rights for public use." 
• Art. XI, § 7: "The State has an obligation to protect, control and 
regulate the use of Hawaii's water resources for the benefit of its 
people. The legislature shall provide for a water resources agency 
which, as provided by law, shall set overall water conservation, 
quality and use policies; define beneficial and reasonable uses; 
protect ground and surface water resources, watersheds and natural 
stream environments; establish criteria for water use priorities while 
assuring appurtenant rights and existing correlative and riparian uses 
359. In re Water Use Pennit Applications. 9 P.3d 409, 443-44 (Haw. 2000) (citations omitted); see 
also Morgan v. Planning Dep't, 86 P.3d 982, 993 n.12 (Haw. 2004). 
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and establish procedures for regulating all uses of Hawaii's water 
resources." 
• Art. XI, § 9: "Each person has the right to a clean and healthful 
environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental quality, 
including control of pollution and conservation, protection and 
enhancement of natural resources. Any person may enforce this 
right against any party, public or private, through appropriate legal 
proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as 
provided by law." 
• 
• 
• 
Art. XI, § 11 : "The State of Hawaii asserts and reserves its rights 
and interest in its exclusive economic zone for the purpose of 
exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, 
both living and nonliving, of the seabed and subsoil, and 
superadjacent waters." 
Art. XII, § 4: Public Trust: "The lands granted to the State of 
Hawaii by Section 5(b) of the Admission Act and pursuant to 
Article XVI, § 7 of the State Constitution ... shall be held by the 
State as a public trust for native Hawaiians and the general public." 
Art. XII, § 5: "There is hereby established an Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs. The Office of Hawaiian Affairs shall hold title to all the real 
and personal property now or hereafter set aside or conveyed to it 
which shall be held in trust for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians." 
• Art. XII, § 6: "The board of trustees of the Office of Hawaiian 
Affairs shall exercise power as provided by law: to manage and 
administer the proceeds from the sale or other disposition of the 
lands, natural resources, minerals and income derived from 
whatever sources for native Hawaiians and Hawaiians, including all 
income and proceeds from that pro rata portion of the trust referred 
to in section 4 of this article for native Hawaiians; to formulate 
policy relating to affairs of native Hawaiians and Hawaiians; and to 
exercise control over real and personal property set aside by state, 
federal or private sources and transferred to the board for native 
Hawaiians and Hawaiians." 
• Art. XII, § 7: "The State reaffirms and shall protect all rights, 
customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and 
religious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a tenants who are 
descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian 
Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right of the State to regulate 
such rights." 
• Art. XVI, § 7: Compliance with Trust: "Any trust provisions which 
the Congress shall impose, upon the admission of this State, in 
respect of the lands patented to the State by the United States or the 
proceeds and income therefrom, shall be complied with by 
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appropriate legislation. Such legislation shall not diminish or limit 
the benefits of native Hawaiians under Section 4 of Article XII." 
Hawai'i Statutes: 
• HAW. REV. STAT.§ 7-1: "The people shall have a right to drinking 
water, and running water, and the right of way. The springs of 
water, running water, and roads shall be free to all, on lands granted 
in fee simple .... " 
• HAW. REV. STAT. § 10-l(a): Incorporates the trust for Native 
Hawaiians into the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. 
• HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-1: The public lands include submerged 
lands. 
• HAW. REV. STAT.§ 171-2: This provision defines the public lands. 
• HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-3: The Department of Land and Natural 
Resources "shall manage, administer, and exercise control over 
public lands, the water resources, ocean waters, navigable streams, 
coastal areas, and minerals and all other interests therein .... " 
• HAW. REV. STAT.§ 171-18: Public trust lands for schools. 
• HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-36(a)(9): The public has the right to use 
piers. 
• HAW. REV. STAT. § 171-53: Reclamation of submerged lands is 
prohibited without the state's permission. 
• HAW. REv. STAT. ch. 174C: State Water Code. Section l 74C-2(a) 
"recognize[ s] that the waters of the State are held for the benefit of 
the citizens of the State" and "declare[s] that the people of the State 
are beneficiaries and have a right to have the waters protected for 
their use." In addition, the Code requires the "protection of 
traditional and customary Hawaiian rights, the protection and 
procreation of fish and wildlife, the maintenance of proper 
ecological balance and scenic beauty, and the preservation and 
enhancement of waters of the State for municipal uses, public 
recreation, public water supply, agriculture, and navigation. Such 
objectives are declared to be in the public interest."360 
• HAW. REV. STAT.§§ 174C-31 to 174C-32: Hawaii Water Plan. The 
Commission must "[i]dentify rivers or streams, or a portion of a 
river or stream, which appropriately may be placed within a wild 
and scenic rivers system, to be preserved and protected as part of the 
public trust."361 
360. HAW. R.Ev. STAT.§ l74C-2(c)(2009). 
361. Id.§ 174C-3l(c)(4). 
121 
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• HAW. REV. STAT.§ 174C-41 to 174C-63: Regulation of Water Use. 
Before the State ofHawai'i can regulate water use in a given area, it 
must designate a water management area. 
• HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 174C-66 to 174C-71: Water Quality. These 
statutes provide protection of instream uses. 362 
• HAW. REV. STAT.§ l 74C-101: Native Hawaiian Water Rights. 
• HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 190D-1 to 190D-36: Oceans and Submerged 
Lands Leasings. 
• HAW. REV. STAT. § 200-6: Permits are required for structures or 
moorings in ocean waters or navigable streams. 
• HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 205A-l to 205A-71: Coastal Zone 
Management. 
Definition of "Naviga hie Waters": 
The Hawaiian courts are well aware of the convoluted nature of the 
"navigable waters" definition.363 "Navigable waters" in Hawai'i include all 
waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, whether navigable or not, and 
waters that are navigable-in-fact, even if not tidal.364 Hawai'i has long accepted 
the tidal test of navigability. 365 
Perhaps because of its water resources trust (see below) and its island 
nature, Hawai'i does not have well-developed law for non-tidal navigable-in-
fact waters. Nevertheless, for public trust purposes, Hawai'i appears to have 
adopted the pleasure boat test for navigability: "Navigable waters, including 
both those navigable by larger vessels and those navigable by rowboats and 
other small craft, are public highways. The right of navigation includes the 
right to travel on the waters not only for business purposes but also in pursuit of 
pleasure."366 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
Relying on Illinois Central Railroad, the Hawai'i Supreme Court declared 
in 1899 that "[t]he people of Hawaii hold the absolute rights to all its navigable 
waters and the soils under them for their own common use. The lands under the 
navigable waters in and around the territory of the Hawaiian Government are 
362. Id.§ 174C-71. 
363. In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 776 n.6 (Haw. 1977). 
364. Id. 
365. In re Bishop, 35 Haw. 608 (Haw. Terr. 1940). 
366. Kuramoto v. Hamada, 30 Haw. 841,845 (Haw. Terr. 1929). 
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held in trust for the public uses of navigation."367 Traditionally in Hawai'i, the 
right of navigation supersedes the right of fishery.368 
More recently, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has described the public trust 
as "a dual concept of sovereign right and responsibility."369 Hawai'i recognizes 
broad public rights in its waters, noting that "the trust [has] traditionally 
preserved public rights of navigation, commerce, and fishing. Courts have 
further identified a wide range of recreational uses, including bathing, 
swimming, boating, and scenic viewing, as protected trust purposes."370 
Moreover, given Hawaii's history, "the exercise of Native Hawaiian and 
traditional and customary rights [is] a public trust purpose."371 In contrast, "the 
public trust has never been understood to safeguard rights of exclusive use for 
private commercial gain. Such an interpretation, indeed, eviscerate( d] the 
trust's basic purpose[-]of reserving the resource for use and access by the 
general public without preference or restriction."372 Thus, "[a]s commonly 
understood, the trust protects public waters and submerged lands against 
irrevocable transfer to private parties, or 'substantial impairment,' whether for 
private or public purposes .... "373 
"[T]he ultimate authority to interpret and defend the public trust in Hawaii 
rests with the courts," and "[j]ust as private trustees are judicially accountable 
to their beneficiaries for dispositions of the res, so the legislative and executive 
branches are judicially accountable for dispositions of the public trust."374 
Moreover, "(t]he beneficiaries of the public trust are not just present 
generations but those to come."375 
In general, "beachfront title lines run along the upper annual reaches of the 
waves, excluding storm and tidal waves."376 Similarly, although "Hawaii's 
land laws are unique in that they are based on ancient tradition, custom, 
practice and usage," the boundary designated "ma ke kai" "is along the upper 
367. King v. Oahu Ry & Land Co., 11 Haw. 717, 725 (Haw. Terr. 1899) (citations omitted); see 
also Carter v. Territory, 14 Haw. 465, 1902 WL 1419, at •3, •10 (Haw. Terr. 1902) (announcing a 
public trust for navigation and fishing but allowing exclusive rights of sea fisheries to be acquired by 
grant or prescription, although the presumption is against the claimant). For a comprehensive 
examination of Hawaii's public trust doctrine, see generally Denise E. Antolini, Water Rights and 
Responsibilities in the Twenty-First Century: A Forward to the Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on 
Managing Hawaii's Public Trust Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. I (2001); Symposium, Proceedings of 
the 2001 Symposiwn on Managing Hawaii's Public Trust Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 21 (2001). 
368. Kuramoto, 30 Haw. at 845. 
369. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409,448 (Haw. 2000). 
370. Id. at 448. 
371. Id. at 449. 
3 72. Id. at 450. 
313. In re Wai'ola O Moloka'i, Inc., 83 P.3d 664,692 (Haw. 2004) (citations omitted). 
374. Id at 684-85. 
375. Id. at 685. 
376. In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d 771, 776 n.6 (Haw. 1977). 
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reaches of the wash of waves, usually evidence by the edge of vegetation or by 
the line of debris left by the wash of waves .... "377 
The public trust doctrine can invalidate any attempts to extend property 
boundaries beyond the high-water mark: 
In Hawaii, the public trust doctrine, recognized in our case law prior to the 
enactment of our land court statute, can similarly be deemed to create an 
exception to our land court statute, thus invalidating any purported 
registration of land below the high water mark. . . . [L ]and below high 
water mark is held in public trust by the State, whose ownership may not be 
relinquished, except where relinquishment is consistent with certain public 
purposes. 378 
Moreover, because the public has long used the beaches of Hawai'i, that use 
"has ripened into a customary right. Public policy, as interpreted by this court, 
favors extending to public use and ownership as much of Hawaii's shoreline as 
is reasonably possible. "379 Finally, for similar public policy reasons, "lava 
extensions vest when created in the people of Hawaii, held in public trust by 
the government for the benefit, use, and enjoyment of all the people," and 
therefore "the State as trustee has the duty to protect and maintain [this] trust 
property and regulate its use. "380 
Most recently, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has suggested that the public 
trust doctrine extends to environmental and biodiversity protection. For 
example, in 2005, it suggested that the public trust doctrine applies, via Article 
XI, § I of the Hawai'i Constitution, to regulation of the Palila, an endangered 
bird.381 The following year, it explicitly held that the Department of Health and 
counties are bound by the public trust doctrine when implementing the federal 
Clean Water Act. Thus, when environmental groups sued the Department of 
Health asserting that the Department had violated the public trust doctrine by 
failing to prevent a developer from violating state water quality standards for 
coastal waters, the court concluded that state issuance of National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System permits pursuant to the Clean Water Act are 
subject to the public trust doctrine and that the Department of Health must 
ensure that water quality measures are actually being implemented.382 In 
377. In re Application of Ashford, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (Haw. 1968) (citing Keelikolani v. Robinson, 2 
Haw. 514 (Hawaii Terr. 1862)); see also Territory v. Kerr, 16 Haw. 363, 1905 WL 1327, at *4 (Haw. 
Terr. 1905) (holding that grants of property "along the sea" go to the high water mark); In re Sanborn, 
562 P.2d at 776 n.6 (noting that title to non-tidal navigable-in-fact waters goes to the high-water mark). 
378. In re Sanborn, 562 P.2d at 776; see also Hawaii County v. Sotomura, 517 P.2d 57, 63 (Haw. 
1973) (noting that, pursuant to the public trust doctrine, land below the high water mark belongs to the 
public). 
379. Hawaii County,,. Sotomura, 517 P.2d at 61-62 (citing Oregon ex rel. Thorton v. Hay, 462 
P.2d 671 (Or. 1969)). 
380. Kobayashi v. Zimring, 566 P.2d 725, 735 (Haw. 1977). 
381. Morimoto v. Bd. of Land & Natural Res., 113 P.3d 172, 184 (Haw. 2005). 
382. Kelly v. 1250 Oceanside Partners, 140 P.3d 985, 1009, 1011 (Haw. 2006). 
C:, 
~ 
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addition, under Article XI, § I of the constitution, counties have public trust 
duties as well, and they "have an obligation to conserve and protect the state's 
natural resources."383 
Public trust principles in Hawai'i extend to water rights through a unique 
water resources trust akin to, but of different origin from, the navigable waters 
public trust. Emphasizing the 1978 amendments to the Hawai'i Constitution 
that constitutionalized the public trust doctrine, the Hawai'i Supreme Court has 
noted that in the Kingdom of Hawai' i, the right to water was reserved to the 
people for their common good in all land grants, and ownership of the water 
itself remained at all times in the people. 384 This sovereign reservation imposed 
a public trust on the water itself, similar to, but different from, the public trust 
doctrine that arises as a result of state title to the beds and banks of navigable 
waters.385 
Given Hawaii's water situation, the reassertion of this traditional water 
resources trust has been deemed critical, both as against assertions of riparian 
rights and in light of the State Water Code and water use permits. With respect 
to riparian rights, 
[t]he reassertion of donnant public interests in the diversion and application 
of Hawaii's waters has become essential with the increasing scarcity of the 
resource and recognition of the public's interests in the utilization and flow 
of these waters .... [W]hile there indeed exist relative usufructory rights 
among landowners, these rights can no longer be treated as though they are 
absolute and exclusive interests in the waters of our state. 386 
Instead, "underlying every private diversion and application there is, as there 
always has been, a superior public interest in this natural bounty."387 
With respect to the State Water Code: 
The public trust in the water resources of this state, like the navigable 
waters trust, has its genesis in the common law .... The [State Water] Code 
does not evince any legislative intent to abolish the common law public 
trust doctrine. To the contrary, ... the legislature appears to have engrafted 
the doctrine wholesale in the Code.388 
As a result, the State Water Code "does not supplant the protections of the 
public trust doctrine," and "the public trust doctrine applies to all water 
resources without exception or distinction," including ground waters.389 In 
383. Id. at 1004-05. 
384. In re Water Use Pennit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 441 (Haw. 2000); see also Robinson v. 
Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 310-1 l (Haw. 1982) (giving same history). 
385. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 441; Robinson, 658 P.2d at 310 (noting that 
this sovereign interest was more than just a police power interest; .. [t]he nature of this ownership is thus 
akin to the title held by all states in navigable waterways"). 
386. Robinson, 658 P.2d at 311. 
387. Id. at 312. 
388. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 443 (citations omitted). 
389. Id. at 445. 
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addition, "the maintenance of waters in their natural state constitutes a distinct 
'use' under the water resources trust."390 
Similarly, "a reservation of water constitutes a public trust purpose."391 As 
a result, the Department of Hawaiian Home Land's 
reservations of water throughout the State are entitled to the full panoply of 
constitutional protections afforded other public trust purposes .... To hold 
otherwise would undermine the public trust doctrine, which is a state 
constitutional doctrine, and the relevant policy declarations set forth in the 
[State Water] Code.392 
"The state water resources trust embodies a dual mandate of 1) protection 
and 2) maximum reasonable and beneficial use."393 Specifically, the state has a 
"duty to ensure the continued availability and existence of its water resources 
for present and future generations," but also a "duty to promote the reasonable 
and beneficial use of water resources in order to maximize their social and 
economic benefits to the people of this state."394 With respect to the water 
resources trust, moreover, the Hawai'i Supreme Court explicitly followed 
California's decision in the Mono Lake case, suggesting that the water 
resources trust is more protective than the navigable waters public trust 
doctrine. 395 Indeed, the water resources trust "precludes any grant or assertion 
of vested rights to use water to the detriment of public trust purposes."396 As in 
California, moreover, the state may "revisit prior diversions and allocations, 
even those made with due consideration of their effect on the public trust."397 
While the Commission may have to balance public and private interests in 
water, 
the constitutional requirements of 'protection' and 'conservation,' the 
historical and continuing understanding of the trust as a guarantee of public 
rights, and the common reality of the 'zero-sum' game between competing 
water uses demand that any balancing between public and private purposes 
begin with a presumption in favor of public use, access, and enjoyment ... 
398 
390. Id. at 448. 
391. In re Waiola O Moloka~ Inc., 83 P.3d 664,694 (Haw. 2004). 
392. Id. (citations omitted); see also In re Matter of the Contested Case Hearing on the Water Use 
Permit Application Filed by Kukui (Molokai), Inc., 174 P.3d 320,329,330 (Haw. 2007) (affirming that 
the public trust doctrine is a constitutional doctrine and the Department of Hawaiian Home Land's water 
reservations are public trust uses). 
393. In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 451. 
394. Id. 
395. Id. at 452. 
396. Id. at 453. 
397. Id. 
398. Id. at 454. 
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Moreover, the Commission's decisions in favor of private commercial uses are 
subject to "higher scrutiny. "399 Moreover, the Commission must consider the 
cumulative impacts of diversions and "implement reasonable measures to 
mitigate this impact, including the use of alternative sources." 4oo 
IDAHO 
Date of Statehood: 1890 
Water Law Svstem: Prior appropriation 
Idaho Constitution: Idaho has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine. 
However, its constitution does establish water rights. Relevant provisions of the 
Idaho Constitution include: 
• Art. XV, § 1: "The use of all waters now appropriated, or that may 
hereafter be appropriated for sale, rental, or distribution; also of all 
water originally appropriated for private use, but which after such 
appropriation has heretofore been, or may hereafter be sold, rented, 
or distributed, is hereby declared to be a public use, and subject to 
the regulations and control of the state in the manner prescribed by 
law." 
• Art. XV, § 3: "The right to divert and appropriate the 
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses, shall 
never be denied, except that the state may regulate and limit the use 
thereof for power purposes. Priority of appropriation shall give the 
better right as between those using the water .... " 
• Art XV,§ 7: "[T]he State Water Resource Agency shall have power 
to formulate and implement a state water plan for optimal 
development of water resources in the public interest .... " 
Idaho Statutes: Idaho has codified its public trust doctrine in Idaho Code 
Annotated §§ 58-1201 to 58-1203, which generally limits the public trust 
doctrine and its potential impact on appropriated rights. In codifying the 
doctrine, the Idaho Legislature made the following findings: 
( 1) Upon admission of the state of Idaho into the union, the title to the beds 
of navigable waters became state property, and subject to its jurisdiction 
and disposal under the equal footing doctrine. According to the United 
States [S]upreme [C]ourt's decision in Shively v. Bowlby, the state has the 
right to dispose of. the beds of navigable waters, "in such manner as [it] 
399. Id.; .see also In re Water Use Pennit Applications, 93 P.3d 643,650, 657 (Haw. 2004) (noting 
that "because water is a public trust resource and the public trust is a state constitutional doctrine, this 
court recognizes certain qualifications to the standard of review regarding the Water Commission's 
decisions" and in effect imposes a burden on proposed users to justify their uses of water). 
400. In re Water U.se Permit Applications, 9 P.3d at 455 (citations omitted). 
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might deem proper ... subject only to the paramount right of navigation 
and commerce." The state has the right to determine for itself "to what 
extent it will preserve its rights of ownership in them, or confer them on 
others." Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 56 (1893); and 
(2) Since the admission of the state of Idaho into the union, article XV of 
the constitution of the state of Idaho has governed the appropriation and use 
of the waters of Idaho. Pursuant to article XV of the constitution of the 
state of Idaho, the legislature of the state of Idaho has enacted a 
comprehensive system of laws for the appropriation, transfer and use of the 
waters of Idaho, which addresses the public interest therein; and 
(3) Upon admission of the state of Idaho into the union, the state was 
granted certain lands by the United States government as an endowment for 
designated institutions. Article IX of the constitution of the state of Idaho, 
and laws enacted pursuant thereto [related to public school lands], establish 
a comprehensive system of laws for the management of state endowment 
lands, which addresses the public interest therein; and 
( 4) The common law doctrine known as the public trust doctrine, adopted 
by inference in section 73-116, Idaho Code, had guided the alienation or 
encumbrance of the title to the beds of navigable waters held in trust by the 
state. The public trust doctrine has been used in court decisions and 
pleadings in ways that have created confusion in the administration and 
management of the waters and endowment lands; and 
(5) The public's interest in the environment is protected in other parts of 
Idaho's constitution or statutory law; and 
(6) The purpose of this act is to clarify the application of the public trust 
doctrine in the state of Idaho and to expressly declare the limits of this 
common law doctrine in accordance with the authority recognized in each 
state to define the extent of the common law.401 
The legislation goes on to declare that "[t]he public trust doctrine as it is 
applied in the state of Idaho is solely a limitation on the power of the state to 
alienate or encumber the title to the beds of navigable waters as defined in this 
chapter."402 Further, "[t]he public trust doctrine shall not be applied to any 
purpose other than as provided in this chapter,"403 and it does not apply to 
"[t]he appropriation or use of water, or the granting, transfer, administration, or 
adjudication of water or water rights . . . or any other procedure or law 
applicable to water rights in the state of Idaho" or to "[t]he protection or 
401. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1201 (2009). For discussions of this legislation and its impacts on 
Idaho's common-law public trust doctrine, see generally Michael C. Blurnm, Renouncing the Public 
Trust Doctrine: An Assessment of the Validity of Idaho House Bill 794, 24 EcOLOGY L.Q. 461 ( 1997); 
James M. Kearney, Recent Statute Closing the Floodgates? Idaho's Statutory Limitation on the Public 
Trust Doctrine, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 91 (1997); Lisa Lombardi, Note, The Public Trust Doctrine in Idaho, 
33 IDAHO L. REV. 231 (1996). 
402. IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 58-1203(1). 
403. Id.§ 58-1203(2). 
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exercise of private property rights within the state of ldaho."404 Finally, these 
statutes define "navigable waters" as "those waters that were susceptible to 
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce on the date 
of statehood, under the federal test of navigability" and identify the line of 
"natural or ordinary high water mark" as the boundary of the beds of navigable 
waters.405 
Other relevant statutes in Idaho include: 
• IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-246: No prescriptive easements for 
overflows are allowed in the beds of navigable waters. 
• IDAHO CODE ANN. § 36-1601: This provision defines a "navigable 
stream" to be "(a]ny stream which, in its natural state, during 
normal high water, will float cut timber have a diameter in excess of 
six (6) inches or any other commercial or floatable commodity or is 
capable of being navigated by oar or motor propelled small craft for 
pleasure or commercial purposes .... "406 It provides for.public use 
rights in "(n]avigable rivers, sloughs or streams within the meander 
line or, when not meandered, between the flow lines of ordinary 
high water thereof, and all rivers, sloughs and streams flowing 
through any public lands of the state," which "shall be open to 
public use as a public highway for travel and passage, up or 
downstream, for business or pleasure, and to exercise the incidents 
of navigation-boating, swimming, fishing, hunting, and all 
recreational purposes.',4o7 However, this right of use does not 
include a right of access over private property, except that the public 
can portage around irrigation dams and other private 
obstructions. 408 
• IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 42-101 to 42-114: Appropriation of Water. 
• IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-501 to 42-505: Appropriations by the 
Bureau of Land Management of the US Department of Interior. 
• IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-602 to 42-619: Distribution of Water 
Among Appropriators. 
• IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 42-701 to 42-715: Headgates and Measuring 
Devices. 
• IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 42-1101 to 42-1108: Rights of Way . 
• IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-1201 to 42-1209: Maintenance and Repair 
of Ditches. 
404. Id.§ 58-1203(2)(b), (c). 
405. Id.§ 58-1202(1 ). (3). 
406. Id.§ 36-1601(a). 
407. Id.§ 36-I60l(b). 
408. Id. § 36-160 l(c). 
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• IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-1401 to 42-1418: Water Rights 
Adjudications. 
• IDAHO CODE ANN.§§ 42-1501 to 42-1508: Minimum Stream Flow. 
• 
• 
IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 42-3801: "The legislature of the state ofldaho 
hereby declares that the public health, safety, and welfare requires 
that the stream channels of the state and their environments be 
protected against alteration for the protection of fish and wildlife 
habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, and water quality. 
No alteration of any stream channel shall hereafter be made unless 
approval therefor has been given as provided in this act." 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 58-1302: This provision defines a "navigable 
lake" to be "any permanent body of relatively still or slack water, 
including man-made reservoirs, not privately owned and not a mere 
marsh or stream eddy, and capable of accommodating boats or 
canoes. "409 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
By 1916, the Idaho Supreme Court had rejected the English tidal test of 
navigability in favor of the navigability-in-fact test.410 Until January 1, 1977, 
Idaho Code § 36-907 (1976) defined navigability for public fishing purposes to 
include any stream supporting log or timber floatation during the high water 
season.411 This older statute codified the holding of Mashburn v. St. Joe 
Improvement Co.412 However, on January 1, 1977, Idaho Code§ 36-1601 took 
effect, codifying the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Southern Idaho Fish & 
Game Ass 'n v. Picabo Livestock, lnc.,413 which established a log floatation test 
for both state title and public fishing purposes and recognized that this test was 
less restrictive than the federal test articulated in The Daniel Bal/414 and Utah 
v. United States.415 
Idaho has codified the standard federal title test of "navigable waters"-
that is, "those waters that were susceptible to being used, in their ordinary 
condition, as highways for commerce on the date of statehood, under the 
federal test ofnavigability"-for its public trust doctrine.416 Under this test, the 
409. Id. § 58-1302(a). 
410. N. Pac. Railway Co. v. Hirzel, 161 P. 854, 858-59 (Idaho 1916) (adopting McManus vs. 
Carmichael, 3 Idaho 1 (1856)). 
411. Ritter v. Standal, 566 P.2d 769, 770-71 & n. l (Idaho 1977). 
412. 113 P. 92, 95 (Idaho 1911); see also Ritter, 566 P.2d at 770-71 (citations omitted). 
413. 528 P.2d 1295, 1297-98 & n.1 (Idaho 1974). 
414. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870). 
415. 403 U.S. 9(1971). 
416. IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 58-1201(3) (2009). 
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Salmon River is a navigable water and owned by the state,417 as are the Snake 
and Clearwater Rivers. 418 
The public retains the right to use a broader category of "navigable 
streams" that are defined in terms of log floatation and pleasure boating.419 
Finally, Idaho defines a "navigable lake" to be "any permanent body of 
relatively still or slack water, including man-made reservoirs, not privately 
owned and not a mere marsh or stream eddy, and capable of accommodating 
boats or canoes. "420 
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Snake River in Idaho is 
navigable.421 However, as a result of federal reservations, Idaho does not have 
title to the beds of Coeur d'Alene Lake or the St. Joe River; instead, the United 
States hold title to those two waters in trust for the Coeur d'Alene Tribe. 422 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
Although some early cases suggested that a landowner owns the beds of 
non-tidal navigable-in-fact rivers,423 according to current case law and statutes, 
a riparian owner on a navigable stream or river or a littoral owner on a 
navigable lake takes title to the natural or ordinary high water mark.424 The 
natural or ordinary high water mark is "the line that water impresses on the soil 
by covering it for sufficient periods to deprive the soil of its vegetation and 
destroy its value for agricultural purposes."425 
'" [T]he State owns in trust for the public title to the bed of a navigable 
water below the OHWM [ ordinary high water mark] as it existed at the time the 
State was admitted into the Union. "'426 Landowners cannot exclude the public 
from using dry land below the OHWM, although they retain a concurrent right 
of access.427 "Granting the Lakeshore Owners the right to exclude the public 
from this portion of state lands would be inconsistent with the public trust 
doctrine," which preserves the beds of navigable waters for public use.428 
417. Callahan v. Price, 146 P. 732, 734-35 (Idaho 19 I 5). 
418. N. Pac. Railway Co. v. Hirzel, 161 P. 854,859 (Idaho 1916). 
419. IDAHO. CODE ANN.§ 36-1601(a), (b). 
420. Id § 58-1302. 
421. Moss v. Ramey, 239 U.S. 538,544 (1916); Scott v. Lattig, 227 U.S. 229, 242-43 (1913). 
422. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). 
423. See Moss, 95 P. at 514) (citing Johnson vs. Johnson, 95 P. 499 (Idaho 1908)); Ulbright v. 
Baslington, 119 P. 292, 293-94 (Idaho 1911). 
424. In re Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d 75, 85 (Idaho 2006) (citing West v. Smith, 511 P.2d 1326, 1330 
(Idaho 1973)); IDAHOCODEANN. § 58-1202(1). 
425. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 58-104(9), 58-1202(2); Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake 
Watershed Improvement Dist., 17 P.3d 260, 264 (Idaho 2000). 
426. In re Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d at 85 (quoting Erickson v. Idaho, 970 P.2d 1, 3 (Idaho 1998)). 
427. Id. 
428. Id. (citing Callahan v. Price, 146 P. 732, 735 (Idaho 1915); Idaho Forest Indus., 733 P.2d at 
737). 
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Moreover, "[t]he public trust doctrine is based upon common law equitable 
principles," and: 
While those equitable principles in certain circumstances may no longer 
apply to public trust property which has lost its navigable status naturally, it 
may well be that a loss of navigability resulting from a manmade dike or 
diversion may not, for equitable reasons, eliminate or destroy the public 
trust status of land which was once subject to that trust.429 
Similarly, public rights in a navigable river follow any artificial raising of the 
river level.430 
Illinois Central Railroad established the principle that the state may not 
abdicate its role as trustee of the lands beneath navigable waters to private 
parties.431 In the statutory public trust doctrine enacted in 1996, the Idaho 
Legislature preserved this primary focus and principle of the public trust.432 
Public trust lands conveyed to private parties by the Department of State Lands 
are limited by that principle and remain subject to the public trust.433 "The 
public trust doctrine at all times forms the outer boundaries of permissible 
government action with respect to public trust resources."434 As such, the 
public trust doctrine creates both procedural and judicial review requirements. 
Procedurally, "public trust resources may only be alienated or impaired through 
open and visible actions, where the public is in fact informed of the proposed 
action and has substantial opportunity to respond to the proposed action before 
a final decision is made thereon."435 Judicially, the courts make the final 
determination as to whether a conveyance is valid, taking a close look at the 
agency's decision: 
[T]he court will examine, among other things, such factors as the degree of 
the effect of the project on public trust uses, navigation, fishing, recreation, 
and commerce; the impact of the individual project on the public trust 
resource; the impact of the individual project when examined cumulatively 
with existing impediments to full use of the public trust resource ... ; the 
impact of the project on the public trust resource when that resource is 
examined in light of the primary purpose for which the resources is suited, 
i.e., commerce, navigation, fishing, or recreation; and the degree to which 
broad public uses are set aside in favor of more limited or private ones.436 
429. Idaho Forest Indus., 733 P.2d at 738 (citing Rutledge v. Idaho, 482 P.2d 515 (Idaho 1981)). 
430. Burrus v. Edward Rutledge Timber Co., 202 P. 1067, 1068 (Idaho 1921). 
431. Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Idaho 
1983). 
432. IDAHOCODEANN. § 58-1203(1)(2009). 
433. Kootenai Enwl. Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1095. 
434. Id. 
435. Id. at 1091. 
436. Id. at 1092-93. 
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Nevertheless, the state has the burden to prove its title by clear and 
convincing evidence if the state is not the record title holder.437 Moreover, 
"[t]here is no 'public trust doctrine' relating to land which is wholly 
independent or unconnected with such navigable waters."438 In addition, the 
public trust doctrine does not apply to private property traceable to an 1892 
patent from the United States government.439 
Although public rights were initially limited to navigation and incidents of 
navigation, such rights have expanded in Idaho to include fish and wildlife 
habitat, recreation, aesthetic beauty, and water quality.440 
By statute, the public trust doctrine does not apply to water rights.441 This 
law, enacted in 1996, invalidates a line of cases that had indicated that 
"proprietary rights to use water ... are held subject to the public trust."442 
KANSAS 
Date of Statehood: 1861 
Water Law Regime: Prior appropriation 
Kansas Constitution: Kansas has not constitutionalized its public trust 
doctrine. Indeed, there are no provisions in the Kansas Constitution relevant to 
water. 
Kansas Statutes: 
• KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-201 to 82a-218: Navigable Waters. If there 
is a sudden (avulsive) change in a navigable river, the Secretary of 
State must buy or condemn the new channel.443 The state will 
acquire ownership to the high water mark.444 The state can also 
convey the old channel. 445 
• KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 to 82a-773: Kansas Water 
Appropriation Act. "All water within the State of Kansas is hereby 
437. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Improvement Dist., 17 P.3d 260, 264 
(Idaho 2000). 
438. Idaho Forest Indus., 733 P.2d at 737. 
439. State ex rel. Haman v. Fox, 594 P.2d 1093, 1102 (Idaho 1979). 
440. In re Sanders Beach, 147 P.3d 75, 85 (Idaho 2006); Idaho Forest Indus., 733 P.2d at 737; 
Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1093. 
441. IDAHOCODEANN. §58-1203(2)(b)(2009). 
442. Idaho Conservation League, Inc. v. Idaho, 911 P.2d 748, 750 (Idaho 1995); Kootenai Em•tl. 
Alliance, 671 P.2d at 1094 (holding that .. the public trust doctrine talces precedence even over vested 
water rights"). 
443. KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 82a-201 (2009). 
444. Id.§ 82a-202. 
445. Id.§ 82a-205. 
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dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject to the control 
and regulation of the state in the manner herein prescribed. "446 The 
act allows for minimum streamflows and a permit system.447 The 
act also addresses conservation plans and practices,448 and 
establishes a water bank.449 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
Kansas courts have recognized that, under the English tidal test of 
navigability, three categories of waters existed: the non-navigable waters; 
intermediate waters, whose beds were in private ownership but whose waters 
are subject to public rights of use; and the navigable waters subject to the ebb 
and flow of the tide, whose beds belong to the Crown.450 Nevertheless, in the 
United States, the American navigable-in-fact test governs, and the ancient tidal 
test was never part of Kansas common law.451 
Thus, for state title and public trust doctrine purposes, the Kansas courts 
apply the federal title test of navigability. According to those courts, 
Under this test, bodies of water are navigable and title to the beds under the 
water are vested in the State if: (I) the bodies of water were used, or were 
susceptible of being used, as a matter of fact, as highways for commerce; 
(2) such use for commerce was possible under the natural conditions of the 
body of water; (3) commerce was or could have been conducted in the 
customary modes of trade or travel on water, and (4) all of these conditions 
were satisfied at the time of statehood.452 
Older cases, however, allowed the establishment of navigability by judicial 
notice, "at least so far as the great rivers are concemed."453 Moreover, lack of 
446. Id. § 82a-702. 
44 7. Id. §§ 82a-703a to 82a-703c. 
448. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-733. 
449. Id. § 82a-763. 
450. State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Kan. 1990); Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682, 
689 (1882). 
451. Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637, 645~9 (Kan. 1914); Wood, 26 Kan. at 689. 
452. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1359 (citing United States v. Holt Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55-56 (1926)); see 
also Hurst v. Dana, 122 P. 1041, 1042 (Kan. 1911) (noting that "any water to be navigable should be 
susceptible of use for purposes of commerce or possess the capacity for valuable floatage in 
transportation to market of the products of the country through which it runs, and should be of practical 
usefulness to the public as a public highway in its own state and without aid of artificial means; that a 
theoretical or potential navigability or one that is temporary, precarious and unprofitable, is not 
sufficient"); Kregar v. Fogarty, 96 P. 845, 84~7 (Kan. 1908) (noting that navigability is a question of 
fact determined through the federal commerce test; meandering is not dispositive). 
453. Wood, 26 Kan. at 689 (addressing the navigability of the Kansas River); Hurst, 122 P. at 1042 
(addressing the Arkansas River). 
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use does not affect state title to a river that is navigable-in-fact.454 There is no 
state common law test of navigability in Kansas.455 
Applying the federal test, the Kansas Supreme Court determined that 
Shoal Creek was non-navigable.456 The court emphasized that the creek did not 
allow for any valuable floatage, that it dries up, and that parts of the creek are 
not navigable even by canoes.457 Similarly, the Neosho River was not 
navigable even though it could support log floatation and light boats over short 
distances; it was never used to transport the products of the country. 458 
By 1990, three rivers in Kansas had been declared navigable for title 
purposes: the Kansas River, the Arkansas River, and the Missouri River.459 
Three rivers had been declared non-navigable: the Neosho River, the Delaware 
River, and the Smoky Hill River.460 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
For navigable streams, the riparian landowner owns "only to the 
banks."461 In contrast, landowners along non-navigable streams own the bed of 
the stream and may put a fence across the stream to stop trespassing 
canoeists.462 "Navigable waters and public waters are synonymous terms. This 
state claims title to the beds of public streams only. The title to the beds of all 
other streams is in the riparian owner. "463 
In navigable waters, both riparian owners and the general public have 
rights; "[t]he stream is a public highway, and no one can maintain an exclusive 
privilege to any part of the water."464 Public rights include the right to take 
ice.465 Moreover: 
The title of the state to the bed of a meandered stream is not an absolute 
fee, which the state can dispose of as it wishes; but such title is vested in it 
in trust for the benefit and common right of all the people, for the purposes 
for which such property has been used from time immemorial, viz; the 
common right of passage, of fishing, of the use of the waters for domestic, 
454. Hurst, 122 P. at 1043. 
455. Silerv. Dreyer, 327 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Kan. 1958). 
456. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1360. 
457. Id. 
458. Webb v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Neosho County, 257 P. 966,966 (Kan. 1927). 
459. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1360 (citing Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637 (Kan. 1914); Hurst, 122 P. at 
1041; Wood v. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682 (1882)). 
460. Id. (citing Webb v. Neosho County Commissioners, 257 P. 966 (Kan. 1927); Piazzek v. 
Drainage Dist., 23 7 P. 1059 (Kan. 1925); Kreger v. Fogarty, 96 P. 845 (Kan. 1908)). 
461. Id at 1358; Kregar, 96 P. at 847. 
462. Meek, 785 P.2d at 1358; Kregar, 96 P. at 848 (noting that title in non-navigable \.Vaters goes to 
the thread of the stream). 
463. Pia::::ek, 237 P. at 1060. 
464. Woodl'. Fowler, 26 Kan. 682, WL 910 at •2. 
465. Id. 
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agricultural, and commercial purposes, and therefore the state has no 
proprietary right in the bed of the stream or in the water which it can 
selt.466 
In addition, private persons cannot acquire prescriptive rights in these assets 
against the public. 467 
In 1990, the Kansas Supreme Court refused to extend public trust concepts 
to non-navigable streams based on state ownership of the water and § 82a-702 
of the Kansas statutes.468 
Owners of the bed of a nonnavigable stream have the exclusive right of 
control of everything above the stream bed, subject only to constitutional 
and statutory limitations, restrictions, and regulations. Where the legislature 
refuses to create a public trust for recreational purposes in nonnavigable 
streams, courts should not alter the legislature's statement of public policy 
by judicial legislation. 469 
As a result, "[t]he public has no right to the use of nonnavigable water over-
lying private lands for recreational purposes without the consent of the 
landowner. "4 70 
MONTANA 
Date of Statehood: 1889 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation 
Montana Constitution: The Montana Constitution has several prov1s1ons 
related to water, public access, and environmental protection that the Montana 
courts have deemed relevant to Montana's public trust doctrine.471 These and 
other relevant provisions include: 
• Preamble: "We the people of Montana grateful to God for the quiet 
beauty of our state, the grandeur of our mountains, the vastness of 
our rolling plains, and desiring to improve the quality of life, 
equality of opportunity and to secure the blessings of liberty for this 
and future generations to ordain and establish this constitution." 
• Art. IX, § 1: "The state and each person shall maintain and improve 
a clean and healthful environment in Montana for present and future 
generations."472 "The legislature shall provide for the 
466. Kansas v. Akers, 140 P. 637,640 (Kan. 1914). 
467. Id. at 650. 
468. State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1364 (Kan. 1990). 
469. Id. at 1364-65. 
470. Id. at 1365. 
471. See, e.g., In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to Use of all Water, 55 P.3d 396, 404 
(Mont. 2002) (linking the Constitution to the public trust doctrine). 
472. MONT. CONST., art. IX,§ 1(1)(1972). 
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administration and enforcement of this duty_,..i73 "The legislature 
shall provide adequate remedies for the protection of the 
environmental life support system from degradation and provide 
adequate remedies to prevent unreasonable depletion and 
degradation of natural resources."474 
• Art. IX, § 3: "All existing rights to the use of any waters for any 
useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and 
confirmed."475 "The use of all water that is now or may hereafter be 
appropriated for sale, rent, distribution or other beneficial use, the 
right of way over the lands of others for all ditches, drains, flumes, 
canals, and aqueducts necessarily used in connection therewith, and 
the sites for reservoirs necessary for collecting and storing water 
shall be held to be a public use. "476 "All surface, underground, 
flood, and atmospheric waters within the boundaries of the state are 
property of the state for the use of its people and are subject to 
appropriation for beneficial uses as provided by law_,,477 "The 
legislature shall provide for the administration, control, and 
regulation of water rights and shall establish a system of centralized 
records, in addition to the present system of local records. "4 78 
• Art. IX, § 4: "The legislature shall provide for the identification, 
acquisition, restoration, enhancement, preservation, and 
administration of scenic, historic, archeologic, scientific, cultural, 
and recreational areas, sites, records, and objects, for their use and 
enjoyment by the people." 
• Art. IX, § 7: "The opportunity to harvest wild fish and wild game 
animals is a heritage that shall forever be preserved to the individual 
citizens of the state and does not create a right of trespass on private 
property or diminution of other private rights." 
Montana Statutes: 
• MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-301 to 23-2-322: Recreational Use of 
Streams. These provisions define "ordinary high-water mark" to be 
"the line that water impresses on land by covering it for sufficient 
periods to cause physical characteristics that distinguish the area 
below the line from the area above it. Characteristics of the area 
below the line include, when appropriate, but are not limited to 
deprivation of the soil of substantially all terrestrial vegetation and 
473. Id. § 1(2). 
474. Id. § 1(3). 
475. Id.§ 3(1). 
476. Id.§ 3(2). 
477. Id. § 3(3). 
478. Id.§ 3(4). 
137 
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destruction of its agricultural vegetative value. A flood plain 
adjacent to surface waters is not considered to lie within the surface 
waters' high-water marks."479 Recreational uses of surface waters 
include "fishing, hunting, swimming, floating in small craft or other 
flotation devices, boating in motorized craft unless otherwise 
prohibited or regulated by law, or craft propelled by oar or paddle, 
other water-related pleasure activities, and related unavoidable or 
incidental uses."480 '"Surface water' means, for the purpose of 
determining the public's access for recreational use, a natural water 
body, its bed, and its banks up to the ordinary high-water mark."481 
While codifying public recreational rights, these provisions ensure 
that title to land is not affected by public access,482 and that the 
public can acquire no prescriptive easements as a result of its 
recreational use of surface waters.483 Moreover, the rights do not 
apply to lakes.484 These provisions also restrict riparian landowners' 
Iiability.485 However, the provisions do allow the public rights to 
portage above the high-water mark.486 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-5-705: Nothing in the state's water quality 
laws and water quality assessment provisions "may be construed to 
divest, impair, or diminish any water right recognized pursuant to 
Title 85." 
• MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-7-104: Provisions for the protection of 
streambeds "shall not impair, diminish, divest or control any 
existing or vested water rights under the laws of the state of 
Montana or the United States." 
• 
• 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-111: "Navigable waters and all streams 
of sufficient capacity to transport the products of the country are 
public ways for the purposes of navigation and such transportation. 
This section shall not be construed so as to affect or impair, in any 
manner, any rights acquired prior to July 1, 1901, by any person, 
association of persons, or corporation. The right of any person, 
association of persons, or corporation to take and use any water, as 
now provided by law, from any stream or streams for the purpose of 
irrigation or any beneficial or industrial pursuit shall not be 
abridged." 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-112: "All lakes wholly or partly within 
this state which have been meandered and returned as navigable by 
479. MONT. CODE ANN.§ 23-2-301 (2009). 
480. Id. § 23-2-301(10). 
481. Id.§ 23-2-301(12). 
482. Id. § 23-2-309. 
483. Id. § 23-2-322. 
484. Id. § 23-2-310. 
485. Id § 23-2-321. 
486. Id. § 23-2-311. 
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the surveyors employed by the government of the United States and 
all lakes which are navigable in fact are hereby declared to be 
navigable and public waters, and all persons shall have the same 
rights therein and thereto that they have in and to any other 
navigable streams or public waters."487 "All rivers and streams 
which have been meandered and returned as navigable by surveyors 
employed by the government of the United States and all rivers and 
streams which are navigable in fact are hereby declared 
navigable."488 
MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 2: Surface Water and Ground 
Water. This chapter provides for water rights adjudications; 
appropriations, permits, and certificates of water rights; utilization 
of water; and Indian and federal water rights. 
MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 7: Irrigation Districts . 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-102: "All docks and wharves built on 
any of the navigable waters of the state shall be public docks and 
wharves, and all boats, vessels, and steamboats plying such 
navigable waters shall have a right to land thereat and take on and 
discharge their cargoes and passengers thereon. The owner of such 
dock or wharf shall have the right to charge and collect from the 
owner or owners of such boat, steamboat, or vessel a reasonable 
compensation therefor." 
• MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-107: With respect to land under a 
navigable water, state ownership e:>..1ends to the high water mark or 
meander line. 
• 
• 
MONT. CODE ANN., Title 85, Chapter 20: Water Compacts . 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305: "Navigable rivers, sloughs, or 
streams between the lines of ordinary high water thereof of the state 
of Montana and all rivers, sloughs, and streams flowing through any 
public lands of the state shall hereafter be public waters for the 
purpose of angling, and any rights of title to such streams and the 
land between high water flow lines or within the meander lines of 
navigable streams shall be subject to the right of any person owning 
an angler's license of this state who desires to angle therein or along 
their banks to go upon the same for such purpose." 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
139 
Early on, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the common law "ebb and 
flow" tidal rule of navigability in favor of the navigable-in-fact test.489 For 
487. Id.§ 85-1-112(1). 
488. Id.§ 85-1-112(2). 
489. Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517,519 (Mont 1895). 
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purposes of state title to the beds and banks, Montana uses a federal test of 
navigability based on The Daniel Ball and The Montello.490 However, in the 
Montana Supreme Court's interpretation, this is essentially a log floatation test. 
For example, evidence that the Dearborn River was used in 1887 to float 
approximately 100,000 railroad ties, and used in 1888 and 1889 to float log 
drives supported a finding that the river was navigable for state title 
purposes.491 State ownership of the bed also gives the state ownership of 
minerals contained therein.492 
Nevertheless, "where title to the bed of [a river] rests within the State, the 
test of navigability for use and not for title, is a test to be determined under 
state law and not federal law. "493 In its case law relying on the Montana 
Constitution, the Montana Supreme Court has employed a broad "recreational 
use" test to determine which waters are subject to public use. Specifically, 
the capability of use of the waters for recreational purposes detennined 
whether the waters can be so used. The Montana Constitution clearly 
provides that the State owns the waters for the benefit of its people. The 
Constitution does not limit the waters' use. Consequently, this Court cannot 
limit their use by inventing some restrictive test.494 
By statute, for purposes of public use rights, streams and lakes in Montana 
are navigable if they are navigable in fact under a commerce definition or 
meandered and returned as navigable by federal surveyors.495 In addition, the 
public has a right to fish in any waters that flow through public lands.496 
According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Big Hom River is navigable 
and Montana owns its beds and banks.497 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
The line between private and state ownership of the beds of navigable 
waters is the high-water mark or meander line.498 However, under older 
490. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 166 (Mont. 1984). 
491. Id.; see also Edwards v. Severin, 785 P.2d 1022, 1023-24 (Mont. 1990) (concluding that the 
Yellowstone River is a navigable river because it could float logs). 
492. Jackson v. Burlington N., Inc., 667 P.2d 406, 408 (Mont. 1983). 
493. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d at 168. 
494. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984) (rejecting 
both the federal navigability and .. pleasure boat" tests for public rights); see also Mont. Coal. for Stream 
Access,,. Curran, 682 P.2d at 169 (recreational use and fishing can make a stream navigable for public 
use purposes, and .. [s]treambed ownership by a private party is irrelevant," overruling Herrin v. 
Sutherland, 241 P. 328 (Mont. 1925), which held that persons who waded a non-navigable creek had 
committed a trespass. on the grounds that that holding "was contrary to the public trust doctrine and the 
1972 Montana Constitution"). 
495. MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 85-1-111, 85-1-112 (2009). 
496. MONT. CODE ANN. § 87-2-305. 
497. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 553-57 (1981). 
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statutes, riparian landowners on navigable streams took title to the low water 
mark, while landowners along non-navigable waters took title to the middle of 
the stream or lake.499 Neveertheless, even under these cases, public rights 
extended to the high water mark. 5oo 
"The public has the right to use the waters and the bed and banks up to the 
high water mark," including portage "in the least intrusive manner 
possible."501 Moreover, "(u]nder the Constitution and the public trust doctrine, 
the public has an instream, non-diversionary right to the recreational use of the 
State's navigable surface waters.502 However, this right does not give the 
public access rights over private property. 503 Early rights recognized included 
the rights to fish and to shoot wild ducks.504 
Montana is one of the western states that has used public ownership of 
water to extend public trust rights to non-navigable waters. Thus, the Montana 
Supreme Court has emphasized that "(t]he public trust doctrine in Montana's 
Constitution grants public ownership in water not in beds and banks of 
streams."505 Moreover, "(t]he Montana Constitution makes no distinction 
between Class I and Class II waters. All waters are owned by the State for the 
use of its people."506 As a result, "the public has the right to use the water for 
recreational purposes and minimal use of underlying and adjoining real estate 
essential to enjoyment of its ownership in water," even if the bed and banks are 
privately owned. 507 "The public has a right of use up to the high water mark, 
but only such use as is necessary to utilization of the water itself. We hold that 
498. MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-16-107; Galt v. Mont. Dep't of Fish, Wildlife, & Parks, 731 P.2d 
912,915 (Mont 1987). 
499. Montgomery v. Gehring, 400 P.2d 403,405 (Mont 1965) (citing MONT. REV. CODE.§ 67-712 
(1947)); see also Faucett v. Dewey Lumber Co., 266 P. 646,648 (Mont. 1928) (noting that under MONT. 
REV. CODE§ 6771 (1921), landowners along navigable waters took title to the low-water mark); He1Tin, 
241 P. at 331 (same); Gibson v. Kelly, 39 P. 517,519 (Mont. 1895) (noting that the boundary between 
public and private ownership is the low water mark, based on av. CODE§ 772 (1895)). 
500. Gibson, 39 P. at 519-20 (recognizing public rights of fishing and navigation to this mark). 
501. Mont. Coal. for Stream Access, Inc. v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d 1088, 1091 (Mont. 1984). 
502. In re Adjudication of the Existing Rights to Use All the Water, 55 P.3d 396, 404 (Mont. 
2002). For a more detailed discussion of recreational use rights in Montana, see generally Sarah K. 
Stauffer, The Row on the Ruby: State Management of Public Trust Resources, the Right to Exclude, and 
the Future of Recreational Stream Access in Montana, 30 ENVTL. L. 1421 (2006). 
503. Mont. Coal.for Stream Access v. Hildreth, 684 P.2d at 1091. 
504. Herrin, 241 P. at 331. 
505. Galt v. Montana Dep't offish, Wildlife, & Parks, 731 P.2d 912,915 (Mont. 1987) (emphasis 
added). 
506. Id. 
501. Id.; Mont. Coal. for Stream Access v. Hildeth, 684 P.2d at 1092 (noting that underlying 
ownership of the bed does not matter for the public's recreational use right); Mont. Coal. for Stream 
Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. I 984) (holding that "under the public trust doctrine 
and the 1972 Montana Constitution, any surface waters that are capable of recreational use may be so 
used by the public without regard to streambed ownership or navigability for nonrecreational 
purposes"). 
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any use of the bed and banks must be of minimal impact. "508 Nevertheless, 
Montana statutes make it clear that appropriated water rights trump any other 
public interest in the waters, including environmental protections and public 
use rights.509 
Montana statutes codify public rights of recreation, navigation, and fishing 
in the navigable and public surface waters.510 Given the statutory limitations 
regarding "surface waters" and "natural" waters in § 23-2-301 of the Montana 
Code, recreational rights in artificial lakes are limited. 511 
NEBRASKA 
Date of Statehood: 1867 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation, although some riparian rights 
remain512 
Nebraska Constitution: Nebraska's constitution contains several provisions 
relating to water. These include: 
• Art. XV,§ 4: Water a Public Necessity. "The necessity of water for 
domestic use and for irrigation purposes in the State of Nebraska is 
hereby declared to be a natural want." 
• Art XV, § 5: "The use of the water of every natural stream within 
the State of Nebraska is hereby dedicated to the people of the state 
for beneficial purposes, subject to the provisions of the following 
section." 
• Art. XV, § 6: This section establishes the right to divert 
unappropriated waters, subject to a public interest limitation and a 
preference for domestic use, followed by a preference for 
agriculture. 
• Art. XV, § 7: This section declares that the appropriation of water 
for power uses is a public purpose. 
Nebraska Statutes: 
• NEB. REV. STAT. § Al-105: South Platte River Compact. 
• NEB. REV. STAT.§ Al-106: Republican River Compact. 
508. Galt, 731 P.2dat915;Mont. Coal.forStreamAccessl'. Curran,682P.2dat 172. 
509. MONT. CODE ANN.§§ 75-5-705, 75-7-104, 85-1-111 (2009). 
510. Id.§§ 23-2-301 to 23-2-322, 85-1-111, 85-1-112, 85-16-102, 87-2-305. 
511. Ryan v. Harrison & Harrison Farms, L.L.P., No. 00-395, 2001 WL 828068, at •4 (Mont. 
2001). 
512. Koch v. Aupperle, 737 N.W.2d 869,878 (Neb. 2007); Wassennan v. Coffee, 141 N.W.2d 738, 
744-45 (Neb. 1966). 
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• NEB. REV. STAT. § Al-11O: Nebraska-South Dakota-Wyoming 
Water Compact. 
• NEB. REV. STAT. § Al-111: Nebraska-Kansas Water Compact 
Commission. 
• NEB. REV. STAT.§ Al-112: Wyoming-Nebraska Compact on Upper 
Niobrara River. 
• NEB. REV. STAT.§ Al-114: Missouri-Nebraska Boundary Compact. 
Article VII(b) of the Compact prohibits the states from claiming the 
beds of the Missouri River against private landowners. 
• NEB. REV. STAT.§ Al-115: Blue River Basin Compact. 
• NEB. REV. STAT. § Al-123: South Dakota-Nebraska Boundary 
Compact. Article VII(b) of the Compact prohibits the states from 
claiming the beds of the Missouri River against private landowners. 
• NEB. REV. STAT., Chapter 46: Irrigation and Regulation of Water. 
This chapter provides for water rights adjudications and ground 
water regulation. 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
143 
In 1906, the Nebraska Supreme Court observed the variations among the 
states regarding what constituted "navigable waters" and blamed the 
"confusion" on a variety of factors.513 Noting that Nebraska had adopted 
English common law, the court rejected the navigable-in-fact test for title as a 
mistake and adhered instead to the common law ebb-and-flow tidal test-even 
for the Missouri River.514 Despite holding that Nebraska lacked title in the 
Missouri River, the court explained that "[t]he public retains its easement of the 
right of passage along and over the waters of the river as a public highway. 
This is the interest of the public in connection with such rivers which is 
paramount, and which is, and should be, protected by the courts."515 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
A landowner along navigable or non-navigable waters "owns to the thread 
of the stream, and his riparian rights extend to existing and subsequently 
formed islands."516 "The only difference is that in the case of a navigable 
513. Kinkead v. Turgeon, 109 N.W. 744, 744 (Neb. 1906). 
514. Id. at 745-47. 
515. Id. at 747. But see Clark v. Cambridge & Arapahoe Irrigation & Improvement Co., 64 N.W. 
239, 240-41 (Neb. 1895) (accepting the navigable-in-fact test but nevertheless finding that the 
Republican River was not navigable). 
516. Monument Farms, Inc. v. Daggett, 520 N.W.2d 556, 561-62 (Neb. Ct. App. 1994)~ 
Krumwielde v. Rose, 129 N.W.2d 491,496 (Neb. 1964). 
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stream, such as the Missouri River, it is subject to the superior easement of 
navigation."517 Further, 
[t]he interest of the public in the waters and bed of a navigable river is 
analogous to that of the public in a public road. It has the right of passage 
over the stream as it had over the road. The owner of the land abutting upon 
a private road can do nothing in any way to interfere with the rights of the 
public in the same, nor can the riparian owner on the banks of a navigable 
stream exercise any dominion over its waters or over the bed thereof in any 
manner inconsistent with, or opposed to, the public easement. 518 
Apart from this, neither the courts nor the legislature have 
comprehensively developed Nebraska's public trust law. 
NEVADA 
Date of Statehood: 1864 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation 
Nevada Constitution: There are no provisions relevant to water in the Nevada 
Constitution. 
Nevada Statutes: 
• NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.450: Nuisance includes befouling, 
obstructing, or rendering dangerous for passage "a lake, navigable 
river, bay, stream, canal, ditch, millrace, or basin .... " 
• NEV. REV. STAT. § 322.0052: This provision defines a littoral or 
riparian residential parcel. 
• NEV. REV. STAT. § 455B.420: "'Water access area' includes, 
without limitation, a beach, river entry or exit point and land located 
at or below the ordinary high-water mark of a navigable body of 
water within this state." 
• NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 532: State Engineer. 
• NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 533: Adjudication of Vested 
Water Rights; Appropriation of Public Waters. "The water of all 
sources of water supply within the boundaries of the state whether 
above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the 
public."519 These provisions also declare that recreational use of the 
waters is a beneficial use. 520 
517. Kru,mvielde, 129 N.W.2d at 496 (citing Kinkead v. Turgeon, 109 N.W. 744 (Neb. 1906)). 
518. Kinkead, 109 N.W. at 747. 
519. NEV. REV. STAT.§ 533.025 (2008). 
520. Id § 533.030(2). 
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• NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 534: Underground Water and 
Wells. 
• NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 535: Dams and Other 
Obstructions. 
• NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 536: Ditches, Canals, Flumes, 
and Other Conduits. 
• 
• 
NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 537: Navigable Waters. This 
chapter lists specific waters that the State of Nevada considers 
navigable for title purposes. Thus, "[a]ll of the Colorado River 
within the State of Nevada, from the Arizona line on the north to the 
California line on the south, is hereby declared to be a navigable 
stream for purposes of fixing ownership on the banks and beds 
thereof, and title to the lands below the high water mark thereof is 
held by the State of Nevada, insofar as they lie within the state."521 
Similarly, the Virgin River and Winnemuca Lake are navigable 
waters, with title to their beds and banks in the State of Nevada.522 
NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 538: Interstate Waters, 
Compacts, and Commissions. The Colorado River Compact is 
codified at § 53 8.0 I 0. 
• NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 539: Irrigation Districts. 
• NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 540: Planning and Development 
of Water Resources. 
• NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 540A: Regional Planning and 
Management. 
• NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 541: Water Conservancy 
Districts. 
• NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 543: Control of Floods. 
• NEV. REV. STAT., Title 48, Chapter 544: Modification of Weather. 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
145 
In Chapter 537, Nevada's statutes declare certain waters to be navigable 
for title purposes, including the Colorado River, the Virgin River, and 
Winnemuca Lake. 523 These statutes are effectively treated as conclusive 
determinations of navigability for title purposes. 524 
521. Id.§ 537.010. 
522. Id. §§ 537.020, 537.030. 
523. NEV. REV. STAT. § 537 (2008). 
524. See State Eng'r v. Cowles Bros, Inc., 478 P.2d 159, 160 (Nev. 1970) (concluding that, because 
Winnemuca Lake went dry naturally and gradually, the court would nonnally have declared it non-
navigable for title purposes, but for the declaration of navigability in NEV. REV. STAT. § 537.030 
(1921 )), 
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However, Chapter 537 does not provide a complete list of the navigable 
waters in Nevada, and outside of these statutory declarations, the Nevada courts 
use the federal test for navigability and recognize that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has established different navigability tests for Commerce Clause and state title 
purposes.525 For state title purposes, the water must be navigable as of the date 
of statehood.526 Moreover, "[a] body of water is navigable if it is used or is 
usable in its ordinary condition, as a highway of commerce over which trade 
and travel are or may be conducted."527 Nevertheless, the Nevada Supreme 
Court has interpreted the federal title test to be a log floatation test, concluding 
that: 
[a]lthough no Supreme Court case has expressly based its decision of title 
navigability on the capacity of a stream to float out logs, the emphasized 
portions of ... The Montello and Appalachian Power leads us to believe 
that in the setting of this case navigability for title has been established. 
Log driving was the first and apparently only important commercial use of 
the Carson. The river was fortuitously and ideally located geographically 
for this use. The Carson River was and is navigable. 528 
Moreover, Nevada courts have noted that the Supreme Court allows states to 
use less stringent tests for navigability to define allowable public uses. 529 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
The Nevada Supreme Court has noted that "the states hold title to the beds 
of navigable watercourses in trust for the people of their respective states. Title 
to navigable water beds are normally inalienable."530 As a result, in the absence 
on an express legislative determination to convey these submerged lands, it is 
presumed that state land patents did not convey them. 531 
Early case law indicates that private landowners own to the low water 
mark of navigable waters.532 However, if the title describes a meander line, the 
landowner takes only to that meander line or high water line. 533 
525. State v. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231. 1233, 1235-36, 1238 (Nev. 1972). 
526. State Eng'r, 478 P.2d at 160. 
527. Id. (citing Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922)). 
528. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1236; see also Shoemaker v. Hatch, 13 Nev. 261, 267 (1878) 
(concluding that the Truckee River is navigable because it is "a highway for the floatage of wood and 
timber. and has been treated by the officers of the government as a navigable stream"). 
529. Bunkowski, 503 P.2d at 1235. 
530. Id. at 1233, 1235-36, 1238. 
531. Id. 
532. Shoemaker, 13 Nev. at 267. 
533. Michelsen v. Harvey, 822 P.2d 660,662 (Nev. 1991)~ Reno Brewing Co. v. Pacjard, 103 P. 
415 (Nev. 1909). 
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Nevada's case law on its public trust doctrine is quite limited. Indeed, one 
writer has declared that "Nevada remains the only western state that has not 
addressed the public trust doctrine."534 
Nevertheless, as in many western states, the issue of the relationship 
between appropriative water rights and the public trust doctrine has arisen in 
Nevada, although the courts have largely side-stepped the issue.535 The Nevada 
Supreme Court has discussed the public trust doctrine in the water rights 
context, however, stating that: 
Under the Public Trust Doctrine, the state government, as trustee of all 
public natural resources, owes a fiduciary obligation to the general public 
to maintain public uses unless an alternative use would achieve a 
countervailing public benefit. Thus, the Public Trust Doctrine serves to 
protect public expectations in natural resources held in common against 
destabilizing change.536 
Moreover, the State Engineer's 
refusal to consider alternatives to the [water] project is not consistent with 
the exercise of his functions as the trustee of water resources in Nevada and 
his responsibility to insure that 'all sources of water supply within the ... 
state whether above or beneath the surface of the ground' is managed as an 
asset belonging to the public. In refusing to consider any of the alternatives 
presented by the protestants to the use proposed by the applicants, the State 
Engineer has violated his trust and has failed to consider adequately the 
public's interest in its water resources.537 
As in Montana, the statutory declaration of public ownership of Nevada's 
water may yet influence its public trust doctrine. In 1997, the Nevada Supreme 
Court declared that "the most fundamental tenet of Nevada water law [is that] 
'[t]he water of sources of water supply within the boundaries of the state 
whether above or beneath the surface of the ground, belongs to the public. "'538 
In addition, at least one justice of the Nevada Supreme Court has expressed a 
willingness to consider "the existence and role of the public trust doctrine in the 
State of Nevada," noting that in other states the doctrine has evolved to include 
recreational and ecological uses and emphasizing the public ownership of water 
in Nevada.539 According to Justice Rose, "[t]his extension of the doctrine is 
534. John P. Sande IV, A Ril'er Runs to It: Can the Public Trust Doctrine Save Walker Lake?. 44 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 831, 833 n.15 (2004 ). 
535. See, e.g., Mineral County v. Nev. Dep't of Conservation & Natural Res, 20 P.3d 800,807 n.35 
(Nev. 2001) (avoiding the issue of how the public trust doctrine would apply to water rights affecting 
Walker River on procedural grounds). 
536. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Washoe County, 918 P.2d 697, 709 n.7 (Nev. 1996) 
( citations omitted). 
537. Id. at 709 (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025). 
538. Desert Irrigation, Ltd. v. State, 944 P.2d 835, 842 (Nev. 1997) (quoting NEV. REV. STAT. § 
533.025, with the court adding emphasis). 
539. Mineral County, 20 P.3d at 807-08 (Rose, J., concurring). 
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natural and necessary where, as here, the navigable water's existence is wholly 
dependent on tributaries that appear to be over-appropriated."540 
NEW MEXICO 
Date of Statehood: 1912 
Water Law Svstem: Prior appropriation 
New Mexico Constitution: The New Mexico Constitution includes several 
provisions related to water, and the New Mexico courts have determined that 
the constitutional declaration of public ownership of the waters is relevant to 
public use rights. Relevant provisions of the Constitution include: 
• Art. XVI, § 1: "All existing rights to the use of any waters in this 
state for any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognized and 
confirmed." 
• Art. XVI, § 2: "The unappropriated water of every natural stream, 
perennial or torrential, within the state of New Mexico, is hereby 
declared to belong to the public and to be subject to appropriation 
for beneficial use, in accordance with the laws of this state. Priority 
of appropriation shall give the better right." 
• 
• 
• 
Art. XVI, § 3: "Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and 
the limit of the right to the use of water." 
Art. XVI, § 6(A): "The 'water trust fund' is created in the state 
treasury to conserve and protect the water resources of New Mexico 
and to ensure that New Mexico has the water it needs for a strong 
and vibrant future. The purpose of the fund shall be to secure a 
supply of clean and safe water for New Mexico's residents." 
Art. XX,§ 21: "The protection of the state's beautiful and healthful 
environment is hereby declared to be of fundamental importance to 
the public interest, health, safety and the general welfare. The 
Legislature shall provide for control of pollution and control of 
despoilment of the air, water and other natural resources of this 
state, consistent with the use and development of these resources for 
the maximum benefit of the people." 
New Mexico Statutes: 
• N.M. STAT. ANN. § 3-17-7: "A municipality shall consider 
ordinances and codes to encourage water conservation and drought 
management planning .... " 
540. Id. at 808 (connecting the public trust doctrine to NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025, which declares 
public ownership ofNevada's water). 
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• N.M. STAT. ANN.§§ 3-27-1 to 3-27-9: Municipal Water Facilities. 
• N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-53-1 to 3-53-5: Municipal Regulation of 
Waters. 
• N.M. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-14: This provision prohibits diversions or 
reductions of flows that are detrimental to game fish. 
• N.M. STAT. ANN. § 19-13-2(C): This provision defines "state lands" 
to include "all land owned by the state, all land owned by school 
districts, beds of navigable rivers and lakes, submerged lands and 
lands in which mineral rights have been reserved to the state." 
• N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 1: Water Rights in General. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
"All natural waters flowing in streams and watercourses, whether 
such be perennial, or torrential, within the limits of the state ofNew 
Mexico, belong to the public and are subject to appropriation for 
beneficial use. A watercourse is hereby defined to be any river, 
creek, arroyo, canyon, draw, or wash, or any other channel having 
definite banks and bed with visible evidence of the occasional flow 
of water. "541 This article also contains provisions related to the 
Pecos River water shortage crisis and New Mexico's obligations to 
deliver water to Texas,§§ 72-1-2.1 et seq., and settlements of water 
rights claims and disputes by tribes. 542 
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 2: State Engineer . 
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 3: Water Districts and Water 
Masters. 
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 4: Surveys, Investigations and 
Adjudications of Water Rights. 
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 4A: Water Project Finance . 
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 5: Appropriation and Use of 
Surface Waters. 
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article SA: Ground Water Storage 
and Recovery. 
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 6: Water-Use Leasing . 
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 7: Appeals from State 
Engineer. 
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 8: Offenses and Penalties 
under the Water Act of 1907. 
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 9: Application of the Water 
Act of 1907. 
• N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 10: Community Uses. 
541. N.M. STAT.§ 72-1-1 (2009). 
542. Id.§§ 72-1-11, 72-1-12. 
149 
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• N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 11: Salt Lakes. "All the salt 
lakes within this state, and the salt which has, or may accumulate on 
the shores thereof, is, and shall be free to the citizens, and each one 
shall have power to collect salt on any occasion free from 
molestation or disturbance."543 
• N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 12: Underground Waters. 
• 
• 
"The water of underground streams, channels, artesian basins, 
reservoirs or lakes, having reasonably ascertainable boundaries, is 
declared to belong to the public and is subject to appropriation for 
beneficial use."544 
N.M. STA. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 12A: Mine Dewatering . 
N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 13: Artesian Wells . 
• N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 14: Interstate Stream 
Commission; Protection of Interstate Streams. 
• N.M. STAT. ANN., Chapter 72, Article 15: Interstate Compacts. The 
Colorado River Compact is codified within this chapter.545 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
New Mexico cases regarding title navigability are limited, and the most 
important resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court declaring the Rio Grande non-
navigable. Specifically, the Court reversed the New Mexico Territorial Court to 
find that "the Rio Grande is not navigable within the limits of the territory of 
New Mexico. The mere fact that logs, poles, and rafts are floated down a 
stream occasionally and in times of high water does not make it a navigable 
river."546 The Court went on to note: 
Obviously, the Rio Grande, within the limits of New Mexico, is not a 
stream over which, in its ordinary condition, trade and travel can be 
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water. Its use for 
any purposes of transportation has been and is exceptional, and only in 
times of temporary high water. The ordinary flow is not sufficient.547 
More recently, the New Mexico Court of Appeals relied on the federal test 
of navigability from The Daniel Ball to declare Navajo Lake to be navigable. 548 
However, this question arose in the context of the applicability of maritime law, 
not state title. 
543. Id § 72-11-1. 
544. Id.§ 72-12-1. 
545. Id.§ 72-15-5. 
546. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 698 (1899) (citing The 
Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430,439 (1874)). 
547. Id at 699. 
548. Wreyford v. Arnold, 477 P.2d 332,336 (N.M Ct. App. 1970) (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 
(JO Wall.) 557,563 (1870)). 
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State title to the beds and banks of navigable waters is less critical to New 
Mexico's public trust doctrine than in other states, because the New Mexico 
Supreme Court held early on that the New Mexico Constitution's declaration of 
public ownership of waters-Article XVI, § 2-is relevant to the defmition of 
"public waters" for public use purposes. Regarding this provision as a 
declaration of existing law, not a change, the court concluded that beneficial 
uses include recreation and fishing, unhampered by a doctrine of riparian 
rights.549 Moreover, navigability under federal law is not the only test for 
determining whether waters are public; recreational use is enough.550 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
"So far as non-navigable streams are concerned, the common law rule, 
seemingly without exception, is that the one owning both banks of a stream 
likewise owns the entire bed thereof, the waters are private waters, and the 
owner has the exclusive right to fish therein."551 Although "[t]he same rule is 
sometimes applied to navigable streams ... it is conceded that the weight of 
authority is, rather, that the bed and waters of a navigable stream are the 
property of the public with adjoining land owners having no exclusive right to 
fish therein. "552 Indeed: 
Where there is no separation in ownership of soil and water, "the right to 
hunt and trap from boats on rivers, lakes, streams, etc., is analogous to the 
right to take fish from the water. As a general rule, the test as to the public 
right of fowling, hunting, and trapping is the public or private ownership of 
the soil beneath the waters."553 
As in many western states, the fact that the New Mexico Constitution declares 
waters to be publicly owned is relevant not just to state water law but also to 
the public's rights to use those waters. In 1947, the New Mexico Supreme 
Court declared that all waters are public waters until beneficially appropriated, 
and hence the public can use all waters for outside recreation, sports, and 
fishing. 554 
In 1899, the U.S. Supreme Court suggested with regard to the Rio Grande 
River that the federal government's interest in downstream navigability may 
limit application of the prior appropriation doctrine. Thus, even though the Rio 
Grande is non-navigable in New Mexico, the Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation 
Company could not divert the entire flow of the river and so destroy 
549. State ex rel. State Grune Comm'n v. Red River Valley Co .• 182 P.2d 421. 427-28 (N.M. 
1947). 
550. Id. at 430. 
551. Id at 426. 
552. Id. 
553. Id. (quoting 24 AM. JUR. 378). 
554. Id. at 429-32. 
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downstream navigability.555 While the Court recognized that the western states 
were moving toward prior appropriation, it still held that appropriative rights 
under state law could not destroy the United States' rights to downstream 
flow. 556 As a result, it remanded the case for a determination of the effects of 
the irrigation company's proposed dam and diversion on downstream 
navigability.557 After the case made another trip to the Supreme Court,558 the 
New Mexico Territorial Court eventually concluded that the irrigation company 
had forfeited its right to build the dam. 559 
NORTH DAKOTA 
Date of Statehood: 1889 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation 
North Dakota Constitution: The North Dakota Constitution has two 
provisions potentially relevant to public trust principles: 
• Art. XI, § 3: "All flowing streams and natural watercourses shall 
forever remain the property of the state for mining, irrigating and 
manufacturing purposes." 
• Art. XI, § 27: "Hunting, trapping, fishing and the taking of game 
area valued part of our heritage and will be forever preserved for the 
people and managed by law and regulation for the public good." 
North Dakota Statutes: 
• N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-01-15: "Except when the grant under which 
the land is held involves a different intent, the owner of the upland, 
when it borders on a navigable lake or stream, takes to the edge of 
the lake or stream at low watermark. All navigable rivers shall 
remain and be deemed public highways. In all cases when the 
opposite banks of any stream not navigable belong to different 
persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall become common to 
both." 
• N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-06-08: "Islands and accumulations of land 
formed in the beds of streams which are navigable belong to the 
state, if there is no title or prescription to the contrary. The control 
and management, including the power to execute surface and 
555. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 701-02 (1899). 
556. Id. at 703. 
557. Id. at 710. 
558. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 65 P. 276 (N.M. Terr. 1900), rev'd and 
remanded, 184 U.S. 416, 424-25 (1902). 
559. United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 85 P. 393,399 (N.M. Terr. 1906). 
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mineral leases, of islands, relictions, and accumulations of land 
owned by the state of North Dakota in navigable streams and waters 
and the beds thereof, must be governed by chapter 61-33." 
• N.D. CENT. CODE§ 61-01-01: "All waters within the limits of the 
state from the following sources of water supply belong to the 
public and are subject to appropriation for beneficial use and the 
right to uses these waters must be acquired pursuant to chapter 61-
04": surface waters, "excluding diffuse surface waters," and all 
waters underground. 
• N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-01-08: "Every person who in any manner 
obstructs the free navigation of any navigable watercourse within 
this state is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
• N.D. CENT. CODE§ 61-01-17: This provision allows the booming of 
logs on shores of navigable streams, but the owner must leave a 
channel for free passage. 
• N.D. CENT. CODE§ 61-01-26: State Water Resources Policy. 
• N.D. CENT. CODE, Chapter 61-04: Appropriation of Water. Among 
other things, the proposed appropriation must be in the public 
interest, which includes consideration of "the effect on fish and 
game resources and public recreation opportunities."560 North 
Dakota prioritizes uses of water; fish, wildlife, and recreational uses 
are all included in the sixth priority, after domestic, municipal, 
livestock, irrigation, and industrial uses.561 
• N.D. CENT. CODE§ 61-04.1-01: "'[T]he state of North Dakota claims 
its sovereign right to use the moisture contained in the clouds and 
atmosphere within the state boundaries. All water derived as a result 
of weather modification operations shall be considered a part of 
North Dakota's basic water supply and all statutes, rules, and 
regulations applying to natural precipitation shall also apply to 
precipitation resulting from cloud seeding." 
• N.D. CENT. CODE, Chapter 61-15: Water Conservation. A 
"navigable lake" is "any lake which shall have been meandered and 
its metes and bounds established by the government of the United 
States in the survey of public lands. "562 This section also defines 
"high water mark." Under its police power, the state has control of 
navigable Jakes "within the ordinary high water mark for the 
purpose of constructing, maintaining, and operating dams, dikes, 
ditches, fills, spillways, or other structures to promote the 
conservation, development, storage, distribution, and utilization of 
560. N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-04-06( 4) (2009). 
561. Id§ 61-04-06.1. 
562. Id.§ 61-15-01. 
153 
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such water and the propagation and preservation of wildlife. "563 
These provisions also allow for water and wildlife conservation 
projects.564 Finally, "[a]ny person who, without written consent of 
the state engineer, shall drain or cause to be drained, or who shall 
attempt to drain any lake or pond, which has been meandered by the 
government of the United States in the survey of public lands, shall 
be guilty of a class B misdemeanor."565 
• N.D. CENT. CODE § 61-33-01: "Sovereign lands" are "those areas, 
including beds and islands, lying within the ordinary high 
watermark of navigable lakes and streams." 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
Navigability for title purposes is a question of federal law, and a water is 
navigable if it is navigable-in-fact.566 North Dakota does not employ the tidal 
navigability test.567 Instead: 
When a stream is not tidewater ... , it must be navigable in fact in its 
natural state, without the aid of or reference to artificial means, and be of 
sufficient capacity to render it capable of being used as a highway for 
commerce, either in the transportation of the products of the mines, forests, 
or of the soil of the country through which it runs, or of passengers .... 
It must be capable of being used for such a purpose, that is, for a public 
highway, a considerable part of the year, and it is not sufficient that it have 
an adequate volume of water therefor only occasionally, as the result of 
freshets, for brief periods of uncertain recurrence and duration. 568 
The North Dakota Supreme Court has noted, however, that "the test as to 
navigability applied in North Dakota is not as narrow as that in federal courts .. 
. . "
569 A water will be deemed navigable-in-fact for state title purposes if it 
supports rowing for pleasure and hunting, the cutting and selling of ice, or 
hunting from flat-bottomed boats.570 Similarly, public uses supporting 
navigability do not have to be commercial or pecuniary: 
A use public in its character may exist when the waters may be used for the 
convenience and enjoyment of the public, whether traveling upon trade 
purposes or pleasure purposes. . . . Purposes of pleasure, public 
563. ld. § 61-15-02. 
564. Id.§ 61-15-03. 
565. Id.§ 61-15-08. 
566. Ozark-Mahoning Co. v. North Dakota, 37 N. W.2d 488, 490 (N.D. 1949). 
567. Roberts v. Taylor. 181 N.W. 622,625 (N.D. 1921). 
568. Bissel v. Olson, 143 N.W. 340, 341 (N.D. 1913) (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 
557, 563~ The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874)). 
569. O=ark-Mahoning Co., 37 N.W.2d at 491. 
570. North Dakota v. Brace, 36 N. W.2d 330, 333 (N.D. 1949). 
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convenience, and enjoyment may be public as well as purposes of trade. 
Navigation may as surely exist in the former as in the latter.571 
155 
In addition, it is the capacity for public use, not current use, that counts. 572 
Even so, under this test Fuller Lake is non-navigable, because it is small 
and marshy and its only public use is hunting.573 Similarly, Grenora Lake is 
also not navigable: 
There is no evidence that any use has ever been or could be made of the 
waters of the lake either for pleasure or for profit, for travel, or for trade. 
No boats were used thereon. The water at all times has been of such a 
character that it was not habitable for fish. Neither the lake not its 
surroundings are suitable for any purposes of pleasure. It is true that aquatic 
birds sometimes rested on its surface and there is evidence that hunters 
occasionally shot waterfowl that flew to or from the lake, but this was an 
infrequent occurrence. s74 
The provision of the North Dakota Constitution declaring waters to be 
publicly owned does not give the state title to the beds and banks.575 The 
Legislature can declare waters navigable, but "[t]he Legislature may not adopt 
a retroactive definition of navigability which would destroy a title already 
vested under a federal grant, or transfer to the state a property right in a body of 
water or the bed thereof that had previously been acquired by a private 
owner."576 
Unless a waterway is meandered or declared navigable by the state 
legislature, it is presumed to be non-navigable, and the burden of proof is on 
the party claiming navigability.577 Thus, the Mouse River was presumed non-
navigable, because the parties assumed that it was.578 In contrast, Devil's Lake 
was stipulated to be navigable-in-fact based on boats using the lake for 
commercial purposes.579 Similarly, "it is clear from the undisputed testimony .. 
. and from prior holdings of this court that the Missouri River is a navigable 
stream in this state. "580 
North Dakota engaged in a long battle with the United States to quiet title 
to the Little Missouri River. Despite original findings that the river was 
navigable, the U.S. Supreme Court dismissed North Dakota's quiet title claim 
on the grounds that North Dakota had failed to comply with the Quiet Title 
571. Roberts, 181 N.W. at 626. 
572. Id. 
573. Brace, 36 N.W.2d at 334. 
574. Ozark-Mahoning Co., 37 N.W.2d at 491. 
575. Id. at 335; see also Roberts, 181 N.W. at 625 (noting that this constitutional provision "is a 
declaration concerning public waters"). 
576. Brace, 36 N.W.2d at 332. 
577. Amoco Oil Co. v. N.D. Highway Dep't, 262 N.W.2d 726, 728 (N.D. 1978). 
578. Id. 
579. Rutten v. North Dakota, 93 N.W.2d 796, 797 (N.D. 1958). 
580. Hogue v. Bougois, 71 N.W.2d 47, 52 (N.D. 1955) (citing Gardner v. Green. 271 N.W. 775; 
North Dakota v. Loy, 720 N.W.2d 668). 
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Act's twelve-year statute of limitations581 for claims against the federal 
government. 582 In 1986, Congress amended the Act to exempt state claims to 
navigable rivers from the statute of limitations, and North Dakota re-filed its 
action. Nevertheless, despite evidence of use by Indians, ferries, and explorers, 
and modem use by recreational canoeists, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit concluded that the Little Missouri River is not navigable and that 
title to its beds and banks remains in the United States. 583 The court applied 
The Daniel Ball test of navigability.584 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
Riparian landowners own to the thread of non-navigable streams. 585 The 
federal equal footing doctrine gives states title to the beds underlying navigable 
waterways to the high water mark, but states can then pick a different title line. 
Despite a statutory provision establishing that riparian landowners generally 
take title to the low water mark,586 "[w]hether North Dakota has limited its title 
to the area below the low watermark has not been decided. "587 
Regardless of title, however, the public trust doctrine extends to the high 
water mark, because under the equal footing doctrine and the public trust 
doctrine, the state could not totally abdicate its interest in that land. 588 Thus, the 
state and private landowners have co-existent, overlapping interests in the shore 
zone between the high and low water marks. 589 The ordinary high water mark 
is determined by the existing state of the river, even if Army Corps dams-as 
on the Missowi River-have raised the water level.590 "[T]he state has rights in 
the property up to the ordinary high watermark. The ordinary high watermark is 
ambulatory, and is not determined as of a fixed date."591 The public trust 
doctrine and its protection of the public's right of navigation support this 
view.592 
581. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1972). 
582. Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of University & School Lands, 461 U.S. 273, 284-93 
(1983). 
583. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of University & School Lands v. United States, 972 F.2d 235, 240 
(8th Cir. 1992). 
584. Id. at 237-38. 
585. Amoco Oil Co. v. North Dakota Highway Dep't, 262 N.W.2d 726, 728 (N.D. 1978) (citing St. 
Paul & P.RR Co. v. Schurmeier, 72 U.S. 272, 287-89 ( 1868)). 
586. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-01-15 (2009). 
587. J.P. Furlong Enterprises, Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 n.l 
(N.D. 1988). But see State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills (Mills I), 523 N.W.2d 537, 540-42 (N.D. 
1994). 
588. Mills I, 523 N.W.2d at 542-44. 
589. State ex rel. Sprynczynatyk v. Mills (Mills II), 592 N.W.2d 591,592 (N.D. 1999). 
590. Id. 
591. Id. (citing In re Ownership of the Bed of Devil's Lake, 423 N.W.2d 141, 143-44 (N.D. 
1988)). 
592. Id. at 593. 
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"The purpose of state title was to protect the public right of navigation. "593 
Indeed, by statute, "[a]ll navigable rivers shall remain and be deemed public 
highways."594 Thus, the policy of protecting the public right of navigation is 
embodied in both the public trust doctrine and North Dakota statutes. 595 State 
title and public rights shift to the new beds when navigable rivers change 
course: 
The Territorial Legislative Assembly recognized that our state would 
receive title to the beds of navigable waters at statehood. Accordingly, by 
1877, it had enacted a code that would secure title of the state to such lands 
and modify common law so that the state's title would follow the 
movement of the bed of the river. This accords with the underlying public 
policy, since the purpose of a state holding title to a navigable riverbed is to 
foster the public's right of navigation, traditionally the most important 
feature of the public trust doctrine. Moreover, it seems to us that other 
important aspects of the state's public interest, such as bathing, swimming, 
recreation, and fishing, as well as irrigation, industrial and other water 
supplies, are most closely associated with where the water is in the new 
riverbed, not the old. 596 
The public trust doctrine does not prohibit all development, and hence the 
granting of a permit to drain wetlands did not violate the public trust doctrine-
assuming that the doctrine even applied-when the State Engineer studied the 
consequences, imposed conditions, and was subject to a public interest 
requirement.597 However, the public trust doctrine does limit the state's 
discretionary authority "to allocate vital state resources," as enunciated in 
Illinois Central Railroad. 598 
Moreover, the doctrine is not restricted to conveyances of real property; 
instead, "[t]he State holds the navigable waters, as well as the lands beneath 
them, in trust for the public," as provided in the North Dakota Constitution and 
refined in statutes.599 Thus, North Dakota's public trust doctrine applies to 
appropriations of water. When the State Engineer issues water permits, "the 
Public Trust Doctrine requires, at a minimum, a determination of the potential 
effect of the allocation of water on the present water supply and future needs of 
this State. This necessarily involves planning responsibility."600 While the 
593. J.P. Furlong Enters., Inc. v. Sun Exploration & Production Co., 423 N.W.2d 130, 132 (N.D. 
1988). 
594. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 47-01-15 (2009). 
595. J.P. Furlong Enters., 423 N.W.2d at 136-37. 
596. Id. at 140. 
597. In the Matter of the Application for Permits to Drain Related to Stone Creek Channel 
Improvements & White Spur Drain, 424 N.W.2s 894,901 (N.D. 1988) (citing United Plainsmen v. N.D. 
Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457,463 (N.D. 1976)). 
598. United PlainsmenAss'n, 247 N.W.2d at 460. 
599. Id. at 461 (noting that "[w]e believe that § 61-01-01, NDCC, expresses the Public Trust 
Doctrine"). 
600. Id. 
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North Dakota Supreme Court also acknowledged that "[i]t is evident that the 
Public Trust Doctrine is assuming an expanding role in environmental law," it 
saw no need for such expansive declarations in the context of water rights 
permitting.601 Instead, even as "[c]onfined to traditional concepts, the Doctrine 
confirms the State's role as trustee of the public waters. It permits alienation 
and allocation of such precious state resources only after an analysis of present 
supply and future need."602 
OKLAHOMA 
Date of Statehood: 1907 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation and riparian rights603 
Oklahoma Constitution: Only one provision of the Oklahoma Constitution is 
relevant to water. It declares that "[t]he Legislature shall have power and shall 
provide for a system of levees, drains, and ditches and of irrigation in this State 
when deemed expedient .... "604 
Oklahoma Statutes: 
• OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 60: This section preserves riparian 
rights to use water for domestic use. 
• OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 337: "Islands and accumulations of land 
formed in the beds of streams which are navigable, belong to the 
state, if there is no title or prescription to the contrary." 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 1: Irrigation and Water Rights. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter IA: Oklahoma Dam Safety Act. 
• 80 OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 2: Irrigation Districts. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 4: Conservation in General. 
601. /dat463. 
602. Id.~ see also N.D. State Water Comm'n v. Bd. of Managers, 332 N.W.2d 254,258 (N.D. 1983) 
(holding that the State does not lose its authority over the waters of a lake merely because the bed is 
privately owned and detennining that "[p]rotecting the integrity of the waters of the state is a valid 
exercise ofthe Commission's duties pursuant to§ 61-02-12, NDCC, as well as being part ofthe state's 
affmnative duty under the 'public trust' doctrine"; as a result the Commission had authority to control 
the drainage of a non-navigable lake). 
603. Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 571-72 (Okla. 1990) 
(noting that while the 1963 amendments to Oklahoma's water law modified riparian rights, Oklahoma 
riparian owners retain "a vested common-law right to the reasonable use of the stream," and the 
legislature's attempt to extinguish those riparian rights by giving ownership of all water to the state was 
unconstitutional; however, appropriative rights for irrigation have existed since 1897, and riparian and 
appropriative rights are co-existent). 
604. OKLA. CONST., art. XVI,§ 3. 
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• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 5: Conservancy Act of 
Oklahoma. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 8: Grand River Dam Authority. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 11: Oklahoma Groundwater 
Law. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 14: Oklahoma Water Resources 
Board. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 14A: Oklahoma Weather 
Modification Act. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 15: Port Authorities. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 17: Regional Water Distribution 
Act. 
• 80 OKLA. ST AT. ANN. tit., Chapter 18: Rural Water, Sewer, Gas and 
Solid Waste Management Districts Act. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 20: Kansas-Oklahoma Arkansas 
River Basin Compact. 
• 80 OKLA. ST AT. ANN. tit., Chapter 20A: Arkansas River Basin 
Compact Arkansas-Oklahoma. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 20B: Red River Compact. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 21: Scenic Rivers Act. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 22: Conservation District Act. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 23: Oklahoma Floodplain 
Management Act. 
• 80 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit., Chapter 25: Oklahoma Weather 
Modification Act. 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
159 
Navigability is a question of fact, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court has 
adopted and applied the federal test of navigability from The Montello.605 
Under this test, the South Canadian River is non-navigable, and avulsive 
(sudden) changes to the river did not change title.606 Similarly, no stipulation 
was allowed as to the navigability of the Grand River or the Neosho River, and 
both were found non-navigable under the federal test ofnavigability.607 
605. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430,439 (1874)~ see Hale v. Record. 146 P. 587, 587 (Okla. 
1915). 
606. State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office v. Warder, 198 P.2d 402, 406--07 (Okla. 1948). 
607. Hanes v. Oklahoma, 973 P.2d 330, 333-34 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998). 
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court has distinguished navigability for title 
purposes from navigability for public use purposes. Thus, it found that the 
Kiamichi River was navigable for fishing and pleasure but not for commerce: 
[W]e find that the Kiamichi River is one of the beautiful streams of 
southeastern Oklahoma that it has for many years been known as one of the 
best fishing streams in the State and used by the public for fishing, 
recreation and pleasure; that at one time the stream was used for 
commercial purposes in that logs were floated down its channel to be used 
for mill purposes; that at the site of the controversy herein the river was 
between 150 and 200 feet in width; that many small boats used the river. 608 
Thus, the river was not navigable for title purposes and private landowners 
owned the bed of the river. However, that ownership is "subject to the rights of 
the public to use the river as a public highway," and the landowner "does not .. 
. have exclusive fishing rights therein. "609 Thus, the Kiamichi River was 
"navigable" in the sense that the public could use the river, but not in the sense 
that the state owned the bed.610 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the Arkansas River is 
navigable; as a result, title to the bed vested in the state.611 However, eight 
years later, the U.S. Supreme Court declared that under the federal test of 
navigability, the Arkansas River along the Osage Indian Reservation in 
Oklahoma is non-navigable and belongs to the United States in trust for the 
Tribe.612 The Oklahoma Supreme Court responded by declaring that the Osage 
Tribe had title only to the bed of the non-navigable portions.613 
In 1953, the Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that the Arkansas River 
was navigable from its confluence with the Grand River, vesting title to the bed 
in the state.614 However, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the entire 
river below its confluence with the Grand River, while navigable, was reserved 
to the Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw tribes by treaty.615 
In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Red River is not 
navigable anywhere in Oklahoma, so the state does not own its beds.616 
608. Cllll)' v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935 (Okla. 1969). 
609. Id. 
610. Id. at 936. 
611. Oklahoma v. Nolegs, 139 P. 943,945 (Okla. 1914). 
612. Brewer Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86-87 (1922). 
613. Vickey v. Yahola Sand & Gravel Co., 12 P.2d 881, 885 (Okla. 1932). But see Aladdin 
Petroleum Corp. v. State ex rel. Comm'rs of Land Office, 191 P.2d 224, 229-30 (Okla. 1948) (applying 
the U.S. Supreme Court's non-navigability analysis to the Arkansas River). 
614. Lynch v. Clements, 263 P.2d 153, 156 (Okla 1953). 
615. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 630-32 (1970); United States v. Cherokee 
Nation ofOklahoma, 480 U.S. 700, 701 (1987). 
616. Oklahoma v. Texas, 259 U.S. 565, 566-67 (1922); accord Aladdin Petroleum Corp., 191 P.2d 
at 228-29. Contra Hale v. Record, 146 P. 587,588 (Okla. 1915) (finding the Red River to be navigable). 
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Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
The state takes title to the beds of navigable rivers to the high water 
mark.617 Moreover, pursuant to Illinois Central Railroad, the government has a 
right to regulate public wharves and piers in navigable waters, loading places 
along navigable waters, and rights in navigable waters.618 The Oklahoma 
courts have not otherwise extensively addressed the state public trust doctrine, 
except to hold that the public has rights of boating, recreation, and fishing in 
waters that are not navigable under the federal title test.619 
When the Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledged the co-existence of 
riparian and appropriative water rights in 1990, the dissent was "of the ... 
opinion that the majority confuses certain public rights in our streams as being 
exclusive private property rights of riparians."620 In contrast, the dissent was 
willing to establish an expansive public trust doctrine that would require 
minimum flows in Oklahoma's rivers and supersede private rights.621 
OREGON 
Date of Statehood: 1859 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation622 
Oregon Constitution: Oregon has not constitutionalized its public trust 
doctrine. However, the Oregon Constitution contains several relevant 
provisions, including: 
• Art. I, § 1: As part of its private property takings protections, the 
Oregon Constitution states that "the use of all roads, ways and 
waterways necessary to promote the transportation of the raw 
products of mine or farm or forest or water for beneficial use or 
drainage is necessary to the development and welfare of the state 
and is declared a public use." 
• Art XI-D, § 1: "The rights, title and interest in and to all water for 
the development of water power and to water power sites, which the 
617. Oklahoma v. Nolegs,139 P. 943, 94~6 (Okla. l 914); City of Tulsa v. Comm'rs of Land 
Office, IOI P.2d 246,248 (Okla. 1940). 
618. Sublett v. City ofTulsa, 405 P.2d 185, 196 (Okla. 1965). 
619. Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933, 935-36 (Okla. 1969). 
620. Franco-Am. Charolaise, Ltd. v. Okla. Water Res. Bd., 855 P.2d 568, 595 (Okla. 1990) 
(Hargrave, J., dissenting). 
621. Id. at 595-96. 
622. See In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1089-90 (Or. 1924) (upholding the state's prior 
appropriation system). 
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state of Oregon now owns or may hereafter acquire, shall be held by 
it in perpetuity." 
Art. XI-D, § 2: As part of its constitutional authority over water 
power, "[t]he state of Oregon is authorized and empowered," inter 
alia: (I) "[t]o control and/or develop the water power within the 
state"; (2) "[t]o lease water and water power sites for the 
development of water power"; (3) "[t]o develop, separately or in 
conjunction with the United States, or in conjunction with the 
political subdivisions of this state, any water power within the state, 
and to acquire, construct, maintain and/or operate hydroelectric 
power plants, transmission and distribution lines"; (4) "[t]o develop, 
separately or in conjunction with the United States, with any state or 
states, or political subdivisions thereof, or with any political 
subdivision of this state, any water power in any interstate stream 
and to acquire, construct, maintain and/or operate hydroelectric 
power plants, transmission and distribution lines"; (5) "[t]o contract 
with the United States, with any state or states, or political 
subdivisions thereof, or with any political subdivision of this state, 
for the purchase or acquisition of water, water power and/or electric 
energy for use, transmission, distribution, sale and/or disposal 
thereof'; and (6) "[t]o do any and all things necessary or convenient 
to carry out the provisions of this article." 
Art XI-D, § 4: Nothing in the constitutional authority over water 
power "shall be construed to affect in any way the laws, and the 
administration thereof, now existing or hereafter enacted, relating to 
the appropriation and use of water for beneficial purposes, other 
than for the development of water power." 
Art. XI-H, § I: This article provides for "loans and grants for the 
purpose of planning, acquisition, construction, alteration or 
improvement of facilities for or activities related to, the collection, 
treatment, dilution and disposal of all forms of waste in or upon the 
air, water and lands of this state." 
Article XI-1(1): This article covers water development projects and 
creates a Water Development Fund. "The fund shall be used to 
provide financing for loans for residents of this state for 
construction of water development projects for irrigation, drainage, 
fish protection, watershed restoration and municipal uses and for the 
acquisition of easements and rights of way for water development 
projects authorized by law." 
Art. XV, §§ 4, 4a: These two provisions allow state lottery funds to 
be used for "the public purpose of financing the protection, repair, 
operation, creation and development of state parks, ocean shores 
and public beach access areas, historic sites and recreation areas ... 
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• Art. XV,§§ 4, 4b: These two provisions allow state lottery funds to 
be used for salmonid and wildlife protection, including protection 
and restoration of watersheds, aquatic habitats, and water quality. 
Oregon Statutes: 
• OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 196: Columbia River Gorge; Ocean 
Resource Planning; Wetlands; Removal and Fill. "The protection, 
conservation and best use of the water resources of this state are 
matters of the utmost public concern. Streams, lakes, bays, estuaries 
and other bodies of water in this state, including not only water and 
materials for domestic, agricultural and industrial use but also 
habitats and spawning areas for fish, avenues for transportation and 
sites for commerce and public recreation, are vital to the economy 
and well-being of this state and its people. Unregulated removal of 
material from the beds and banks of the waters of this state may 
create hazards to the health, safety and welfare of the people of this 
state. Unregulated filling in the waters of this state for any purpose, 
may result in interfering with or injuring public navigation, fishery 
and recreational uses of the waters. In order to provide for the best 
possible use of the water resources of this state, it is desirable to 
centralize authority in the Director of the Department of State 
Lands, and implement control of the removal of material from the 
beds and banks or filling of the waters of this state. "623 The Director 
of the Department of State Lands may issue permits for the fill or 
dredging of water resources only if the activity: "(a) [i]s consistent 
with the protection, conservation and best use of the water resources 
of this state ... ; and (b) [ w ]ould not unreasonably interfere with the 
paramount policy of this state to preserve the use of its waters for 
navigation, fishing and public recreation."624 The Oregon courts 
have concluded that these two provisions ( as formerly numbered) 
"are a codification of the public trust doctrine."625 
• OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 274: Submersible and Submerged Lands. 
In general, "submerged lands" in Oregon are "lands lying below the 
line of ordinary low water of all navigable waters within the 
boundaries of this state as heretofore or hereafter established, 
whether such waters are tidal or nontidal."626 "Submersible lands," 
in contrast, are the "lands lying between the line of ordinary high 
water and the line of ordinary low water of all navigable waters and 
all islands, shore lands, or other such lands held by or granted to this 
623. OR. REV. STAT.§ 196.805 (2009). 
624. Id. § 196.825(1). 
163 
625. Morse v. Or. Div. of State Lands, 581 P.2d 520,527 (Or. Ct. App. 1978), ajf'd, 590 P.2d 709 
(Or. 1979). 
626. OR. REV. STAT§ 274.005(7). 
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state by virtue of her sovereignty, wherever applicable, within the 
boundaries of this state as heretofore or hereafter established, 
whether such waters or lands are tidal or nontidal."627 The "line of 
ordinary high water" is "the line on the bank or shore to which the 
high water ordinarily rises annually in season," while the "line of 
ordinary low water" is "the line on the bank or shore to which the 
low water ordinarily recedes annually in season. "628 "Tidal 
submerged lands" are "lands lying below the line of mean low tide 
in the beds of all tidal waters within the boundaries of this state as 
heretofore or hereafter established."629 "The title to the submersible 
and submerged lands of all navigable streams and lakes in this state 
now existing or which may have been in existence in 1859 when the 
state was admitted to the Union, or at any time since admission, and 
which has not become vested in any person, is vested in the State of 
Oregon. The State of Oregon is the owner of the submersible and 
submerged lands of such streams and lakes, and may use and 
dispose of the same as provided by law."630 "The State Land Board 
has exclusive jurisdiction to assert title to submerged or submersible 
lands in navigable waterways on behalf of the State of Oregon, "631 
and this chapter provides procedures for the administrative 
determination of navigability.632 Moreover, "all meandered lakes 
are declared to be navigable and public waters," with title to their 
submerged and submersible lands vested in the State of Oregon 
unless otherwise validly conveyed.633 "The Department of State 
Lands [had] exclusive jurisdiction over all ungranted tidal 
submerged lands owned by this state .... "634 
OR. REV. STAT., Chapter 537: Water Rights Act. "All water within 
the state from all sources of water supply belongs to the public," 
including ground water.635 The Act allows for instream water rights 
for public uses,636 and public uses include but are not limited to 
recreation, "conservation, maintenance and enhancement of aquatic 
and fish life, wildlife, fish and wildlife habitat and any other 
ecological values," pollution abatement, and navigation.637 In 
addition, "[p]ublic uses are beneficial uses," but "(t]he recognition 
of an in-stream water right ... shall not diminish the public's rights 
627. Id. § 274.005(8). 
628. Id.§ 274.005(3), (4). 
629. Id.§ 274.705(7). 
630. Id. § 274.025(1 ). 
631. Id. § 274.402( 1 ). 
632. Id. §§ 274.404 to 274.412. 
633. Id.§ 274.430(1). 
634. Id. § 274.710. 
635. Id. §§ 537.010, 537.525. 
636. Id. §§ 537.332- 537.360. 
637. Id. § 537.332(5)(b). 
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in the ownership and control of the waters of this state or the public 
trust therein."638 The Water Rights Act also allows for extensions of 
the irrigation season639 and encourages conservation of water. 640 
• OR. R.Ev. STAT., Chapter 780: Improvement and Use of Navigable 
Streams: "All channels of rivers and watercourses made navigable 
or the navigation of which is improved ... shall be public highways, 
and shall be free to all crafts navigating them. "641 
Definition of"Navigable Waters": 
165 
For title purposes, Oregon originally adhered to the ebb-and-flow tidal test 
of navigability.642 Thus, because the Tualatin River was not subject to the ebb 
and flow of the tide, its bed and banks were privately owned. 643 In contrast, the 
bed and banks of the Columbia River, which is subject to the ebb-and-flow of 
the tide, are owned by the state. 644 Moreover, in tidal waters, state title 
advances with the rising of the sea.645 
However, the Oregon Supreme Court soon thereafter adopted a fairly 
liberal log floatation test of navigability that extended public use navigability to 
navigable-in-fact waters. It held in 1869 that: 
any stream in this state is navigable on whose waters logs or timbers can be 
floated to market, and that they are public highways for that purpose; and 
that it is not necessary that they be navigable the whole year for that 
purpose to constitute them as such. If at high water they can be used for 
floating timber, then they are navigable; and the question of their 
navigability is a question of fact, to be determined as any other question of 
fact by a jury. Any stream in which logs will go by the force of the water is 
navigable. 646 
This rule, the court held, best served Oregon public policy: 
638. Id. § 537.334(1), (2). 
639. Id § 537.385. 
640. Id. § 537.460. 
64 I. Id § 780.030. 
642. See Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 448-49 (1869) (recognizing that the navigable-in-fact test has 
largely replaced the ebb-and-flow tidal test in the United States); Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 411 
( 1877) (holding that "the tide lands-those uncovered by the ebb and flow of the sea-belong to the 
state of Oregon by virtue of its sovereignty"); Hogg v. Davis, 30 P. 160, 160 (Or. 1892) (same); Bowlby 
v. Shively, 30 P. 154, 156 (Or. 1892), aff'd, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) ("Upon the admission of the state into the 
Union, the tide lands became the property of the state, and subject to its jurisdiction and disposal."). 
643. Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 376, 380-82 (1882). 
644. Hinman, 6 Or. at 411-12; see also Atkinson v. Tax Comm'n of Or., 303 U.S. 20, 22 (1938) 
(determining that Oregon, not the United States, owns the bed of the Columbia River on Oregon's side 
of the border with Washington); Hurne v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065, 1067 (Or. 1907) 
(determining that the Rogue River is navigable, and its bed is owned by the State, because it is 
influenced by the tide for at least four miles). 
645. Wilson v. Shively. 4 P. 324, 325-26 (Or. 1884). 
646. Felger v. Robinson, 3 Or. 455, 457-58 (1869). 
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And we think it the rule that best accords with common sense and public 
convenience, for these rapid streams, penetrating deep into the mountains, 
are the only means by which timber can be brought from these rugged 
sections, without great labor and expense; and by their use large tracts of 
timber, otherwise too remote or difficult of access, can be rendered of great 
value, as the country shall grow and timber become scarce.647 
Thus, "[a] stream, which, in its natural condition, is capable ofbeing commonly 
and generally useful for floating boats, rafts or logs, for any useful purpose of 
agriculture or trade, though it be private property, and not strictly navigable, is 
subject to the public use as a passageway."648 
As such, the Oregon courts early on distinguished three categories of 
waters: 
First, Such rivers, or arms of the sea, in which the tide ebbs and flows; and 
in these, which are technically called navigable, the sovereign is the owner 
of the subjacent soil, and all right in it belongs exclusively to the public. 
Second, Such streams as are navigable in fact for boats, vessels, or lighters; 
and in these, which are termed public highways, the public have an 
easement for the purposes of navigation and commerce, but the title of the 
subjacent soil to the middle of the stream, and the right to the use of the 
water flowing over it is in the riparian owner, subject to the superior rights 
of the public to use it for the purposes of transportation and trade. Third, 
Such streams as are so small or shallow as not to be navigable for any 
purpose; and in these the public have no rights of a highway or otherwise, 
and they are altogether private property.649 
In 1935, however, the State of Oregon was involved in litigation in the 
U.S. Supreme Court that applied the federal navigable-in-fact test to determine 
whether Oregon had title to the beds of Lake Malheur, Mud Lake, Harney 
Lake, the Narrows, and Sand Reef.650 The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized 
that navigability for purposes of title is a federal question651 and applied the 
647. Id. at 458. 
648. Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445, 449 (1869); see also Haines v. Hall, 20 P. 831. 835 (Or. 1888) 
("Whether the creek in question is navigable or not ... depends upon its capacity in a natural state to 
float logs and timber, and whether its use for that purpose will be an advantage to the public."); Nutter v. 
Gallagher, 24 P. 250, 252-53 (Or. 1890); Kamm v. Normand, 91 P. 448, 450-53 (Or. 1907); Lebanon 
Lumber Co. v. Leonard, 136 P. 891, 892 (Or. 1913); Guilliams v. Beaver Lake Club, 175 P. 437, 440-42 
(Or. 1918). 
649. Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371, 375-76 (1882); see also Haines v. Welch, 12 P. 502, 
503 (noting that navigability "depends upon [the water's] capacity, extent and importance. If it is 
capable of serving an important public use as a channel for commerce, it should be considered public; 
but if it is only a brook, although it might carry down saw logs for a few days during a freshet, it is not, 
therefore, a public highway. (citation omitted) And even if it were public, in the sense that it is useful to 
float products to market, it can only be used with due regard to the rights of the owner of its banks 
through which it flows."). 
650. United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935). 
651. Id. at 14. 
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federal commerce-based test to determine that none of the waters in question 
was navigable in fact: 
[N]either trade nor travel did then or at any time since has or could or can 
move over said [waters], or any of them, in their natural or ordinary 
conditions according to the customary modes of trade or travel over water; . 
. . nor has any of them since been used or susceptible of being used in the 
natural or ordinary condition of any of them as permanent or other 
highways or channels for useful or other commerce. 652 
As a result, the Oregon courts now apply the federal navigable-in-fact test of 
navigability as well as the tidal test. Moreover, while acknowledging that this 
test derives from The Daniel Ball, The Montello, and United States v. Utah, 
they apply this title test broadly, emphasizing that the extent of commerce on a 
river is not the test. 653 Timber use and log floatation are still evidence of 
navigability, 654 and the Oregon Court of Appeals declared the John Day River 
navigable on the basis of Native American use and log floatation for timber 
purposes. 655 
In addition, according to contemporary Oregon statutes, all meandered 
lakes are considered navigable and public, unless otherwise validly 
conveyed. 656 Moreover, by statute, Oregon recognizes both the tidal and 
navigable-in-fact tests for navigability.657 Thus, Oregon now asserts title by 
statute to a broader category of waters than the federal title navigability test 
would allow, because Oregon asserts title to the submerged and submersible 
lands of waters which became navigable after its admission to the United States 
in 1859, unless those lands have been validly conveyed to private persons.658 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
Oregon provided the occasion for the U.S. Supreme Court to determine 
that, once submerged lands passed from the federal government to the states, 
issues of title as between the state and private landowners were to be 
determined by state law.659 This case involved the Willamette River, and 
652. Id. at 15 (citing United States v. Holt State Banlc., 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926); United States v. 
Utah. 283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931); Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922); 
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574,586 (1922); Econ. Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 
123 (1921); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,698 (1899); The Daniel 
Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557,563 (1870)). 
653. Nw. Steelheaders Ass'n. Inc. v. Simantel, 112 P.3d 383, 389-90 (Or. Ct. App. 2005). 
654. Id. at 390. 
655. Id. at 391-95. 
656. OR. REV. STAT.§ 274.430(1)(2009). 
657. Id. § 274.005(7)-(8). 
658. Id.§ 274.025(1). 
659. Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 370-72 (1977) 
(overruling Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 313 (1973)). 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2-CRAJG 3/8/2010 4:30:53 PM 
168 ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 37:53 
Oregon eventually decided that, under Oregon law, the state retained ownership 
of the bed after an avulsive change to the river. 660 
Oregon also provided the occasion for the U.S. Supreme Court to declare 
that, as a federal matter, states take title to the beds of navigable waters to the 
high-water mark.661 Oregon has now codified this rule.662 Moreover, no 
adverse possession of lands below the low-water mark of navigable waters is 
allowed. 
In Oregon, riparian owners retain riparian rights to use the water and 
submerged lands below the high-water mark, including the right to wharf out, 
the right to moor logs on the water, and a preference in leasing or purchasing 
tidelands, if the state decides to lease or sell them.663 However, these rights are 
subject to the public's rights of use.664 
The Oregon courts have acknowledged that 
lands underlying navigable waters have been recognized as unique and 
limited resources and have been accorded special protection to insure their 
preservation for public water-related uses such as navigation, fishery and 
recreation. Under the common law public trust doctrine, the public use of 
such waters could not be substantially modified except for water-related 
purposes. 665 
"The state, as trustee for the people, bears the responsibility of preserving and 
protecting the right of public use of the waters for those purposes. "666 
These trustee responsibilities have been applied to fishing regulation. As a 
result, statutes purporting to convey exclusive rights to fish in navigable waters 
violated the privileges and immunities clause in the Oregon Constitution.667 
Nevertheless, because the state has jurisdiction over navigable waters, it can 
660. State ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co .• 582 P.2d 1352 (Or. 1978). 
661. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14-15, 26 (1897)(involving the Columbia River). 
662. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 274.025(1), 274.005; see also Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 412 (Or. 
1877) (concluding that the high tide line is the property line for properties along the Columbia River, 
regardless of what the grant says); Parker v. W. Coast Packing Co .• 21 P. 822, 824 (Or. 1889) (holding 
that the state owns submerged lands on a navigable river to the high water mark); Oregon v. Portland 
Gen. Elec. Co .• 95 P. 722, 728-29 (Or. 1908) (same). 
663. Smith Tug & Barge Co. v. Columbia Pac. Towing Corp .• 443 P.2d 205, 207-18 (Or. 1958) 
(reviewing the history of Oregon's case law on the subject). 
664. Id. at 218. 
665. Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands. 581 P.2d 520,523 (Or. App. 1978), ajf'd, 590 P.2d 709 
(Or. 1979). 
666. Or. Shores Conservation Coal. v. Or. Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 662 P.2d 356, 364 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1983); see also Wilson v. Welch, 7 P. 341,344 (Or. 1885) ("The state does own the channel of the 
navigable river within its boundaries. and the shore of its bays, harbors, and inlets between high and low 
water. but its ownership is a trust for the public."). 
667. Hume v. Rogue River Packing Co., 92 P. 1065, 1072-73 (Or. 1907); see also Johnson v. Hoy, 
47 P.2d 252, 252 (Or. 1935) (holding that the Legislature cannot grant an exclusive right to fish for 
salmon). 
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regulate fishing.668 Specifically, fishing methods can be enjoined if they 
interfere with the public's common right of fishing.669 
Under the public trust doctrine, "[w]hile certain of the state's interests are 
alienable, its obligation as trustee of the public interest remains .... Thus, all 
submerged and submersible lands are subject to the paramount responsibility of 
the state to preserve and protect the public interest. "670 Like California, Oregon 
views waters as a limited and precious resource: 
The severe restriction on the power of the state as trustee to modify water 
resources is predicated not only upon the importance of the public use of 
such waters and lands, but upon the exhaustible and irreplaceable nature of 
the resources and its fundamental important to our society and our 
environment. These resources, after all, can only be spent once. Therefore, 
the law has historically and consistently recognized that rivers and estuaries 
once destroyed or diminished may never be restored to the public and, 
accordingly, has required the highest degree of protection from the public 
trustee.671 
As a result, the purpose of a private use of navigable waters is critical to 
whether the use may be allowed under the public trust doctrine. Following 
Illinois Central Railroad, the Oregon courts have concluded "that water 
resources should be devoted to uses which are consistent with their nature and 
should be protected from inimical uses."672 Undertakings in furtherance of and 
consistent with the trust, "such as the construction of wharves, docks and 
piers," are permitted, while "upland-related activities which consume water 
resources by adapting them to uncharacteristic uses" must be examined more 
closely.673 However, to the e:x.1ent that the Oregon public trust doctrine 
prohibits some uses, it "does not prohibit [activities] other than water-related 
uses . . . ."674 Moreover, the State Lands Board does not give up the jus 
publicum in leasing submerged lands.675 
668. Oregon v. Nielsen. 95 P. 720, 722 (Or. 1908); Antony v. Veatch, 220 P.2d 493, 498-99 (Or. 
1950). 
669. Radich v. Frederckson, 10 P.2d 352, 355 (Or. 1932); Johnson, 47 P.2d at 252. 
670. Morse, 581 P.2d at 524. 
671. Id. 
672. Id. at 525. 
673. Id. For an earlier review of Oregon's public trust doctrine, see generally Michael B. Huston, 
The Public Trust Doctrine in Oregon, 19 ENVTL. L. 623 ( 1989). For an argument in favor of expanding 
that doctrine, see generally Scott B. Yates, Comment, A Case For the Extension of the Public Trust 
Doctrine in Oregon, 27 ENvn. L. 663 (1997). 
674. Morse v. Oregon Div. of State Lands, 590 P.2d 709, 711 (Or. 1979); see also Cook v. Dabney, 
139 P. 721, 722 (Or. 1914) (holding that the Oregon State Lands Board cannot convey submerged lands 
"in a manner and for a purpose which would act as a direct and pennanent impediment to navigation," 
because doing so would violate the public trust doctrine); Hinman v. Warren, 6 Or. 408, 412 ( 1877) 
(holding that the State "has no authority to dispose of its tidelands in such a manner as may interfere 
with the free and untrammeled navigation of its rivers, bays, inlets and the like. The grantees of the state 
[to properties along the Columbia River] took the land subject to every easement growing out of the 
right of navigation inherent in the public."); Bowlby v. Shively, 30 P. 154, 160 (Or. 1892), ajf'd, 152 
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Oregon's Water Rights Act explicitly acknowledges the public trust 
doctrine and prohibits instream water rights from diminishing public rights in 
waters under that doctrine.676 Moreover, under Oregon case law, private 
landowners cannot divert navigable-in-fact rivers subject to public use 
rights.677 
Oregon statutes ex1end public rights to any waters made navigable by the 
state678 and to non-navigable, privately owned waters that can float boats, rafts 
or logs. 679 The private owner cannot deny the public its right of navigation, 
including the right to bypass obstructions by traveling over private land, but the 
public has only an "incidental" right to "meddle" with the privately owned 
banks.680 
In addition, the public has acquired the right to use the dzy sand portions 
of beaches through the doctrine of custom.681 As a result, there is no taking of 
private property when the state denies landowners permits to build sea walls.682 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
Date of Statehood: 1889 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation 
South Dakota Constitution: The South Dakota Constitution has no provisions 
relevant to the public trust doctrine. 
South Dakota Statutes: 
• S.D. COD. L. § 1-2-8: South Dakota-Nebraska Boundary Compact. 
• S.D. COD. L. § 8-03: "The public has a right to use the strip of land 
50 feet landward from all navigable waters provided the strip is 
U.S. 1 (1894) (holding that the state can dispose of tidelands, but only subject "to the paramount right of 
navigation and commerce," and "the owner of the upland or tide water has certain rights, arising from 
his adjacency to such waters, subordinate, however, to their use by the public for navigation and 
fishing"). 
675. Brusco Tugboat Co. v. Oregon, 589 P.2d 712, 718 (Or. 1978). 
676. OR. REV. STAT.§ 537.334(2) (2009). 
677. Shaw v. Oswego Iron Co., 10 Or. 371,383 (1882). 
678. OR. REV. STAT. § 780.030. 
679. Weise v. Smith, 3 Or. 445,449 (1869). 
680. Id. at 450. 
681. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673-78 (Or. 1969). For an argument that the 
public trust doctrine still plays a role in protecting public rights in Oregon's beaches, see generally Erin 
Pitts, Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Tool for Ensuring Continued Public Use of Oregon 
Beaches, 22 ENVTL. L. 731 (1992). 
682. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449,451 (Or. 1993). 
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between the ordinary high water mark and ordinary low water mark 
of public bodies of water." 
• S.D. COD. L. Chapter 34A-10: Environmental Protection Act. This 
act creates a private right of action "for the protection of the air, 
water, and other natural resources and the public trust therein from 
pollution, impairment, or destruction."683 Similarly, agencies can 
allow parties to intervene in agency proceedings if the proceeding in 
question "involves conduct which has the effect of polluting, 
impairing, or destroying the air, water, or other natural resources or 
the public trust therein."684 The act also allows the courts to "grant 
temporary equitable relief where necessary for the protection of the 
air, water, and other natural resources or the public trust therein 
from pollution, impairment, or destruction, "685 and requires the 
courts to "adjudicate the impact of the defendant's conduct on the 
air, water, or other natural resources and on the public trust therein 
in accordance with this chapter. "686 In both administrative and 
judicial proceedings, "any alleged pollution, impairment, or 
destruction of the air, water or other natural resources or the public 
trust therein, shall be determined, and no conduct shall be 
authorized or approved which does, or is likely to have such effect 
so long as there is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with 
the reasonable requirements of the public health, safety, and 
welfare."687 Courts may "grant temporary and permanent equitable 
relief, or may impose conditions on the defendant that are required 
to protect the air, water, and other natural resources or the public 
trust therein from pollution, impairment, or destruction."688 
• S.D. COD. L. Title 43, Chapter 17: Water Boundaries and Riparian 
Lands. "The ownership of land below ordinary high-water mark, 
and of land below the water of a navigable lake or stream, is 
regulated by the laws of the United States or by such laws of the 
state as the Legislature may enact."689 "Unless the grant under 
which the land is held indicates a different intent, the owner of the 
upland, if it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes to the 
edge of the lake or stream at low water mark. All navigable rivers 
and lakes are public highways within fifty feet landward from the 
water's nearest edge, provided that the outer boundary of such 
public highway may not expand beyond the ordinary high water 
mark and may not contract within the ordinary low water mark, and 
683. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34A-10-1 (2009)(emphasis added). 
684. Id.§ 34A-10-2 (emphasis added). 
685. Id.§ 34A-10-5 (emphasis added). 
686. Id. § 34A-10-7 (emphasis added). 
687. Id.§ 34A-10-8. 
688. Id§ 34A-10-11. 
689. Id.§ 43-17-1. 
171 
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subject to§§ 43-17-29, 43-17-31, 43-17-32, and 43-17-33."690 "In 
all cases where the opposite banks of any streams not navigable 
belong to different persons, the stream and the bed thereof shall 
become common to both."691 "The Water Management Board shall 
establish . . . the ordinary high water mark and install benchmarks 
and may establish the ordinary low water mark on public lakes 
which are used for public purposes including, but not limited to 
boating, fishing, swimming, hunting, skating, picnicking, and 
similar recreational pursuits."692 "If any water level rises above the 
ordinary high water mark of a navigable lake, the right of the public 
to enjoyment of the entire lake may not be limited, except that 
access to the lake shall be by public right-of-way or by permission 
of the riparian landowner .... "693 "A stream, or portion of a 
stream, is navigable if it can support a vessel capable of carrying 
one or more persons throughout the period between the first of May 
to the thirtieth of September, inclusive, in two out of every ten 
years. A dry draw, as defined in § 46-1-6, is not navigable. This 
section does not apply to any stream or portion of a stream which is 
navigable pursuant to federal law. Any person may petition the 
Water Management Board for a declaratory ruling as to the 
navigability of any stream, or portion of a stream, in this state."694 
Under certain circumstances, riparian owners can fence navigable 
waters.695 However, the fence must be constructed so "that the right 
of the public to utilize the navigable stream is not prohibited or 
unduly restricted."696 Moreover, the right to fence "does not apply 
to any river or stream or portion of any river or stream that has been 
determined to be navigable pursuant to federal law."697 
S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 1: Water Resources Act: Definitions 
and General Provisions. Under these provisions, "the people of the 
state have a paramount interest in the use of all the water of the state 
and that the state shall determine what water of the state, surface 
and underground, can be converted to public use or controlled for 
public protection. "698 Moreover, "all water within the state is the 
property of the people of the state, but the right to the use of water 
may be acquired by appropriation as provided by law.''699 
"(B]ecause of conditions prevailing in this state the general welfare 
690. Id.§43-17-2. 
691. Id. § 43-17-4. 
692. Id. § 43-17-21. 
693. Id.§ 43-17-29. 
694. Id.§ 43-17-34. 
695. Id. § 43-17-35. 
696. Id. 
697. Id. 
698. Id.§ 46-1-1. 
699. Id.§ 46-1-3. 
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requires that the water resources of the state be put to beneficial use 
to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or 
unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the 
conservation of such water is to be exercised with a view to the 
reasonable and beneficial use thereof in the interest of the people 
and for the public welfare. The right to water or to the use or flow of 
water in or from any natural stream or watercourse in this state is 
and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for 
the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not 
ex1end to the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of 
diversion of water."700 Domestic use takes precedence.701 
S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 2: Water Resources Act: Water 
Management Board and Chief Engineer. 
S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 2A: Water Resources Act: 
Administrative Procedure for Appropriation of Water. 
S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 3A: Water Resources Act: Weather 
Modification Activities. 
• S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 4: Water Resources Act: Dry-Draw 
and Nonnavigable Stream Dams. 
• S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 5: Water Resources Act: 
Appropriation of Water. 
• S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 6: Water Resources Act: 
Groundwater and Wells. 
• S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 7: Water Resources Act: Storage, 
Diversion, and Irrigation Works. 
• S.D. COD. L. Title 46, Chapter 8: Water Resources Act: Eminent 
Domain. 
• S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 10: Water Resources Act: 
Adjudication of Water Rights. 
• S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter IOA: Water Resources Act: Water 
Use Control Areas. 
• S.D. Coo. L. Title 46, Chapter 12: Water Resources Act: Irrigation 
Districts. 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
173 
South Dakota recognizes several categories of navigable waters. The test 
of navigability for title purposes under the equal footing doctrine is a federal 
700. Id.§ 46-1-4. 
701. Id.§ 46-1-5. 
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test.702 According to the South Dakota Supreme Court, the ebb-and-flow tidal 
test of title navigability is not useful in South Dakota.703 Instead, the state uses 
the navigable-in-fact test for other waters.704 Under this test, Lake Albert is 
navigable. 705 In addition, by statute, South Dakota has identified the Missouri 
River, James River, Boise des Sioux River, and the lower five miles of the Big 
Sioux River as being federally navigable. 706 
For purposes of determining whether the public has rights to use waters, 
South Dakota uses a common law "pleasure boat" test for navigability.707 For 
public use purposes, "whether or not waters are navigable depends upon the 
natural availability of waters for public purposes taking into consideration the 
natural character and surroundings of a lake or stream. This division of lakes 
and streams into navigable and nonnavigable is the equivalent of classification 
of public and private waters."708 
By statute, South Dakota defines "navigable water" for public use 
purposes to be "[a] stream, or portion of a stream [that] can support a vessel 
capable of carrying one or more persons throughout the period between the first 
of May to the thirtieth of September, inclusive, in two out of every ten 
years."709 However, this definition "does not apply to any stream or portion of 
a stream which is navigable pursuant to federal law."7JO 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
Fairly continuously under South Dakota's statutes, private landowners 
have owned navigable waters to the low-water mark.711 However, the 
landowner's title is "absolute" only to the high water mark; title to lands 
between the high water and low water marks is subject to the rights of the 
public.712 The public has access to and a right to use these lands for 
"navigating, boating, fishing, fowling, and like public uses."713 Nevertheless, 
702. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 829-31 (S.D. 2004). 
703. Flisrand v. Madson, 152 N.W. 796,799 (S.D. 1912). 
704. Id. at 799-800. 
705. Id. 
706. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-17-38. 
707. Parks, 616 N.W.2d at 830-31 (citing Hillebrand v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821 (S.D. 1937)). 
708. Hillebrand, 274 N.W. at 822. 
709. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 43-17-34. 
710. Id. 
711. Flisrand v. Madson. 152 N.W. 796, 799 (S.D. 1912) (citing Crv. CODE§ 289); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS§ 43-17-2. 
712. Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799 (citing av. CODE§ 289); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 43-17-2. 
713. Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799 (citing av. CODE§ 289); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 43-17-2; see also 
Hillebrand, 274 N.W. at 822 (listing sailing, rowing, fishing, fowling, bathing, skating, taking water, 
and cutting ice as public uses). 
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the ordinary high water mark can migrate, and public rights follow natural 
changes in the waterway. 714 
In contrast, at common law, landowners have "absolute ownership" of the 
beds of non-federally navigable waters.715 However, under current statutes, 
[ u ]nless the grant under which the land is held indicates a different intent, 
the owner of the upland, if it borders upon a navigable lake or stream, takes 
to the edge of the lake or stream at low water mark. All navigable rivers 
and lakes are public highways within fifty feet landward from the water's 
nearest edge, provided that the outer boundary of such public highway may 
not expand beyond the ordinary high water mark and may not contract 
within the ordinary low water mark .... 716 
For federally navigable waters, "[o]nce the beds of the navigable waters are in 
state ownership, they are held subject to a public trust and cannot be conveyed 
unless it would promote a public trust purpose. ,m 7 
As in many western states, public ownership of water for prior 
appropriation purposes is becoming relevant to public rights in non-navigable 
waters in South Dakota. Recently, the South Dakota Supreme Court declared 
that "[n]ever in South Dakota has determining the navigability of a water body 
been a matter of deciding if the water itself is public or private."718 Instead, 
under the Desert Land Act of 1877,719 non-navigable waters became subject to 
state control. 720 When the legislature adopted the prior appropriation doctrine 
in 1905, it qualified riparian owners' rights to the water, and several states have 
recognized public rights in water despite private ownership of the bed, 
including Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Wyoming, Minnesota, North Dakota, 
and Iowa 721 Moreover, in 1955 the South Dakota Legislature confirmed that 
all water is public property.722 As a result, the Water Resources Act works in 
tandem with the public trust doctrine: 
[W]hile we regard the public trust doctrine and Water Resources Act as 
having shared principles, the Act does not supplant the scope of the public 
trust doctrine. The Water Resources Act evinces a legislative intent both to 
allocate and regulate water resources. In part, this Act codifies public trust 
714. S.D. Wildlife Fed'n v. Water Mgmt. Bd., 382 N.W.2d 26, 31-32 (S.D. 1986). 
715. Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799,801. 
716. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS.§ 43-17-2. 
717. Parks v. Cooper, 676 N.W.2d 823, 829 (S.D. 2004) (declaring lllinois Central Railroad Co. to 
be the first definition of the public trust doctrine); Flisrand, 152 N.W. at 799-800. 
718. Parks, 616 N.W.2d at 829. For a more extensive discussion of this case, see generally Janice 
Holmes, Note, Following Jhe Crowd: The Supreme Court of South Dakota Expands the Scope of Jhe 
Public Trust Doctrine to Non-Navigable, Non-Meandered Bodies of Water in Parks ,,. Cooper, 38 
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1317 (2005). 
719. 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-23 (2006). 
720. Parks, 676 N.W.2d. at 831-32 (citing Cal. Or. Power Co. v. Beaver Cement Co., 295 U.S. 
142, 162-64 (1935)). 
721. Id. at 833-36. 
722. Id. at 837. 
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principles. The first three sections of the Act embody the core principles of 
the public trust doctrine-"the people of the state have a paramount interest 
in the use of all the water of the state," SDCL 46-1-1; "the state shall 
determine in what way the water of the state, both surface and 
underground, should be developed for the greatest public benefit," SDCL 
46-1-2; and "all water within the state is the property of the people of the 
state." SDCL 46-1-3.723 
Thus, even when increased precipitation creates new lakes over private 
property that had never really existed before, "the State of South Dakota retains 
the right to use, control, and develop the water in these lakes as a separate asset 
in trust for the public," and the public trust doctrine applies independently of 
bed ownership.724 "[A]ll waters within South Dakota, not just those waters 
considered navigable under the federal test, are held in trust by the State for the 
public."725 The public purposes for which these lakes can be used potentially 
include, but are not limited to, "boating, fishing, swimming, hunting, skating, 
picnicking, and similar recreational pursuits."726 However, the court noted, it 
would be better for the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to 
regulate public recreational use of new non-navigable lakes, because "it is 
ultimately up to the Legislature to decide how these [new] waters are to be 
beneficially used in the public interest" and to carry out these policies "through 
a coordination of all state agencies and resources."727 
South Dakota's Environmental Protection Act also embodies the public 
trust doctrine.728 This act "authoriz[es] legal action to protect 'the air, water 
and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, 
impairment or destruction. "'729 
TEXAS 
Date of Statehood: 1845 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation after 1895730 
Texas Constitution: The Texas Court of Appeals recently indicated that 
Article XVI, § 59(a) of the Texas Constitution is relevant to the public trust 
doctrine. 731 This provision states: 
723. Id. at 838. 
724. Id. 
725. Id. at 838-39. 
726. Id. at 840 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 43-17-21). 
727. Id. at 841. 
728. Id. at 838. 
729. Id. (quoting S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 34A-10-l). 
730. TEX. WATERCODE.ANN. § 11.001(b)(Vemon2009). 
731. Cwnmins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 17. 175 S.W.3d 34, 49 
(Tex. App. 2005). 
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The conservation and development of all of the natural resources of this 
State, and development of parks and recreational facilities, including the 
control, storing, preservation and distribution of its storm and flood waters, 
the waters of its rivers and streams, for irrigation, power and all other 
useful purposes, the reclamation and irrigation of its arid, semiarid and 
other lands needing irrigation, the reclamation and drainage of its 
overflowed lands, and other lands needing drainage, the conservation and 
development of its forests, water and hydro-electric power, the navigation 
of its inland and coastal waters, and the preservation and conservation of all 
such natural resources of the State are each and all hereby declared public 
rights and duties; and the Legislature shall pass all such laws as may be 
appropriate thereto. 732 
No other provisions of the Texas Constitution discuss rights in water. 
Texas Statutes: 
732. 
733. 
734. 
735. 
736. 
737. 
• 
• 
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 21.001: This provision defines a 
"navigable stream" to be "a stream which retains an average width 
of 30 feet from the mouth up." 
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN., Chapter 33: Coastal Public Lands 
Management Act of 1973. "The natural resources of the surface 
estate in coastal public land shall be preserved. These resources 
include the natural aesthetic values of those areas and the value of 
the areas in their natural state for the protection and nurture of all 
types of marine life and wildlife."733 "Uses which the public at 
large may enjoy and in which the public at large may participate 
shall take priority over those uses which are limited to fewer 
individuals."734 "The public interest in navigation in the intracoastal 
water shall be protected."735 '"Coastal public land' means all or any 
portion of state-owned submerged land, the water overlying that 
land, and all state-owned islands or portions of islands in the coastal 
area."736 "'Submerged land' means any land extending from the 
boundary between the land of the state and the littoral owners 
seaward to the low-water mark on any saltwater lake, bay, inlet, 
estuary, or inland water within the tidewater limits, and any land 
lying beneath the body of water, but for the purposes of this chapter 
only, shall exclude beaches bordering on and the water of the open 
Gulf of Mexico and the land lying beneath this water. "737 The act 
TEX. CONST .• art. XVI, § 59(a). 
TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN.§ 33.00l(b) (Vernon 2009). 
Id. § 33.00I(c). 
Id. § 33.00l(d). 
Id. § 33.004(6). 
Id. § 33.004(11). 
177 
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provides for a Coastal Management Program. 738 Although the act 
allows for leasing of coastal public land, "[m]embers of the public 
may not be excluded from coastal public land leased for public 
recreational purposes or from an estuarine preserve. "739 
• TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 61.001--61.26: Texas Open Beaches 
Act. "It is declared and affirmed to be the public policy of this state 
that the public, individually and collectively, shall have the free and 
unrestricted right of ingress and egress to and from the state-owned 
beaches bordering on the seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico, or if 
the public has acquired a right of use or easement to or over an area 
by prescription, dedication, or has retained a right by virtue of 
continuous right in the public, the public shall have the free and 
unrestricted right of ingress and egress to the larger area extending 
from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on 
the Gulf of Mexico."740 "'Beach' means state-owned beaches to 
which the public has the right of ingress and egress bordering on the 
seaward shore of the Gulf of Mexico or any larger area extending 
from the line of mean low tide to the line of vegetation bordering on 
the Gulf of Mexico if the public has acquired a right of use or 
easement to or over the area by prescription, dedication, or has 
retained a right by virtue of continuous right in the public."741 This 
act was upheld in Moody v. White.742 
• TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 134.006: This provision of the Texas 
Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act ensures that the Act 
"does not affect the right of a person under other law to enforce or 
protect the person's interest in water resources affected by a surface 
coal mining operation." 
• TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE ANN.§ 90.001: This provision defines 
"navigable river or stream" to be "a river or stream that retains an 
average width of 30 or more feet from the mouth or confluence up." 
• TEX. WATER CODE ANN., Chapter 11: Water Rights. "The water of 
the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every flowing river, 
natural stream, and lake, and of every bay or arm of the Gulf of 
Mexico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rainwater of every 
river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and watershed in 
the state is the property of the state."743 The right to appropriate can 
be subordinate to instream flow needs. 744 "The waters of the state 
are held in trust for the public, and the right to use state water may 
738. Id. § 33.053. 
739. Id. § 33.108. 
740. Id. § 61.0ll(a). 
741. Id.§ 61.012. 
742. 593 S.W.2d 372, 379-80 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980). 
743. TEx. WATER CODE ANN.§ 1 l.021(a)(Vemon 2009). 
744. Id. § 11.023(a). 
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be appropriated only as expressly authorized by law."745 Moreover, 
"[m]aintaining the biological soundness of the state's rivers, lakes, 
bays, and estuaries is of great importance to the public's economic 
health and general well-being. The legislature encourages voluntary 
water and land stewardship to benefit the water in the state,"746 and 
"[t]he legislature has expressly required the commission while 
balancing all other public interests to consider and, to the extent 
practicable, provide for the freshwater inflows and instream flows 
necessary to maintain the viability of the state's streams, rivers, and 
bay and estuary systems in the commission's regular granting of 
permits for the use of state waters."747 Water rights can be taken by 
eminent domain.748 The Water Code provides for pro rata 
distribution of water during shortages.749 Obstruction of navigable 
streams is prohibited. 750 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
179 
Texas follows the tidal test of navigability for title purposes, and, as such, 
"[t]he bays, inlets, and other waters along the Gulf Coast which are subject to 
the ebb and flow of the tide of the Gulf of Mexico are defined as 'navigable 
waters. "'751 Applying this test, the Texas Supreme Court noted that Tres 
Palacios Bay was an arm of the Gulf of Mexico and thus held it navigable for 
title purposes. 752 
However, Texas also follows the navigable-in-fact test.753 "[S]treams or 
lakes ... are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being 
used, in their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over 
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of 
trade and travel on water . . . ."754 Moreover, the courts consider the 
navigability test "broad" because navigable waters in Texas "include waters 
745. Id. § 1 l.0235(a). 
746. Id.§ l I.0235(b). 
747. Id. § 1 I.0235(c). 
748. Id. § 1 I.033. 
749. Id. § l I .039. 
750. Id. § I l.096. 
751. Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 175 S.W.2d 410, 41 I (Tex. l943)(citing City of Galveston 
v. Mann, 143 S.W.2d 1028, 1033 (Tex. I 940); Crary v. Port Arthur Channel & Dock Co., 47 S.W. 967, 
970 (Tex. 1898)); Butler v. Sadler, 399 S.W.2d 411,415 (Tex. Civ. App. I 966). 
752. Lorino, 175S.W.2dat4ll (citingTexasv.Bradford,50S.W.2d 1065, 1069(Tex.1932)). 
753. 111 Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, 218 S.W.3d 173, 182 n.7 (Tex. App. 2007) (citations 
omitted); Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441, 443-44 (Texas 1935). 
754. Hix v. Robertson, 211 S.W.3d 423, 428 n.3 (Tex. App. 2006) (quoting Taylor Fishing Club v. 
Hammett, 88 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 
U.S. 49, 56 (1926))). 
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within the tidewater limits of the Gulf of Mexico and streams that are navigable 
in law or fact."755 
Nevertheless, "[e]very inland lake or pond that has the capacity to float a 
boat is not necessarily navigable. It must be of such size and so situated as to be 
generally and commonly useful as a highway for transportation of goods or 
passengers between the points connected thereby. "756 Thus, even though boats 
could float on Stanmire Lake, the lake could not practically be used for 
commerce, and hence it was not navigable.757 Conversely, under this test, as 
well as the tidal test, the Old River and San Jacinto River are navigable.758 In 
addition, the Colorado River is navigable, and the state owns its bed.759 
By statute, Texas has defined "navigable stream" to be a river or stream 
"which retains an average width of 30 feet from the mouth up."760 While the 
Texas Court of Appeals referenced this definition in a recent case in connection 
with title navigability, 761 the real "effect of this statute is to render all streams 
navigable in law that have an average width of 30 feet, regardless of ownership 
of the bed of the streams and regardless of whether they are actually 
navigable. "762 Thus, creeks not navigable in fact can still be subject to public 
use under these statutes. 763 This legislation dates back to 1929 and was enacted 
"because survey lines has incorrectly crossed navigable streams," and the 
legislation "sought to rectify those errors by relinquishing title in the 
streambeds while reserving the public's right to the waters of navigable 
streams."764 However, versions of the thirty-foot rule have actually existed in 
Texas since 1837.765 Public rights in these waters include navigation, fishing, 
recreation, and commercial uses.766 For example, Hog Creek is a statutorily 
navigable stream and the public has a right to enjoy its waters, including by 
fishing, and those rights extend to a lake formed by damming the creek. 767 
755. TH lnl's., 218 S.W.3d at 182 n.7. 
756. Taylor Fishing Club, 88 S.W.2d at 129. 
757. Id. at 130. But see Weider v. Texas. 196 S.W. 868. 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (declaring 
Green Lake navigable because it could float boats for fishing, and discussing the .. pleasure boat" and log 
floatation tests of navigability with approval); Orange Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 126 S.W. 604, 606 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1910) (holding that log floatation was enough to make a water navigable. citing The 
Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430,432 (1874)). 
758. Taylor Fishing Club, 88 S.W.2d at 184. 
759. NaCl Resort Communities, Inc. v. Cain, 479 S.W.2d 341, 349-50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). 
760. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 21.001 (Vernon 2009); see also TEX. PARKS & WILD. CODE 
ANN. § 90.001 (Vernon 2009). 
761. TI-I Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine. 218 S.W.3d 173,184 (Tex. App. 2007). 
762. Tex. River Barges v. City of San Antonio. 21 S.W.3d 347,352 (Tex. App. 2000). 
763. Hix v. Robertson, 211 S.W.3d 423, 427-28 (Tex. App. 2006); see also Port Acres 
Sportsman's Club v. Mann, 541 S.W.2d 847, 848-49 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (holding that the Big Hill 
Bayou, which was deemed non-navigable in 1875, was navigable under the statute). 
764. Hix, 211 S.W.3d at 428. 
765. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441,444 (Tex. 1935). 
766. Tex. River Barges, 21 S.W.3d at 352. 
767. Hix, 211 S.W.3d at 428. 
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However, the adjoining lake was not navigable because the statute does not 
apply to lakes. 768 In addition, both the north and south forks of the Upper 
Guadalupe River are navigable under this statutory definition.769 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
"Title to land covered by the bays, inlets, and arms of the Gulf of Mexico 
with tidewater limits is in the State, and those lands constitute public property 
that is held in trust for the use and benefit of the people."770 As such, 
submerged lands are different from ordinary public lands. 771 The shore is the 
stretch of land between the high and low water marks, and as a "settled 
principle of English common law," title to the shore belongs to the state.772 
Until the shore is granted, the state "holds the right, both to the water and land 
under the water, for the public use; and the right of passing and repassing, 
navigation, fishing, etc., etc., are common to all the citizens, subject of course 
to such general regulations as may be imposed for the general benefit."773 
Public rights include hunting, fishing, navigation, "and other lawful 
purposes."774 
In common law land grants after 1840, the boundary between state and 
private property in tidal lands is the mean high tide line. 775 For Spanish or 
Mexican grants, the boundary is the mean higher high tide line, 776 which is the 
average of the higher of the two daily high tides over time. In contrast, "[m]ean 
high tide is measured by taking an average of all the daily highest readings over 
a long time. Mean high tide is the same as mean high water."777 Title to islands 
follows title to the bed. 778 
"[T]wo presumptions arise regarding submerged lands: (I) they are owned 
by the State and (2) the State has not acted to divest them."779 "[O]nly the 
Texas Legislature may convey submerged tidal lands."780 However, unlike in 
768. Id. at 428-29. 
769. In re Adjudication of Upper Guadalupe River Segment of Guadalupe River Basin, 625 S.W.2d 
353, 362--63 (Tex. App. 1981 ). 
770. Natland Corp. v. Baker's Port, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 52, 57 (Tex. App. 1993); City of Corpus 
Christi v. Davis, 622 S.W.2d 640,643 (Tex. App. 1981). 
771. Lorino v. Crawford Packing Co., 175 S.W.2d 410,412 (Tex. 1943). 
772. City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 1859 WL 6290, at *9 (1859). 
773. Id. at *11 (citations omitted). 
774. Diversion Lake Club v. Heath, 86 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. 1935); see generally Michael D. 
Morrison, The Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the Needs of Texas Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 365 (1985). 
775. City of Corpus Christi, 622 S.W.2d at 643 (citing Rudder v. Ponder, 293 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. 
1956)); TH Invs., Inc. v. Kirby Inland Marine, 2 I 8 S.W .3d 173,184 (Tex. App. 2007). 
776. TH lnl's., 218 S.W.3d at 184. 
777. Id. at 184 n.10 ( citation omitted). 
778. Tumerv. Mullins, 162 S.W.3d 356, 361--62 (Tex. App. 2005). 
779. TH Inl's., 218 S.W.3d at 182-83. 
780. Id. at 183. 
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most states, when the State of Texas does grant submerged lands to individuals, 
there is no implied reservation in favor of the public trust, despite the ruling in 
Illinois Central Railroad. 781 
The state's ownership of water782 is relevant to the operation of the public 
trust doctrine in Texas. 783 "The purpose of the State maintaining title to the 
beds and waters of all navigable bodies is to protect the public's interest in 
those scarce natural resources. "784 As such, "the State, as trustee, is entitled to 
regulate those waters and submerged lands to protect its citizens' health and 
safety and to conserve natural resources."785 
There are also indications from the Texas courts that fish and other aquatic 
life are subject to public trust principles. As far back as 1942, the Texas Civil 
Court of Appeals declared: 
The waters of all natural streams of this State and all fish and other aquatic 
life contained in fresh water rivers, creeks, stream, and lakes or sloughs 
subject to overflow from rivers or other streams within the borders of this 
State, are declared to be the property of the State; and the Game, Fish ad 
Oyster Commission has jurisdiction over and control over such rivers and 
aquatic life. The ownership is in trust for the people ... , and pollution of 
streams and water courses is condemned .... The Constitution of Texas, 
Art. 16, § 59(a) ... designates rivers and streams as natural resources, 
declares that such belong to the State, and expressly invests the Legislature 
with the preservation and conservation of such resources.786 
Date of Statehood: 1890 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation 
781. Natland Corp. v. Baker's Port. Inc., 865 S.W.2d 52, 59-60 (Tex. App. 1993) (citing Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 473, 481-84 (1988); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 26 
(1894); City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349 (1859); Texas v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d 579 (Texas 
1961)); City of Galveston v. Menard, 23 Tex. 349, 1859 WL 6290, at *12 (1859). 
782. TEX WATER CODE ANN.§ 1 l.021(a)(Vemon 2009). 
783. Cummins v. Travis County Water Control & Improvement Dist., 175 S.W.2d 34, 48 (Tex. 
App. 2005). For a lengthier discussion of this case, see generally Amy Mockenhaupt, Cummins v. 
Travis County Water Control and Improvement Dist., 175 S.W.3d 34 (Tex. App. 2005), 9 U. DENV. 
WATER L. REV. 269 (2005). 
784. Cummins, 175 S.W.2d at 49. 
785. Id. (citing Goldsmith & Powell v. Texas, 159 S.W.2d 534, 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942)); see 
also Carruthers v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 645 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. 1983) 
("The waters of public navigable streams are held by the State in trust for the public, primarily for 
navigation purposes." (citing Motl v. Boyd, 286 S.W. 458 (Tex. 1926))). 
786. Goldsmith & Powell, 159 S.W.2d at 535. 
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Utah Constitution: Utah has not constitutionalized its public trust doctrine. 
However, several provisions of the Utah Constitution are relevant. These 
include: 
• Art. XI, § 6: "No municipal corporation, shall directly or indirectly, 
lease, sell, alien or dispose of any waterworks, water rights, or 
sources of water supply now, or hereafter to be owned or controlled 
by it; but all such waterworks, water rights and sources of water 
supply now owned or hereafter to be acquired by any municipal 
corporation, shall be preserved, maintained and operated by it for 
supplying its inhabitants with water at reasonable charges: Provided, 
That nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent any 
such municipal corporation from exchanging water-rights, or 
sources of water supply, for other water-rights or sources of water 
supply of equal value, and to be devoted in like manner to the public 
supply of its inhabitants." 
• Art. XVII, § 1: "All existing rights to the use of any of the waters in 
the State for any useful or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized 
and confirmed." 
• Art. XX, § I: "All lands of the State that have been, or may 
hereafter be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands acquired 
by gift, grant or devise, from any person or corporation, or that may 
otherwise be acquired, are hereby accepted, and declared to be the 
public lands of the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, to 
be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the respective 
purposes for which they have been or may be granted, donated, 
devised or otherwise acquired." 
Utah Statutes: 
• UTAH CODE ANN. § 23-21-4(1): "[T]here is reserved to the public 
the right of access to all lands owned by the state, including those 
lands lying below the official government meander line of navigable 
waters, for the purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing." 
• UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-9-6(5): The Marketable Record Title Act 
does not apply to sovereign lands. 
• UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-34-3.2: Wetlands Protection Account. 
"Funds in the Wetlands Protect Account may be used in accordance 
with the public trust doctrine."787 
• UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-1-I: This provision defines "public trust 
assets" to be "those lands and resources, including sovereign lands, 
administered by the" Division of Forestry, Fire, and State Lands.788 
787. UTAH CODE ANN. § 79-2-305(3) (2009). 
788. Id.§ 65A-l-1(4). 
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"Sovereign lands," in tum, are "those lands lying below the ordinary 
high water mark of navigable bodies of water at the date of 
statehood and owned by the state by virtue of its sovereignty."789 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-2-5: The Division of Forestry, Fire, and 
State Lands (DFFSL) can limit public use of leased parcels of 
sovereign lands to protect lessees from hunting, trapping, or fishing. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-10-l: The DFFSL "is the management 
authority for sovereign lands, and may exchange, sell, or lease 
sovereign lands but only in the quantities and for the purposes as 
serve the public interest and do not interfere with the public 
trust."790 "Nothing in this section shall be construed as asserting 
state ownership of the beds of nonnavigable lakes, bays, rivers, or 
streams."791 
• UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-10-2(1): The DFFSL, "with the approval 
of the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources 
and the governor, may set aside for public or recreational use any 
part of the lands claimed by the state as the beds of lakes or 
streams." 
• UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-10-3: This provision allows for 
agreements and establishes dispute resolution procedures to 
establish boundaries of sovereign lands. 
• UTAH CODE ANN. § 65A-10-8: This provision provides for 
management of the Great Salt Lake. 
• UTAH CODE ANN.§ 73-1-1: "All waters in this state, whether above 
or under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the 
public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof." 
• UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-5: "The use of water for beneficial 
purposes, as provided in this title, is hereby declared to be a public 
use." 
• UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-1 to 73-3-31: Appropriation of Water. 
"Rights to the use of the unappropriated public waters in this state 
may be acquired only as provided in this title. No appropriation of 
water may be made and no rights to the use thereof initiated and no 
notice of intent to appropriate shall be recognized except application 
for such appropriation first be made to the state engineer in the 
manner hereinafter provided, and not otherwise. The appropriation 
must be for some useful and beneficial purpose, and, as between 
appropriators, the one first in time shall be first in rights; provided, 
that when a use designated by an application to appropriate any of 
the unappropriated waters of the state would materially interfere 
789. Id.§ 65A-l-1(5). 
790. Id.§ 65A-10-l(l). 
791. Id.§ 65A-10-1(2). 
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with a more beneficial use of such water, the application shall be 
dealt with as provided in Section 73-3-8. No right to the use of 
water either appropriated or unappropriated can be acquired by 
adverse use or adverse possession."792 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
185 
Utah has provided the U.S. Supreme Court with several occasions to 
discuss the definition of navigability that gives states title to the beds and banks 
of navigable waters. For example, in litigation regarding title to the Green 
River, the Grand River, and the Colorado River in Utah, the U.S. Supreme 
Court affirmed that states received title to the beds and banks of navigable 
waters upon statehood, while the federal government retained title to the beds 
and banks of non-navigable waters. 793 The question of title navigability is a 
federal question, and hence the fact that the Utah Legislature in 1927 passed 
legislation declaring these three rivers navigable was irrelevant.794 
Summarizing its prior case law, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that: 
The test of navigability has frequently been stated by this Court. In The 
Daniel Ball, IO Wall. 557, 563 ... , the Court said: "Those rivers must be 
regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in fact. And 
they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being 
used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which 
trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade 
and travel on water." In The Montello, 20 Wall. 430, 441 ... , it was 
pointed out that "the true test of navigability of a stream does not depend 
on the mode by which commerce is, or may be, conducted, nor the 
difficulties attending navigation," and that "it would be a narrow rule to 
hold that in this country, unless a river was capable of being navigation by 
steam or sail vessels, it could not be treated as a public highway." The 
principles thus laid down have recently been restated in United States v. 
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 ... , where the Court said: 
'The rule long since approved by this court in applying the Constitution 
and laws of the United States is that streams or lakes which are 
navigable in fact must be regarded as navigable in law; that they are 
navigable in fact when they are used, or susceptible of being used, in 
their natural and ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over 
which trade and travel are or may be conducted in the customary modes 
of trade and travel on water; and further that navigability does not 
depend on the particular mode in which such use is or may be had-
whether by steamboats, sailing vessels or flatboats-nor an absence of 
occasional difficulties in navigation, but the fact, if it be a fact, that the 
792. Id.§ 73-3-1. 
793. United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931). 
794. Id. at 75 & n.6. 
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stream in its natural and ordinary condition affords a channel for useful 
commerce.' 795 
Moreover, "[t]he extent of existing commerce is not the test."796 
Under this test, all three rivers were declared navigable, and Utah owns 
their beds and banks.797 Similarly, the Great Salt Lake is navigable and owned 
by Utah.798 According to the U.S. Supreme Court, "the fact that the Great Salt 
Lake is not a part of a navigable interstate or international commercial highway 
in no way interferes with the principle of public ownership of its bed."799 
Finally, Utah owns the bed and banks of Utah Lake, another navigable lake.800 
In 1927, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the English ebb-and-flow tidal 
test of navigability.801 According to that court's most recent definition of 
navigability, a body of water is navigable for title purposes "if it is useful for 
commerce and has 'practical usefulness to the public as a public highway' ... 
. "
802 In contrast, "[a] theoretical or potential navigability, or one that is 
temporary, precarious, and unprofitable, is not sufficient."803 Under this test, 
Scipio Lake was not navigable because the lake was not, and was not likely to 
become, "a valuable factor in commerce."804 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
In waters navigable for title purposes, private landowners own only to the 
high water mark, often deemed the equivalent of the meander line.805 The high 
water mark is "the mark on the land where valuable vegetation ceased to grow 
because the land was inundated by water for long periods oftime."806 
795. Id. at 76. 
796. Id. at 82. 
797. Id. at 89. 
798. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); see also Morton, Int'l, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. 
Co., 495 P.2d 31, 34 (Utah 1972) ("The Great Salt Lake is the property of Utah subject only to 
regulation ofnavigation by Congress."); Utah State Road Comm'n v. Hardy Salt Co., 486 P.2d 391, 392 
(Utah 1971) (declaring the Great Salt Lake navigable under the Equal Footing Doctrine); Deseret 
Livestock Co. v. Utah, 171 P.2d 401,403 (Utah 1946) (declaring the Great Salt Lake navigable under 
the principles of United States l'. Utah, 283 U.S. at 89). 
799. Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. at 10 (citations omitted). 
800. Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 203--09 (1987); see also Utah v. 
Rollo, 262 P. 987, 989-90 (Utah 1927) (declaring Utah Lake navigable under the rules of United States 
v. Holt State Banlc, 270 U.S. 49 (1926) and Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 {1894)). 
801. Rollo, 262 P. at 991-92. 
802. Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting Monroe v. Utah, 175 P.2d 
759, 761 (Utah 1946) (quoting Harrison v. Fite, 148 F. 781, 784 (8th Cir. 1906))). 
803. Monroe, 175 P.2d at 761. 
804. Id. at 762. 
805. Provo City v. Jacobsen, 217 P.2d 577,578 (Utah 1950); see also UTAH CODE ANN.§ 23-21-
4(1) (2009) (citing the meander line as the line for public rights); UTAH CODE.ANN.§ 65A-l-1(5) (citing 
the high water mark as the boundary of sovereign lands). But see Knudsen v. Omanson, 37 P. 250,251 
(Utah 1894) (emphasizing that the border is the water line, not the meander line). 
806. Provo City, 217 P.2d at 578. 
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For navigable waters and sovereign lands in Utah, the essence of the 
public trust doctrine, as expressed in Illinois Central Railroad, "is that 
navigable waters should not be given without restriction to private parties and 
should be preserved for the general public for uses such as commerce, 
navigation, and fishing."807 Deciding whether a conveyance of sovereign lands 
to a private party was in the public interest is a question of fact for trial.808 
Public ownership of the water itself has expanded the scope of Utah's 
public trust doctrine by giving the public rights to use non-navigable waters. 
Under Utah Code Annotated § 73-1-1, waters are owned by the public. The 
Utah Supreme Court has explained that: 
Public ownership is founded on the principle that water, a scarce and 
essential resource in this area of the country, is indispensable to the welfare 
of all people; and the State must therefore assume the responsibility of 
allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the people of the 
State as a whole. 809 
Thus: 
Under this "doctrine of public ownership," the public owns state waters and 
has "an easement over the water regardless of who owns the water bed 
beneath." In granting this public this easement, "state policy recognizes an 
interest of the public in the use of state waters for recreational purposes." 
This court has enumerated the specific recreational rights that are within 
the easement's scope. They include "the right to float leisure craft, hunt, 
fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing that water."810 
Bed ownership is thus irrelevant for the public's rights to use waters in the 
state. 811 Moreover, "the scope of the public's easement in state waters provides 
the public the right to engage in all recreational activities that utilize the water 
and does not limit the public to activities that can be performed upon the 
water."812 As a result, "the public has the right to touch privately owned beds 
of state waters in ways incidental to all recreational rights provided for in the 
easement."813 
Utah appears to have extended its public trust doctrine to ecological 
protection. As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, 
The 'public trust' doctrine . . . protects the ecological integrity of public 
lands and their public recreational uses for the benefit of the public at large. 
807. Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 635 (Utah 1990) (citing Kootenai Envtl. 
AJliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983)). 
808. Id. at 635-36. 
809. JJNP Co. v. Utah, 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982). 
810. Conater v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 899-900 (Utah 2008) (quoting JJNP Co., 655 P.2d at 
I 137). See generally Teresa Mareck, Searching for the Public Trust Doctrine in Utah Water Law, 15 J. 
ENERGY, NATURAL R.Es., & ENVTL. L. 321 ( 1995). 
811. Conater, 194 P.3d at 899-900. 
812. Id. at 901. 
813. Id. at 901-02 (limiting criminal trespass liability for water users). 
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The public trust doctrine, however, is limited to sovereign lands and 
perhaps other state lands that are not subject to specific trusts, such as 
school trust lands.814 
WASHINGTON 
Date of Statehood: 1889 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation. However, existing riparian rights 
have been protected, especially with respect to non-navigable waters.815 With 
respect to navigable waters, "the state's title to the beds and shores of navigable 
lakes and streams is paramount and absolute, and ... an abutting owner has no 
riparian or littoral right in the waters or shores of the stream."816 
Washington Constitution: Washington has constitutionalized some of its 
public trust doctrine, particularly with regard to state ownership of submerged 
lands and the Illinois Central Railroad limitation on conveyances of submerged 
lands. Moreover, several provisions of the Washington Constitution are 
relevant to water and submerged lands. These include: 
• Art. XV, § 1: "The state shall never give, sell or lease to any private 
person, corporation, or association any rights whatever in the waters 
beyond such harbor lines, nor shall any of the area lying between 
any harbor line and the line of ordinary high water, and within not 
less than fifty feet nor more than two thousand feet of such harbor 
line (as the commission shall determine) be sold or granted by the 
state, nor its rights to control the same relinquished, but such area 
shall be forever reserved for landings, wharves, streets, and other 
conveniences of navigation and commerce." 
• 
• 
Art. XV, § 2: Leases for wharves and docks in harbors and tidal 
waters are limited to 30 years. 
Art. XVII, § 1: "The state of Washington asserts its ownership to the 
beds and shores of all navigable waters in the state up to and 
including the line of ordinary high tide, in waters where the tide 
ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of ordinary high 
water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes: Provided, 
That this section shall not be construed so as to debar any person 
from asserting his claim to vested rights in the courts of the state." 
814. NaCl Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909,919 (Utah 1993). 
815. City ofNewWhatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 64 P. 735, 738 (Wash. 1901). 
816. Hill v. Newell, 149 P. 951, 952 (Wash. 1915); see also Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 26 P. 539, 541-
42 (Wash. 1891) (holding that there are no riparian rights on navigable waters). 
,·,, 
\bl 
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• Art. XVII, § 2: "The state of Washington disclaims all title in and 
claim to all tide, swamp and overflowed lands, patented by the 
United States: Provided, the same is not impeached for fraud." 
• Art. XXI, § I: "The use of the waters of this state for irrigation, 
mining and manufacturing purposes shall be deemed a public use." 
Washington Statutes: 
• 
• 
• 
WASH. REV. CODE § 79.02.010(1): "Aquatic lands" are "all state-
owned tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of navigable 
waters as defined in chapter 79.90 RCW that are administered by 
the [D]epartment [of Natural Resources]." 
WASH. REV. CODE§ 79.02.095: Normal public lands statutes do not 
apply to state tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the beds of 
navigable waters. 
WASH. REV. CODE§ 79.100.010(2): For purposes of dealing with 
derelict vessels, "aquatic lands" are "all tidelands, shorelands, 
harbor areas, and the beds of navigable waters, including lands 
owned by the state and lands owned by other public or private 
entities." 
• WASH. REV. CODE§§ 79.105.001 to 79.105.904: Aquatic Lands. 
"Aquatic lands" are "all tidelands, shorelands, harbor areas, and the 
beds of navigable waters."817 "Beds of navigable waters" are "those 
lands lying waterward of and below the line of navigability on rivers 
and lakes not subject to tidal flow, or extreme low tide mark in 
navigable tidal waters, or the outer harbor line where harbor area 
has been created."818 "First-class shorelands" are "the shores of a 
navigable lake or river belonging to the state, not subject to tidal 
flow, lying between the line of ordinary high water and the line of 
navigability, or inner harbor line where established and within or in 
front of the corporate limits of any city or within two miles of either 
side."819 "The legislature finds that state-owned aquatic lands are a 
finite natural resource of great value and an irreplaceable public 
heritage."820 The state is to manage aquatic lands to encourage 
public use and access and to ensure environmental protection.821 
Moreover, in managing aquatic lands, the state "shall preserve and 
enhance water-dependent uses," which are favored over non-water 
dependent use; highest priority goes to "uses which enhance 
renewable resources, water-borne commerce, and the navigational 
817. WASH. REV. CODE§ 79. 105.060(1)(2009). 
818. Id§ 79.105.060(2). 
819. Id.§ 79.105.060(3). 
820. Id.§ 79.105.010. 
821. Id.§ 79.105.030. 
189 
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and biological capacity of the waters .... "822 Specifically, the 
Department must consider the value of state-owned aquatic lands 
"as wildlife habitat, natural area preserve, representative ecosystem, 
or spawning area'' before leasing the lands or allowing changes in 
use.823 Sales and leases of these lands are allowed but require a 
permit. 824 Similarly, land exchanges are allowed "if the exchange is 
in the public interest and will actively contribute to the public 
benefits .... ''825 
WASH. REV. CODE§§ 79.130.010 to 79.130.900: Beds ofNavigable 
Waters. The legislative intent of these provisions is the same as in § 
79.105.001, relating to aquatic lands.826 Leases of these beds are 
allowed. 827 
• WASH. REV. CODE§§ 90.03.005 to 90.03.611: Water Code. "It is 
the policy of the state to promote the use of the public waters in a 
fashion which provides for obtaining maximum net benefits arising 
from both diversionary uses of the state's public waters and the 
retention of waters within streams and lakes in sufficient quantity 
and quality to protect instream and natural values and rights."828 
"Subject to existing rights all waters within the state belong to the 
public .... "829 The Water Code requires minimum flows and levels 
to be protected. 830 
• WASH. REV. CODE§§ 90.14.010 to 90.14.910: Registration, Waiver, 
and Relinquishment. 
• WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.16.010 to 90.16.120: Appropriation of 
Water for Public and Industrial Purposes. 
• WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.20.010 to 90.20.110: Appropriation 
Procedure. 
• WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.22.010 to 90.22.060: Minimum Water 
Flows and Levels. 
• WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.40.010 to 90.40.100: Water Rights of 
United States. 
• WASH. REV. CODE §§ 90.42.005 to 90.42.900: Water Resource 
Management. The legislature found that Washington was facing a 
822. Id.§ 79.105.210(1). 
823. Id.§ 79.105.210(3). 
824. See id.§§ 79.105.100-79.105.160. 
825. Id. § 79.105.400. 
826. Id.§ 79.130.001. 
827. Id.§ 79.130.010. 
828. Id. § 90.03.005. 
829. Id § 90.03.010. 
830. Id. § 90.03.247. 
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water shortage.831 These provisions establish a trust water rights 
program832 and water banking. 833 
• WASH. REV. CODE§§ 90.44.010 to 90.44.520: Regulation of Public 
Ground Waters. 
Definition of"Navigable Waters": 
191 
Washington recognizes both the "ebb and flow" tidal test and the 
navigable-in-fact test for title navigability.834 Thus, a slough was considered 
navigable when it was navigable during the ebbing and flowing of the tide 
and has been and can be used as a public highway for boats, scows, and 
other ordinary modes of water transportation for general commercial 
purposes, and especially for rafting, booming, and floating and towing of 
logs up and down the same; that said slough has been so used for at least 
twenty years.835 
Washington has used a log floatation test, in combination with the 
declaration in Article XVII § 1, of the Washington Constitution, to find the 
Cowlitz River navigable for purposes of state ownership and control.836 
Similarly, Lake Union was declared navigable because it is capable of being 
navigated. 837 However, "a stream which can only be made navigable or 
floatable by artificial means is not a public highway."838 Moreover, the 
Washington Supreme Court has also applied the federal commerce test of 
navigability. 839 
The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Columbia River is a 
navigable river under the federal test.840 As a result, Washington, not the 
United States, owns the beds and banks of that river on the Washington side of 
the Oregon-Washington border.841 
831. Id. § 90.42.005(2)(a). 
832. See id §§ 90.42.030-90.42.040. 
833. Id§ 90.42.100. 
834. WASH. CONST., art. XVII. § t Brace & Hergert Mill Co. v. Washington, 95 P. 278, 280 
(Wash. 1908); City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 64 P. 735, 737-38 (Wash. 1901). 
835. Dawson v. McMillan, 75 P. 807, 808--09 (Wash. 1904). 
836. Robinson v. Silver Lake Railway & Lumber Co., 279 P. 1109, 1113-14 (Wash. 1929). 
837. Brace & Hergert Mill Co., 95 P. at 281. 
838. East Hoquiam Boom & Logging Co. v. Neeson, 54 P. 1001, 1002 (Wash. 1898) (citing The 
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (IO Wall.) 557 (1870)). 
839. Lefevre v. Wash. Monument & Cut Stone Co., 81 P.2d 819, 822 (Wash. 1938) (citing 
Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922); Snively v. Washington, 9 P.2d 773, 774 (Wash. 1932); Smith 
v. Washington, 50 P.2d 32, 32-33 (Wash. 1935); Proctor v. Sim, 236 P. 114, 116 (Wash. 1925)). 
840. Silas Mason Co. v. Tax Comm'n of State of Wash., 302 U.S. 186, 197-99 (1937). 
841. Id. at 198. 
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Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
In Washington, the ordinary high water mark is the boundary between 
state and private ownership in navigable waters. 842 However, "the public has 
the right to go where the navigable waters go, even though the navigable waters 
lie over privately owned lands. "843 
Before Washington changed its policies in 1971 to limit sales and leases of 
aquatic lands, "the state had sold approximately 60 percent of its tidelands and 
30 percent of its shorelands."844 Despite the state's power to engage in such 
sales and leases, however, "[t]he Legislature has never had the authority ... to 
sell or otherwise abdicate state sovereignty or dominion over such tidelands 
and shorelands."845 The state cannot convey this jus publicum, 
and the state holds such dominion in trust for the public. It is this principle 
which is referred to as the 'public trust doctrine.' Although not always 
clearly labeled or articulated as such, our review of Washington law 
establishes that the doctrine has always existed in the State of 
Washington. 846 
Moreover, in general, in every grant of submerged lands "there was an implied 
reservation of the public right."847 
Washington's Shoreline Management Act of 1971848 fully meets the 
requirements of the public trust doctrine. 849 As such, public recreational docks 
permitted under the Act do not violate the doctrine.850 Similarly, a county 
ordinance banning personal watercraft in navigable waters did not violate the 
public trust doctrine, because the doctrine is flexible, the "county had not given 
up its right of control over its waters," and "the Ordinance is consistent with the 
goals of statewide environmental protection statutes"; plus, "it would be an odd 
use of the public trust doctrine to sanction an activity that actually harms and 
damages the waters and wildlife of this state."851 
842. Brace & Hergert Mill Co., 95 P. at 280. 
843. Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232, 238 (Wash. 1969). See generally Lorraine Bodi, The 
Public Trust Doctrine in the State of Washington: Does It Make Any Difference to the Public?, 19 
ENVTL. L. 645 (1989). 
844. Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 992 (Wash. 1987). 
845. Id. 
846. Id. at 994 (citations omitted). 
847. City of New Whatcom v. Fairhaven Land Co., 64 P. 735, 737 (Wash. 1901); see also Lake 
Union Drydock Co., Inc. v. Wash. Dep't of Natural Res., 179 P.3d 844, 851 (Wash. App. 2008) (holding 
that the Department cannot lease shorelands for $1.93 per acre (which is considered "virtually rent-
free") because, under the public trust doctrine, the state cannot give away the jus publicum). 
848. WASH. REV. CODE§ 90.58 (2009). 
849. Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 995. 
850. Id. at 997. 
851. Weden v. San Juan County, 958 P.2d 273, 283-84 (Wash. 1998). But see Biggers v. City of 
Brainbridge Island, 169 P.3d 14, 22 (Wash. 2007) (en bane) (holding that the Washington Constitution 
and the public trust doctrine limit local government authority to regulate the shoreline use, and police 
powers are limited there). See generally Ralph W. Johnson, The Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Z.One 
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Because the public trust doctrine existed in Washington prior to the 
Shoreline Management Act of 1971, there could be no regulato:ry takings 
claims based on that statute's limitations on shoreland property's use.852 "The 
public trust doctrine resembles a 'covenant running with the land ( or lake or 
marsh or shore) for the benefit of the public and the land's dependent 
wildlife. "'853 As a result, owners along shorelands "never had the right to 
dredge or fill [their] tidelands, either for a residential community or 
farmlands. "854 
In navigable waters, the public has rights of navigation, fishing, boating, 
swimming, water skiing, and other related recreation. 855 Such other rights 
probably include boating, bathing, fishing, fowling, skating, cutting ice, water 
skiing, and skin diving.856 However, "in Washington, the public trust doctrine 
does not encompass the right to gather clams on private property," because 
shellfish rights follow title to the submerged lands. 857 
Nevertheless, Washington's public trust doctrine is limited to surface 
navigable waters, and the Washington Supreme Court has refused to apply it to 
either ground waters or non-navigable waters. 858 Moreover, absent specific 
statuto:ry authorization, state agencies cannot "assume the State's public trust 
duties and regulate in order to protect the public trust. "859 As a result, the 
public trust doctrine does not apply to the Department of Ecology's 
implementation of state water law. 860 
In contrast, Washington has flirted with applying some version of a public 
trust doctrine to wildlife, especially shellfish. For example, the Washington 
Court of Appeals has stated that the public trust doctrine applies to the 
Department of Natural Resources' regulation of shellfish such as geoducks.861 
Management in Washington State, 67 WASH. L. R.Ev. 521 (1992) (discussing the relationship of the 
doctrine to police power and coastal planning). 
852. Orion Corp. v. Washington, 747 P.2d 1062, 1072-73 (Wash. 1987). 
853. Id. (quoting Scott Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious?, l ENVTL. L. & LmG. 
107, 118 (1986)). 
854. Id. at 1073. 
855. Caminiti, 732 P.2d at 994 (citing Wilbour v. Gallagher, 462 P.2d 232,239 (Wash. 1969)). 
856. Wilbour, 462 P.2d at 239 n.7. See generally Davison, supra note 146 (arguing that 
Washington's public trust doctrine is already broader in the rights it protects). 
857. Washington v. Longshore, 982 P.2d Jl9l, I 195-96 (Wash. App. 1999), ajf'd, 5 P.3d 1256, 
1259--63 (Wash. 2000) (en bane); see also Wash. State Geoduck Harvest Ass'n v. Washington State 
Dep't of Natural Res .• 101 P.3d 891, 895 (Wash. App. 2004) (noting that shellfish are not typical 
wildlife in Washington because they are considered part of the land). 
858. See Rettowski v. Dep't of Ecology, 858 P.2d 232,239 (Wash. 1993) (en bane). 
859. Id. 
860. Id. at 239-40; see also RD. Merrill Co. v. Wash. Pollution Control Hearings Bd., 969 P.2d 
458, 467 (Wash. 1999) (holding that. in the water rights context, the public trust doctrine is not an 
independent source ofregulatory authority for the Department of Ecology); Postema v. Wash. Pollution 
Control Hearings Bd., 11 P.3d 726, 744 (Wash. 2000) (en bane) (same). 
861. Wash. State Geoduck Han•est Ass'n, 101 P.3d at 895. But see Citizens for Responsible 
Wildlife Mgmt. v. Washington, 103 P.3d 203, 205 (Wash. App. 2004) ("No Washington case has 
applied the public trust doctrine to terrestrial wildlife or resources. But we need not decide whether the 
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Nevertheless, the Department's regulation of the commercial geoduck harvest 
pursuant to the wildlife statutes did not violate the public trust doctrine despite 
the public right to fish, because the state must "balance the protection of the 
public's right to use resources on public land with the protection of the 
resources that enable these activities," the Department had not given up its 
control over the state's geoduck resources, and the regulation facilitated 
sustainable geoduck harvesting and natural regeneration of the resource, 
serving the public interest. 862 Because the state owns the beds of navigable 
waters and because, under Washington case law, shellfish are considered part 
of the beds, the Department "has a continuing obligation under the public trust 
doctrine to manage the use of the resources on the land for the public interest. 
And [ case law] is consistent with the conclusion that shellfish embedded on 
public property are resources that invoke a public right under the public trust 
doctrine. "863 
WYOMING 
Date of Statehood: 1890 
Water Law System: Prior appropriation864 
Wyoming Constitution: Wyoming has constitutionalized public rights in 
water through the constitutional declaration that waters belong to the state. 
Several other constitutional provisions are also relevant: 
• Art. I, § 31: "Water being essential to industrial prosperity, of 
limited amount, and easy of diversion from its natural channels, its 
control must be in the state, which, in providing for its use, shall 
equally guard all the various interests involved." 
• Art. 8, § 1: Irrigation and Water Rights. "The water of all natural 
streams, springs, lakes or other collections of still water, within the 
public trust doctrine applies [to prohibitions on terrestrial hunting and trapping] because, even if it does, 
Citizens' challenge fails." (emphasis added)). 
862. Wash. State Geoduck Han•est Ass'n, 101 P.3d at 895-97 (examining WASH REV. CODE § 
79.135.210 (2005)). 
863. Id. at 896; see also Nelson Alaska Seafoods, Inc. v. Washington, 177 P.3d 1161, 1164 (Wash. 
App. 2008) (upholding a tax on geoduck harvests on the first commercial owner and noting that the 
Department of Natural Resources merely regulated the harvest in accordance with the public trust 
doctrine). For a discussion of whether Washington's public trust doctrine could apply to other 
environmental issues, see ·Ralph W. Johnson, Oil and the Public Trust Doctrine in Washington, 14 U. 
PuGET SOUND L. REV. 671, 671-73, 688-707 (1991) (discussing the application of the doctrine to oil 
spills). 
864. See Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 P. 258, 259 (Wyo. 1900) (noting that prior appropriation 
legislation had been in place since 1875 and holding that "[i]n this state the doctrine prevails that a right 
to the use of water may be acquired by priority of appropriation for beneficial purpose, in contravention 
to the common law rule that every riparian owner is entitled to the continued natural flow of the waters 
of the stream running through or adjacent to his lands"). 
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boundaries of the state, are hereby declared to be the property of the 
state." 
• Art. 8, § 2: "There shall be constituted a board of control, to be 
composed of the state engineer and superintendents of the water 
divisions, which shall, under such regulations as may be prescribed 
by law, have the supervisions of the waters of the state and of their 
appropriation, distribution and diversion, and of the various officers 
connected therewith. Its decisions shall be subject to review by the 
courts of the state." 
• 
• 
• 
Art. 8, § 3: "Priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall give 
the better right. No appropriation shall be denied except when such 
denial is demanded by the public interest." 
Art. 8, § 4: "The legislature shall by law divide the state into four 
( 4) water divisions, and provide for the appointment of 
superintendents thereof." 
Art. 8, § 5: This provision establishes the office of the state 
engineer. 
• Art. 13, § 5: Municipal corporations have authority to acquire water 
rights. 
• Art. 16, § 10: This provision governs the construction and 
improvement of works for the conservation and utilization of water. 
Wyoming Statutes: 
• WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 1-37-106: Adjudication of Water Rights. 
• WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 35-10-401: This provision prohibits obstruction 
of a "public river or stream, declared navigable by law," or pollution 
of waters. 
• WYO. STAT. ANN. Title 41, Chapter 3: Water Rights. This provision 
establishes preferences for domestic and transportation purposes, 
steam power plants, and industrial purposes. 865 "The legislature 
finds, recognizes and declares that the transfer of water outside the 
boundaries of the state may have a significant impact on the water 
and other resources of the state. Further, this impact may differ 
substantially from that caused by uses of the water within the state. 
Therefore, all water being the property of the state and part of the 
natural resources of the state, it shall be controlled and managed by 
the state for the purposes of protecting, conserving and preserving to 
the state the maximum permanent beneficial use of the state's 
waters."866 These statutes encompass reservoirs (Article 3); 
865. WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 41-3-102 (2009). 
866. Id. § 41-3-11 S(a). 
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abandonment of water rights {Article 4); water divisions and 
superintendents {Article 5); water districts and commissioners 
(Article 6); water conservancy districts (Article 7); flood control 
districts {Article 8); underground water (Article 9); and instream 
flows (Article 10). 
• WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 41-12-301: Colorado River Compact. 
Definition of "Navigable Waters": 
The Wyoming Supreme Court acknowledges the variety of definitions of 
"navigable waters," including the federal commerce definition, which it uses as 
the title definition of navigability. The court noted: 
We understand that "navigability in the Federal sense" means the capability 
or susceptibility of waters, in their natural condition, of being used for 
navigation in interstate or international commerce, and navigability in any 
other sense may mean any one of a variety of definitions given navigability 
by either of the several states of the Union.867 
Historical statutes in Wyoming reference transportation and log floatation. 868 
Regarding public use rights in Wyoming, "the actual usability of the 
waters is alone the limit of the public's right to employ them."869 Except in 
federally navigable waters, ''the exclusive control of waters is vested in the 
state," and hence "[i]t follows that the state may lay down and follow such 
criteria for cataloguing waters as navigable or nonnavigable, as it sees fit, and 
the state may also decide the ownership of submerged lands, irrespective of the 
navigable or nonnavigable character of the waters above them."870 As a result, 
because the Wyoming Constitution gives the waters to the state, fine 
distinctions of navigability are unimportant. 871 "The test of navigability does 
not determine other uses to which the state may put its waters even though 
navigability would determine the title to the land underlying them."872 
Rights in "Navigable Waters": 
"[I]f a river is nonnavigable the bed and channel of the stream belong to 
the riparian owner. "873 
Nevertheless, in Wyoming, the public has rights in the waters themselves, 
irrespective of bed ownership. According to the Wyoming Supreme Court: 
867. Dayv. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 143 (Wyo. 1961). 
868. Id. 
869. Id. 
870. Id. 
871. Id. at 144. 
872. Id. 
873. Id. at 145. 
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At the modem common law, public waters are generally confined to those 
which are navigable; and public rights therein to navigation and fishery, 
and privileges incident thereto. In the arid region of this country another 
public use has been recognized by custom and laws, and sanctioned by the 
courts-a public use sufficient to support the exercise of eminent 
domain.874 
197 
Thus, Wyoming waters are public, and the constitutional declaration of state 
ownership is valid. 875 
More expansively, "the Legislature was aware that, without regard to their 
being navigable or nonnavigable in the Federal sense or any other concept of 
navigability, [the state's] waters are usable for purposes other than irrigation, 
consumption, power or mining and that the waters might be used for 
transportation by floatation."876 As a result, the public has a right to float in the 
North Platte River, whlch was also recognized in the 1959 State Laws of 
Wyoming. 877 
State ownership of the waters themselves impresses those waters with a 
public trust. 878 The public can float craft down any waters so usable, regardless 
of bed ownership, and can scrape bottom, disembark, and pull the craft over 
shoals.879 Moreover, members of the public can hunt or fish while floating.880 
However, public use rights do not give the public the right to wade or walk on 
privately owned streambeds.881 
874. Fann Inv. Co. v, Carpenter, 61 P. 258,264 (Wyo. 1900). 
875. Id. at 264-65. 
876. Day, 362 P.2d at 143. 
877. Id. at 139. 
878. Id. at 145. 
879. Id. at 145-16. 
880. Id. at 147. 
881. Id. at 146. 
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our 
online companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@ 
boaltorg. Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://l\•ww.boaltorg/elq. 
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This Court granted certiorari (131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011) (Mem.)) to decide the first question presented by the petition for a writ 
of certiorari (Pet. i-ii), which asks: 
Does the constitutional test for determining whether a section of a river is navigable for title purposes require a trial court to 
determine, based on evidence, whether the relevant stretch of the river was navigable at the time the State joined the Union as 
directed by United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931), or may the court simply deem the river as a whole generally navigable 
based on evidence of present-day recreational use, with the question "very liberally construed" in the State's favor? 
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*1 INTRODUCTION 
Under the constitutionally grounded equal footing doctrine, all States enter the Union with title to the lands underlying the 
navigable waters within their borders and "the right to control and regulate navigable streams" on that land. Coyle v. Smith, 
221 U.S. 559,573 (1911). This case concerns the State of Montana's title to lands underlying three rivers - the Missouri, Clark 
Fork, and Madison. Those rivers not only are home to some of the most prized trout fishing in the world, but have served as 
public highways of commerce since long before frontier times. The importance of the Missouri runs even deeper. The Missouri 
has long been regarded as one of America's great rivers and is the object of one of the nation's most important explorations -
the Lewis and Clark Expedition. From territorial times to this day, the Great Falls of the Missouri have appeared on the official 
seal of Montana. In a real sense, the question in this case is whether the Great Falls belong to the people of Montana in public 
trust, or instead to the federal government or petitioner PPL Montana (PPL). 
After carefully considering this Court's navigability precedents dating back nearly two centuries, the Montana state courts 
reached a judgment that would surprise few Montanans: The rivers at issue are navigable, and Montana therefore took title 
to the riverbeds at statehood, in public trust for Montanans. Indeed, PPL itself admitted at the outset of this litigation that the 
rivers at issue were navigable. Infra at 15. PPL now asks this Court to overturn that judgment. PPL's position is grounded 
on a novel interpretation of this Court's decisions and a selective account of history. If adopted, PPL's position would *2 
upset centuries-old expectations and call into question the navigability of rivers not just in Montana but throughout the United 
States. That is particularly true for the American West, where rivers remain important highways of commerce, provide vital 
habitats for fish and wildlife, are generally open to the public for recreational pursuits such as fishing, and have a near-mystical 
quality in parts like Montana. Cf New York v. New Jersey, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931) ("A river is more than an amenity; it is 
a treasure.") (Holmes, J.). 
The "constitutional test" for navigability (Pet. i) articulated by the Montana Supreme Court is grounded on this Court's 
precedents going back to The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871). PPL itself acknowledges that, under "long-settled 
law," the touchstone of navigability-for-title is whether the river was used, or was susceptible for use, as a highway of commerce 
at statehood. PPL Br. 27 (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563). As to the Missouri and Clark Fork, PPL argues that this 
test cannot be met, because the Great Falls (Missouri) and Thompson Falls (Clark Fork) themselves were impassable by boat. 
But, as the Montana Supreme Court recognized (Pet. App. 54-55), this Court long ago held that natural interruptions do not 
defeat navigability where the obstacles were portaged so that the river continued to serve as a channel of commerce. Indeed, 
WE.Sit..AW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 4 
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since at least the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, such "carrying places" have been recognized as facilitating - not defeating -
the highways of commerce along America's navigable rivers. Here, it is undeniable that the falls in question were portaged so 
that the rivers served as continuous highways of commerce before statehood. 
* 3 As to the Madison, PPL's primary argument is that the Montana Supreme Court erred in considering post-statehood use in 
determining whether the navigability test was met. All agree that, compared to the Missouri and Clark Fork, there is relatively 
little evidence of the pre-statehood use of the Madison. In that respect, the Madison presents a tougher historical case. But The 
Daniel Ball itself holds that navigability may be based on susceptibility for use as a highway of commerce. 77 U.S. at 563. And 
this Court's precedents support the commonsense conclusion that - while the navigability-for-title test looks to navigability at 
the time of statehood - post-statehood evidence of navigability is relevant, and thus admissible, insofar as it helps to establish 
susceptibility of navigation at statehood. That is the only basis for which the Montana Supreme Court relied upon evidence of 
post-statehood use. Pet. App. 56. And this Court's precedents also repudiate PPL's other argument concerning the Madison that 
log floats and commercial drift boat fishing on the river are not relevant in gauging navigability as of statehood. 
PPL goes to extraordinary lengths to attack the Montana Supreme Court's decision. It calls into question the good faith and 
intentions of the Montana courts, PPL Br. 25, 30, 33, and decries the Montana Supreme Court's decision as a 'judicial taking[]," 
id at 25. But the only potential "taking" in this case is the one that PPL is attempting to accomplish by asking this Court to 
substantially narrow the centuries-old concept of navigability and thereby deprive Montana - and the people of Montana - of 
their long-held title to the riverbeds at issue. That effort should be rejected. 
*4 STATEMENTOFTHECASE 
More than two centuries ago, Captain Meriwether Lewis stood on the banks of the Missouri in the territory that would become 
Montana. Taken by the sight before him, Lewis observed that he did not believe "that the world can furnish an example of a river 
running to the extent which the Missouri and Jefferson's rivers do through such a mountainous country and at the same time 
so navigable as they are." JA 162. Within a few years of Lewis and Clark, fur traders established trade routes along Montana's 
rivers, to both the East and West. Decades later, with the advent of the gold and copper rushes, Montana's population surged 
and the territory's fledgling economy began to take off. But transportation remained a challenge. The railroad did not reach 
Montana until the late 19th century, and at the time Montana joined the Union in 1889, the railroad was still in its infancy. See 
id at 112-13, 215,236. Cutting through Montana's vast expanse, Montana's network ofnavigable waterways fueled exploration 
and the territory's economic growth. That was particularly true for the Missouri - one of America's signature waterways - which, 
among other things, was used to transport gold mined from the Helena area back East. Ultimately, the history of the Missouri 
and other rivers at issue in this case well illustrates the indispensable role that navigable waters played in the exploration, 
economy, and everyday life of early America. 
A. Montana's Entry Into The Union 
The State of Montana - like all States - holds title to the lands beneath all navigable waters within its borders for the benefit of 
its citizens. The sovereign's responsibility to hold such lands in trust for its *5 citizenry can be traced as far back as Justinian 
in ancient Rome. See Institutes of Justinian, Lib. II, Tit. I, § 2 (T. Cooper transl. 2d ed. 1841) ("Rivers and ports are public; 
hence the right of fishing in a port, or in rivers are in common."). Under English common law dating back to the time of the 
Magna Carta, the Crown held title to all lands underlying navigable waters "for the benefit of the whole people." Utah Div. of 
StateLandsv. United States, 482U.S.193, 196(1987)(citingShivelyv. Bowlby, 152U.S.1, 11-14(1894));seeMichaelEvans 
& R. Ian Jack, Sources of English Legal and Constitutional History 53 (1984). 
When the original thirteen Colonies formed the Union, they claimed title to the lands under navigable waters within their 
boundaries as the sovereign successors to the English Crown. Shively, 152 U.S. at 15-16. "The shores of navigable waters, and 
the soils under them, were not granted by the Constitution to the United States, but were reserved to the states respectively." 
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Pollardv. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212,230 (1845). Because the "right to the rivers passes with a transfer of sovereignty, id 
at 216, new States entered the Union "on an equal footing with the original 13 Colonies and succeeded to the United States' 
title to the beds of navigable waters within their boundaries," United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. I, 5 (1997). Montana entered 
the Union on the same footing in 1889 when it became the 41st State. 
From the time of Montana's statehood, it has been generally recognized that the riverbeds at issue belong to the people of 
Montana in public trust, and not private riparian owners. At or around the time of statehood, the General Land Office (the 
predecessor agency to the Bureau of Land Management within the *6 Department of the Interior), "meandered" most of the 
riverbanks along the rivers at issue to ensure that any later conveyances to private parties ended at the high-water mark - and 
thus did not purport to convey title to the lands underlying navigable waters. See Trial Exh. S-48 at 13 (Jenkins Report). The 
maps created by the Surveyors General of the United States plainly show that the federal surveyors "returned as navigable" 
the rivers at issue and therefore excluded the riverbeds from private conveyances. See, e.g., Exhs. S-40, S-41, S-42, S-42B 
(Thompson Falls); Exh. S-33 (Madison); see also Exh. S-44 (Missouri River Commission map). Although such meandering 
does not conclusively establish navigability, it is precisely the sort of thing on which "settled expectations" are formed "where 
land titles are concerned." Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668,687 (1979). 1 
Under instructions issued by the Commissioner of the General Land Office in 1881, navigable rivers were to be meandered by federal 
surveyors on both banks, thereby clearly delineating riparian property boundaries, while rivers considered non-navigable were to 
be meandered on only one bank. See U.S. Gen. Land Office, Instructions of the Commissioner of the General Land Office to the 
Sun,eyors General of the United States Relative to the Sun,ey of the Public Lands and Private Land Claims 33-35 (May 3, 1881). 
Montana law has long recognized such meandering in determining title to riverbeds. SeeMont. Code Ann. § 85-1-112. 
Likewise, consistent with the understanding that the State owns the riverbeds, the State has long managed the rivers and attendant 
riverbeds under actual and apparent authority of title. Thus, for example, Montana's Board of Land Commissioners, which 
manages school trust land across Montana, has *7 issued (at least) 97 easements on the Missouri, Clark Fork, and Madison, 
an additional 85 mineral leases on the Missouri, and eight annual licenses and other leases on the Clark Fork and the Missouri 
to such private parties. 2 Likewise, in practice, private parties seeking to construct a power line, pipeline, riprap, kayak run, 
access bridge, or other commercial fixture along the rivers at issue in this case generally have sought permission from the State 
before doing so. 
2 Montana Trust Land Management System (TMLA NET) Query, Sept. 27,2011 (record and ownership repository),http://dnrc.mt.gov/ 
trust/default.asp; see Resp. Mont. S. Ct Br. 13-15 (discussing State's management of trust lands). 
Not long after statehood, the Montana Supreme Court recognized the navigability of both the Missouri and Clark Fork, 
describing the latter as " a matter of common knowledge. " Opp. App. 31 ( citation omitted), 35. To the State's knowledge, until 
this litigation, no private riparian owner has ever claimed title to the riverbeds at issue as against the State. And, as the Montana 
trial court found ( consistent with the way in which the federal government meandered the rivers at issue long ago), the deeds 
held by PPL and other private owners show on their face that any private ownership interests end at the riverbank. Opp. App. 
59; see id at 37-38; Resp. Mt. S. Ct. Br. 28-29. Nor has the United States ever asserted ownership of the riverbeds at issue - an 
assertion that would be undermined by the way the federal government's own surveyors meandered the rivers at statehood. 3 
3 In a footnote that refers to flood lands, the United States (at 3 n.3) appears to suggest that PPL pays rent to the federal government 
for some portion of the riverbeds at issue. That is incorrect. PPL advanced this argument for the first time in its Supplemental Brief 
in Support of Certiorari (at 2), citing only a letter that PPL itself submitted to FERC just ten days before that Supplemental Brief 
was filed (id at App. 4-9). In any event, the State's claim for compensation meticulously excluded federally-owned flooded uplands 
(see Ex. S-48 at 22; Sept. 4, 2007 Order 20-29 (Dkt. 253)), and was based solely on riverbeds to which the United States has 
never claimed title. 
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*8 B. The Rivers At Issue 
The Missouri, Clark Fork, and Madison Rivers span hundreds of miles of the northwest, central, and southern parts of the State. 
See Add. 1 a (map). While each has its own unique history and geography, the rivers - and especially the Missouri - are among 
the crownjewels ofMontana's system of waterways. 
Missouri River. The Missouri is the longest river in North America (spanning some 2400 miles) and before the railroads took 
root provided one of the most important thoroughfares to the West for settlers and pioneers. See, e.g., Francis Parkman, The 
Oregon Trail, Sketches of Prairie and Rocky-Mountain Life (1883); JA 311. It has been cited frequently in court opinions, 
legislative debates, and historic works as the exemplar of a navigable river. 4 The Missouri has its headwaters at Three Forks, 
Montana - the junction of the Gallatin, Madison, and Jefferson Rivers - and flows northward through Helena, Great Falls, and 
Fort Benton, Montana, before turning east and entering *9 North Dakota. After passing through six more States, it eventually 
flows into the Mississippi River. 
4 See, e.g., Hardin v. Jordan, 140 U.S. 371,382 (1891); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690,698 (1899); 
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 94 (1907); 59 Cong. Rec. 7730 (1920). 
In 1803, aware of the Missouri's reputation as one of the continent's great waterways, President Jefferson commissioned an 
expedition whose "object" was "to explore the Missouri River, and such principal streams of it ... [that] may offer the most 
direct and practicable water-communication across the continent." JA 304-05. Lewis and Clark left St. Charles, Missouri, on 
May 14, 1804, heading up the Missouri for what would become one of America's greatest explorations. They arrived in what 
today is Montana approximately one year later, having ascended the river in pirogues and bateaux. 
On June 13, 1805, Lewis set out ahead of the group to scout the upcoming route. By midday, he had come upon a series of 
five waterfalls, the largest of which - known as Great Falls - Lewis called "the grandest site I ever beheld." 4 The Journals of 
the Lewis & Clark E.xpedition, 284 (Gary E. Moulton ed., Univ. of Neb. Press 1987). Within a day, Lewis managed to chart 
out a roughly 17-mile portage around the falls - a distance that must be viewed in light of the 20 or more miles that Lewis 
and his team regularly traveled in a day during the course of the expedition. The portage began on June 22. JA 405. Although 
the land was unfamiliar, the load heavy (JA 407-08), and some members of the party - including Sacagawea - ill (JA 412), 
the expedition arrived at upper portage camp, just south of the present day city of Great Falls, on July 2 - 11 days later. App. 
2a (map); JA 421. On July 15, the party put *10 their boats back into water to proceed up the Missouri to its very mouth at 
Three Forks. JA 433-34. 5 
5 PPL describes (at 8, 40-41) the portage as taking 33 days. That covers the period from when Lewis first discovered the Great Falls 
to when the expedition put boats back into water above the falls. The expedition "set out to pass the portage" nine days after Lewis 
discovered the falls. JA 405. It took the expedition 11 days to travel the 17 miles from the lower to upper portage camps. And the 
expedition spent the remaining 13 days at upper portage camp preparing to continue the journey upriver. See JA 401-434. 
The Great Falls consists of five different falls along almost eight river miles from the first cascade to the last, with various 
rapids and calmer waters mixed in between. The largest cascade - Great Falls - is the first in the series moving upriver from 
Fort Benton. Crooked Falls lies about 4.3 miles upriver from that. Beautiful Falls (or Rainbow Falls) lies about a half mile up 
river. Colter Falls, which is now fully submerged, lies about one mile upriver. And Black Eagle Falls, the last of the cascades, 
lies about two miles upriver. See JA 687; Add. 2a (map). The 17 miles that has been used in this case to refer to the Great 
Falls is generally demarked by the confluence with Belt (Portage) Creek, several miles below Great Falls, and Sun (Medicine) 
River, several miles above Black Eagle Falls. JA 296; Add. 2a. It is undisputed that the falls themselves were not passable 
by boat at statehood. 
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Although Lewis and Clark's portage of the Great Falls is certainly the most historic, it was by no means the last. In particular, 
during the 1860s, amidst the Montana gold rush, large numbers of miners regularly portaged the Great Falls as they traveled 
the Missouri between Fort Benton and Three Forks. JA 313. A line *11 of mackinaw boats regularly carried passengers from 
north of Helena to Fort Benton, making a short portage around the Great Falls, and arriving at Fort Benton in just three days 
total. From there, passengers embarked onto steamboats and headed East down the Missouri as far as St. Louis. See JA 312-13 
(citing Hubert Howe Bancroft, History of Washington, Idaho, and Montana 732 n.9 (1890)); Add. 3a-6a, 9a-16a (excerpts of 
federal government briefs in Montana Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n). 6 
6 Although the United States attempts the distinguish Montana Power Company on legal grounds (U.S. Br. 26), the Solicitor General's 
factual description of the "actual use" of the same stretch of the Missouri at issue here is in no way tied to any particular legal 
argument concerning navigability. Add. 3a-7a. 
The 260-mile stretch of the Missouri between Three Forks and Fort Benton - encompassing the seven dams that PPL today 
owns along the Missouri - served as a vital highway of commerce at and before statehood. There is historical evidence that 
the stretch was used by fur traders and miners to transport their goods, as well as evidence of the use of steamboats above and 
below the falls, and oflog rafting. See, e.g., JA 112, 169, 175-77, 181, 189, 307-08. As the evidence shows - and the Solicitor 
General of the United States has previously explained in detail to this Court - the Great Falls by no means marked the end of, 
or impeded, this highway of commerce. Rather, a relatively short portage around the falls allowed commerce to continue along 
this stretch of the river as part of a continuous highway of commerce. That highway was well-known, and well-traveled, before 
the railroads arrived in Montana. See JA 313 & n.24; Add. 4a-5a, 13a-15a. 
*12 Clark Fork River. The Clark Fork rises in the Silver Bow Mountains near Butte, Montana. From there, it flows northwest 
through Missoula where it intersects with the Blackfoot, continues through Thompson Falls, and eventually crosses into Idaho, 
where it empties into Lake Pend Oreille. The Clark Fork provided a remarkably uniform channel at statehood with few 
interruptions. The only significant obstruction was the Thompson Falls - which today is the site of one of PPL's dams. The 
falls occupied less than half a mile and caused a drop in elevation of four to six feet. Including its surrounding rapids, the falls 
span approximately 2.8 miles. Despite that obstacle, the Clark Fork was regularly navigated by traders and explorers along this 
stretch, and was used for numerous log drives, before statehood. 
Shortly after Lewis and Clark passed through Montana on their way back East, David Thompson - a fur trader and explorer 
- canoed down the Clark Fork from the Flathead river all the way to Lake Pend Oreille, "portaging at Thompson Falls and 
Rock Island Rapids." JA 66,234. Others similarly navigated the Clark Fork from Missoula (above Thompson Falls) down to 
Lake Pend Oreille. JA 101. During the early fur-trading era, the Kootenai "often traded on the Clark Fork" (referring to the 
stretch between the lower Flathead and Lake Pend Oreille, encompassing Thompson Falls). JA 105. Many decades later, during 
the 1860s and 1870s, local newspapers reported boat service along the Clark Fork from points above Thompson Falls to Lake 
Pend Oreille. JA 118, 131. 
This stretch of the Clark Fork also served as a significant channel for log drives. Multiple reports oflog floats on the Clark Fork 
appear in the 1880s, in *13 tandem with the need to move building materials for construction of the railroads. JA 213. Log 
drives originated on Ninemile Creek and the Flathead River - both above Thompson Falls - and the logs were driven down the 
Clark Fork all the way to Idaho. JA 240-41. In 1882, the Missoulian announced that logs "can be floated right to the locality 
down the Missoula and Pen d'Oreille rivers." JA 143. There are numerous additional accounts of log floating and small boat 
use from Lake Pend Oreille to places above Thompson Falls around the time of statehood and shortly thereafter. See JA 126, 
129,223, 234, 356-57. 
Steamboat navigation brought heavier traffic to the Clark Fork below Thompson Falls. In the 1860s, during the Montana gold 
rush, several companies operated steamboats that took miners and others from Lake Pend Oreille to points near Thompson Falls 
and back, providing for "a complete and reliable line of steamers for a distance of 125 miles, from Pen d'Oreille [sic] landing 
to Thompson's river." JA 119; see JA 113, 116, 119-21, 125, 138-39, 141. 
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Madison River. The Madison River rises in Yellowstone National Park in Wyoming and flows northward into Montana for 140 
miles before joining the Gallatin and Jefferson Rivers at Three Forks to form the Missouri River. When William Clark reached 
the Three Forks on July 25, 1805, he obsetved that the Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin Rivers were "nearly of a Size" (i.e., 
shared the same characteristics). JA 252. This comparison is significant because Lewis had previously described the Jefferson 
as an exemplar of a navigable river in "a mountainous country." J A 162. While it has been reported that the Madison was used 
by trappers and explorers in the 1800s (JA 218,251), *14 the evidence of pre-statehood commerce along the river was sparse 
compared to that of the Missouri and the Clark Fork. The lack of additional historic use no doubt stems in part from the fact 
that low-land Indian Tribes, such as the Blackfeet, lacked permanent settlements and were notoriously hostile to outsiders - as 
Lewis himselflearned the hard way. JA 189. 7 
7 On July 27, 1806, the Blackfeet attacked Lewis and his party, stealing some of their guns and attempting to escape with their horses. 
Lewis and other members of the party took chase to recover the stolen property, eventually apprehended the culprits, and recovered 
their horses. See 5 Original Journals of the Lewis and Clark Expedition (R G. Thwaites ed., 1904) 219-28. 
The Madison's natural condition between April and July was viewed as ideal for log-driving - this being "the first river in the 
country that had not a dollar of expenditure before the drive was started." JA 155. Shortly after Montana's entry into the Union, 
however, several dams were built along the Madison - including the Hebgen and Madison dams owned by PPL - making log 
floats more difficult by lowering water levels during what were previously high-flow months and erecting artificial obstructions. 
JA 258-59. Nevertheless, not long after statehood, the Madison River Lumber Company floated logs down most of the middle 
portion of the Madison, despite the relatively lower July waters. JA 155. 
The Madison is best known today for its prized fishing - something close to "religion" in Montana. Norman MacLean, A River 
Runs Through It and Other Stories 1 (1976). The river is classified as a "blue ribbon" trout stream and attracts avid fishermen 
from all around the world. JA 261. Commercial fishing drift *15 boats regularly navigate the Madison near the Ennis and 
Heb gen dams. JA 261-62; Opp. App. 63. These drift boats are the historical successors to the shallow-draft pirogues and bateaux 
used by Lewis and Clark and traders in early commerce. See generally Richard Fletcher, Drift Boats and River Dories 53-63 
(Stackpole Books 2007). The Madison is today among the most heavily used rivers in Montana - just behind the Missouri -
in angler days. Opp. App. 63. 
C. This Litigation 
1. In 2003, parents of Montana school children filed suit in federal district court in Montana against PPL and other privately 
owned utilities on behalf of Montana's public school children, seeking compensation for defendants' use of state-owned 
riverbeds at various hydroelectric generation facilities. The suit alleged that the riverbeds occupied by the dams comprised 
state-owned trust lands for which Montana was obliged under the state constitution to seek compensation in the form of rent 
for their use. The State inteivened in the action and filed its own complaint seeking compensation from defendants for use of 
the riverbeds. The district court dismissed the action for lack of diversity jurisdiction. Pet. App. 3-5. 
2. Before the federal action was dismissed, PPL and other hydroelectric utilities filed a declaratory judgment action against the 
State in Montana state court, seeking a declaration that Montanans are not entitled to compensation for the use of the riverbeds 
at issue. The State counterclaimed, claiming that it owned the riverbeds at issue and seeking a declaration that it was due 
compensation for their use. Opp. App. 2-3 (,JiJ 1-2). PPL admitted that its dams were on "navigable river[s]." E.g., Pet. App. 5-8, 
17-20; Opp. *16 App. 17-20 (iii! 16, 17-24, 26-27). Instead of contesting navigability, PPL argued that the State's claims for 
compensation were preempted by the Federal Power Act and the federal navigational seivitude because the plants at issue were 
federally licensed. But after the district court rejected those preemption arguments, PPL did an about-face on navigability. 8 
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8 PPL later tried to disavow its admissions and claimed that it had never admitted navigability for title purposes. But neither the State's 
counterclaims nor PPL's answer contained any limitation in describing the rivers as "navigable." Moreover, the State pleaded that 
"Montana acquired title to the beds and banks of navigable waters in Montana at issue herein." Opp. App. 2 ('i 3). PPL made similar 
concessions in its pleadings and briefs in the preceding federal case. Id. at 26-31. Courts have long recognized that such admissions 
ordinarily are binding. See, e.g., American Title Ins. Co. v. Lace/aw Corp., 861 F.2d 224, 226 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Peuse v. 
Mal/..-uch, 911 P .2d 1153, 1157 (Mont. 1996). And the Montana district court appropriately found that these admissions were binding 
on PPL here. Pet. App. 139-43. 
The State moved for partial summary judgment on navigability. (PPL did not cross-move.) Both sides submitted affidavits 
attaching various materials. The State's evidence is summarized at Opp. App. 26-57. PPL's affidavits are reprinted at Pet. App. 
190-213. The main point of PPL's lead expert (Emmons) was that the Missouri and Clark Fork were not navigable because it 
was "impossible" to take a boat down the Great Falls or Thompson Falls themselves. Id at 197; see id at 197-201, 203. PPL's 
other expert (Schumm) focused on the Madison. Id at 205-15. Applying the test for navigability established by The Daniel Ball, 
77 U.S. at 563 - which holds that rivers are "navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible of being *17 used, in their 
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce" - the district court granted summary judgment for the State. Pet. App. 135,143. 
The court rejected PPL's position - which was the crux of its argument concerning the Missouri - that "the Great Falls clearly 
prevent navigability" because the falls themselves are not susceptible to boat traffic. Id at 138. As the court explained, this 
Court has long found that natural obstacles "requiring portage" do not defeat navigability when, as the evidence showed here, 
" 'the natural navigation of the river is such that it affords a channel for useful commerce.' "Id ( quoting The Montello, 87 U.S. 
(20 Wall.) 430,443 (1874)). The court explained that the same analysis compelled a finding that the Clark Fork was navigable, 
despite Thompson Falls, given the evidence that the river was used as a "channel of commerce." Id at 142. The court also held 
that PPL was bound by its admissions that these rivers were navigable. Id. at 139, 142. 
As for the Madison, the court recognized that, although there is comparatively "little historical documentation" of its use, 
the available evidence - which includes reports of use " 'by explorers, trappers, miners, farmers, and loggers' " as well as a 
log float in 1913 - established navigability. Id at 143. The court also observed that "[t]oday, the Madison River experiences 
considerable recreational use," and found that, "[a]s with the Missouri and Clark Fork," PPL was "bound by its admissions" 
on navigability. Id 9 
9 The Montana summary-judgment rule requires that a party present any "opposing affidavits" before the "day of hearing." Mont. 
R. Civ. P. 56{c). Two months after the district court's ruling on navigability, PPL purported to make an "offer of proof regarding 
navigability," comprising hundreds of pages of additional reports prepared by its paid experts. JA 38. The district court heard that 
proffer but did not accept these reports as part of the summary judgment record- and could not have under Montana Rule 56(c). PPL 
thus did not put these documents in the appendix before the Montana Supreme Court or refer to them in that court. PPL nevertheless 
included the late-filed Emmons report in the appendix to its certiorari petition (at 216312) and continues to rely on both reports in 
its merits brief. See, e.g., PPL Br. 14, 16, 17, 18. Cf Br. in Opp. 11 n. l. 
*18 The district court subsequently held a trial on the outstanding issues in the case and ultimately entered judgment requiring 
PPL to compensate the people of the State of Montana for its use of their riverbeds. 
3. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the district court's navigability ruling. The Court explained that its "independent review 
of the case law in this area" confirmed that the district court's "understanding of the navigability for title test was correct," 
including as to the two "crucial aspects" of the district court's ruling: the significance of portages (bearing on the navigability 
of the Missouri and Clark Fork) and use of post-statehood evidence (bearing on the navigability of the Madison). Id at 53-54. 
Relying on The Montello, the court held that portages do not destroy navigability (id) or "require a piecemeal classification" 
of the river (id at 58). The court explained that this Court had long recognized that most of the nation's rivers " 'originally 
present[ ed] serious obstructions to an uninterrupted navigation,' " but these " 'natural barriers' " did not destroy navigability 
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where the river still" 'afford[ed] a channel *19 for useful commerce.'" Id at 54a (quoting The Montello, 87 U.S. at 442-43). 
Applying that settled principle, the court held that, "[ d]espite the presence of portages along the Clark Fork and Missouri Rivers, 
the historical evidence establishes that they provided a channel for commerce at the time of statehood, or were susceptible of 
such use." Id at 56. 
As for the post-statehood usage of the Madison, the court explained that, under this Court's decisions in The Montello and 
United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931 ), a river is navigable if "it was 'susceptible' of providing a channel for commerce," 
even ifthere is little evidence of" 'actual use' at or before the time of statehood." Pet. App. 54. Applying that principle, the 
court held that, "[w]hile the historical usage of the Madison was not well-established, the evidence of a log float on its middle 
portion in the 19th century, combined with its present-day usage, demonstrates that this river was susceptible of providing a 
channel for commerce at the time of statehood." Id at 56. 
The court also carefully considered PPL's more particularized, evidence-specific objections to summary judgment. See id at 
56-62. Although PPL has suggested that the Montana Supreme Court gave short shrift to the navigability issue, the court's 
treatment of that issue was entirely consistent with the space devoted to this issue in the parties' briefs - in a case in which PPL 
presented several issues on appeal. 1 o 
10 Because it agreed with the district court's conclusion that the State was entitled to judgment under the navigability-for-title test, the 
Montana Supreme Court did not need to reach PPL's direct admissions of navigability. Pet. App. 62. 
*20 SUM11AR. Y OF ARGUMENT 
The judgment reached by the Montana Supreme Court in this case would have seemed natural to Lewis and Clark and the many 
pioneers who followed in their wake and helped settle the State. PPL's sharp-edged attack on the reasoning and even motives of 
the Montana Supreme Court is unfounded and out of step with this Court's precedents. The judgment of the Montana Supreme 
Court should be affirmed. 
I. Montana's interest in the riverbeds at issue in this case implicates a matter of core federalism. Under the equal footing doctrine, 
title to the lands beneath navigable waters is conveyed to the States upon their admission into the Union by the Constitution 
itself. That conveyance is consistent with the ancient public trust doctrine recognizing that the lands beneath navigable waters 
are held in public trust for all to use as common highways of commerce - a principle embodied in American law since at least 
as far back as the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. This Court has the final say over whether riverbeds are part of a navigable 
waterway, and thus conveyed to the States under the equal footing doctrine. But in reviewing a state court's judgment that rivers 
are navigable, there is no basis for the Court to adopt the extraordinary "rule of skepticism" proposed by PPL. Instead, the 
Court should approach navigability issues with the same care and respect it reserves for other matters bearing on an essential 
attribute of state sovereignty. 
II. The Montana Supreme Court properly articulated the "constitutional test" (Pet. i) for navigability in determining whether 
Montana took title at statehood to the riverbeds at issue. Indeed, the test framed by the Montana Supreme Court is faithfully 
*21 grounded on this Court's navigability decisions going back to The Daniel Ball, which look to whether the river - at the 
time of statehood - was used, or susceptible of being used, as a public highway for commerce. PPL itself acknowledges (at 27) 
that The Daniel Ball supplies the proper constitutional test. In arguing that the Montana Supreme Court did not abide by that 
tes~ PPL really is asking this Court fundamentally to change the test. The test that PPL proposes is at odds not only with more 
than a century of this Court's jurisprudence, but with the concept of navigability - and the role of rivers in American life - that 
would have been familiar to the Framers at the time the Constitution was adopted. 
As to the Missouri and Clark Fork, PPL's overriding complaint is that the Montana Supreme Court did not carve out the Great 
Falls and Thompson Falls from the surrounding waters and hold that the riverbeds underlying the falls are non-navigable 
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because the falls themselves were not passable by boat. But since as far back as The Montello, this Court - relying on The Daniel 
Ball - has held that "obstructions" that preclude "unbroken navigation" do not defeat navigability, where the obstructions were 
portaged so that the rivers continued to serve as public highways of commerce. Here, there is undeniable evidence that the Great 
Falls and Thompson Falls were portaged so that the rivers continued to serve as public highways for commerce at the time of 
statehood. For example, in the 1860s, during the Montana gold rush, gold was transported down the Missouri from Helena to 
Fort Benton - and then back East - with the aid of a portage around the Great Falls. Although the falls prevented "unbroken 
navigation," they did not *22 stop the rivers from serving as highways of commerce - and thus they do not defeat navigability. 
Relying on United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931), PPL argues that courts must carve out any non-"de minimis" or 
"negligible" interruption as its own segment and analyze that segment separately for navigability-for-title purposes. But Utah 
does not support PPL's segmentation rule. Unlike the falls at issue in this case (and the interruptions in The Montello), the 
canyon involved in Utah was not fully portaged, so the highway of commerce came to a dead end at the canyon. Nor does 
PPL's segmentation rule have much to commend it. PPL does not define what interruptions are "de minimis" or "negligible," 
and its segmentation approach is a recipe for uncertainty and invites litigation by riparian owners seeking to isolate and break 
off purportedly "non-navigable" bits and pieces. As The Montello teaches, what matters is not whether a particular interruption 
is one mile, 4.35 miles, or 20 miles, but whether the attendant stretch of the river served as a continuous highway of commerce, 
notwithstanding the interruption. That test is not only consistent with this Court's precedent, it is consistent with the history 
and geography of North America. 
As to the Madison, PPL takes aim at the Montana Supreme Court's consideration of post-statehood evidence of use as relevant 
to the river's navigability at statehood. But since at least The Daniel Ball it has been settled that navigability may be determined 
not only on actual use as a highway for commerce, but susceptibility for use as such. The Montana Supreme Court simply 
recognized - as this Court itself has - that post-statehood evidence may be "relevant upon the issue of the susceptibility of the 
rivers" when it *23 shows that the rivers were used as highways of commerce at statehood Utah, 283 U.S. at 82. Nor is 
there any merit to PPL's objection about the "kind of commerce that counts" (PPL Br. 49 (emphasis added)) in demonstrating 
navigability. Log floating was one of the classic commercial uses of rivers in the 19th century, and there is no reason to disregard 
commercial recreational uses - like drift boat fishing - where the boats used by present-day river-goers are comparable to the 
boats used by those plying and trading on the waters before statehood. 
III. Because this Court granted certiorari solely to address whether the Montana Supreme Court articulated the proper 
"constitutional test" for navigability (Pet. i), there is no reason for the Court to entertain any record-specific objections to the 
grant of summary judgment. Nor is there any reason to tum this state court case into a reprisal of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), on when evidence is sufficient to create a material issue of disputed fact. In any event, contrary to 
PPL's objections, there is nothing inherently problematic - or off limits - about granting summary judgment on navigability 
issues. Courts and special masters frequently make summary judgment determinations on navigability. PPL's problem is not 
that the Montana courts improperly applied the standard for summary judgment. Its problem is that it litigated this case based 
on a mistaken understanding of the legal test for navigability. Thus, for example, PPL did not submit any evidence rebutting 
the fact that the Great Falls and Thompson Falls were portaged so that the rivers served as continuous highways of commerce. 
Properly *24 viewed, the summary judgment record supports the judgment of the Montana Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE QUESTION PRESENTED RAISES A CORE ISSUE OF FEDERALISM 
Montana's title to the riverbeds at issue in this case "uniquely implicate[s]" its sovereign interests. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene 
Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 284 (1997). Indeed, this Court has long recognized that state ownership of"lands underlying navigable 
waters" is "an essential attribute of sovereignty." Utah Div. of State Landsv. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 (1987). Under the 
equal footing doctrine, the States' title to such lands is conferred "by the Constitution itself." Idaho, 521 U.S. at 283 (citations 
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and internal quotation marks omitted). State ownership over such lands thus represents a core component of federalism. See 
Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262,272 (2001); United States v. Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 5 (1997); Montana v. United States, 450 
U.S. 544,551 (1981); Mumford v. Wardwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 423,436 (1867); see also Sonia Sotomayor, Note, Statehood 
and the Equal Footing Doctrine: The Case/or Puerto Rican Seabed Rights, 88 Yale L.J. 825, 837 & n.69 (1979) (explaining 
that constitutional equal footing doctrine rests upon considerations of" 'dual federalism'"). 
The equal footing doctrine is grounded on the centuries-old "public trust doctrine," which dates back at least to Ancient Rome 
and was adopted by the English Crown in the Magna Carta. See Idaho, 521 U.S. at 284;supra at 4-5. The public trust doctrine 
protects" 'the paramount right of public use of navigable waters,' "and recognizes that the sovereign *25 holds the submerged 
lands beneath those waters" 'as a public trust, to subserve and protect the public right to use them as common highways for 
commerce, trade, and intercourse.'" Illinois Cent. R.R Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,458 (1892) (citation omitted). This principle 
was vital to the nation at the time of the founding, and before, when navigable waterways served as the primary arteries for 
inland travel and commerce. And it is embodied in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, which was later enacted into federal law 
by the First Congress, and declares that "[t]he navigable waters leading into the Mississippi and St. Lawrence, and the carrying 
places between the same, shall be common highways, and forever free." 11 
II An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North West of the River Ohio (Northwest Ordinance of 1787) 
(adopted by the First Congress in I Stat. 50, 52 (1789)). Because the Northwest Ordinance existed at the time of the founding and 
was enacted into law by the First Congress, it is strong evidence of how the Framers viewed the public trust doctrine embodied in 
the equal footing doctrine. 
Especially in view of the constitutional foundation for the State's title to lands underlying navigable waters and its responsibility 
to manage public trust lands, PPL's attack on the motives of the State in seeking to protect the title to the riverbeds at issue 
is misguided. This Court generally presumes the good faith of all government actors, including the States. There is no reason 
to proceed from any other understanding when a State asserts title to public trust lands. Yet PPL essentially asks this Court to 
adopt a constitutional presumption that state claims of navigability are "contriv[ ed]," and apply "a particular *26 skepticism 
toward navigability determinations made by a State's own courts in the State's favor." PPL Br. 29-30. That approach would 
turn upside down cardinal principles of respect for the States, and for the judgments of state courts, that are central to "Our 
Federalism" and embedded in the constitutional design. This Court of course has the final say over the validity of a State's 
assertion of title over riverbeds under the equal footing doctrine. But in resolving such claims, there is no basis for proceeding 
from any premise but that the State has acted in good faith - and on behalf of the public trust it seeks to protect. 
Federalism comes into play in another way in this case. To the extent that the riverbeds at issue in this case are held to be non-
navigable, the United States no doubt would claim title to the lion's share of those lands. See United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 
64, 75 (1931); U.S. Br. I ("Where the waters were non-navigable at the time of statehood, the United States has asserted its 
ownership of the riverbeds .... "). As it turns out, the United States government historically has been adverse to the States in 
cases where title to submerged lands is at issue. See, e.g., Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75, 100 (2005); Utah, 283 U.S. 
at 16;United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. I, 15 (1935); Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 586 (1922). Here, the United States 
takes the position that the rivers at issue are navigable for federal regulatory purposes, but not for state title purposes - a win-
win for the federal government. 
Ultimately, the constitutional test ofnavigability advanced by PPL, and fully backed by the United States, would have the effect 
of stripping the States of sovereignty over the lands underlying navigable waters by fundamentally narrowing the concept of 
*27 navigability long recognized by this Court. At a minimum, the Court ought to approach that far-reaching argument with 
the caution it typically exercises in matters impeding state sovereignty. 
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II. THE STATE COURT APPLIED THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL TEST FOR NAVIGABILITY IN 
DECIDING THIS CASE 
PPL challenges the "constitutional test" (Pet. i) articulated by the Montana Supreme Court in deciding whether the rivers at issue 
are navigable. As the United States explained in its invitation brief, PPL's attacks on the Montana Supreme Court's decision are 
based largely on an "overstate[ment of] the Montana Supreme Court's rationale," U.S. Invitation Br. I 0, and a misreading of 
this Court's precedents, see id at I 0-17. Fairly read, the navigability test articulated by the Montana Supreme Court is entirely 
consistent with this Court's precedents going back to The Daniel Ball (1870), and with the historical conception of navigability 
embodied in the Northwest Ordinance. In the end, it is the constitutional test proposed by PPL - not the one articulated by the 
Montana Supreme Court - that dramatically departs from settled law. 
Indeed, although PPL acknowledges that the test for navigability is constitutionally grounded, it bases its position on a 
conception of the role of rivers - and trade and travel along rivers - that would have been foreign to the Framers. The Framers 
lived in a time when rivers provided the major arteries of commerce and travel in North America, and when rivers were regularly 
portaged so that trade and commerce could continue along the waters. The Framers would have appreciated that "there are 
but few of our fresh-water rivers which did not originally present serious *28 obstacles to an uninterrupted navigation." The 
Montello, 87 U.S. at 443. And they would not have conceived of a constitutional test for navigability under which portages 
around such obstacles would destroy navigability or require chopping up the nation's great rivers into navigable and non-
navigable pieces based on the presence of such portageable interruptions. 
This Court should reject PPL's invitation to adopt such an ahistorical conception of navigability now. 
A. The Montana Supreme Court Applied This Court's Constitutional Test 
The Montana Supreme Court based its conclusion that the State owns the riverbeds at issue on its determination that the evidence 
showed that the Missouri and Clark Fork "provided a channel for commerce at the time of statehood," and that the Madison 
was "susceptible of providing a channel for commerce at the time of statehood." Pet. App. 56. That analysis comes right out 
of this Court's decisions. 
1. More than a century ago, in The Daniel Ball, this Court held that "rivers must be regarded as public navigable rivers in law" 
if they "are navigable in fact." 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) at 563. Rivers "are navigable in fact when they are used, or are susceptible 
of being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be conducted in 
the customary modes of trade and travel on water." Id 
Four years later, this Court elaborated on that basic test in The Montello, explaining that "the vital and essential point is whether 
the natural navigation of the river is such that it affords a channel for useful commerce." 87 U.S. at 441. "If this be so," the Court 
held, ''the river is navigable in fact, although its *29 navigation may be encompassed with difficulties by reason of natural 
barriers, such as rapids and sandbars." Id The Court rejected "the rule laid down by the district judge as a test ofnavigability," 
under which a river is non-navigable insofar as "obstructions" requiring portage prevent "unbroken navigation." Id at 442. As 
the Court explained, the Northwest Ordinance itself had recognized such "carrying-places," where "boats must be partially or 
wholly unloaded and their cargoes carried on land," and the district court's test "would exclude many of the great rivers of the 
country which were so interrupted by rapids as to require artificial means to enable them to be navigated without break." Id. 
at 442-43. "Indeed," the Court continued, "there are but few of our fresh-water rivers which did not originally present serious 
obstacles to an uninterrupted navigation." Id. at 443. 
Applying The Daniel Ball test, the Court held that the Fox River is navigable, notwithstanding "several rapids and falls" in 
its natural state that impeded "unbroken navigation," even with the use of small "Durham boats," and thus required "a few 
portages." Id. at 439,441,442. The Court focused on the history of the Fox River as means of trade - i.e., "highway of commerce" 
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- in the region and further explained that its test was consistent with "the purpose of the [Northwest] Ordinance of 1787." Id 
at 442, 444. 12 
12 The United States asserts (at 25) that "the obstructions to navigation [in The Montello] were removed by artificial navigation (locks 
and canals)." That is true - but misleading- because the Court detennined that the Fox River was navigable based on the natural state 
of the river "before the navigation of the river was improved." 87 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added). 
*30 2. PPL acknowledges (at 27) that The Daniel Ball states the proper test, but claims that the Montana Supreme Court 
improperly relied on The Montello and so-called non-title cases. According to PPL, because The Montello did not address "title 
navigability," it does not count. PPL Br. 42 (emphasis added). PPL's attempt to sink The Montello is understandable - it answers 
PPL's theory that portaged interruptions destroy navigability. But PPL's argument fails. 
The Montello Court did not believe that it was doing anything but applying The Daniel Ball test to the Fox River stretch at 
issue. The very first sentence of the decision refers to The Daniel Ball; the following sentences set forth the constitutional test 
established by The Daniel Ball; and the decision then states that the Court's holding is based on the "[a]ppl[ication]" of that 
test. 87 U.S. at 439. Moreover, far from purporting to break new ground, the Court observed that "[t]he views that we have 
presented on this subject receive support from the courts of this country that have had occasion to discuss the question of what 
is a navigable stream." Id at 443 & n.16 ( citing cases). 
In the 140 years since they were decided, this Court has consistently relied on The Daniel Ball and The Montello in stating the 
constitutional test for state title to submerged lands. The Court did just that in Utah - the "title" case on which PPL and the 
United States principally rely. There, the Court drew the "test for navigability" - as "frequently stated by this Court" - directly 
from The Daniel Ball and The Montello. Utah, 283 U.S. at 76;see also, e.g., Packer v. Bird, 137 U.S. 661, 667 (1891) (relying 
on The Daniel Ball); Oklahoma, 258 U.S. at 586 (citing The Daniel Ball and The Montello); *31 Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. 
v. UnitedStates, 260 U.S. 77, 86 (1922) (invoking The Monte/Io's "channel for useful commerce" test); United States v. Holt 
State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 56 (1926) (citing The Montello); Oregon, 295 U.S. at 15 (relying on The Daniel Ball). 
This Court also has observed that courts should be mindful of "the purpose for which the concept of 'navigability' was invoked 
in a particular case." Kaiser Aetnav. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 170-71 (1979). And the Court has adapted The Daniel Ba/land 
The Monte/Io's test for navigability in three specific respects depending on the context in which it is invoked: (1) for title cases, 
the Court looks to the river's natural state, whereas for regulatory cases it considers the river's natural and improved condition; 
(2) for title cases, the Court determines navigability as of the time of statehood, whereas for regulatory cases it considers the 
river's condition today; and (3) for title cases, the Court asks whether the river was part of a useful channel for commerce, local 
or otherwise, whereas for regulatory cases it requires the river to be part of a channel of interstate commerce. See U.S. Br. 9-10. 
But these settled variations are in no way implicated by the decision under review: The Montana Supreme Court considered 
navigability at the time of statehood, looked to the rivers' natural state, and considered whether the rivers were part of a useful 
channel of commerce. Pet. App. 54-62. 
It simply does not follow, as PPL suggests, that navigability cases from one context are categorically inapposite - and should 
be rigorously segregated from - cases that arise in other contexts. The inquiries overlap far more than they diverge. That is 
why this Court has relied on title and regulatory cases *32 interchangeably, except insofar as the settled distinctions above 
are implicated. Indeed, even PPL does not follow its own proposed dichotomy, because it relies affirmatively on regulatory 
cases, when it suits its own interests to do so. See PPL Br. 37, 49, 54 (relying on non-title cases); Pet. 21, 24. The dichotomy 
that PPL and the United States now try to create between The Daniel Ball and The Montello is completely artificial and out 
of step with precedent. 
Principles of stare decisis, not to mention the need for "certainty and predictability" that PPL itself touts ( at 33 ), counsel strongly 
against reconceiving more than a century of this Court's navigability precedents by retroactively holding that this Court's title 
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and regulatory cases must be rigidly compartmentalized in a way that is completely at odds with this Court's own reliance on 
and use of those precedents. 
B. The Montana Supreme Court Properly Considered The Stretches That Comprised The Relevant Channels Of 
Commerce 
PPL argues (at 40) that the Montana Supreme Court erred by taking a" 'whole river' approach" (at 40) to navigability, without 
considering navigability on a "segment-by-segment basis" (at 34). That argument is a straw man. The phrase "river as a 
whole'' (or anything like it) does not appear in the Montana Supreme Court's decision. And the State has never argued, and the 
Montana courts did not hold, that a river that is navigable "as a whole" is necessarily navigable in fact along its entire length. At 
the certiorari stage, the United States recognized that PPL's "river as a whole" argument was based on an "overstat [ ement of] 
the Montana Supreme Court's rationale" (U.S. Invitation Br. 10), though in its merits- *33 stage brief it chooses to perpetuate 
that mischaracterization itself(U.S. Br. 11-12, 18). 
The Montana Supreme Court analyzed whether the rivers at issue were navigable by looking not to the rivers "as a whole," and 
not to natural interruptions in isolation (as PPL proposes), but by considering whether the stretches of the rivers that included 
the interruptions on which PPL focuses formed a continuous highway for commerce, notwithstanding the interruptions. Pet. 
App. 56. That analysis is perfectly consistent with this Court's precedents. 
1. The crux of PPL's challenge to the navigability of the Missouri and Clark Fork is that the Montana Supreme Court should 
have focused exclusively on the natural interruptions - on which PPL's power plants generally sit - and should have disregarded 
the surrounding stretches of the rivers. See, e.g., PPL Br. 40, 41, 59. As PPL sees it, because "boats ... could not pass the falls 
area itself," the riverbeds at issue are not navigable - end of story. Id at 12; see id at 8, 15-16, 46; see also Pet. App. 198 
( emphasizing that "there has never been any navigation on the Missouri River in the Great Falls Reach because the physical 
characteristics of the falls prevent it") (Emmons); id at 202 (same concerning Thompson Falls). The United States repeats this 
refrain. U.S. Br. 22 (emphasizing that the falls themselves were "impassable"). The Montana Supreme Court properly rejected 
that line of analysis. 
PPL's argument is based almost entirely on Utah, which PPL says (at 36) "exemplifies the segment-by-segment approach." 
According to PPL, Utah holds that a court must analyze not just "the specific river sections at issue" but any "stretches within 
those sections that [have] distinct topographical *34 characteristics." PPL Br. 37 (emphasis added). Anything but a "de 
minimis" or "negligible" obstacle, PPL maintains (at 38), must be analyzed separately - and would almost certainly be deemed 
non-navigable in PPL's view, since an obstacle is by definition impassable. That approach finds no footing in Utah. 
The Utah Court did not carve up the Colorado River like a Thanksgiving turkey, hacking away at every non-de minim is 
portion containing a natural obstacle and considering it in isolation as a new "stretch" with each change in the river's physical 
characteristics. Rather, the Court analyzed the head of navigation and concluded that, despite many obstructions in its natural 
state, the entire Colorado river was navigable, with the exception of a 36-mile stretch (Cataract Canyon), which had never been 
entirely portaged and had geological features making that portage infeasible. The Court therefore concluded that the Colorado 
ceased to be navigable at that point. See283 U.S. at 17;see also PPL Supp. Br. App. 10-13. 
Cataract Canyon is completely different than the Great Falls and Thompson Falls, and not just because - at 36 miles long -
Cataract Canyon is more than twice as long as Lewis and Clark's 17-mile portage around the Great Falls. Unlike the Great Falls 
and Thompson Falls, Cataract Canyon was "not ... fully portaged." U.S. Br. 23 n.13. Parts of the canyon were portaged. See 
PPL Supp. Br. App. 12. But there is no evidence that the canyon was portaged so that the waterway - above and below the canyon 
- served as a continuous highway of commerce, or even that the canyon was susceptible to such use. Instead, it was uncontested 
that the canyon, and its forbidding terrain (see id), created a dead end. In this case, by contrast, *35 it is undeniable that trade 
and travel portaged around the falls in question and that the river stretches served as continuous public highways of commerce. 
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PPL also points to Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574 (1922), and argues (at 38) that instead of analyzing the entire 1360-mile 
Red River the Court considered "the much shorter segment at issue." But that "much shorter segment" was 539 miles long -
i.e., the entire length of the Red River in the State of Oklahoma. 258 U.S. at 582,585 & n.4. Moreover, the Court considered 
that entire 539-mile stretch even though the dispute between Oklahoma and Texas concerned "the proceeds of oil and gas 
taken from 43 miles" of the riverbed. Id at 579. Oklahoma thus provides no support for the kind of piecemeal segmentation 
approach that PPL advances here, which requires a court to break a river up into navigable and non-navigable segments for 
any interruption that is not de minimis. 13 
13 The other cases relied upon by PPL for its novel segmentation regime are also inapposite. See U.S. Invitation Br. 12-13 (explaining 
that these cases "did not address how to treat non-navigable 'middle section[s] of an otherwise-navigable river'") (quoting Pet. 20) 
(alteration in original)). 
2. PPL does not define what counts as a "de minimis," or "negligible," interruption for purposes of its Uber-segmentation 
approach. But it latches on to Utah's consideration of "the first 4.35 miles of the stretch of the Colorado river" at issue in that 
case and argues that that stretch is not de minimis. PPL Br. 38. As the United States explained in its invitation brief(at 11), "Utah 
does not stand for the legal proposition that any 4.35-mile interruption in navigability must be treated as a distinct segment." 
Indeed, the "4.35-mile *36 segment" relied upon by PPL (at 38) is not an interruption at all. Rather, Utah argued (and this 
Court agreed) that those 4.35 river miles properly belonged with the navigable waters upstream (the Green and Grand Rivers, 
which came together to form the Colorado), not the Cataract Canyon stretch that everyone agreed was non-navigable. See Utah, 
283 U.S. at 89;see also U.S. Invitation Br. 12. 
Moreover, elsewhere in Utah the Court made clear that it did not view a distance of 4.35 miles as significant in the context of 
a river like the Colorado, calling the 4.35 miles a "short stretch." 283 U.S. at 89. Likewise, the Utah Court saw no problem 
with the special master's reference to one stretch of the Grand River as "only six miles in all." Id at 85 (emphasis added). 
Characterizing a stretch of several miles as "short" might seem odd in the abstract, but it is not in the context of a river. Cf 
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 596 (1945) (referring to "short stretch" of "40-odd miles" of a river). And in the same 
vein, to the extent that it has any constitutional relevance to the navigability inquiry here, the stretches at issue in this case are 
likewise properly regarded as "short." 
But as cases like The Montello teach, what matters in gauging navigability is not whether an interruption is one mile, 4.35 
miles, or 20 miles long. What matters is whether the attendant stretch of the river served as a continuous highway of commerce 
- notwithstanding the interruption. Supra at 28-30. If PPL's position had been law, then the Court's decision in The Montello 
would have simply focused on identifying the impassable segments of the Fox River, isolated those segments from the rest of 
the river, and declared them to be non-navigable. That, in essence, is what the *37 district court did in The Montello. See 87 
U.S. at 442. But this Court rejected that approach and looked to whether the rivers served as continuous highways of commerce 
- despite the obstacles. Id at 442-43. 
This does not mean that interruptions cannot defeat navigability. They can - and do. The longer or more severe the interruption, 
the more difficult it will likely be to establish navigability. In Utah, for example, it was clear that the highway of commerce 
stopped at the 36-mile Cataract Canyon; no one argued that the canyon was portaged to connect a trade route along the river 
above and below the canyon. This case is just the opposite. As the Montana Supreme Court explained, on the Missouri the 
Great Falls was portaged so that trade flowed from Three Forks to Fort Benton. Pet. App. 61. And on the Clark Fork, Thompson 
Falls was portaged to establish a trade route from the confluence of the Flathead River (above the falls) to Lake Pend Oreille 
in Idaho. Id; see supra at 9-12. 
The focus on whether the pertinent stretches were used as (or are susceptible for use as) a highway of commerce establishes a 
workable and time-honored principle grounded on more than a century of case law. By contrast, PPL's hyper-segmentation rule 
is highly manipulable and seems designed primarily to aid hydroelectric generators whose plants generally sit on interruptions. 
PPL offers little guidance, other than its vague "de minimis" or "negligible part" exception, on what interruptions do not qualify 
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for segmentation. PPL's test thus is a recipe for uncertainty in an area in which PPL itself (at 33) demands "predictability," 
and will require courts to go back and carve up waterways that have long been found navigable into "navigable" and "non-
navigable" pieces. After all, "there are but *38 few of our fresh-water rivers which did not originally present serious obstacles 
to an uninterrupted navigation." The Montello, 87 U.S. at 443. 
C. The Montana Supreme Court Properly Recognized That Portaging Does Not Automatically Defeat Navigability 
In a variation on their segmentation argument, PPL and the United States argue that portaged interruptions on a river are not 
"themselves navigable for the ... purpose of establishing title." PPL Br. 42; see U.S. Br. 23-27. In other words, according to PPL 
and the United States, any non-de minimis interruption requiring portage is non-navigable for title purposes. That position is 
inconsistent with the purposes of the public trust and equal footing doctrines as well as more than a hundred years of precedent. 
1. As discussed, this Court has recognized since The Montello that falls, rapids, or other interruptions requiring portage do not 
destroy navigability - so long as the surrounding stretch of the river served as a useful channel for commerce. Supra at 28-30. 
And this Court has repeatedly re%irmed - pointing to The Daniel Ball and The Montello - that "(n]avigability, in the sense of 
the law, is not destroyed because the watercourse is interrupted by occasional natural obstructions or portages." Economy Light 
& Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113, 122 (1921); see id at 121-22. Indeed, in Economy Light & Power Company, the 
Court confirmed the navigability of a river stretch that included over 24 miles of nearly-consecutive interruptions, including "a 
7-mile portage," and a land "transfer of over 11 miles." Economy Light & Power Co. v. United States, 256 F. 792, 795-96 (7th 
Cir. 1919); 256 U.S. at 124 (affirming); see also *39 St. Anthony FallsWater Power Co. v. St. Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 
349,359 (1897) (holding river stretch navigable "at all points" including waterfall and surrounding rapids). 
Likewise, other federal and state courts - in both the title and regulatory contexts - have recognized that portageable obstacles 
do not destroy navigability, and settled expectations have formed based on this rule. 14 To take just one example, it has been 
settled for more than 50 years that the riverbeds underlying Niagara Falls, which of course required a portage, are owned by 
the State of New York - "even at the point of the falls." Niagara Falls Power Co. v. Duryea, 57 N.Y.S.2d 777, 784 (Sup. Ct. 
1945); see also In re State Reservation at Niagara, 3 7 Hun. 53 7, 16 Abb. No. Cas. 395 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1885), appeal dismissed, 
7 N.E. 916 (1886). Under PPL's rule, however, the riverbeds underlying the falls would have to be carved out and declared 
non-navigable for title purposes. 
14 See, e.g., Knott v. FERC, 386 F.3d 368, 372-73 (1st Cir. 2004); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. FERC, 993 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 
1993); Consolidated Hydro, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1258, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.2d 491, 493-94 
(D.C. Cir. 1950); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 123 F.2d 155, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Alaska v. United States, 662 F. 
Supp. 455, 466-67 (D. AJaska 1987), affd, Alaska v. Ahtha, 891 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1989); see also 27 William Mark McKinney 
& Burdett Alberto Rich, Ruling Case Law, Waters,§ 218, at 1310 (1920); see generally John A. Humbach, Public Rights in the 
Navigable Streams of New York, 6 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 461(1989). 
2. PPL tries to tackle The Monte/Io's rule that portaging does not defeat navigability in two different ways. First, it argues 
that The Montello "addressed regulatory navigability, not title navigability." PPL Br. 42. But that is beside the point because, 
as *40 discussed, this Court has for more than a century relied upon The Montello interchangeably with The Daniel Ball in 
describing the constitutional test for navigability - and even did so in Utah, the case that PPL itself holds out as the vanguard 
for "title navigability." See supra at 31-32. Second, PPL argues that Utah establishes that "portageable interruptions" do defeat 
navigability, pointing to the fact that the Court held that the Cataract Canyon stretch was not navigable. PPL Br. 42. As discussed, 
however, Cataract Canyon was not fully portaged and so commerce came to a dead end at the canyon. In that key respect, Utah 
is entirely different from The Montello - and this case. Supra at 34-35. 
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940) (AEP), cited by the United States, is not to the contrary. 
As the United States itself concedes (at 25), that case did not involve "any obstructions requiring a portage." Moreover, in the 
passage relied upon by the government, the Court simply noted differences between the title and regulatory inquiries that are 
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not pertinent here - namely, the fact that the regulatory inquiry is not confined to the time of statehood or the rivers' natural 
state. See311 U.S. at 407-08. But, as the Montana Supreme Court recognized (Pet. App. 56), the State's assertion of title to 
the Missouri and Clark Fork here is based on evidence of actual use of the rivers in their natural state and before statehood. 
Supra at 18-19. 15 
15 The United States suggests (at 24-25) that this Court should draw a negative inference from Congress•s definition of "navigable 
waters" in 16 U.S.C. § 796. This is a 180-degree change from the government's position before this Court in Montana Power Company, 
where the Solicitor General told the Court that ''this defmition is in accord with established principles," and specifically invoked the 
holding in The Montello. Add. 8a (emphasis added). The United States was right then. Section 796 expands the navigability inquiry 
in certain respects for regulatory purposes (natural vs. improved condition and statehood v. present-day use), but not insofar as it 
recognizes that portages do not destroy navigability. More important, nothing in§ 796 could narrow the constitutional definition of 
navigability for title purposes. 
*41 3. As a fallback, PPL suggests (at 42) that "this Court's precedent at most might permit treating a portageable stretch 
of an otherwise navigable river as itself navigable for title purposes only if it qualified as a 'short inteITUption' or 'negligible 
part' within the meaning of Utah." See U.S. Br. 24. PPL takes this Court•s language out of context and fails to account for 
the fact that "short" is a relative term when it comes to describing something like a river. Supra at 36. But in any event, that 
standard is unworkable for the same reasons that PPL's "de minimis" or "negligible part" exception to its segmentation rule is 
impracticable. See supra at 35-37. And once it is recognized (as this Court has held since The Montello) that portages do not 
defeat navigability where the river is used as a continuous highway of commerce, then there is no constitutional or principled 
basis for arbitrarily cutting off navigability at a particular mile marker. 
PPL argues (at 42) that the 17-mile portage of the Great Falls was too long and "arduous" to qualify under this test. Early 
Americans, particularly those who helped settle the West, had a hardier conception of distances than the typical modem day 
city slicker. *42 Lewis and Clark, for example, regularly traveled 20 or more miles a day during their expedition. There is 
no reason why the Constitution would draw a distinction between a 17-mile portage and a one-, five-, or 10-mile portage. Cf 
Economy Light & Power, supra (7-mile portage). Actions speak louder than labels. By definition, any inteITUption that was 
in fact portaged to allow the river to continue to serve as a highway of commerce is "short" enough for any constitutionally 
relevant navigability purpose. 
Moreover, the question for purposes of this case is not how long it took Lewis and Clark to portage the Great Falls - on the 
first try by any explorer, in an unknown territory roamed by grizzlies, with a full expedition (and a seriously ill Sacagawea) 
in tow. It is whether the falls were portaged at statehood so that the river was used as a highway of commerce. They were. 
By the 1860s, the portage was conducted regularly by large numbers of miners under far less "arduous" conditions and in a 
fraction of the time. See supra at 10-11. This history conclusively refutes PPL's suggestion (at 41) that the Great Falls portage 
was "wholly incompatible with commercial navigation." 16 
16 The possibility that a river "could be portaged in theory" does not establish navigability. U.S. Br. 24 (emphasis added). Just as the 
application of the "susceptibility for use" prong of The Daniel Balls navigability test must be based on a realistic assessment of 
what is susceptible, so too must an assessment of the feasibility of portage. For example, given the history and geography of Cataract 
Canyon (see supra at 34), the theoretical possibility that an Ernest Shackleton might fmd a way to portage the canyon is not enough to 
establish navigability. Moreover, the key point is not simply whether the river was portaged, but whether it was portaged so that the 
river served as a continuous highway of commerce. As discussed, the river stretches here were not simply portageable "in theory"; 
they were regularly portaged in/act by those using the rivers as public highways of commerce. 
*43 4. Finally, PPL's and the United States' position that portage always (or invariably) defeats navigability is out of step with 
the history of the nation - and the geography of North America. As The Montello recognizes in discussing the travels of the 
likes of Marquette and Joliet (87 U.S. at 440), portaging was a common means of overcoming obstructions along waterways 
that indisputably served as key channels of commerce and trade. The many towns and rivers across the country with "portage" 
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in their name - like Portage City, Wisconsin (id. at 439) and Portage Creek, Montana - not to mention the reference to the 
"canying places" in the Northwest Ordinance, speak volumes about how deeply ingrained the practice of portage was in early 
American travel and commerce. Adopting PPL's position would disregard the deeply rooted historical fact that interruptions 
necessitating portages did not prevent a river from serving as a public highway of commerce in America 
D. The Montana Supreme Court Properly Considered The Madison's Susceptibility For Use As A Highway Of 
Commerce 
PPL's remaining criticisms of the Montana Supreme Court's decision relate principally to the Madison River and focus on its 
articulation of the "susceptible-for-use" prong of the navigability test. Here again, PPL's attacks prove unfounded. 
*44 1. PPL acknowledges that The Daniel Ball test considers not only whether a river was actually used as a highway of 
commerce at statehood, but whether it is" 'susceptible of being used'" as such. PPL Br. 27 (quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 
at 563 (emphasis added)). But PPL argues that this Court should convert the alternative "susceptibility" prong into a "rare" 
exception that can be invoked only when there is "limited or non-existent settlement in the region, and even then only if river 
conditions are the same today as at statehood."Jd. at 26; see id. at 43, 45. In other words, without asking this Court to overrule 
any precedent, PPL essentially asks this Court to all but scuttle the "susceptibility for use" prong. 
The "susceptibility for use" prong has been a fixture of the constitutional test for 140 years. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563;Utah, 
283 U.S. at 76;Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 56. There is no evidence that it has proved unworkable or ineffectual in screening 
navigability claims. To the contrary, the "susceptibility for use" inquiry makes perfect sense in light of the purposes of the 
equal footing and public trust doctrines. The Founders no doubt understood that not all navigable rivers in America would have 
documented instances of commercial trade at the time of statehood. And although the navigability test is focused on navigability 
at the time of statehood, there is no reason to deny States title to rivers that were capable of meeting the navigability test at 
statehood. 
Under well-settled law, the Montana Supreme Court in no way erred in holding that the Madison was navigable based on its 
conclusion that the Madison "was susceptible of providing a channel for commerce at the time of statehood." Pet. App. 56. 
*45 2. PPL tries a backdoor attack on the "susceptibility for use" prong by arguing (at 47) that this Court should adopt a 
rule that reliance on "modem-day usage" is "strongly disfavored." But there is no reason for this Court to adopt a special 
evidentiary rule for navigability determinations. The ordinary rules of evidence, including the rule of relevance (e.g., Mont. 
R. Evid. 401), suffice. This Court has long recognized that post-statehood evidence may be "relevant upon the issue of the 
susceptibility of the rivers" when it shows that the rivers were used as highways of commerce at the time of statehood. Utah, 
283 U.S. at 82;see U.S. Invitation Br. 15 (recognizing that such evidence "may be probative of navigability at statehood"). The 
Montana Supreme Court simply recognized that commonsense rule. See Pet. App. 55-56 (given that navigability be based on 
actual use or susceptibility for use, "present-day usage of a river may be probative of its status as a navigable river at the time 
of statehood') ( emphasis added). 
Nor is there anything suspect about the way in which the Montana Supreme Court consulted post-statehood evidence. PPL 
claims (at 48) that the court failed to take into account that the flow of the river was altered by PPL's dams. But the Montana 
Supreme Court specifically recognized that the flow of the river had been "altered" by PPL's dams, albeit not in the way PPL 
would have liked. Pet. App. 58; see id at 57. As the court - and PPL's own expert - recognized, the dams reduced the flow 
of water along the Madison during most of the year. Id; see Pet. App. 210-11 (Schumm). The Montana Supreme Court could 
take that asserted change into account and conclude that - since the river would have been only more navigable *46 before the 
dams at least part of the year - the evidence of substantial drift boat use on the Madison today was relevant to, and supported, 
a finding ofnavigability at statehood. Resp. Mont. S. Ct. Br. 31-32. 
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3. PPL's highly restrictive test for the "kind of commerce that counts" (at 49 (emphasis added)) in gauging navigability also 
should be rejected. This Court has admonished that navigability for title" 'does not depend on the mode by which commerce is, 
or may be, conducted.'" Utah, 283 U.S. at 76 (emphasis added). And the Court has recognized log-floating, in particular, as a 
legitimate form of"commerce" for purposes of determining a State's title to navigable waters for at least I 14 years. St. Anthony 
Falls Water Power Co., 168 U.S. at 359 (relying on fact that river stretch had been used for floating "logs with chutes that are 
artificially prepared" in finding navigability, even though it was asserted that the stretch could not support boat traffic); see 
also The Montello, 87 U.S. at 441 (including as navigable "many of the large rivers of the country over which rafts of lumber 
of great value are constantly taken to market") (emphasis added). 
The West's lumber industry in the late 19th century depended on rivers to transport lumber to market. See Wisconsin Pub. Serv. 
Corp. v. FPC, 147 F.2d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 1945). Logs were as much a commodity on rivers as the load of any steamboat. In line 
with this Court's cases, the lower courts have long treated commercial log-driving as a commercial use sufficient to establish 
navigability. See, e.g., Consolidated Hydro, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1258,1261 (D.C. Cir. 1992); City of Centralia v. FERC, 
851 F.2d 278, 281-82 (9th Cir. 1988); Wisconsin v. FPC, 214 F.2d 334, 336-37 (7th Cir. 1954). In considering evidence oflog 
floating to assess *47 the navigability of the Madison, therefore, the Montana Supreme Court took a well-worn path. 
There also is no reason categorically to exclude evidence of "recreational" uses of a river - especially when it comes to 
recreational uses like drift-boat fishing or rafting with both a substantial commercial and boating component. PPL Br. 49-52. 
This Court has recognized that recreational boat use of a river is probative of navigability, because "personal or private use by 
boats demonstrates the availability of the stream for the simpler type of commercial navigation." Appalachian £lee. Power, 
311 U.S. at 416 (emphasis added). That is certainly true in the case of the Madison, which is floated in commercial drift boats 
by thousands of anglers each year. Opp. App. 63. 17 
17 PPL also criticizes (at 22, 54-58) the Montana Supreme Court's statement that "[t]he concept of navigability for title purposes is 
very liberally construed by [this Court]." Pet. App. 54. But that statement must be read in context. The very next sentence refers to 
the fact that this Court's own precedents compel a finding of navigability not only where a river was actually used as a highway of 
commerce at statehood, but where it was susceptible for use as such. Presumably the reason that PPL asks this Court to discard the 
susceptibility-for-use test is that it believes the test is expansive. In any event, the rest of its decision makes clear that the Montana 
Supreme Court framed the proper constitutional test in deciding the navigability of the rivers at issue. And this Court, of course, 
'"reviews judgments, not statements in opinions.' " Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020, 2030 (2011 ). 
*48 ID. THE STATE COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER ON THE 
HEARING RECORD 
1. PPL sought certiorari on a purely legal question concerning the "constitutional test" for navigability. Pet. i. It framed the 
question in terms of what the "constitutional test" for navigability requires "a trial court" to do. Id (emphasis added). No doubt 
appreciating that this Court ordinarily does not second-guess the fact-specific determinations of state courts, PPL did not seek 
certiorari on whether the Montana trial court correctly held that summary judgment was proper on the particular record before 
it- assuming the court articulated the proper "constitutional test." That issue is outside the question on which this Court granted 
certiorari. See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 193 (1997) (where the petition asked the Court to decide the legal 
rule, we "shall not go beyond the writ's question to reexamine the fact-based rule-application issue that the [petitioners] now 
raise"). Thus, if this Court agrees with the State that the Montana Supreme Court framed the correct constitutional test for 
navigability, it should affirm. 
2. In any event, PPL's argument that the Montana courts improperly granted summary judgment in this case suffers from several 
basic methodological flaws. To begin with, PPL has exaggerated the evidence that it properly presented to the Montana trial 
court on summary judgment. Supra 18 & n. 9. In addition, PPL erroneously suggests (e.g., PPL Br. 2) that there is something 
inherently problematic about granting summary judgment on navigability, or navigability-for-title issues. That suggestion is 
refuted by this Court's precedents and widespread practice before the courts *49 and special masters. Trial courts across 
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the country frequently make summary judgment determinations on matters of navigability or the like, as do special masters 
appointed by this Court in original actions. 18 
18 See, e.g., Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401, 1406 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990); Illinois v. Army Corps of 
Eng'rs, No. 79 C 5406, 1981 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14165, at *6-7 (N.D. 111. Jan. 9, 1981); Alaska v. United States, 662 F. Supp. 455, 
468 (D. Alaska 1987); United States v. Undenvood, 344 F. Supp. 486,496 (M.D. Fla. 1972). 
Alaska v. United States, 545 U.S. 75 (2005), for example, involved a dispute over title to submerged lands that - like this 
case - turned in large part on historical materials. And like this case, Alaska was resolved on summary judgment. Special 
Master Gregory Maggs explained that despite numerous "genuine disagreements" between the parties, "summary judgment 
is an appropriate mechanism" for resolving the underlying title claim because the parties' disagreements were "really over 
the interpretation of the available undisputed facts" and the relative legal significance of available documents. Alaska v. 
United States, No. 128, original, Special Master's Report at 17-22 (2004), available at http://docs.law.gwu.edu/facweb/ 
gmaggs/128orig/summary _ judgment_report.pdf. This Court affirmed the special master's "thorough, commendable report" 
and findings. 545 U.S. at 83, 96. 
Here, the "genuine disagreements" among the parties relate primarily to the proper legal significance of undisputed, or 
indisputable, historic facts. That is especially true for the Missouri and Clark Fork Rivers, where there is indisputable evidence 
that Great Falls and Thompson Falls did not prevent the rivers from *SO serving as continuous highways of commerce, with 
the aid of portage. See supra at 10-12. PPL did not offer any evidence disputing the historical fact that the falls were portaged so 
that the rivers could serve as highways for commerce at statehood. Instead, PPL argued that there was no evidence that anyone 
boated the falls themselves. See supra 33. As explained, that legal theory is incorrect. 19 
19 As to the Clark Fork, PPL has pointed to a 1910 federal district court decree- a judgment issued two decades after statehood concerning 
alleged property rights as between two private parties - that referred in dictum to the Clark Fork generally as "not navigable" without 
any underlying findings of fact relevant to that conclusion. See Supp. Pet. App. 11. The Montana Supreme Courts properly concluded 
that this statement - which was not binding on the Montana courts or any party in the case - was the epitome of the kind of conclusory 
statement that does not create a genuine issue of material fact. Pet. App. 57; see Williams v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 123 P.3d 213, 
218 (Mont. 2005) ("[M]ere conclusory ... statements" do not raise a genuine issue of material fact.). 
While a closer call, PPL has presented no reason for this Court to overturn the Montana courts' summary judgment determination 
as to the Madison either. The State presented evidence that the Madison was susceptible for use as a highway of commerce at 
statehood and, indeed, was ideal for log driving. See supra at 14. Even the dissent on the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged 
that "the State met its initial burden to prove navigability under the title test." Pet. App. 116. PPL points to a Corps Report that 
evaluated - more than 40 years after statehood - the river's potential for improvements for modern-day use. JA 485-86. But that 
report has no bearing on *51 whether and to what e>..1ent the river was susceptible for use by the common modes ofnavigation 
at statehood. PPL also relies heavily on Schumm's testimony that the flow of the Madison changed after the dams were built. 
But, as the State explained (Resp. Mont. S. Ct. Br. 31-32), Schumm's own conclusions on the changes in flow made it more 
likely that the Madison was susceptible for use as a highway of commerce for at least part of the year. See Utah, 283 U.S. at 
87 (river need not be navigable year-round). 
3. Finally, PPL attacks the State's historical evidence, suggesting (at 15) that frontier newspapers and similar historical sources 
are somehow off limits in determining navigability. PPL's paid expert Emmons argued below (as he does in this Court, as 
"amicus curiae") that these materials are categorically unreliable, because they supposedly rely on sources given to "hyperbole" 
or "fabrication." Br. of Professors 20-21. But this Court itself has relied on such sources in determining navigability. See, e.g., 
The Montello, 87 U.S. at 440-42;see also, e.g., Alaska, 545 U.S. at 82, 96 (Special Master Report relies on historical accounts); 
Montana Power Co. v. FPC, 185 F.2d 491, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (relying on advertisements of boat service in contemporary 
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Helena newspapers and holding that newspaper accounts "are among the source materials of history"). The Montana Supreme 
Court in no way erred in considering such historical materials. 20 
20 Paradoxically, Emmons himself has relied heavily on the same frontier newspapers. See, e.g., J A 758 nn. 24-25, 760 n.27, 765 n.32, 
791 n.67, 792 n. 68, 797 n.74, 798 n.75, 801 n.78. 
*52 Contrary to the caricature of judicial proceedings that PPL tries to paint, the Montana courts carefully considered the 
summary judgment record under the constitutional test for navigability established by this Court's precedents and reasonably 
concluded that PPL had failed to create a genuine issue of disputed fact precluding summary judgment. There is no reason 
for this Court to re-do the summary judgment determination for the Montana courts. The Court should address the question 
presented and affirm. 
***** 
Adoption of PPL's novel constitutional test for navigability would have the immediate practical effect of stripping Montana -
and Montanans - of the title that they gained to the riverbeds at issue upon admission into the Union in 1889. That includes title 
to the Great Falls of Montana - a symbol of Montana since territorial times. 21 But the impact of such a ruling would extend 
much further. PPL's test would call into question the navigability of rivers throughout the United States - at least in any place 
where there exists ( or existed) a non-de minimis interruption. At a minimum, that test is a recipe for confusion and litigation 
over title to submerged lands throughout the country. And worse, the test is likely to result in the balkanization of rivers, like 
the Missouri, that always have been regarded as navigable, into bits and pieces of navigable and non-navigable "segments." 
That result almost certainly would interfere with the management of fish and wildlife along such waterways and hinder *53 
public access to the waters for fishing. And it could scarcely be more at odds with the public trust doctrine - embodied in 
the constitutional equal footing doctrine - which sought to ensure that America's great rivers and waterways would remain 
"common highways, and forever free," for the benefit of the people. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 1 Stat. at 52. 
21 For the history of the Great Seal of the State of Montana, see http://sos.mt.gov/about_office/State_Seal.asp. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Montana should be affirmed. 
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*3a No. 518 
October Term 1950 
The Montana Power Company, a corporation, petitioner 
V. 
Federal Power Commission 
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
BRIEF FOR THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION IN OPPOSITION 
*** 
STATEMENT 
*** 
Actual Use: For the steamboats which came up the River from St. Louis, the Great. Falls presented a natural banier (R. 65). As 
a result, Fort Benton was sometimes labelled [sic] the "head of navigation," and until 1888, when the advent of the railroads 
curtailed the demand for water transportation, steamboat traffic up to Fort Benton flourished (R. 64-65, 543-558, 1014-15, 
1434). The record shows, however, that three steamboats from Fort Benton successfully navigated the River to points more 
than 30 miles upstream from *4a Fort Benton and back (R. 65, 215-216, 1013, 1141-1142, 1207, 1450). Similarly, steamboats 
operating above the Great Falls were confined there, portages being made around the Falls only with smaller craft; for this upper 
part of the River, the "foot ofnavigation" was sometimes placed just above the Falls (R. 1207; Ex. 17(a) (1880), p, 1474). 
Before 1900, there was considerable use of the 263-mile reach of the River above Fort Benton, the Falls always requiring a 
portage around them. A number of exploratory and Government survey trips were made in manually-powered crafts of various 
sizes, notably the 1805 expedition under Lewis and Clark, whose party made a successful ascent to Three Forks and beyond 
(R. 64-65, 1357-1383, 1549-1575). In 1872, Thomas P. Roberts, an engineer for the Northern Pacific Railroad, in the course 
of a survey of this part of the River, descended the River from Three Forks to Fort Benton in a skiff (R. 66, 1147-1208). 7 In 
addition, Hubert Howe Bancroft's (1890) "History of the Pacific States" records the use of the River between Stubbs Ferry (mile 
2390), about 85 miles below Three Forks, and Fort Benton for the transportation of large numbers of miners returning to the 
States following the 1864 discovery of gold where Helena is now located; according to Bancroft, a stage line was established to 
carry passengers from Helena to a point *Sa on the River whence was operated a line of mackinaw boats carrying passengers 
to Fort Benton, portaging around the Falls (R. 66-67,1415-1419). 8 This use of the River apparently started soon after the 1864 
discovery of gold in Helena, probably diminished soon after 1868 when most of the gold had been extracted, and ceased around 
1870 when the placers were exhausted; clearly, however, the business was lively around 1866-1867 (R. 67). 9 
7 
8 
Roberts concluded that the River above Fort Benton could be relied upon for navigation without improvement and his report supported 
a plan for a steamboat link between Fort Benton and lbree Forks, trans-shipping freight around the Falls (R 66, 1195-99). The 
Roberts' report was regarded as so useful that the Secretary of War approved its publication for use of the Army Engineers (R. 1147). 
Although no description of those boats is available, it seems certain that they were manually-powered and probably were large 
sharpended bateaux (R 67). 
WEST!..AW © 2016 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 24 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PPL Montana, LLC v. State of Montana, 2011 WL 5126226 {2011) 
9 Bancroft's account is confumed (1) by advertisements of the boat service in contemporary Helena newspapers (R 67, 1417, 
1139-1141, 1210), and (2) by an 1867 legislative grant of an exclusive privilege for a portage-toll road to the Missouri River Falls 
Wagon Road Company (Mont Laws, Territory, 1867, 4th Reg. Sess., p. 109.) (R. 67) 
Between 1867 and 1900, there was extensive intrastate use of the River between Stubbs Ferry and Great Falls for the downstream 
transportation of loose logs and large rafts of lumber (R. 66, 417-418, 1142-1146, 1209, 1224-1228, 1263-1265, 1328-1329). 
Also, several small steamboats were placed on the River above the Falls, for the most part in the period after the close of the 
navigation era below Benton (R. 66). This operation continued around 1900 and was confined principally to the 55-mile stretch 
known as "Long Pool," located immediately above the Great Falls (R. 66, 391-397, 563-564, 1313-1315, 1323-1327, 1343, 
1354, Ex. 17(b) ( 1892) p. 1906, (1895) p. 2227, ( 1898) p. 1850). Some steamboats were engaged in the local, *6a commercial 
carrying of freight and passengers (R. 66). IO 
IO 
*** 
The Annual Report of the Chief of Engineers for the Year 1901 (Ex. 17 (b)) combining figures for traffic between Great Falls and 
Cascade with those for traffic between Cascade and Stubbs Ferry shows a total of2,528 tons of freight and 11,175 passengers carried 
(p. 2394). 
ARGUMENT 
*** 
[ 1.] (b) The Company claims that since the Great Falls preclude literal through use of the River and thus prevent it from fonning 
an unbroken highway, the portion of the River here involved could not be a "navigable water" of the United States (Pet. 3, 22). 
But while no stream can by itself constitute an unbroken highway if at any point a land carriage or portage is necessary, such a 
condition is not a prerequisite to a finding of navigability. This is clear from the Act's definition of "navigable waters" which 
expressly includes "all falls, shallows, or rapids compelling land carriage" where the stream is used or suitable for use despite 
such interruptions between the navigable parts. And this definition is in accord with established principles. In The Montello, 20 
Wall. 430, this Court rejected the lower court holding that the Fox River was not navigable by reason of "several rapids and 
falls" and concluded that it had always been navigable in fact, saying (20 Wall, at 442-443): 
the rule laid down by the district judge as a test of navigability cannot be adopted, for it would exclude 
many of the great rivers of the country *7a which were so interrupted by rapids as to require artificial 
means to enable them to be navigated without break. Indeed, there are but few of our fresh-water rivers 
which did not originally present serious obstructions to an uninterrupted navigation. 
In the Economy Light Co. case, the Court stated that (256 U.S. at 122): 
navigability, in the sense of the law, is not destroyed because the watercourse is interrupted by occasional 
natural obstructions or portages***. 
And the Appalachian case declares that (311 U.S. at 408-9) "There never has been doubt that the navigability referred to in the 
cases was navigability despite the obstruction of falls, rapids, sand bars, carries, or shifting currents." 
In the instant case, the interrupting Falls cover a 17-mile section, never navigated in fact, and require a portage of about 18 miles 
(R. 69). But, as shown supra, pp. 7-8, many trips along the River were made via portage around the Falls. Such an interruption 
does not sever the upper 214 miles of the Missourri from the lower 2,244, but rather is merely an obstruction notwithstanding 
which the River was used as a continued highway in interstate commerce at least as far upstream as Stubbs Ferry. Cf. The Daniel 
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Ball, 10 Wall. 557, 563;Pennsylvania Water&: Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 123 F.2d 155, 161 (C.A.D.C.), 
certiorari denied, 315 U.S. 806. It follows that the presence of the Falls does not destroy the *Sa River's status as a navigable 
water of the United States. 20 
20 Even if the Act's definition of navigable waters does not fully correspond with established judicial criteria, Congress clearly has 
the power, and the legislative history plainly indicates that it intended to exercise it (H. Rep. No. 910, 66th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 7), 
to regulate waters in such an interrupting reach of a navigable stream. Otherwise, its admitted power to regulate lower navigable 
portions of the stream could be destroyed through the location of obstructions in the interrupting reach. 
*** 
Respectfully submitted, 
Philip B. Perlman, 
Solicitor General. 
Newell A. Clapp, 
Acting Assistant 
Attorney General. 
Paul A. Sweeney, 
Melvin Richter, 
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Attorneys. 
Bradford Ross, 
General Counsel. 
Willard W. Gatchell, 
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Bernard A. Foster, Jr., 
Special Counsel, 
Federal Power Commission 
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*9A BRIEF AND APPENDIX FOR RESPONDENT 
No.10200 
The Montana Power Company, petitioner 
V. 
Federal Power Commission, respondent 
ON PETITION TO REVIEW ORDERS OF THE FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION 
*** 
ARGUMENT 
*** 
The historic actual use of the .Missouri River in Interstate and Intrastate Commerce. - The Missouri River is formed by 
the confluence of the Jefferson, Madison and Gallatin Rivers at Three Forks in southwestern Montana. Generally, it flows 
northeastward to a point approximately 30 miles beyond Fort Benton and thence in an easterly and southeasterly direction to 
its junction with the Mississippi River about 17 miles above St. Louis, Missouri. Between its headwaters and its mouth the 
Missouri flows across or along seven States. In round figures its length is 2,475 miJes; its drainage basin 529,000 square miles; 
and its fall 3,630 feet. 
*lOa The Commission noted several facts with respect to the past actual use of the river from its mouth to Fort Benton 
(App. 64, 65). These facts seemingly have not been controverted by the Petitioner and the Commission's determination that 
the Missouri River from its mouth to Fort Benton is a navigable water of the United States is not questioned (Pet. Br. 15). 
Petitioner has made one contention, however, with respect to this stretch of the river which may be related to the Commission's 
over-all finding. That contention is that Congress by its authorization and construction of the Fort Peck Dam has abandoned 
"navigability" insofar as the exercise of its jurisdiction is concerned from the site of the dam upstream (Pet. Br. 18, 19; 96-102). 
This particular contention is discussed infra, p. 33. 
The facts in the record with respect to the St. Louis-Fort Benton section of the river establish so completely that this part of the 
river was used both in its natural and improved condition for the transportation of persons and property in interstate commerce 
that the Commission gave only brief mention of that evidence in its opinion (App. 64-65). The opinion notes that in this so-
called lower section steamboat traffic flourished from 1819 until 1888 and that this traffic between Fort Benton and points on 
the Missouri River downstream therefrom involved millions of dollars worth of freight and thousands of passengers. 
The record in this case is clear as to the reasons for the decline of the steamboat traffic in the lower section. The Commission 
obseJVed that in 1859, the very year the Missouri River steamboat reached its perfection, the railroad invasion began (App. 65). 
With each *Ila westward step of the rails steamboat traffic was sharply curtailed (App. 1014). SeJVice to Fort Benton ceased 
in 1888. During the period of heavy use of the lower section for navigation the river above Fort Benton was not used to any 
extent comparable to the use made of the lower section. The upstream terminal oflarge steamboats was Fort Benton (App. 64). 
The real controversy in this case is related to the section of the river between Fort Benton and Three Forks. This section of the 
river is about 263 miles long. All of the Petitioner's hydroelectric installations on the Missouri River are located in this stretch. 
Beginning about 3 2 miles above Fort Benton is a series of rapids and sheer falls descending about 520 feet in 17 miles known 
as the Great Falls of the Missouri. It has been recognized by all throughout the proceeding before the Commission that the 
Great Falls presented a natural barrier to steamboat traffic originating at points below. Fort Benton was sometimes labeled the 
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"head ofnavigation" (App. 1008, 1013, 1448) although the record shows that three steamboats from Fort Benton successfully 
navigated the river to and from points more than 30 miles upstream from Fort Benton (App. 215,216, 1450; 1141). Similarly, 
steamboats operating above the Great Falls were confined there, portages being made around the Falls only with smaller craft. 
For this upper part of the river, therefore, the "foot of navigation" was sometimes placed just above the Falls (App. 1207). 
Before 1900 there was considerable use of this 263-mile reach between Fort Benton and Three Forks, the Great Falls always 
requiring a portage around them. In this section a number of exploratory and Government survey trips were made in manually 
* 12a powered craft of various sizes. The 1805 trip under the famous explorers Lewis and Clark is perhaps the best known trip 
of exploration (App. 1357, 1549, 1577). These explorers with their party made a successful ascent with crude handpowered craft 
to Three Forks and beyond. There are only two rapids above the Falls section which have ever presented difficulty in continous 
[sic] navigation. These are known as Half-Breed Rapids (mile 2327) and Beartooth Rapids (mile 2365). The "Journals of Lewis 
and Clark" are quite detailed, particularly with respect to the difficulties encountered on this 1805 trip. The two rapids sections, 
however, received only casual mention. 
In 1872 Thomas P. Roberts, an engineer for the Northern Pacific Railroad, made a detailed and informative survey of the 263-
mile section of the stream (App. 1181 ). Roberts' purpose was to provide his employer with information so that plans might be 
laid by the railroad company for a combination boat and rail route through this area. Roberts considered his report so important 
that he sent it to the Chief of Engineers of the U. S. Anny for the information of that officer, who in tum regarded it as so 
significant that it was published under the auspices of the War Department. Roberts descended the river from Three Forks to 
Fort Benton in a skiff. He concluded that the Missouri in the section that he had examined could be relied upon for navigation 
without improvement and he set forth in his report a tentative plan for utilization of this upper portion of the river with a rail 
link for transshipping freight around the Falls (App. 1197, 1198). 
In the period from 1867 until around 1900 there was extensive intrastate use of the river between Stubbs Ferry (mile 2390), 
which is 85 miles below Three Forks, *13a and the City of Great Falls (mile 2260) for the downstream transportation of 
loose logs and large rafts of lumber. (App. 1142, 1210, 1256, 1264-5, 1283, 1297, 1308, 1311, 1313, 1355, 414 et seq., 385 
et seq., 398 et seq., 225 et seq., 236 et seq.). Also, several small steamboats were placed on the river above the Falls. These 
boats were operated in the period after the close of the navigation era below Fort Benton and continued until around 1900 (Ex. 
17-B, lodged). Most of the steamboat traffic in the upper section of the Missouri River took place within a 55-mile stretch 
known as the "Long Pool'' located just above the Great Falls. This traffic consisted of a local commercial carrying of freight 
and passengers. One steamboat operated for a relatively long period in a scenic section of the river known as the "Gates of the 
Mountains." This boat was used for the purpose of carrying excursion passengers on a sightseeing trip. The vessel could and 
did operate over a larger section, however (App. 392, 397, 1435, 1436, 1444). 
The uses of the river above Fort Benton for navigation were, for the most part, either intrastate or noncommercial in 
character. However, the record shows that the river between Stubbs Ferry and Fort Benton served as an artery for downstream 
transportation in interstate commerce of large numbers of miners following the 1864 discovery of gold where Helena is now 
located. 
Hubert Howe Bancroft's History of the Paci.fie States, published in 1890, records such use of this part of the river for the 
transportation of miners returning to the States (App. 1415, 1139, 1140). A stage line was established to carry passengers from 
Helena to a point on the Missouri River whence Kennedy & Company *14a operated a line of mackinaw boats carrying 
passengers to Fort Benton, portaging around the Falls (App. 1140, 1417). From its general study of the navigation of the area, 
the Commission, in the absence of a specific description of these boats, concluded that they were probably manually powered 
and probably were large sharp-ended bateaux. The Commission noted in its opinion that it was not possible to fix the beginning 
and ending of this particular use of the river. From its study of the general historical facts relating to the area, the Commission 
estimated that it started soon after the 1864 discovery of gold at Helena and that it diminished soon after 1868 when most of the 
gold had been extracted. It assumed that any transportation of this kind must have ceased around 1870 because history records 
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that the placers were exhausted at about that date. The evidence in the record established satisfactorily to the Commission, 
however, that the business was most lively in the years 1866 and 1867 (App. 1417). 
Petitioner has attacked this aspect of the Commission's findings of fact particularly and claims that this use of the river has 
not been established as a fact (Pet. Br. 74-8). The primary source of the information upon which the Commission relied is the 
historical writings of Hubert Howe Bancroft, generally acknowledged to be the foremost historian of the northwestern part 
of the United States as of the time his works were published. His books are considered today, by modem historians, to be an 
invaluable source of historical information {App. 204, 212). 
It has been the use of this information derived from the Bancroft volume which has disturbed the Petitioner most, and in its 
briefs both before the *15a Commission and this Court, Petitioner has made an attempt to relate this material entirely to what 
it considers an improper use by the Commission of newspaper accounts as evidence. It suggests that the only real evidence 
of actual use of the upper section of the river in conjunction with the lower section for purposes of interstate commerce is 
this data respecting the movement of gold miners. It is clear from the record that the Commission did not rely solely upon the 
newspaper remarks and advertisements in arriving at its findings of fact. The Bancroft volume of history was the primary source 
of the information used by the Commission, and this Bancroft material was corroborated by information from contemporary 
newspapers of the period. It is noted further that an expert witness who was acknowledged by Petitioner to be a specialist in 
historical research found the Bancroft data and the newspaper material to be acceptable for purposes of historical research and 
so testified {App. 212). Attention will be given to the legal aspect of the claims of the Petitioner with respect to the character of 
the evidence used by the Commission in this proceeding in a later section of this brief, infra, p. 30. However, it is submitted, that 
the evidence of the interstate movement of the gold miners as used by the Commission is not evidence based upon conjecture, 
speculation, or uncorroborated hearsay. Any historical evidence respecting the movement of persons and property nearly a 
century ago is necessarily "hearsay" from a technical standpoint. The use by an administrative fact-finding agency of probative 
hearsay has never been proscribed. 
The evidence of actual use of the upper section of the Missouri River, as summarized in its opinion {App. *16a 65-6-7), led 
the Commission to the conclusion that this stream is a navigable water of the United States and within the meaning of Sec. 
3 (8) of the Act. 
*** 
Comparison With Other Rivers Established as Navigable Waters. - Petitioner points out in its brief that the Commission in its 
opinion did not discuss the physical characteristics of the streams held navigable in any of the cases it cited or the evidence of 
use or suitability for use found in any of them; nor did the Commission make any comparison between facts in any of those 
cases and the facts in this case (Pet. Br. 55). The absence in the Commission's opinion of such comparisons does not mean, of 
course, that such comparisons were not made by the Commission in arriving at its decision. This Missouri River case is but one 
of many cases of its same type which have been heard and decided by the Commission. Thorough treatment of the comparable 
physical characteristics of the Missouri River and adjudicated streams was furnished to the Commission by its staff in the briefs 
filed. Comparisons between the Missouri River and the Fox River and the New River were presented to the Commission in this 
proceeding during an oral argument heard by it prior to its final determination. 
The Missouri River between Fort Benton and Three Forks compares favorably with the New River held navigable in United 
States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., supra, with the Fox River held navigable in The Montello, supra, with the DesPlaines 
River, held navigable in Economy Light and Power Company v. United States, supra, and with some parts of the Colorado River, 
held navigable in United States *17a v. Utah, supra. The space permitted in this brief will not allow a detailed presentation 
with respect to these other rivers, but a few of the salient facts relating to the physical characteristics of the rivers named, and 
the navigation which had taken place will be given. 
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(A) The New River 
The fall between Allisonia and Hinton was established by a sutvey to average about 4.5 feet per mile. Comparative slope profiles 
of portions of the New River, held navigable by the Supreme Court in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 
supra, and the portions of the Missouri River here in question have been included in this Brief as Appendix B. 
(B) The Fox River 
The portion of the Fox River involved in The Montello, supra, was 37 miles in length, the upper 18 miles of which in their 
natural condition had an average fall of approximately 8 feet per mile. Within this reach the maximum fall was 29.5 feet within 
a distance of only three-fourths ofa mile, while within another portion of2.5 miles there was a fall of 38 feet. (Annual Report 
of the ChiefofEngineers, 1876, p. 235; I, p.204.) Continuous navigation by boats of shallow depth was not possible because of 
the obstruction by shoals, rapids and falls which made portages necessary. For this reason the trial court held the entire lower 
Fox River nonnavigable; but the decision was reversed by the Supreme Court. Prior to its improvement by locks and dams such 
commerce as existed was by Durham boats propelled by animal power. These Durham boats, in size, draft and capacity, were 
not unlike the mackinaws used by the gold miners on the upper Missouri. A reproduction of the only available profile *18a 
of the Fox River in the portion in question has been included in this Brief as Appendix A. 
(C) The DesPlaines River 
The portion of the DesPlaines River in controversy in the Economy case, supra, was only 45 miles in length, 60 percent of 
which was pool water and 40 percent shoal water. The discharge was as much as 600 c. f. s. during an average of only 73.2 
days per year. This amazing deficiency in stream flow, as computed from gage [sic] readings made daily over a 20-year period, 
rendered it incapable of floating a boat through 40 percent of its length during an average of 175 days per year, while lengthy 
portages, either of the entire cargo or parts thereof, were required during an average of 248 days per year. With the exception 
of an average period of 4.3 days per year, the controlling depths over the rapids were never more than 15 inches, and such 
controlling depths were found only during an average period of 116.2 days per year. At all other times the controlling depths 
were 12 inches or less, and a number of portages were required, totalling [sic] in excess of 12 miles, and consisting either of 
part of the cargo, the entire cargo, or both cargo and boat. During a period of 175 days it was necessary to portage not only 
the entire cargo, but also the boat, over 40 percent of the entire distance from Riverside to the mouth of the river, a distance 
of approximately 18 miles (256 F. 792, 795-6). 
(D) The Colorado River 
The case of United States v. Utah, supra, came to the Supreme Court as the court of original jurisdiction, and a Special Master 
was appointed to hear the evidence and submit findings and conclusions. The Special Master found that the Colorado River 
from *19a mile 176 above Lees Ferry south to the Utah-Arizona boundary was navigable. His findings were sustained by 
the Supreme Court (283 U.S. 64, 80-1, 82-3). This case did not involve a determination of whether the Colorado River was a 
"navigable water of the United States," but the same tests ofnavigability were used, and the Special Master stated unequivocably 
[sic] that he had utilized the Federal rule. 
*** 
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INTEREST OF AMICI* 
Amici are organizations dedicated to the 
protection of natural resources and activities that 
depend on those resources. Amici represent 
members who comprise a substantial number of 
America's conservationists, paddlers, anglers, and 
hunters. All of amici have a strong and 
demonstrated interest in the ability of states, in their 
sovereign capacity, to protect water resources. 
The National Wildlife Federation ("NWF") is a 
national, non-profit corporation working to protect 
the ecosystems that are most critical to native 
wildlife in order to ensure a healthy wildlife legacy 
for future generations. Founded in 1936, NWF is 
headquartered in Virginia and has regional offices 
across the country. NWF has approximately four 
million members and supporters nationwide. N\:vF 
members fish, hunt, and observe wildlife, and use 
wetlands, streams, rivers, and lakes for recreation 
and aesthetic enjoyment. 
The Nature Conservancy ("TNC") is a non-profit 
corporation founded in 1951 whose mission is to 
preserve the plants, animals and natural 
communities that represent the diversity of life on 
Earth by protecting the lands and waters they need 
to survive. TNC is the largest private owner of 
conservation land in the United States - over 2.6 
million acres - much of which includes riparian 
lands. Through ownership of riparian lands or in 
• The parties have filed letters with the Clerk indicating 
blanket consent to the filing of amicus briefs. No counsel for 
any party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no person 
or entity other than above-named amici curiae and their 
counsel made a monetacy contribution intended to fund the 
preparation or submission of this brief. 
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partnership with others, TNC has protected over 
5,000 river miles. TNC's nearly 4,000 staff members 
work in 50 states and 39 countries. Because of its 
scientific expertise and wide-ranging strategic 
partnerships, TNC is considered the leading global 
freshwater conservation organization. 
The Delaware Nature Society; Environmental 
League of Massachusetts; Indiana Wildlife 
Federation; Louisiana Wildlife Federation; Montana 
Wildlife Federation; Natural Resources Council of 
Maine; North Carolina Wildlife Federation; North 
Dakota Wildlife Federation; Citizens for 
Pennsylvania's Future (PennFuture), South Carolina 
Wildlife Federation; South Dakota Wildlife 
Federation; Tennessee Wildlife Federation; Vermont 
Natural Resources Council; West Virginia Rivers 
Coalition and Wisconsin Wildlife Federation are 
state-based non-profit organizations affiliated with 
the National Wildlife Federation. All are dedicated to 
the conservation of fish and wildlife and their habitat 
including, in particular, the rivers and lakes upon 
which fish and wildlife depend. They are committed 
to a science-based, watershed approach to 
management of fish, wildlife, and water resources, 
and to preserving opportunities for recreation in and 
on the waters subject to the public trust. 
Montana Trout Unlimited ("MTU'') and Oregon 
Council Trout Unlimited ("OCTU'') are affiliates of 
Trout Unlimited, a national non-profit corporation 
founded over 50 years ago with more than 140,000 
volunteers organized into about 400 chapters from 
Maine to Alaska. OCTU has 2,836 members in five 
chapters, each formed around a watershed; MTU has 
thirteen river-based chapters, comprised of 
approximately 3,400 volunteer members. MTU's and 
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OCTU's members are avid anglers dedicated to the 
conservation, protection, and restoration of wild and 
native trout and salmon in their watersheds. 
The River Management Society ("RMS") is a 
national non-profit professional organization. The 
mission of the Society is to support professionals who 
study, protect, and manage North American rivers. 
Dedicated to holistic river management, its diverse 
membership includes federal, state, and local agency 
employees, educators, researchers, consultants, 
organizations and citizens. The objective of RMS is 
to advance the profession of river management by 
providing managers, researchers, educators and 
others a forum for sharing information about the 
appropriate use and management of river resources. 
RMS builds its organization with a broad base of 
expertise in all aspects of river management and 
stewardship including an ecosystem approach to 
recreation, water quality, riparian health, and 
watershed management. 
The Utah Stream Access Coalition ("the 
Coalition") is a Utah non-profit corporation with over 
1,000 members. The Coalition's mission includes 
restoring and preserving the public's right to use 
Utah's public waters for recreational and other 
lawful purposes, and securing recognition that the 
title to the beds of all navigable waters is in the state 
of Utah in trust for the people. The Coalition is 
currently involved in litigation in the Utah state 
courts seeking a determination that the Weber River, 
the site of commercial log drives in the late 1800s 
and early 1900s, meets the federal navigability for 
title test. 
Western Resource Advocates ('WRA") is a 
regional organization dedicated to protecting the 
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West's land, air and water. Founded in 1989, and 
headquartered in Boulder, Colorado, WRA works in 
eight states of the interior West (Arizona, Colorado, 
Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and 
Wyoming). Core program areas include creating a 
clean energy future and curtailing climate change, 
defending public lands and iconic landscapes from 
the impact of energy development, and protecting 
rivers and water supplies. WRA staff, members, and 
supporters rely on western rivers for working, 
fishing, recreating, researching, and aesthetic 
enjoyment. 
INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This CoU1·t granted certiorari to address the 
proper test for determining navigability for title, 
which governs whether a state holds title to waters 
and submerged lands under the Equal Footing 
doctrine. See Pet. i; 131 S. Ct. 3019 (2011). 
The case presents issues of great importance to 
amici and their members. As this Court's decisions 
emphasize, ownership of navigable waters and the 
lands beneath them has traditionally been regarded 
as a central aspect of state sovereignty because these 
resources serve vital public interests. Long before the 
founding of the United States, public trust principles 
have protected citizens' rights to engage in commerce 
and enjoy fisheries in navigable waters. The basic 
premise of the Equal Footing doctrine is that 
ownership of navigable waters and their submerged 
lands is an essential attribute of statehood; a state 
deprived of that ownership would not share fully in 
what it means in our constitutional system to be a 
state. 
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In many states, the public trust extends beyond 
commerce, navigation, and fisheries to a variety of 
other public values such as protecting natural 
ecosystems and providing opportunities for 
recreation. State governments' ability and 
responsibility to protect these values, and the 
public's ability to enjoy them, depend upon a stable 
and rational test for determining navigability for 
title. 
The rule advocated by petitioner PPL Montana, 
LLC ("PPL"), which affirmatively promotes highly 
fragmented ownership of rivers and other 
waterbodies, would interfere with consistent 
resource management and likely impair the public's 
interests in the management and protection of these 
valuable resources. Amici fully recognize that 
neither federal ownership nor private ownership of 
river resources is inherently incompatible with 
protecting river resources; but a rule of 
fragmentation like that urged here is certain to harm 
public interests and interfere with the practical 
needs of river management. 
As we explain below, the test urged by PPL -
which would eliminate state ownership of river 
segments that had to be portaged at statehood - is 
inconsistent with longstanding precedent and would 
destabilize title to rivers and their beds that has long 
been considered soundly vested in the states. 
Fragmenting ownership in this way would impair 
the states' ability to protect fisheries and river 
ecosystems and provide public access for recreation. 
Contrary to PPL's rendition, the Montana 
Supreme Court correctly applied this Court's 
decisions setting forth the test for navigability for 
title. It is instead PPL and its supporters that urge 
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the Court to abandon its traditional inquiry -
whether a waterbody serves as a highway for 
commerce - and embrace instead a new test that 
would be difficult to administer and would invite 
piecemeal challenges that would fragment state 
ownership of navigable waters. 
As we demonstrate below, the Montana Supreme 
Court's consideration of evidence of log drives was 
consistent with settled precedent, which recognizes 
that such activities were a central mode of commerce 
thi·oughout much of the country at the time many 
states were admitted to the Union, and can establish 
that a river served as a "channel of useful commerce" 
at statehood. 
The Montana court also properly considered post-
statehood recreational use as evidence of a river's 
susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce at 
statehood. Allowing such proof of "susceptibility" is 
particularly important to enforcing the 
Constitution's Equal Footing doctrine, given the 
sparse populations and undeveloped economies of 
many states upon their entry into the Union, as well 
as the evolution of commerce since that time. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE RULE THAT STATES OWN THE 
NAVIGABLE WATERS AND THE LANDS 
BENEATH THEM IS DEEPLY ROOTED AND 
SERVES VITAL SOVEREIGN AND PUBLIC 
INTERESTS 
A. State Ownership of Navigable Waters and 
the Lands beneath Them Is Central to State 
Sovereignty 
PPL discusses the Equal Footing doctrine as if it 
were a disfavored common-law technicality or a 
historical relic, to be applied grudgingly, without 
regard to the doctrine's purposes or history. But 
state ownership of navigable rivers and riverbeds is 
deeply ingrained in both state and federal law. This 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the doctrine 
serves state and public interests of the highest order, 
and the Court has rejected narrow and restrictive 
approaches similar to those advocated by PPL here. 
This Court has explained that 
lands underlying navigable waters have 
historically been considered "sovereign lands." 
State ownership of them has been "considered an 
essential attribute of sovereignty." Utah Div. of 
State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195 
(1987). The Court from an early date has 
acknowledged that the people of each of the 
Thirteen Colonies at the time of independence 
''became themselves sovereign; and in that 
character hold the absolute right to all their 
navigable waters and the soils under them for 
their own common use, subject only to the rights 
since surrendered by the Constitution to the 
general government." Martin u. Lessee of Waddell, 
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16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842). Then, in Lessee of Pollard 
v. Hagan, 3 How. 212 (1845), the Court concluded 
that States entering the Union after 1789 did so 
on an "equal footing" with the original States and 
so have similar ownership over these "sovereign 
lands." Id., at 228-229. 
Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 283 
(2001). Thus, states' title to navigable waters and 
the lands submerged beneath them "is 'conferred ... 
by the Constitution itself."' Oregon ex rel. State 
Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 
363, 374 (1977). See also Pollard, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 
at 230 ("To give to the United States the right to 
transfer to a citizen the title to the shores and the 
soils under the navigable waters, would be placing in 
their hands a weapon which might be wielded 
greatly to the injury of state sovereignty, and deprive 
the states of the power to exercise a numerous and 
important class of police powers."). 
The Equal Footing doctrine extends to waters 
that were navigable in fact at the time of a state's 
admission to the Union. See United States v. Utah, 
283 U.S. 64, 76 (1931). Rivers are "navigable in fact 
when they are used, or are susceptible of being used, 
in their ordinary condition, as highways for 
commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be 
conducted in the customary modes of trade and 
travel in water." The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 
557, 563 (1871). Navigability does not depend on the 
particular mode of use of a waterway, but instead on 
whether "the stream in its natural and ordinary 
condition affords a channel for useful commerce." 
Utah, 283 U.S. at 76 (quoting United States v. Holt 
State Bank, 270 U. S. 49, 56 (1926)). In Utah, for 
example, the Court accepted statehood-era evidence 
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of navigation on various stretches of the Green and 
Colorado Rivers by timber rafts, rowboats, flatboats, 
steamboats, motorboats, barges and scows, "some 
being used for exploration, some for pleasure, some 
to carry passengers and supplies, and others in 
connection with prospecting, surveying, and mining 
operations." Id. at 79, 82. 
B. Sovereign Title to Navigable Waters Derives 
from their Vital Public Benefits 
The Equal Footing doctrine flows from the 
recognition that navigable waters and their 
submerged lands implicate exceptionally important 
public interests, and that that states are trustees of 
these resources for the benefit of their citizens. As 
early as 1842, the Court held that the "public trust 
doctrine" - the "absolute right," vested in the people 
of the new republic, to "to all their navigable waters, 
and the soils under them" - defeated an oyster 
harvester's claim to own the land below the high 
water mark of Raritan Bay. Martin v. Lessee of 
Waddell, 16 Pet. 367, 410 (1842). This Court's 
elaboration of the Equal Footing doctrine in Shively 
v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894), followed from the 
longstanding public trust character of submerged 
lands. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 
U.S. 469, 4 73 (1988) (referring to Shively as the 
"seminal case in American public trust 
jurisprudence") (citation omitted). 
The states hold title to navigable waters and the 
lands under them in their sovereign capacity "in 
trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy 
the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over 
them, and have liberty of fishing therein, freed from 
the obstruction or interference of private parties." 
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Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Illinois, 146 
U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
While the public character of submerged lands 
dated back to English common law and earlier, 
American law "enhanced and extended" that 
principle - by, among other things, extending 
sovereign title to navigable streams and lakes not 
subject to the tides. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 
284. The interests of the sovereign and the public in 
navigable waters were especially acute here because 
of inland waterways' central place in the growth and 
commerce of the young nation and in the survival of 
its people. See Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 
(1876) ("[P]ublic authorities ought to have entire 
control of the great passageways of commerce and 
navigation, to be exercised for the public advantage 
and convenience."); The Propeller Genesee Chief v. 
Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851); Canal 
Comm 'n v. People ex rel. Tibbits, 5 Wend. 423, 460 
(N.Y.1830) ("Had the common law originated on this 
continent we should never have heard of the doctrine 
that fresh water rivers are not navigable above the 
flow of the tide").1 
States' public trust doctrines, and state statutes 
effectuating public trust principles, continue to 
safeguard the uses historically protected 
commerce, navigation and the fishery - as well as 
1 See also 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(l) (Submerged Lands Act 
provision declaring it to be "in the public interest that (1) title 
to and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within 
the boundaries of the respective States, and the natural 
resources within such lands and waters, and (2) the right and 
power to manage, administer, lease, develop, and use the said 
lands and natural resources" be confirmed and vested in the 
states). 
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rights of public access. Many state judicial decisions 
have held that the public trust embraces protection 
of other public values, such as water conservation, 
protection of aquatic ecosystems, and recreation. 2 
Because state ownership of navigable waters and 
their submerged lands carries with it a variety of 
protections for the public interest in water resources, 
the navigability for title question has significant 
implications for the public at large. 
A ruling for PPL here could have repercussions 
even beyond unsettling state titles, insofar as a 
number of states have adopted the navigability for 
title test to determine the right to recreational uses 
of rivers. State ownership of streambeds under the 
navigability for title test is often a critical element of 
state law regarding public recreational rights to 
rivers and streams. See 4 Water and Water Rights, 
§30.0l(a) ("The public right to use water in place 
frequently is founded upon state sovereign 
ownership of navigable waters and the land beneath 
them."); see also A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Water 
Rights and Resources, at 494 (2011); Robin K. Craig, 
A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust 
2 See 4 Waters and Water Rights§ 30.02(a) (Robert E. Beck, 
et al., eds .. 2010) (overview of the public trust doctrine); James 
R. Rasband, Equitable Compensation for Public Trust Takings, 
69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 331, 379 (1998) (describing trust protection 
for recreational and ecological values associated with navigable 
waters); Timothy M. Mulvaney, lnstream Fwws and the Public 
Trust, 22 Tul. Envtl L.J. 315, 377 (2009); see al.so In re Water 
Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409 (Haw. 2000); National 
Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983); 
United Plainsmen Ass 'n v. N.D. State Water Conservation 
Comm 'n, 247 N.W.2d. 457 (N.D. 1976). 
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Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, 
and State Summaries, 16 Penn. State Envtl. L.J. 1 
(2008); Robin K. Craig, A Comparative Guide to the 
Western States' Public Trust Doctrines: Public 
Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an 
Ecological Public Trust, 3 7 Ecology Law Q. 53 
(March 2010); Arlwnsas v. Mcllroy, 268 Ark. 227, 595 
S.W.2d 659 (1980).3 
Particularly in states where the federal 
navigability for title test directly governs public 
recreational rights, a federal standard that segments 
rivers into "navigable" and "non-navigable" according 
to what obstacles may have existed on a river is to 
place fishermen and boaters in the untenable 
position of having to decide when, in a given 
circumstance, a river is open to use and when it is 
not. See Northwest Steelheaders Ass'n v. Simantel, 
112 P .3d 383 (Ore. App. 2005) (rejecting criminal 
trespass claims against anglers who had fished on 
section of John Day River on which navigability and 
state ownership were disputed), review denied, 12 
P.3d 65 (Ore. 2005). The likely result will be 
3 In other states, including Montana, navigability for title 
does not determine the public's right to access rivers for fishing 
and boating; that right is governed by a more liberal standard. 
See Montana Coalitwn for Stream Access v. Curran, 683 P.2d 
163, 170 (Mont. 1984). It is, of course, well within a state's 
authority to determine its citizens' recreational access to the 
state's waterways. See id. ("Navigability for use is a matter 
governed by state law. It is a separate concept from the federal 
question of determining navigability for title purposes."). But 
even in such states, losing ownership of sections of rivers and 
their submerged lands would work a significant restriction in 
state authority and the loss of statutory protections and public 
trust obligations uniquely applicable to state-owned lands. 
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escalating conflict between members of the public 
and the purported "owners" of the river. 
II. PPL'S PROPOSED TEST IS INCONSISTENT 
WITH PRECEDENT 
PPL's central submission is that a proper 
understanding of the navigability for title test would 
have focused only on the natural obstructions on the 
:Missouri and Clark Fork Rivers and denied 
navigability because those segments themselves 
were not navigated by vessels - despite the 
acknowledged fact that pre-statehood travelers and 
traders portaged around these obstructions to 
continue their progress along the river. See PPL Br. 
15-16, 40, 41. The United States, as amicus, urges 
that the obstructed reaches (including the Great 
Falls themselves) and any other river obstacles that 
needed to be portaged, must be excised from the title 
that passes to the state under the Equal Footing 
doctrine. See U.S. Br. at 7 ("Although portaging may 
connect navigable segments into a continuous 
highway for commerce, portaging around a non-
navigable segment does not make that segment 
navigable for title purposes.") (emphasis in original). 
The path-marking decisions of this Court do not 
point PPL's way. Navigability for title is governed by 
the "navigability in fact" test articulated in The 
Daniel Ball, and consistently applied in Equal 
Footing doctrine cases. Under that test, 
[t]hose rivers must be regarded as public 
navigable rivers in law which are navigable in 
fact. And they are navigable in fact when they 
are used, or are susceptible of being used, in their 
ordinary condition, as highways for commerce, 
over which trade and travel are or may be 
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conducted in the customary modes of trade and 
travel on water. 
77 U.S. at 563 (emphasis added). The Daniel Ball 
test is uncongenial to PPL's segmentation argument 
here; for under the test articulated by the Court, 
what becomes "public" or state-owned is the river, 
not segments of the river. 
This Court's decisions have been marked by 
practical recognition of the widely varying conditions 
under which different states entered the Union and 
the inequity of diminishing a state's sovereign 
entitlement because it was sparsely populated or 
economically undeveloped at statehood.4 Thus, the 
Court has made clear that it suffices if a river was 
susceptible to serving as a channel of commerce, see 
Utah, 283 U.S. at 76, and has refused to impose rigid 
limits on the types of activity that can establish that 
a river served as a useful channel of commerce, see 
id.; St. Anthony Falls Water Power v. St. Paul Water 
4 Census figures suggest how extraordinarily sparsely 
populated the Western territories were on the eve of statehood. 
The 1890 Census, conducted the year Idaho and Wyoming 
joined the Union, and the year after Montana did, reported the 
following populations for these enormous states (each one of 
which covers an area far larger than all of New England): 
Idaho - 84,385; Montana - 132,159; Wyoming - 60,705. U.S. 
Census Office, Report on Population of the United States at the 
Eleventh Census, Part I, !xviii (1895). The population density 
for the three states was 1.0, 0.91, and 0.62 persons per square 
mile, respectively, see id. at xx.xv, a tiny fraction of the density 
of most of the original states a century earlier. The census for 
1850, conducted a year after California became a state, tallied 
92,597 (not counting Native Americans), yielding a population 
density of 0.49 persons per square mile. U.S. Census Office, 
Abstract of Census Legislation of the United States, 1790 to 
1850 Inclusive xxxiii (1853). 
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Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349, 359 (1897) (finding 
navigability based on evidence of floating "logs with 
shutes that are artificially prepared" even though it 
was argued that the stretch was not navigable ''by 
boat"); infra, pp. 28-32. 
This Court elaborated upon the navigability in 
fact test in The Montello, 87 U.S. 430, 439, 442-43 
(187 4), where it found Wisconsin's Fox River had 
been navigable in fact in its natural state even 
though the river in that condition was obstructed by 
several rapids and falls, necessitating portages. The 
Court rejected the lower court's decision against 
navigability, which was based "chiefly on the ground 
that there were, before the river was improved, 
obstructions to an unbroken navigation." Id. at 442. 
The Court acknowledged that these obstructions 
made navigation difficult, but noted that even with 
these difficulties, "commerce was successfully carried 
on." Id. As the Court explained: 
[T]he rule laid down by the district judge as a test 
of navigability cannot be adopted, for it would 
exclude many of the great rivers of the country 
which were so interrupted by rapids as to require 
artificial means to enable them to be navigated 
without break. Indeed, there are but few of our 
fresh-water rivers which did not originally 
present serious obstructions to an uninterrupted 
navigation. In some cases, like the Fox River, 
they may be so great while they last as to prevent 
the use of the best instrumentalities for carrying 
on commerce, but the vital and essential point is 
whether the natural navigation of the river is such 
that it affords a channel for useful commerce. If 
this be so the river is navigable in fact, although 
its navigation may be encompassed with 
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difficulties by reason of natural barriers, such as 
rapids and sand-bars. 
Id. at 443 (emphases added). 
The Montello disposes of PPL's segmentation 
argument, because it establishes that the need to 
portage around an obstacle does not defeat 
navigability. See Montana Br. 28-31. The United 
States (Br. 25) attempts to dismiss The Montello on 
the ground that it was not a title case, but the 
Montello Court explicitly held, based on The Daniel 
Ball test that the United States concedes (Br. 9) 
governs navigability for title purposes, that the Fox 
River "has always been navigable in fact." The 
Montello, 87 U.S. at 443 (emphasis added). And this 
Court and lower courts have repeatedly cited The 
Montello as stating the law for purposes of 
navigability for title. See Montana Br. 30-31. 
PPL bases its arguments for segmentation and 
excision primarily upon United States v. Utah, 283 
U.S. 64 (1931), which it says authorizes denying 
navigability when there is a non-trivial obstacle to 
vessel passage. But this reading of the case is itself 
improperly segmented; it takes out of context a few 
passages that, read in context, are entirely 
unsupportive of PPL's position. As Montana 
explains at length, the portion of the Colorado River 
found non-navigable in Utah - the impassable 
reach within Cataract Canyon - undisputedly 
represented a "dead end" (Montana Br. 31) to trade 
navigation - no one passing upriver or downriver 
could or did portage the canyon to engage in 
continued commerce on the river. See 283 U.S. at 77. 
Thus, under the settled Daniel Ball/Montello test 
(which the Court applied to all of the disputed 
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reaches in the case), the river ceased to be a useful 
channel or highway for commerce at that point. 5 
In contrast to the dead-end obstacle in Utah, 
there was no dead end at either the Missouri River's 
Great Falls or the Clark Fork's Thompson Falls; to 
the contrary, both were regularly portaged, and both 
rivers served as highways for commerce both above 
and below the respective falls. See Montana Br. 34-
35. Neither Utah, nor any other authority, provides 
for a denial of navigability in such circumstances. 6 
PPL's and the United States' theory that river 
reaches that required a portage must be excised from 
state sovereign title would mean that states' 
ownership of navigable rivers is shot through with 
interruptions. Each falls, rapid, riffle, or obstacle 
significant enough to have required a portage would 
be separated out from state ownership of all of the 
5 The Utah op1ruon bears little resemblance to PPL's 
rendition of it as establishing a grudging and demanding 
standard: The Court applied The Montello; it sustained 
navigability over numerous exceptions by the United States, 
including that sand bars precluded a finding of navigability; 
and it emphasized that susceptibility for use in commerce is 
sufficient, specifically, various vessels plied the segments for 
exploration; pleasure; the transport of passengers and supplies; 
and prospecting, surveying, and mining operations. 283 U.S. at 
67, 82, 87. 
6 As Montana explains (Br. 35), Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 
U.S. 574 (1922), does not support PPL's proposed rule. Nor 
does Brewer-Elliott Oil & Gas Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 77 
(1922) (cited at PPL Br. 35; US Br. 14, 18), authorize 
considering a river segment in isolation; the Court there found 
that the navigational head of the Arkansas River was 
downstream of the reservation lands in question, 260 U.S. at 
86. Thus, the upstream, non-navigable portion was not part of 
a highway for commerce under the Daniel Ball test. 
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portions of the river that statehood-era boats did 
pass through. Given that most navigable rivers were 
marked by "serious obstacles to uninterrupted 
navigation," The Montello, 87 U.S. at 443, this rule 
would make a patchwork pattern of state and non-
state ownership of rivers extremely common. 
But, as Montana points out, the extreme 
segmentation of ownership that PPL's rule would 
produce - thousands of federal or private inholdings 
along the beds of navigable rivers - does not in fact 
prevail. See Montana Br. 39 & n. 14; Canal Comm 'n, 
5 Wend. 423, at 464 (holding that private claimant 
failed to show title to a waterfall in the Mohawk 
River). 
To be sure, as Utah illustrates, a natural obstacle 
may destroy the practical utility of a river for 
commerce - rendering the river non-navigable 
upstream or downstream of the obstacle. But the 
navigability inquiry requires consideration of the 
relationship of that interruption to commerce along 
the river; when commerce passed around the 
obstacle by portage or otherwise, and continued 
along the river above or below the obstacle, the river 
is navigable, and there is no excision of the 
obstructed segment from the State's ownership. A 
"segment" of river is only non-navigable if it is not 
part of a useful channel for commerce. See The 
Montello, 87 U.S. at 442-43. 
Contrary to PPL's contentions, the Montana 
Supreme Court carefully examined, and adhered to, 
the precedents of this Court. See 53a-62a. It did not, 
as PPL charges, adopt a casual "whole river" test 
that would find navigability whenever any part of 
the river supported commerce. And aspersions on 
the state court's motives are as unwarranted here as 
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such aspersions would be against a federal court 
adjudicating a claim of ownership by the United 
States.7 
III. PPL'S FRAGMENTED ANALYSIS OF 
NAVIGABILITY FOR TITLE WOULD 
INTERFERE WITH THE PUBLIC TRUST 
AND IMPAIR STATES' ABILITY TO 
MANAGE NATURAL RESOURCES 
In addition to being inconsistent with this Court's 
precedents, PPL's proposed approach would be 
highly problematic for the public interests the Equal 
Footing doctrine is intended to safeguard. PPL 
tellingly makes no serious attempt to explain its 
favored segmentation approach in terms of the 
purposes and policies of the Equal Footing doctrine. 
The Equal Footing doctrine is built upon a 
recognition that navigable waters serve vital public 
interests, particularly commerce, navigation, and 
fisheries, that state governments exist to protect. 
While rivers may lack the unrivalled economic 
importance they had in 18th- and much of 19th-
century America, rivers' economic importance 
remains great - and includes not only transportation 
of persons and goods from point to point, but also 
enormously valuable uses such as sport fishing, 
whitewater rafting, canoeing and a host of other 
7 Skepticism about state courts' ability to resolve 
submerged lands claims is hard to square with Coeur d:4lene 
Tribe, which required a federally recognized Indian Tribe to go 
to Idaho state court to resolve its federal law-based claims of 
ownership to a lakebed. 521 U.S. at 288. 
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recreational activities. 8 Moreover, scientific study 
has only broadened our understanding of the critical 
roles rivers play in sustaining entire ecosystems - a 
function that has prompted a further set of state 
laws and programs to protect these public resources.9 
A rule that chopped up sovereign title to rivers 
wherever waterfalls, rapids, sand bars, vegetation, or 
myriad other natural obstacles required Statehood-
era travelers to portage would directly undermine 
those interests. It would invite third-party "owners" 
(and claimants) to engage in activities in rivers 
without regard to the public interest in these 
resources and fragment the trust responsibility over 
the river. 
It would be hard to design a rule more inimical to 
effective river resource management than one that 
extracted from state ownership every place along a 
river that 19th-century navigators had to portage. It 
is now widely understood that fragmented 
management authority can seriously frustrate efforts 
to protect fisheries, aquatic ecosystems, water 
8 In 2006, anglers in the United States spent $26.3 billion 
on freshwater fishing trips and equipment. See U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service & U.S. Census Bureau, National Survey of 
Fishing, Hunting and Wildlife-Associated Recreation 10 (2006). 
9 See, e.g., Lawrence L. Master, et al., eds., Rivers of Life: 
Critical Watersheds for Protecting Freshwater Biodiversity 14-
15 (TNC 1998) (''Freshwater habitats provide for many of our 
fundamental needs: water for drinking and irrigation, food in 
the form of fishes and waterfowl; and in-stream services such as 
flood control, transportation, recreation and water quality 
protection. Health river systems retain water and buffer the 
effects of storms, reducing the loss of life and property to 
floods. Naturally vegetated streamside riparian zones help trap 
sediments and break down nonpoint source pollutants."). 
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quality, and other natural resources and amenities. 10 
A large body of scientific literature supports the 
proposition that, to the extent possible, ecosystems 
should be managed in a holistic, landscape-scale 
manner, and administrative fragmentation should be 
avoided.11 The extreme fragmentation resulting 
from the approach PPL and its amici propose would 
impede effective natural resource management. 
Excising from state ownership river reaches that 
at statehood contained waterfalls, rapids, sandbars 
and other obstacles is all the more problematic 
because such features often have exceptional 
importance in terms of public trust values. For 
example, reaches punctuated by navigational 
10 See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to 
Watershed Protection, 25 Envtl. L. 973, 981-1003 (1995) 
(discussing imperatives for watershed-based approaches to 
river management); J. A Stanford, et al., Ecological 
Connectivity in Alluvial River Ecosystems and its Disruption by 
Flow Regulation, 11 Regulated Rivers: Research & Mgt. 105, 
116 (1995) ("Resource managers must become 'conservators of 
ecological connectivity"'); N. Leroy Poff, et al., The Natural F7ow 
Regime: A Paradigm for River Conservation and Restoration, 
47 Bioscience 769, 769-70 (1997) (explaining that water 
resources management has suffered from "fragmented 
responsibility," making it "difficult, if not impossible, to manage 
the entire river ecosystem"). 
11 Karen A Poiani, et al., Biodiversity Conservation at 
Multipl,e Scaks: Functional Sites, Landscapes, and Networks, 
50 Bioscience 133, 134 (2000) ("a growing appreciation of the 
enormous complexity and dynamic nature of ecological systems 
led to the concept of ecosystem management, wherein success is 
best assured by conserving and managing the ecosystem as a 
whole"); Norman L. Christensen, et al., The Report of the 
Ecological Society of America on the Scientific Basis for 
Ecosystem Management, 6 Ecological Applications 665, 669 
(1996); John Copeland Nagle, et al., The Law of Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Management (2d ed. 2006). 
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obstructions such as boulders, sandbars or logjams 
that may have made boat passage hazardous or 
impossible often create the pools, riffles and other 
geomorphic areas that are vital habitats for fish and 
other species. See J .D. Allan, Landscapes and 
Riverscapes: The Infl,uence of Land Use On Stream 
Ecosystems, 35 Ann. Rev. Ecol. Evol. Syst. 257, 260 
(2004); Kurt D. Fausch, et al., Landscapes to 
Riverscapes; Bridging the Gap Between Research and 
Conservation of Stream Fishes, 52 Bioscience 483, 
483 (2002).12 These features are critical to the 
maintenance of river ecosystems, and they are 
especially important to the health of aquatic 
species.13 Moreover, reaches that might have 
required portage at statehood may be especially 
important for recreation and scenic enjoyment. See 
Montana Br. 39 (citing example of Niagara Falls); 
12 See also Timothy J. Beechie, et al., Process Based 
Principles for &storing River Ecosystems, 60 Bioscience 209, 
209-211 (2010) (noting that fish are highly adapted to natural, 
dynamic processes such as erosion, channel migration, and 
recruitment of woody debris); Burchard H. Heede, et al., 
Hydrodynamic and Pluvial Geomorphological Processes: 
Implications for Fisheries Management and Research, IO N. 
Am. J. Fisheries Mgmt. 249 (1990). 
13 An example is the bull trout, which occurs in the Clark 
Fork and is listed as a threatened species by the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service. Bull trout need deep runs with unembedded 
boulder and cobble substrates, and pools with large woody 
debris. Scientists advocate maintaining natural connections 
and a diversity of complex habitats over a large spatial scale to 
maintain dispersal of bull trout populations. C.C. Muhlfeld, et 
al., Seasonal Movement and Habitat Use by Subadult Bull 
Trout in the Upper Flathead River System, Montana, 25 N. Am. 
J. of Fisheries Mgmt. 797, 797 (2005). These management 
approaches may be taken to scale to benefit not just the bull 
trout but an entire ecosystem. 
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Mont. Code Ann. § 1-1-501 (depiction of Great Falls 
on Montana's state seal). Thus, quite apart from its 
dissonance with this Court's precedents, PPL's rule 
is a particularly undesirable one from the 
perspective of states' sovereign ability to pursue a 
rational natural resources policy. Cf. Pollard, 44 U.S. 
(3 How.) at 230 (emphasizing importance of 
ownership of navigable rivers to "numerous and 
important" state powers). 
A rule that fragmented ownership and 
management authority over navigable rivers among 
states, the federal government, and private parties 
would be likely to create jurisdictional and policy 
conflicts. Fish and wildlife, of course, move freely 
across property lines and jurisdictional boundaries, 
but a patchwork of management regimes is likely to 
disserve even shared management goals. 
Furthermore, managing fragmented lands is 
expensive and inefficient - a point that federal 
agencies frequently make when they pursue policies 
designed to minimize fragmentation. 14 
Finally, there is real irony in PPL's efforts to 
invoke interests in stability of title and settled 
expectations. See, e.g., PPL Br. 4 7, 57; Br. of 
Creekside Coalition, et al. 11-12, 24-27. For it is PPL 
14 See Melanie Tang, SNPLMA, FLTFA, and the Future of 
Public Land Exchanges, 9 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L & 
Pol'y 55, 59 (2002) ("Increasingly since 1981, both the [Bureau 
of Land Management (BL.M)] and the [U.S. Forest Service] have 
'used exchanges to dispose of fragmented parcels of land to 
consolidate land ownership patterns to promote more efficient 
management of land and resources."') (citation omitted); ELM:, 
Land Exchange Handbook H-2200-01 at 1-1 (characterizing 
land exchanges as an "important tool to consolidate ownership 
for more effective management") (Aug. 31, 2005); id. at 11-1 to 
11-2 (discussing assembled land exchanges). 
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that seeks an abrupt change in the law of 
navigability. A rule inviting challenges to state title 
whenever intermittent obstacles required Statehood-
era travelers and traders to portage would impose 
massive burdens on states to defend titles long 
thought to be settled. As noted above, such a rule 
would invite conflicts between public users of 
navigable rivers and riparian owners who believe 
that a waterfall, rapid, or riffle along the shore ousts 
public ownership of portions of the river passing 
their land. 
Such a new rule would present serious problems 
of proof - especially daunting if, as PPL insists, it 
would be the State's burden to show that a particular 
reach was not portaged in statehood days. See PPL 
Br. 54; but cf. U.S. Br. 20 n. 11. Whether trappers or 
traders portaged around a particular rocky reach of 
river more than a century ago is likely to be 
extremely difficult and costly to determine. Evidence 
whether travelers ran or portaged a particular river 
segment is likely to become even sparser over time. 
Because of these difficulties, and the sheer 
volume of property at issue, PPL's proposed test 
would impose massive burdens on state 
governments, and would divert state resources 
toward defending title to isolated pieces of their 
sovereign lands. 
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IV. PPL'S OTHER ATTACKS ON THE 
MONTANA SUPREME COURT'S LEGAL 
ANALYSIS ARE UNFOUNDED 
Although most of its attention is devoted to 
advocating the segmentation theory, PPL also 
challenges certain other features of the Montana 
Supreme Court's decision, including its reliance on 
evidence concerning log drives and evidence of post-
statehood recreational use to demonstrate 
navigability for title. But these arguments are 
similarly mistaken. 
A. The Montana Supreme Court Properly 
Relied upon Evidence of Log Drives as 
Evidence of Navigability 
The Montana Supreme Court was well within the 
mainstream of settled legal opinion when it relied on 
evidence of log drives, an especially important 
commercial use of rivers in nineteenth century 
America, in considering the navigability of the 
Madison and Clark Fork Rivers. 
From the mid-1800s to the early 1900s, many 
rivers across the northern half of the Nation served 
as vital highways of commerce for the logging 
industry. See Robert E. Pike, Tall Trees, Tough Men 
(2000) (New England); Earl E. Brown, Commerce on 
Early American Waterways (2010) (]Mid-Atlantic); 
Malcolm Rosholt, The · Wisconsin Logging Book, 
Palmer Publications (1980) (Midwest); William H. 
Wroten, The Railroad Tie Industry in the Central 
Rocky Mountain Region: 1867-1900 (Ph. D. thesis, 
U. Colo. 1956) (Rocky Mountains); Heritage Research 
Center, Montana Navigable Water Study (submitted 
to Montana Department of State Lands December 
1986); Montana Br. 12-13. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
Log drives arrived in the Rocky Mountains in the 
1860s with the construction of the transcontinental 
railroad, which needed 2,400 wooden "ties" for every 
mile of track. Wroten, supra. Log drives were also 
vital to the mining industry in the West, supplying 
prop timbers for mine shafts and tunnels, and 
cordwood to make charcoal for ore smelters. See 
Charles S. Peterson, et al., A History of the 
Wasatch-Cache National Forest (report submitted to 
the U.S. Dept of Agriculture 1980); Gregory C. 
Crampton, et al., The Navigational History of Bear 
River- Wyoming, Idaho, Utah (U. of Utah 1975). 
This country abolished the European practice of 
allowing riparian landowners and local authorities to 
extract tolls and duties from loggers driving the 
river. Brown, supra. Beginning as early as 1771, 
laws declared many eastern American rivers to be 
"public highways." Id. This principle extended into 
the Midwest by virtue of the Northwest Ordinance 
which declared that "[t]he navigable waters leading 
into the Mississippi and the Saint Lawrence, and the 
carrying places between, shall be common highways, 
and forever free, ... without any tax, impost, or duty 
therefor." Northwest Ordinance, Art IV (adopted 
1787), 1 Stat. 52 (1789). In the 1800s, Western 
territories adopted laws recognizing rivers as public 
highways, often for the specific purpose of protecting 
public log driving rights. For example, in 1872 the 
Colorado Territory adopted a law stating that "it 
shall be lawful for any person ... to float and all 
kinds of timber ... down any of the streams of this 
Territory .... " Colo. Gen. L. § 1856 (1872). See also 
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public 
Trust: Some of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVrL. L. 
425, 431-38 (1989). Early case law in the West also 
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recognized this public right. See Idaho Northern R. 
Co. v. Post Falls Lumber & Mfg., 119 P. 1098, 1101 
(Idaho 1911) ("Any stream in which logs will go by 
the force of water is navigable.") (quoting and 
endorsing standard from Oregon decisions). 
When Montana and the other Rocky Mountain 
states entered the Union in the late 1800s, log 
driving was not just a common commercial use of the 
waterways; it was vital to the Nation's development. 
Not surprisingly, modern state and federal court 
decisions in the West have relied on a history of log 
drives to find that rivers meet the federal 
navigability for title test. See Oregon Div. State 
Lands v. Riverfront Protection Ass'n, 672 F.2d 792 
(9th Cir. 1982) (M:cKenzie River in Oregon); State v. 
Bunkowski, 503 P.2d 1231 (Nev. 1972) (Carson River 
in Nevada); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, 
682 P .2d 163 (Dearborn River in Montana, 
ultimately decided on state law grounds); see also 33 
CFR § 329.6 (regulatory definition of navigability 
includes commercial log drives). The leading modern 
treatise discussion of navigability for title concludes 
that "[t]he use of water to drive logs to market 
qualifies." 4 Waters and Water Rights, § 
30.0 l(d)(3)(C). 
B. Evidence of Post-Statehood Recreational 
Uses Can Support Navigability in Fact at 
Statehood. 
Since title to the lands beneath navigable waters 
passes to a State upon its admittance to the Union, 
the navigability of a State's rivers must be 
determined as of that date. Utah, 283 U.S. at 75. 
PPL has challenged the Montana Supreme Court's 
use of post-statehood evidence, claiming that such 
evidence 1s only permissible under narrow 
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circumstances, namely, when "conditions of 
exploration and settlement explain the infrequency 
or limited nature of [actual] use." Br. at 45 (quoting 
Utah, 283 U.S. at 82). PPL's assertion, however, 
ignores key language in the opinion. Nor has any 
subsequent court read the language PPL quoted to 
limit post-statehood evidence in the way PPL 
advocates. 
In Utah, the Court confirmed that rivers are 
navigable in fact "when they are used, or are 
susceptible of being used, in their ordinary condition, 
as highways for commerce, over which trade and 
travel are or may be conducted in the customary 
modes of trade and travel on water." 283 U.S. at 76 
(quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563 and citing 
Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. at 56) (emphasis added); 
accord The Montello, 87 U.S. at 441 ("[T]he true test 
of the navigability of a stream does not depend on 
the mode by which commerce is, or may be, 
conducted") (emphasis added). Neither in The 
Daniel Ball nor in Holt State Bank did the Court 
limit the "susceptible of being used" phrase in the 
manner PPL claims. 
Utah did not hold that "[e]vidence of 
'susceptibility to use' . . . is rarely relevant to 
whether a river was navigable at statehood," PPL Br. 
at 43, or that such evidence is "irrelevant□ outside 
the context of remote and undeveloped rivers." Id. 
Rather, the Court held that "[t]he extent of existing 
commerce is not the test." 283 U.S. at 82. In the 
section of the opinion PPL relies upon, the Court did 
not prescribe a general limitation on the 
consideration of a river's susceptibility to use, but 
confirmed the appropriateness of considering 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
susceptibility in the circumstances of the case at 
hand: 
In view of past conditions, the government 
urges that the consideration of future commerce 
is too speculative to be entertained. Rather is it 
true that, as the title of a state depends upon the 
issue, the possibilities of growth and future 
profitable use are not to be ignored. . . . The 
question remains one of fact as to the capacity of 
the rivers in their ordinary condition to meet the 
needs of commerce as these may arise in 
connection with the growth of the population, the 
multiplication of activities, and the development 
of natural resources. And this capacity may be 
shown by physical characteristics and 
experimentation as well as by the uses to which 
the streams have been put. 
283 U.S. at 83 (emphasis added). Utah makes clear 
that the navigability inquiry is not confined to the 
specific kinds of activities or vessels that were 
present at statehood. See also Alaska v. United 
States, 662 F. Supp. 455, 463 (D. Alaska 1987), aff'd 
sub nom. Alaska v. Ahtna, Inc., 891 F.2d 1401 (9th 
Cir. 1989). Courts determining navigability for title 
after Utah have not construed the phrase 
"susceptible of use" narrowly. See, e.g., Ahtna, 891 
F.2d at 1405. 
The only limitations on consideration of post-
statehood evidence are that the physical 
characteristics of the body of water must be similar 
to those present at statehood, and the vessels 
employed in post-statehood uses must be comparable 
to vessels available at the time of statehood. When 
physical characteristics have changed since 
statehood to make river more amenable to 
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navigation, i.e., to enable post-statehood uses that 
would not have been possible at statehood, evidence 
of those post-statehood uses ordinarily will not 
support a finding of title navigability. N.D. ex rel. 
Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands v. United States, 972 
F.2d 235, 240 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding river non-
navigable because of changed physical 
characteristics of river, in spite of evidence of modern 
use of canoes comparable to boats in use at 
statehood); see also Ahtna, 891 F.2d at 1405 (finding 
river navigable based on modern uses where parties 
had stipulated that physical conditions of the river 
had not changed since statehood). Courts have also 
considered the characteristics of the post-statehood 
watercraft, specifically, their draft (hull depth in 
water) and their weight-bearing capacity. Id. 
(finding weight-bearing capacity of contemporary 
boats comparable to those used at time of statehood). 
PPL also maintains that recreational use may not 
be considered as evidence supporting a finding of 
navigability. Br. at 49. There is no merit to that 
proposition, however, and courts have frequently 
accepted evidence of recreational use of a body of 
water in determining navigability for title purposes. 
See U.S. Br. at 31 & n.16 (acknowledging this point). 
Contrary to PPL's claim that the Court in Utah v. 
United States "went out of its way to avoid placing 
any weight on recreational use," Br. at 51, the Court 
in that 1971 decision expressly cited an "excursion 
boat" in its survey of the evidence supporting a 
finding of navigability, 403 U.S. at 12; accord Utah, 
283 U.S. at 82 (characterizing evidence of post-
statehood activity of boats, including "some [used] for 
pleasure," as "properly received" by the special 
master and as "relevant upon the issue of the 
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susceptibility of the rivers to use as highways of 
commerce" at the time of statehood); Ahtna, 891 F.2d 
at 1405 (finding that guided fishing and sightseeing 
trips qualify as commercial activity for purposes of 
establishing navigability for title); North Dakota ex 
rel. Bd. of Univ. and Sch. Lands v. Andrus, 671 F.2d 
271, 278 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding evidence of uses 
including modern recreational canoe use to support 
title navigability because such use was a "viable 
means of transporting people and goods" at the time 
of statehood), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Block 
v. N.D., 461 U.S. 273 (1983); Northwest Steelheaders 
Ass'n, 112 P.3d at 391-92 (finding navigability for 
title based in part by recreational use); Defenders of 
Wildlife v. Hull, 18 P .3d 722, 734-35 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2001). 
Where courts have found waters non-navigable in 
spite of evidence of recreational uses, the reason has 
not been that the uses were recreational, but that 
they were "demonstrably ineffective," United States 
v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 23 (1935), or that they 
occurred in river conditions that differed 
significantly from those present at the time of 
statehood. North Dakota, 972 F.2d at 240 (finding 
river non-navigable because river's physical 
characteristics changed, in spite of evidence of 
modern use of canoes comparable to boats in use at 
statehood). 
In United States v. Oregon, the Court determined 
the navigability in fact of three small lakes and the 
two waters that connected them, finding that all but 
one "disappear completely or become negligible 
during a dry season." 295 U.S. at 16. The fifth 
measured less than two feet in depth over half its 
area and in the summer was largely "made up of 
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small lakes or ponds, separated by mud or dry land." 
Id. at 17. Most of the areas covered by water were 
also covered with thick vegetation. Id. Based on 
these conditions, the Court found "impracticable" the 
two activities offered as evidence of navigability, 
trapping and boating. Id. at 20-22. Trappers had to 
operate largely by wading, and boaters had to get out 
and pull their craft frequently, encountering 
"impenetrable" vegetation and a "labyrinth of 
channels" that they had to mark with flags to return 
safely. Id. Thus, the Court did not reject evidence of 
uses because of their "recreational" character, as 
PPL maintains, Br. at 50, but because the physical 
characteristics of the waters could not support those 
uses. Of course, in the territories, activities such as 
fishing, hunting, rafting, and canoeing, which are 
primarily recreational today, were often essential for 
subsistence and basic commerce. 
Likewise, the remaining cases PPL cites do not 
support the claim that "courts have routinely found 
evidence of recreational use insufficient to establish 
title navigability." Id. In the first of the two early-
twentieth century appellate decisions PPL invokes, 
the court found Big Lake non-navigable despite the 
use of "canoes, skiffs, and dugouts." Harrison v. Fite, 
148 F. 781, 786 (8th Cir. 1906). The cOln·t made this 
finding, however, not because these uses were 
recreational, but because of the physical 
characteristics of the lake and the river: the lake was 
"largely a tangled jungle, choked with willows, 
aquatic growth, and dead trees and stumps," and 
during most of the year the lake bed was visible and 
used as pasture. Id. The water body at issue in 
North American Dredging Co. of Nevada v. Mintzer, 
245 F.297, 299 (9th Cir. 1917), was a channel cutting 
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through a tidal salt marsh; the court emphasized 
that the bottom of the channel was "practically 
exposed" at low tide, rendering navigation of any sort 
possible only during times of high water. Neither 
decision, then, rested on the "recreational" character 
of the uses. 
Further, Harrison and American Dredging pre-
date the Court's key decisions on navigability for 
title, United States v. Utah and Utah v. United 
States, as well as more recent decisions within the 
same circuits that expressly upheld the relevance of 
recreational use to title navigability determinations. 
North Dakota, 671 F.2d at 278; Ahtna, 891 F.2d at 
1405. Harrison and American Dredging, then, and 
not Ahtna, 891 F.2d at 1405, are best understood as 
"outliers," Br. for Petitioner at 52, and do not support 
the contention that recreational uses may not 
provide evidence of navigability for title.15 
In sum, evidence of recreational use is sanctioned, 
not forbidden, by previous court decisions. Where 
courts have found waters non-navigable, it was not 
because the uses were recreational, but because the 
physical characteristics of those waters rendered any 
navigation impracticable. Recreational uses may 
support a finding of navigability for title, and post-
15 In addition to Harrison and American Dredging, PPL 
cites to two state court cases. In both cases, the courts focused 
on the inland lakes' lack of any connection with any other body 
of water. Taylor Fishing Club v. Hammett, 88 S.W. 2d 127, 
129-30 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); State v. Aucoin, 20 So. 2d 136, 160 
(La. 1944). Furthermore, in Aucoin the physical characteristics 
of the lake made navigation impracticable. 20 So. 2d at 160 
(finding that boats often became bogged down and had to be 
dragged through the mud of lake "surrounded by cypress 
swamps and impassable prairie"). 
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statehood recreational uses such as sport fishing, 
whitewater rafting, and canoeing are properly 
considered as evidence of a waterway's navigability. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgment of the Montana Supreme Court 
should be affirmed. 
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